Essays analysing historical cases of economic intervention by national governments by Martina, Alan
ESSAYS ANALYSING HISTORICAL CASES OF
ECONOMIC INTERVENTION BY NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
Thesis submitted, for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National 
University, by Alan Martina in May, 1976.
AUTHOR’S STATEMENT
I declare that the work described in this thesis is my own, 
except where the work of others is specifically acknowledged.
SYNOPSIS OF THESIS
The three essays which make up this thesis deal with 
particular historical cases where the market in various national, 
or international, markets may have failed to function Pareto-optimally. 
While indicating in each of the essays where the relevant market(s) 
may have failed, the essential objective of these essays is to critically 
assess the government economic interventionist policies which these 
market failures called forth.
The first essay attempts to establish whether, or not, the 
Japanese government of the Meiji period was constrained from attaining 
Pareto-optimal levels of economic intervention by virtue of the fact 
that it was prevented by international trade treaties from imposing 
tariffs on imports. While it is shown that in a world without any 
subsidiary constraints the Japanese government probably still could 
have achieved Pareto-optimum levels of intervention, once other apparently 
realistic institutional constraints are imposed on the analysis this 
result becomes less certain.
The second essay is mainly concerned with determining whether 
or not the government assistance given to the United States cotton textile 
industry of the ante-bellum period was optimally applied. This government 
intervention is mainly assessed from the point of view of the infant 
industry argument, although part of the discussion departs from this 
perspective for considering the issue at hand. The conclusions reached 
vary somewhat from those attained by others who have considered this topic.
In the final essay the issue discussed is the problems the 
British government had between 1754 and 1775 in implementing its public 
finance policy in the thirteen British North American colonies; a policy 
aimed at providing, and paying for, collectively consumed goods. The 
central theme considered is what were the political-economic factors which 
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In a recent essay addressed to economic historians D.C. North
complained that practioners of the subject of economic history were too
inclined to work within the intellectual framework of assumed perfect
markets, which meant that all the marginal conditions of the neoclassical
comparative-static economic model were met; what was required was a
departure from this intellectual framework, where appropriate, in order
to place studies of economic history more in accord with what is often
economic r e a l i t y . W h i l e  the essays which follow were not written as
an explicit positive response to this complaint by North about how his
professional colleagues went about practicing the discipline of economic
(2)history, these essays are very much concerned with historical 
examples where the assumptions needed for perfect markets to operate may 
well not have been met; in each of the pieces of economic history 
analysed below, and as will be pointed out in varying degrees of detail, 
in each essay, there is some grounds, if not always substantial grounds, 
for believing that the market did not operate perfectly on the occasions
(3)discussed. Given the presence of failures in the laissez faire
(1) D.C. North, "Beyond the New Economic History", Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 24 (1974), pp. 1-7.
(2) In fact work on these essays had begun some time before North's 
essays appeared in print.
(3) Since there will be these discussions, in each essay, to indicate 
where the market may have failed there is no need here to go into 
the general theoretical reasons why markets may fail to provide 
optimum quantities of certain types of goods, or allow potential 
production possibilities to be attained.
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market, which prevents this market operating Pareto-efficiently, it is 
usually argued by neoclassical economists that there is now a basis for 
government intervention to overcome these market failures and, thereby, 
make the community better off. The reason why a national government may 
be required to do the intervening is that on occasions only via the form 
of combined effort on the part of the community that is organised within 
the political institution of a national government, instead of 
individuals, or small groups, in the community behaving independently of 
one another, would it be possible for the community to take the measures 
required to eliminate the market failures present in the economy.
But finding a logical and acceptable basis for government 
economic intervention is only part of the task in the essays which 
follow, of assessing the economic performance of national governments. 
The next step is a critical assessment of the attempts by governments to 
overcome these weaknesses in the markets of various national economics. 
This is indeed the major theme running through the essays which follow; 
namely, one of critically analysing the problems various governments had 
in implementing government economic policies in an attempt to achieve 
some social optimum outcome, and/or whether these governments 
implemented their economic policies in the optimum fashion if free to do 
so. Certainly subsidiary themes are to be found in these essays, 
particularly in the third essay, but even in this essay the theme never 
strays far from the one just outlined.
(1) The first, and to a lesser extent the second, essay also touches on 
the efforts of national governments to attain economic goals other 
than overcoming market imperfections. This form of government 
intervention, however, is also open to scrutiny from the point of 
view of determining whether this government employed the most 
efficient methods for attaining these non-economic policy goals.
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That the major theme of these essays is that outlined in the 
previous paragraph suggests another common major element in the essays; 
namely, that each essay is an exercise in applying the tools of welfare 
economics to a more or lesser degree. The reason for this statement is 
that since these essays are involved with comparing government economic 
performance with some social optimum performance this suggests that some 
method has been devised for determining what criteria have to be met for 
the social optimum to be reached, a method which welfare economics is 
supposed to provide. In essays one and three the application of standard 
welfare economics is fairly explicit. However, the second essay tackles 
a problem in welfare economics which is relatively complex; namely, 
measuring the social optimum degree of government intervention over time 
and comparing it with the actual performance of the government. Because 
this economic issue raises measurement problems which, in practice, are 
too difficult to handle, the analysis has to be simplified down to more 
measurable criteria; criteria which, while not derived from a process of 
maximizing a social welfare function, hopefully indicate reasonably 
closely the optimum degree of government intervention.
To demonstrate that there are these common and central themes 
in these essays this introduction should provide a brief outline of the 
major issues discussed in each essay. Before doing this it first should 
be pointed out that the three essays may be classified into two parts. 
Part A is composed of the first two essays, each essay being concerned 
with discussing the appropriate implementation of interventionist 
international trade policies. Part B, made up entirely of the third 
essay, is essentially focused on the problems, and the failure to master 
these problems, of devising an appropriate political-economic 
institutional structure which would allow a government to obtain, without
iv
a great deal of coercion, the revenue needed for this government to be 
able to supply the required goods and services which the atomized laissez 
faire market would be unable to provide.
The first essay in section one attempts to determine whether, 
or not, the Japanese governments in the period from about the 1860's 
through to the late 1890's were constrained in implementing relevant 
aspects of government economic policy, as a result of being precluded 
from utilising tariffs as a policy tool during this time period because 
of the enforcement of certain trade treaties by the Western powers. In 
other words, this essay is interested in determining whether, or not, 
this government's economic intervention was forced to depart from the 
optimum forms of intervention because of the unavailability of the tariff 
as an economic policy tool during the period of interest.
The second essay in section one concentrates attention mainly 
on a certain aspect of interventionist trade policy; namely, the infant 
industry argument; to determine whether the United States government of 
the antebellum period applied tariff protection in a satisfactory manner 
in order to protect certain sections of the infant cotton textile 
industry in New England. Because the general topic of the protection of 
the infant industry was touched upon in the first essay, and since these 
essays are meant to present relatively self-contained analyses, there 
will be a little repetition in the second essay of some of the discussion 
that appeared in the first. Having said this the second essay will be 
far more involved with the empirically testing of whether, according to 
certain criteria, government intervention was optimally applied. Since 
a good deal has been written in the past on what should have been the 
appropriate form and degree of intervention to protect the United States
Vcotton textile industry in the antebellum period, a large section of this 
essay will be devoted to critically discussing the previous efforts at 
determining whether, or not, the protectionist policies of the United 
States government could have been improved upon.
These two essays togehter take up just under half of the page 
length of this thesis. The third essay is an extended discussion of the 
problems the British government had between about 1754 and 1775 in 
implementing a public finance policy in the thirteen British North 
American colonies aimed at providing goods and services which the 
unassisted laissez faire market certainly was incapable of providing.
(The explanation of why this market could not perform this function will 
be discussed at length in this essay.) More fundamental issues are 
raised in this essay, than in the previous two, about the process of 
government economic intervention; namely, even if a clear case is 
established for supplementing the operation of the laissez faire market, 
with the application of some form of political institutional or economic 
devise performed by the national government, a fundamental issue that may 
be in need of investigation is what are the political-economic factors 
which induce, or fail to induce, the community to form the political 
coalition required to make government intervention acceptable to a 
sizable membership of the coalition, for without this coalition formation 
certain types of government economic intervention may be impossible, or 
indeed the very existence of this national government may be repudiated 
by those initially subject to its political-economic actions. In other 
words, whereas the previous two essays implicitly assumed that the 
requirements necessary for the existence of the institution of government 
were met and, therefore, the institutional framework was in place to make 
government economic intervention possible, in the third essay this
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assumption is not taken for granted.
The discussion in essay three will take place within the 
framework of the relevant historical events which led up to the British 
North American colonists stating their desire, and taking military action, 
to break away from the political-economic control of the British 
Parliament; viz. the beginning of the American Revolution; an historical 
incident caused in part, as will be argued in the third essay, by the 
form of economic intervention utilized by the national government becoming 
completely unacceptable to a certain group in the coalition formed to 
allow the government to overcome an imperfection in the market. As is to 
be expected in such a study, particular attention will need to be given to 
the task of attempting to explain to as great a depth as possible, via a 
process of testing hypotheses about political-economic behaviour, the 
relevant behaviour of major members of the political coalition formed to 
make possible certain types of government economic actions. From this 
analysis it is hoped to establish the more fundamental factors which 
induced the expressed dissatisfaction with the economic intervention of 
the British government. If such an exercise is reasonably successfully 
carried out then it should assist in determining the appropriate form 
that this government intervention should have taken to reduce the 
political-economic problems involved with the British government 
intervening in certain sections of the market and, thereby, possibly 
prevent the disintegration of the political coalition which composed 
part of the British Empire of the third quarter of the eighteenth century.
As can be seen from this brief survey of the contents of these 
essays a relatively large amount of history is covered in this thesis; 
particular aspects of the economic performance, or political-economic
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performance, of three governments and one major member of a political 
coalition (the American colonists) are assessed, and these various pieces 
of analyses cover a combined period from the mid-eighteenth century to 
the late nineteenth century, with there being one gap of about forty 
years from 1775, or later, through to about 1815. Despite this apparent 
diversity of historical material covered in this thesis all of it is 
essentially open to economic analysis using economic tools which are 
similar in nature since they are nearly all drawn from the theoretical 
constructs provided by modem welfare economics.
PART A
2ESSAY I
ON THE ABSENCE OF TARIFF AUTONOMY IN MEIJI JAPAN 
BETWEEN 1868 AND 1899.
3In 1838 Japan completed signing a series of commercial 
treaties, the Ansei Treaties, with foreign powers (the United States, 
Holland, Russia, Great Britain and France) which imposed the restriction 
that a maximum ad valorem duty of twenty per cent would be allowed on 
imports except for a few specified commodities and the use of import 
quotas, as a substitute for tariffs, were disallowed. The Japanese 
economy was deprived of nearly all this potential tariff protection when 
in 1866 a new treaty was signed limiting the average ad valorem duty to 
five per cent on most imports. In 1899 some tariff autonomy was regained 
but the general rate was not open to a full revision until 1911.
Just given these facts it would appear that the Japanese 
authorities followed a free trade policy between 1866 and 1899. Baba and 
Tatemoto certainly appear to believe this for they write as follows:
"[An] important consequence of the low duties was that Japan 
had to participate in the international division of labour with little 
protective measures, and specialized in the lines of production in which 
it had comparative advantage in textbook fashion."^
The latter part of this quotation is interpreted to mean that 
the Japanese economy for the period 1866 to 1899 was induced by the
(1) M. Baba and Tatemoto, "Foreign Trade and Economic Growth in Japan: 
1858-1937", in L. Klein and K. Ohkawa (eds), Economic Growth: The
Japanese Experience since the Meiji Era. (Richard D. Irwin Inc., 
Homewood, Illinois, 1968), p. 164.
4structure of international prices to produce and consume at a point
dictated by a free trade policy, a policy defined as one which does not
alter the effective exchange rate and does not alter the incentive to
produce and consume as provided by the structure of international
(1)prices.
The authorities did not, however, follow such a policy because
when it is realised that the authorities used subsidies in one form or
another in the Japanese economy the conditions for a free trade policy
must have been violated; this would have been so even if the tariffs had
been zero and not at the actual average rate of three per cent which they
(2)were during the period 1866 to 1899. The use of trade subsidies
would have altered the effective exchange rate, while taxes-cum-subsidies 
on domestic production, consumption and factor use would have altered the 
incentive to produce and consume at points other than those indicated by 
the structure of international prices. As long as the authorities used 
one or more of the following tax-cum-subsidies, export and/or production 
and/or factor use, the subsidy (subsidies) would have induced the Japanese 
economy to depart from a position where "it specialised in the lines of
(3)production in which it had comparative advantage".
(1) This definition of a free trade policy has been derived from Bhagwati. 
See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy: 
Departures from Unified Exchange Rates (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1968), p. 1.
(2) See Kamekichi Takahashi, The Rise and Development of Japan's Modem 
Economy (Jiji Press, Tokyo, 1969), p. 303, on the average tariff 
imposed during the period 1866 to 1899.
(3) It is assumed here that there are no domestic or foreign distortions. 
This assumption is relaxed later when dealing in more detail with the 
issues raised here. See Section III below.
5The issue, concerning Japanese trade poiicy for the period 
1866-1899, which has attracted far more attention is whether the Japanese 
economy laboured under an added constraint because the authorities could 
not use tariffs where needed to reach economic targets set by the 
government. Views expressed in answer to this question vary. Before 
presenting the sort of views that have been stated, the issue has to be 
more carefully stated. This can be done by first stating two questions: 
Were tax-cum-subsidies the optimum (first-best) policy tool to have used 
to reach the relevant economic (not non-economic) targets set by the 
Japanese government? Is it not possible that tariffs might have been the 
first-best policy tool to have used for this purpose? If the answer to 
these questions is that the government wished to achieve an economic 
target which required the use of a tariff as the first-best policy tool, 
the use of an inferior policy tool (such as a subsidy) would have hindered 
Japanese economic development in the sense that the level of economic 
welfare reached by the Japanese community, after the target had been 
achieved, would have been below the level of welfare achievable had a 
tariff been used instead. If the answer to the questions set is that a 
tax-cum-subsidy was always the first-best policy tool to have been used to 
reach the economic targets set by the Japanese government then the lack of 
tariff autonomy did not hinder Japanese economic development.
In an article by S i n h a ^  the view was expressed that it did not 
matter very much which policy tool was used. He wrote as follows:
"Although Japan could not impose a protective tariff according 
to the treaties with the Western powers this could be largely circumvented
(1) R.P. Sinha, "Unresolved Issues in Japan's Early Economic Development", 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy_, Vol. 16 (June, 1969), p. 149.
6by direct assistance and subsidies."
The use, by Sinha, of the term "largely circumvented" appears
to imply that tax-cum-subsidies were second-best policy tools whereas
tariffs were the most appropriate policy tools that could have been
employed. Rosovsky and Ohkawa, on the other hand, believe that the
lack of tariff autonomy hindered the Meiji government in its attempts to
achieve its financial objectives; that a tariff would have been the
first-best policy tool to have used to reach the financial objectives of
the government but the government was forced into using an inferior
policy tool. Kamekichi Takahashi is more wide ranging than Ohkawa and
Rosovsky in his belief that tariffs would have been the first-best
policy tool to have used to reach government targets. A repetitive theme
in his book is summed up by the statement:
"Due to these treaties (restricting the use of tariffs) many
obstacles were put in the path of Japan's modern manufacturing
(2)development."
Because the Japanese government was forced into using at best 
second-best policy tools to achieve the target of developing modern 
manufacturing Japan's economic development was hindered. At least this 
is the implicit view held by Takahashi.
(1) K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, "A Century of Economic Growth", in 
W.W. Lockwood (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise (Princeton 
University Press, 1965), p. 61.
Also in H. Rosovsky, "Japan's Transition to Modern Economic Growth, 
1868-1885',' in H. Rosovsky (ed .)> Industrialization in Ttio Systems 
(John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966), pp. 121-122.
(2) Kameckichi Takahashi, Japan's Modem Economy, op. cit.3 p. 303.
Also see pages 141, 228 and 237 for a similar view.
7None of these writers make an attempt to support, with 
explicit economic analysis, their expressed views about the economic 
repercussions of the lack of tariff autonomy in Japan. This essay in 
this thesis will attempt to fill this gap by analysing the question of 
whether the lack of tariff autonomy was a constraint on Japanese 
economic development in the period 1866 to 1899. Since economic 
theorists have demonstrated that in certain circumstances relating to 
international trade a subsidy of some kind is the first-best policy 
tool to use, in other situations a tariff and sometimes the use of 
other kinds of policy tools, Sinha, Rosovsky and Ohkawa, and Takahashi 
might not all be correct in their beliefs about the effects of the 
lack of tariff autonomy on Japanese economic development.
An important point to make at this stage is that the 
following discussion will concentrate on the economic targets which 
the Meiji government set for itself between 1868 and 1899 where a 
tariff might have been used to reach these targets. It may be that it 
can be shown that to reach certain economic targets a tariff would be 
the first-best policy tool to use. But unless these targets were 
actually some of the targets of the Meiji government it is of little 
use considering these targets if one wants to draw valid conclusions 
about the economic repercussions of the lack of tariff autonomy in 
Japan; obviously if the Japanese government did not set itself an 
objective which required a tariff as the first-best policy tool to 
achieve it then it did not require a tariff in its kit of economic 
policy tools. In short, this paper will consider the problem of what 
the first-best policy tools would have been to achieve the identified 
economic policy targets of the Meiji government, although in the 
concluding section limited reference will be made to other economic
8targets.
To handle the problem set it will be assumed that the policy 
tools the Meiji government had available to it where tariffs, subsidies 
and alternative policy tools as required. If it can be shown that 
subsidies, or some alternative policy tool available to the Meiji 
government, would have been the first-best policy to have used to reach 
the economic objectives of the government, where a tariff could possibly 
have been used instead (but it would have been an inferior policy tool 
to have employed), then it can be concluded that the lack of tariff 
autonomy was not a constraint on Japanese economic development.
The first task will be to determine the economic and non­
economic targets of the Meiji government^ during the period 1868 and 
1899 where a tariff might have been used to achieve these targets.
This is really equivalent to searching for the government targets which 
entailed the departure by the Meiji government from a free trade policy 
if these targets were to be achieved. Once these targets have been 
identified it will be demonstrated why Baba and Tatemoto are most 
probably wrong in their belief that the Japanese economy "specialized 
in the lines of production in which it had comparative advantage."
This demonstration will aid the subsequent discussion for determining 
which policy tool would have been the first-best policy tool to have
(1) The Meiji era lasted from 1868 to 1912. Although the Ansei Treaty 
was signed in 1858 it was not until the Meiji era that government 
economic targets became reasonably articulated, although there had 
been some discussion of economic objectives before this date 
during the late Tokugawa period. For this reason the analysis 
will concentrate on the period 1868 to 1899.
9used to reach a given government target. This final piece of analysis 
will allow qualified conclusions to be drawn about the repercussions 




As is to be expected, the Meiji government did not neatly 
state all the economic targets which it intended to try and reach but 
various arguments were put forward to support trade intervention at 
various times during the period 1868 to 1899. Some of these arguments 
are easily identified, some are not and where there is doubt the 
government target is assumed to have been used to guide government 
economic action. This procedure will tend to overstate the need for 
government intervention and, therefore, possibly overstate the need to 
use tariffs to reach government targets. Some readers might think 
this procedure conflicts with the point made earlier, namely, that 
this paper would be interested only in considering the actual targets 
set by the Meiji government. This point must be generously interpreted, 
however, because of the difficulties of identifying all the reasonably 
likely economic targets of the Meiji government which possibly involved 
the use of trade intervention if the targets were to be achieved.
The six identified economic targets of the Meiji government 
where a tariff might have been used to reach these targets may be 
divided into those concerned with eliminating distortions in the 
economy and those concerned with other economic objectives. The 
targets concerned with distortions will be considered first.
1. THE FACTOR PRICE RIGIDITY ARGUMENT
The burden that the unemployed samurai class imposed on the 
economy was seen as being a serious problem by the Meiji government.
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The only income that most of the samurai obtained after the Restoration
in 1868 was a stipend paid to them by the government. In 1876 an
attempt was made to lower the cost to the government of these payments
by converting the stipends into interest bearing bonds. The domestic
inflation between 1873 and 1881, combined with this issuing of bonds,
appreciably lowered the real value of government payments made to the
samurai. ^  This action no doubt more than any other by the government
(2)encouraged the samurai to rebel. After the Satsuma rebellion of
1877 the government realized that aid needed to be directed towards 
the samurai to raise their income.
The Meiji government had two options open to it. The one
was to raise the level of transfer payments made to the samurai. This
option was not taken up but instead the government concentrated on the
alternative of increasing the employment opportunities available to 
(3)the samurai. The implicit reasoning behind this action seems to
have been that if the real wage offered to the samurai could be raised 
high enough they would prefer to become fully employed rather than 
remain unemployed while being paid their stipends or its equivalent.
The problem that needed to be overcome to eliminate the
(1) For a detailed account of this piece of history see W.G. Beasley, 
The Meiji Restoration (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), 
pp. 379-390.
(2) There might have been other reasons why the samurai rebelled. In 
particular the Meiji government had acted to erode the social 
status of the samurai other than by reducing the incomes paid to 
them.
(3) See T.C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Change in Japan
(Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 33-34.
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unemployment amongst the samurai was the downward rigidity of the real 
wage paid to the samurai. ^  There was some idea of an institutional 
wage rate. If the real wage paid to the samurai fell below this wage 
rate the samurai preferred not to work, but rather to be unemployed 
and to be paid stipends. The Meiji government needed to raise the 
real wage paid to the samurai above this institutional real wage in 
order to fully employ the samurai and in this way raise the average 
real income going to the samurai.
There was another section of the labour force which also
seems to have suffered from unemployment although the evidence of this
is less obvious. The sudden exposure of the Japanese economy to
international trade, particularly after 1866, meant the economy had to
adjust to a new set of commodity prices. In fact the terms of trade
has been calculated to have improved some 3.5-fold; the relative price
index on Japan's exportables being calculated to have gone from 100 to
(2)
133, and the relative index on importables from 100 to 39.
(1) Downward rigidity of factor prices will be defined throughout this 
paper in terms of a constant-utility combination of all goods 
consumed by the Japanese community. It does matter for the 
analysis which follows of factor price rigidity how rigidity is 
defined. H.G. Johnson shows how alternative definitions alter the 
results obtained. See H.G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention 
in the Presence of Domestic Distortions," in Robert E. Baldwin
et. al. 3 Trade Growth and the Balanee of Payments (North-Holland, 
Amsterdam, 1966), pp. 15-18. The definition used for the purposes 
of this paper is adequate and reasonable.
(2) See J.R. Huber, "Effects on Prices of Japan's Entry into World 
Commerce after 1858", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 75 (1971), 
pp. 616-622. This estimate of the terms of trade can only be 
treated as being tentative because of the difficulty, in particular, 
of handling the problem of developing price indexes for importables 
which includes the prices of commodities where these commodities 
were not available in Japan before trade was introduced, or if 
available, only in a very crude form compared to what was available 
via international trade. If these considerations could be 
accurately taken account of, and Huber took no account of them in 
his arithmetic calculations, then probably the terms of trade 
improved even more than that stated in the main text.
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The resulting shift in the demand schedules for factor inputs might
have caused the average real wage paid to labour to fall, or at
least the real wage rate paid to some labour to fall if factors of
(2)production were immobile. Add to this possibility the assumption
that real wages were inflexible downwards and the conclusion is 
reached that involuntary unemployment might have resulted from the 
introduction of international trade.
(1) See W.F. Stopler and P.A. Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages", 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 9 (1941), pp.58-73, and
J. Bhagwati, "Protection, Real Wages and Real Incomes", Economic 
Journal, Vol. 69 (1959), pp. 733-744.
Given the assumptions in these articles the real wage paid to 
labour would fall if, because of the introduction of trade, the 
price of the importable commodity (Y), produced by an industry 
using relatively labour intensive methods of production, fell 
relative to the price of the other commodity (X), which was 
produced by an industry using relatively capital intensive methods 
of production. The labour capital ratio would tend to rise 
because more units of labour than units of capital would leave the 
industry producing Y to be employed in the industry producing X.
The marginal physical product of labour would fall in both 
industries which means the real wage paid to labour would fall 
unambiguously by the same amount in both industries.
(2) Even if the terms of trade moved so that the price of Y rose 
relative to the price of X, and maintaining the assumption stated 
in footnote (1) about factor intensities, the average real wage 
need not have risen in all sectors, although this is implied by 
the analysis in the previous footnote, if factors of production 
were immobile between sectors. Intoducing the realistic assumption 
that factors in the Japanese economy were immobile between sectors, 
at least in the short-run after the introduction of international 
trade, implies that the marginal physical product of labour was 
constant in both sectors as the full employment capital/labour 
ratio could not alter in either sector. But the marginal revenue 
product of labour in a sector (equal to the unit price of the 
output produced by a sector times the marginal physical product of 
that labour) would rise in the sector which faced an increase in 
the price for its output (the average price of Japanese exportables 
rose) and fall in the sector where the price of its output fell 
(the price of Japanese importables fell). If there was perfect 
competition in factor markets, or at least the wage rate paid to 
labour was proportional to the marginal revenue product of labour, 
then the wage rate would have fallen in the sector selling 
importables.
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There are no estimates of the proportion of the labour force
which was unemployed for the period 1866-1899 or earlier so there is no
way of checking this conclusion d i r e c t l y . T h e r e  is some indirect
evidence to indicate that perhaps unemployment was caused by the
introduction of international trade. The first piece of evidence is
that peasant uprisings became more numerous after 1866 and reached a
peak during the 1880s. While there may have been many reasons for
these peasant uprisings (for example, the new land tax introduced in
1873 was opposed by the peasants) it is possible that unemployment
caused by the introduction of international trade was one of them.
The second piece of evidence is reflected in the statements of
government officials and in the actions of the Meiji government. In
1874, for example, Matsukata warned the Dajokan that if the government
did not establish industries the people would "lose their industries
(2)and fall into poverty and starvation". Later on Count Okuma
observed that the repercussions of the shift in the terms of trade as 
a result of the ending of the period of autarky was "a vast number of 
occupations which had hitherto been thriving had suddenly to be 
abandoned, and skilled labourers and artisans were thrown out of
(1) An estimate of unemployment would have to be careful to take 
account of the relatively unspecialized nature of the Japanese 
work force in the early Meiji era and before. This relative lack 
of specializstion does not rule out the possibility of 
unemployment, it would just be impossible to measure using modern 
definitions of unemployment.
(2) Meiji zaisei keizai shiryo shusei (Materials on Economics and 
Finance in the Meiji Period), Vol. 1, p. 360, cited by T.C. Smith, 
Political Change, op. cit. , p. 30.
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employment in thousands" (1)
No factual evidence is provided to support this statement 
but the actions of the Meiji government provides some indication that 
they were concerned about the plight of the traditional artisan- 
peasant; they attempted to establish new industries to provide 
improved employment for those harmed by the introduction of 
international trade. On this point T.C. Smith has observed;
"It is difficult to single out motives for founding
particular enterprises, but there is no doubt that the hope of bringing
(2)relief to the hard-pressed peasantry was often among them."
As was pointed out above, this evidence does not definitely 
show that unemployment was created as a result of the introduction of 
international trade. It is possible that the apparent decline in 
economic welfare experienced by the Japanese labour force, or certain 
sections of the labour force, was due only to the fall in the real wage 
rate, at least in certain sectors of the labour market, following the 
introduction of international trade, and that there was no downward 
rigidity of wages. If this was the case then an implicit argument used 
by the Meiji government, to support its intervention in the economy to 
bring relief to the Japanese labour force, was that there was a need to 
redistribute income to compensate those who had been made worse off as 
a result of the introduction of trade. It is assumed that both this 
argument, and the factor price rigidity argument, were used by the
(1) Count Okuma, "The Industrial Revolution in Japan", North American 
Review, November 1900, pp. 677-691, particularly p. 679.
(2) T.C. Smith, Political Change_, op. cit., p. 31.
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Meiji government as a basis for setting economic targets.
At this point it seems worthwhile to digress a little by 
discussing the question of whether the Japanese community gained from 
the introduction of international trade, assuming that factor price 
rigidity was present in the economy. There are two reasons for this 
digression. Firstly, the topic discussed is of interest in itself 
and secondly (the more important reason), the discussion will provide 
the opportunity to state the assumptions needed for the general- 
equilibrium trade model used to reach many of the conclusions in this 
paper. The production side of this model has already been implicitly 
used when considering the possibility that the average real wage rate 
fell in Japan as a result of the introduction of trade.
The general-equilibrium trade model as it will be used for 
the time being is static in that there is no technical change, no 
transfers of knowledge, no external economies, no learning processes, 
no uncertainty and no intertemporal optimising conditions. Perfect 
competition exists in all markets. There are two factor inputs, 
capital and labour. These factors are in fixed supply and fully 
employed which means that factor prices are perfectly flexible. 
Factors are perfectly mobile. The two production function which show 
the combination of capital and labour to produce outputs X and Y 
respectively are continuous, homogeneous and linear with diminishing 
marginal rates of substitution between capital and labour. A 
relatively more labour intensive technique of production is needed to 
produce Y. These assumptions ensure that the production possibility
curve is concave from below.
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On the consumption side it is assumed that it is possible to 
represent a potential improvement in economic welfare in the community 
by means of social indifference curves. A potential improvement of 
welfare means that the gainers from any increase in total welfare can 
afford to compensate the losers and still everyone is left better off. 
The social indifference curves are convex from below and do not 
intersect.
The commodity prices ruling in the Japanese economy during 
autarky are different from those ruling after international is 
introduced. Commodity prices change after trade is introduced 
so that Y becomes relatively cheaper compared to X. Japan is a small 
trading nation which is unable to influence commodity prices ruling 
in the international market. Trade is always in balance. The 
international price ratio is fixed after trade is introduced. Neither 
commodity, X or Y, is an inferior good.
The final assumption is that Japan went from a state of 
autarky prior to 1858 to one of free trade in 1858. The Japanese 
economy, in fact, went from near autarky to trade restricted by a 
tariff which could be set at twenty per cent ad valorem between 1858 
and 1866; the tariff could then be set at five per cent between 1866 
and 1899. At a later stage when considering the corrective action 
needed to eliminate the distortion created by factor price rigidity it 
will be shown that the presence of tariffs might have allowed, 
although it is by no means certain, an increase in the level of welfare 
reached above the free trade level. The presence of subsidies which
(1) The evidence to support this statement was cited above.
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existed after 1868 are also ignored for the time being. Similarly 
they will be introduced into the analysis when considering the 
corrective action needed to eliminate the distortion created by factor 
price rigidity.
The model, given the assumptions, is represented in diagram 
one. AB represents the full employment production possibility curve. 
The definition of full employment used here is one which does not 
include the samurai; this particular section of the labour force will 
be introduced later into the model. The point of full-employment 
production during autarky is represented by P on AB. The level of 
welfare reached by the community in an economy where there is no 
international trade, is represented by the social indifference curve U.
International trade is allowed and commodity prices charges 
in the way set out in the assumptions above; the price of Y falls 
relative to X. Production now takes place at the production point 
represented by and consumption at C' is allowed because of the
introduction of international trade. Welfare in the community is 
increased because of trade (U^U) . What is represented in diagram 1 
is an optimum solution with the domestic marginal rate of subsitution 
(DRS) equal to international prices or the foreign marginal rate of 
transformation (FRT), which in turn is equal to the full employment 
domestic marginal rate of transformation (DRT).
If the assumption of perfect factor price flexibility is 
relaxed the economy will produce at some point inside the production 
set OAB because of the introduction of trade. Exactly where inside 
OAB will depend on how factor price rigidity is defined, the rigidity
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(1)of factor prices and the mobility of factors between industries.
As for the definition of factor price rigidity, factor price
rigidity was earlier defined in terms of a constant-utility combination
of all goods consumed. Factor prices will not be defined as totally
rigid; only the price of labour is rigid downwards. The question of
factor mobility raises a small complication concerning the historical
facts. Prior to 1868 factors were highly immobile between industries
because of the restrictions put on the movement of factors by the
(2)Tokugawa regime. (The Tokugawa era lasted from 1615 to 1868).
After the Meiji Restoration these controls had all been removed by the 
early 1870s. It will be assumed, based on these facts, that factors 
were not mobile between the industries producing X and Y respectively 
prior to 1868, and that factor mobility increased after this date.
If factor prices had been flexible the introduction of trade 
in 1859 would have meant that the Japanese economy would have continued 
to produce at P as factors could not have moved out of producing Y into 
producing X. (As this factor immobility was reduced after 1868 the 
point of production could be represented south-east of P on AB in 
diagram 1.) However, the community still would have gained from trade 
because the consumption gain from trade (U^">U). But because of the 
assumed inflexibility of the price of labour, production would not take
(1) See H.G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention", ibid.
(2) For example, peasants were only allowed to grow certain types of 
crops, there were limitations on the movement of raw materials 
such as rice seed and the geographic movement of labour between 
job opportunities was restricted. See for example Y. Horie, 
"Modern Entrepreneurship in Meiji, Japan", (esp. p.198) in
W.W. Lockwood, State and Economic Enterprise in Japan 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965).
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place at P but somewhere directly south of P. Production of Y would 
not stop altogether; capital could be substituted for labour in the 
industry producing Y until the marginal product of labour was raised 
to equal the fixed wage paid to labour. This adjustment process 
implies that some labour previously employed in the industry producing 
Y would have become unemployed. This unemployment implies that there 
was a domestic distortion in the factor market in the economy, which 
means that the economy could not operate on the most efficient 
production possibility curve.
In the initial period after the introduction of international 
trade in 1859, production took place at a point which can be 
represented by G in diagram 1. Under these circumstances it is 
possible that Japan did not gain from the introduction of international 
trade (U* is shown as being below U). As factors became more mobile 
after 1868 the point of production could be represented as having moved 
to the east which would have tended to raise the probability that the
community gained from international trade.
This increase in the mobility of factors may be thought of as 
the introduction of domestic trade. Thus it could be concluded from 
this observation that if the Japanese community gained from trade it 
was not only because of the introduction of foreign trade but also 
because of the introduction of domestic trade as well.
The result that the Japanese community did not gain from the
(1) The general case of this possiblity was first worked out by
G.Harbeler, in "Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International 
Trade", Economic Journal, Vol. LX (June, 1950), pp. 223-240.
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introduction of foreign trade, at least in the short run, is only a 
hypothetical reconstruction of h i s t o r y . I t  most probably did not 
occur, particularly after the dynamic aspects of international trade 
have been taken into account; in particular, the transfer of 
technology from abroad into Japanese industry would have allowed the 
production possibility schedule to shift outwards, thereby allowing 
the Japanese community to reach higher levels of welfare. It should 
also be remembered that factor price rigidity is most probably a 
short-run phenomenon; in the longer-run factor prices become less 
rigid which increases the possibility that Japan gained (in the 
Paretian sense being used here) from foreign trade at least by the 
early Meiji era.
Despite these observations it is not easy, if not impossible, 
to establish whether, or not, the Japanese community unambiguously 
gained just from any potential consumption and resource reallocation 
(comparative static) benefits that could have been made in response to 
the marked alteration of the terms of trade made possible by the 
Japanese economy changing from a situation of near autarky to one
(1) If the assumption of full employment in autarky is relaxed to
allow for there being unemployment of resources in both sectors 
in this initial situation then it is still possible for the 
economy not to gain from trade, although the analysis is a little 
more complicated in this case.
See R. Batra and P.K. Pattanaik, "Factor Market Imperfections and 
Gains from Trade", Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 23 (1971),
pp. 182-188.
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nearer that of free t r a d e . T h e r e  is no national income data 
available for the late Tokugawa period which means that the national 
income data that is available for the early Meiji era, albeit 
unreliable data, is of no help in determining whether comparative static 
gains were made from trade because comparisons cannot be made with 
the earlier Tokuqawa period. Even if this information were available 
there would still be the serious problem of disentangling the 
comparative static gains from trade, and the dynamic gains resulting 
from the international flow of embodied and disembodied technological 
change. Perhaps this problem could to some extent be met by only 
considering a comparatively short period of time after the ending of 
autarky, the assumption being that during this time period little, or 
no, foreign technical know-how influenced the methods of Japanese 
production. But such a technique would make it difficult to observe 
the comparative static gains from trade because of the time required 
for factors of production to reallocate themselves in order that the 
economy could gain from the new set of production and factor prices.
Thus at the present time it does not seem possible to 
disprove the hypothesis that the Japanese community did not gain in 
the short-run from the potential comparative static benefits to be 
derived from the removal, in the late Tokugawa period, of the
(1) Besides the limited tariff protection tending to take the Japanese 
economy away from the free trade position, the tax-cum-subsidy 
policy of the Meiji government also had this effect. This latter 
economic policy, to be considered in more detail below, clearly 
was not imposed with enough vigor to imposed autarky again for 
international trade took place over the whole period from 1858 to 
1899, the period of interest here. These points are discussed in 
greater detail in Section IV below.
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constraints on international trade in Japan.^ In the long run, 
however, the Japanese economy certainly gained from trade, even if it 
were only from the dynamic effects of international trade, for it is 
difficult to visualise how the Japanese economy could have progressed 
as rapidly as it did in the decades after 1858 without the inflow of 
foreign technology.
What about the unemployment problem amongst the samurai?
This unemployment was not considered a problem until some time in the
early and mid-1870s, at a time when the Meiji government started to
try and relieve itself of some of the burden created by this
unemployment by encouraging the samurai, in one form or another, to
take up employment. One way of thinking of this set of events is that
sometime during the mid-1870s the Meiji government realized that the
(2)labour force was larger than previously realised. In terms of the
model being used here, the supply of labour increased because of the 
changed attitudes of the Meiji government towards the samurai.
(1) What is of interest is that this possibility seems to have occurred 
to Matthew C. Perry, the United States government agent who 
negotiated the first trade agreement with the Tokugawa government 
in 1854. Initially Perry proposed a commercial agreement based on 
the American treaties with China, a proposal which was rejected by 
the Japanese. Perry, according to a Japanese account, did not 
press the matter, for according to him: "Commerce brings profit to 
a country, but it does not concern human life. I shall not insist 
upon it (the proposed trade agreement)". It would appear from 
this statement that Perry had realised that the Japanese as a 
whole might not have gained from a too rapid change from autarky
to free trade. For the historical facts concerning this point see 
Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, op. oit., p.96 and 96n, and the 
references there cited.
(2) The samurai made up about 5 to 6 per cent of the total Japanese 
population.
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Now that the problem has been put into this form more can be 
said about the effect this increase in the labour supply might have had 
on the position and shape of the production-possibility curve. 
Maintaining the assumptions of the production side of the trade model 
used above and that the samurai were fully employed the position of the 
new curve would have been everywhere above the original curve, AB. The 
new production-possibility curve, CD, also would have had a shape 
different from AB. It can be shown, using Rybczynski's theorem, that 
the relative shapes of AB and CD would have been such that at any given, 
but equivalent, marginal rate of transformation along CD and AB, 
absolutely more of Y (the labour-intensive good) and absolutely less of 
X (the capital-intensive good) was produced on CD than on AB.^^ The 
relative shapes of AB and CD are drawn in diagram 1 to show this 
particular result, a result which is not important for the analysis 
which follows later in section IV.
The increase in the labour supply made possible by the full 
employment of the samurai would have meant that the economy could have 
produced at P*, instead of at P', if there had been factor price 
flexibility and factor mobility. (The marginal rate of transformation 
at P* is the same as that at P 1. By Rybczynski's theorem absolute more 
of Y and absolute less of X is produced at P* than at P'.) The total 
unemployment of the samurai prior to the mid-1870s (in fact not all the 
samurai were unemployed) and some unemployment amongst the rest of the 
labour force would have meant that the Japanese economy would have
(1) See T.M. Rybczynski, "Factor Endowment and Relative Commodity
Prices", Economica, Vol. XXII (Nov. 1955), pp. 336-341. The basic 
diagrammatic tool of analysis that would be needed to show these 
propositions would be the Edgeworth-box diagram.
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produced at some point inside the production set OCD and in turn inside 
the production set OAB. Where inside OAB has already been discussed.
2. THE INFANT-INDUSTRY ARGUMENT
The infant-industry argument implies that the assumptions 
made earlier in the trade model, of no uncertainty and no technological 
change due to international transfers of knowledge and learning 
processes, have to be relaxed. Despite the fact that there are some 
differences of opinion as to what elements should, or should not, be 
included in the infant-industry a r g u m e n t , t h e  central idea in this 
notion to support government intervention is that were a new and infant 
firm to invest in developing the technical and market knowledge 
required if the firm were to survive against foreign competition it 
would not receive an adequate private rate of return on this investment 
to make the investment worthwhile, although if certain imperfections in 
the market were removed with the aid of temporary government assistance 
this investment becomes profitable both from a private and a social 
point of view.
The presence of learning by a new industry is not of itself 
grounds for government assistance; if the learning is interval to the 
firm, and does not become available to other firms and/or is of no 
economic worth to other firms, there is no need for assistance if 
capital markets operate perfectly. This latter assumption may very
(1) See H.G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention", op. cit.> and 
"A New View of the Infant Industry Argument" and R.H. Snape, 
"Comment"; both the latter two articles are in I.A. McDougall 
and R.H. Snape, Studies in International Economics (Amsterdam, 
North-Holland, 1970).
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well not hold, however, in the case of an infant industry because of a 
lack of perfect knowledge amongst lenders of loanable funds about the 
actual economic prospects of an infant industry. (This lack of perfect 
knowledge, or information, may take on a number of guises; for example, 
lenders may be "irrationally" biased against lending funds to be 
invested in training labour in the new techniques of production.) As 
a result the rate of interest charged by the capital market on funds 
lent to the infant industry is above the social discount rate. As a 
result there is an under-investment in learning in this industry.
Another form of market imperfection, which may also cause an 
under-investment in this learning, is caused by the useful knowledge 
learnt becoming available to other firms in the industry,or economy, at 
a price which causes the social rate of return on this investment to be 
greater than the private rate. In other words, through some failure(s) 
in the market the investors in the relevant knowledge, required for the 
infant industry to survive unassisted, are unable to maintain the degree 
of property rights over this knowledge that is needed to provide a 
private rate of return on this investment which makes the investment 
profitable, although the social rate of return is adequate to make this 
investment worthwhile.
While either, or both, these market failures persist the 
investment in the infant industry is not made, or there is under­
investment, unless some appropriate temporary government assistance is 
provided to overcome this weakness. Once this learning has been done 
the industry should survive unaided, and this assistance could then be 
withdrawn. This is not to say that technical learning externalities, 
and/or capital market imperfections, could not persist after the
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industry could survive unaided by government assistance. But any 
rationale given to support the giving of government assistance to 
compensate firms for this continuation of market imperfections would 
have to be based on notions other than the infant-industry argument, 
for this argument is only concerned with the giving of temporary 
assistance until such time as the industry can withstand foreign 
competition unaided; at least this is how the infant-industry argument 
is usually presented.
The relevant question is did the circumstances exist in the 
Japanese economy in the period 1868 to 1899 which implied that it 
would have been beneficial, from the community's point of view, to give 
temporary assistance to the infant industries. The Meiji government 
authorities seem to have thought that these circumstances did exist.
One specific form of the infant-industry argument implicitly
used by the Meiji government can be inferred from the following
quotation. In March 1876 the Department of the Interior made a request
to the D a j o k a n to establish a woollen industry. In its request it
(2)stated:
"Although it is the natural task of private interests to 
undertake an enterprise like this, the project must be carried out by 
the government. How can our people at present undertake such a large
(1) The executive council of the early Meiji government.
(2) Quoted in Tsugo Ko, "Ishin zengo yomagyo" ("The Woollen Industry 
Before and After the Restoration"), Keizai shi kenkyu (Studies in 
Economic History), Vol. XIX (May, 1938), p. 520, cited by
T.C. Smith, Political Change, op. c i t pp. 37-38.
29
project and exacting enterprise that will require a very large 
investment?"
The implicit argument in this rhetorical question is that the 
Japanese busunessman saw the risks involved in investing in the infant 
industry (the woollen industry in this case) as being so great that he 
preferred not to invest in this industry. This evaluation of risk was 
most probably at least partly based on the experiences of those who 
had tried to establish firms during the late 1860s and early 1870s 
using new and imported techniques of production but who had incurred 
losses.^ The government, on the other hand, seemed to believe that 
these risks were overstated. In other words, the Japanese government 
perceived an imperfection in the capital market which caused the 
interest charged on funds loaned to the infant industry to be 
unnecessarily higher than the rate charged to other sectors of the 
economy. Besides this capital market imperfection there was also an 
externality problem. Once it had been demonstrated that these risks of 
investing in the infant industry had been overstated this knowledge was 
now available, at no cost, to all likely entrants into the industry.
But for a single firm to have shown it was possible to survive the 
risks of investing in the infant industry would have meant that this 
firm would not have gained the full return on this investment in 
knowledge; this firm could not have hidden the fact that it was
(1) See T.C. Smith, Political Change3 op. cit. , p. 39. Smith mentions 
the case of a merchant who tried to establish a cotton mill. He 
concludes from this case history:
"When one considers that the capital invested in this mill 
yielded nothing from 1867 to 1872, and that investment in 
machinery entailed far greater risks than other types of 
investment, it is no wonder others were less venturesome than this 
Tokyo merchant."
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possible to make a reasonable profit in the industry for its very
existance, unassisted by government, demonstrated this point. In such
a situation this investment may never be made as potential entrants
into the industry waited for others to invest in learning about the
risks involved with such investments. In these circumstances a case
could be made for temporary government assistance. This specific
form of the infant-industry argument was implicitly used on many
(2)occasions in Japan for the period being considered here.
The presence of technological externalities also seem to have 
been realised as a reason for government assistance. Technological 
externalities arise when new techniques of production learnt by a firm 
become available to other firms at a price below the cost of producing 
this new knowledge. This would tend to be the case where the market 
for patents was not well developed; which was likely to be the case in 
early Meiji Japan. Under these circumstances the externality would 
cause the private rate of return on investments needed to develop new 
techniques of production to be less than the social rate of return and 
there would, therefore, tend to be an under-investment in the infant 
industry from the community’s point of view. Even if the patents 
market had been well developed in early Meiji Japan it could still be 
argued, on allocative efficiency grounds, that it may have been
(1) This argument could have been constructed around the argument that 
the capital market was imperfect instead of emphasising risk as 
has been done here. The emphasis on risk, however, is more 
specific and no doubt nearer the actual consideration which 
influences the behaviour not to invest.
(2) See, for example, the statement by Okubo Tochimichi, cited by 
T.C. Smith, Political Change_, op. oit., pp. 40-41.
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undesirable to impede the flow of technical knowledge to other firms 
via the patents system, for firms had to pay a positive price for 
technical knowledge purchased in the form of patents instead of the 
optimum price, which was zero, had there been no patents market.
The basis for this statement is that the marginal cost of producing 
this knowledge may have been zero and, therefore, the optimum selling 
price of this knowledge was zero. If this was the case some form of 
government intervention was required, instead of employing the 
institution of the patents market, to induce the optimum level of 
investment in producing technical knowledge.
The Meiji government responded to these lines of argument, 
intentionally or unintentionally, by setting up government run pilot 
plants and by direct production subsidies to private firms where new 
techniques of production were being learnt and developed.
Finally, externalities could have been created because of 
general on-the-job training of labour provided by infant industries. 
This training would have raised the marginal revenue product of 
trained labour by the same amount in and outside the training firm.
If payment for the cost of training was not made at the time of 
training, the cost could be recouped out of labour's future output in 
the firm by labour being paid a wage less than its marginal revenue 
product. But this action would induce labour to leave the training 
firm (before the training firm had recouped its training cost) simply 
because other firms, not having any training costs to meet, would be 
prepared to pay this labour its marginal revenue product, which is 
above the wage paid in the training firm. The infant industry firm 
would, therefore, tend to provide less than the optimum amount of
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training unless it could be paid in some way for the cost of general 
training.
This apparent weakness in the labour-training market could 
have been overcome, in principle at least, if employees were prepared 
to pay the firm, directly, or indirectly (by accepting a wage, during 
the period of general on-the-job training, below their marginal revenue 
product), for this general training. However, firms in early Meiji 
Japan were most probably ill-equipped to provide the type of on-the-job 
training required, and/or there was likely to be some weakness in the 
capital market which prevented it from providing funds to employees to 
be invested in paying for on-the-job training. Implicitly the Meiji 
government seems to have accepted these types of arguments for it 
intervened in the market for training labour and embarked on financing 
and providing education schemes to equip the Japanese labour force with 
general education. For example, in the case of technical industrial 
training the government established the Kobu Daigakko in 1871, an 
institution which later became the Tokyo Imperial University Faculty 
of Engineering, and the Tokyo Higher Technical School in 1881.^
Whether any of these specific forms of the infant-industry 
argument were supported by the actual facts in the Meiji economy we 
might never know, and it does not matter for the purposes of this 
paper. That the Meiji government acted in the way it did does seem to 
imply that it implicitly believed that the arguments were supported by
(1) Also see Takahashi, Japan's Modem Economy, op. cit. , Chapter III, 
Book II on the various schemes devised to provide general and not 
so general training for the Japanese labour force.
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by the facts; that the social rate of return on investing in the 
infant industries was greater than the private rate of return which in 
turn induced a situation where MRS=FRT^DRT from the community's point 
of view.
While this paper is not a critique on Meiji government 
economic policy it seems worthwhile mentioning the difficulties of 
determining whether the government realised that the infant-industry 
argument also makes the point that assistance should be removed once 
what experience has to be learnt for the industry to survive 
international competition has been learnt; to continue this assistance 
after this point of time would mean the provision of unnecessary 
assistance and, therefore, a misallocation of resources. At no stage 
do the Meiji authorities seem to have realised this point but it could 
be inferrred that when the government started to sell to the private 
sector, in the mid-1880s, the firms it had earlier established, that it 
had realised that the assistance to the infant industries had been 
adequate to bring about the required amount of learning. This 
interpretation of the Meiji government's action is too narrow. The 
selling of government firms was also part of a deflationary economic 
policy and possibly not in any way related to the infant-industry 
argument. Also government assistance continued to be given to these 
firms, either directly or indirectly, after they had been sold. On 
the other hand, perhaps this assistance was needed if the government 
wished to reach its other economic targets. But even if this 
assistance had been maintained indefinitely after the learning period 
was over, and there was no other sound reason for maintaining this 
assistance, it can be shown that the Japanese community might still
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have been better off than if no assistance had been given at all to 
the infant industries.^
The arguments supporting government economic intervention, 
but not concerned with domestic distortions in the market, are more 
easily identified.
3. THE NEED TO ACHIEVE A MORE DESIRABLE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
While it was emphasised above that the terms of trade could 
have altered in such a way, after the introduction of international 
trade, as to have lowered the average real wage rate paid to labour, 
or, if there was factor immobility, to lower the real wage paid to
(1) With the use of production subsidies to aid the infant industry 
producing X the production-possibility curve AB shifts to AB'.
(In section IV it is determined why production subsidies should 
be used instead of tariffs to aid the infant industry.) The 
community can now reach U which is greater than U (the level of 
welfare reached without subsidies) but less than U* (the level of 
welfare reached if subsidies are removed at the right time). If 
the long-run discounted gain from U being above U is greater 
than the discounted cost of the subsidy needed to shift AB to 
AB1, then the community has gained in the long-run even though the 
subsidy is maintained indefinitely. On this point see 
H.G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention", op. oit., pp. 29-30.
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labour in the sector producing importables, it is possible that the
terms of trade rather changed to bring about a rise in the average wage
paid to labour, and lowered the real wage paid to capital. In this
case the relative share of total output going to capital would have
fallen (since factor supplies are assumed fixed). Or if factors were
immobile between sectors then the real wage paid to capital would have
(2)fallen in the sector producing importables. But no matter what
assumptions, about changes in the terms of trade and factor mobility, 
actually held for the Japanese economy of the late Tokugawa and early 
Meiji period, it is certain that some groups in the Japanese community 
suffered a loss of real income as a result of the introduction of 
international trade - at least until the dynamic benefits of 
international trade began to be felt. This the Meiji government appears 
to have realised and attempted to provide some sort of compensation to 
those groups which had incurred losses as a result of the introduction 
of trade.
4. THE INCREASE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ARGUMENT.
The Meiji government wished to gain military power for the 
Japanese nation. To attain this military objective the government 
believed that industrial production had to be increased first, or at
(1) The analysis required to demonstrate this result is the same as 
that in p. 13n.l except that the price of Y rises and the price 
of X falls.
(2) The analysis is similar to that found in p. 13n.2. Since the 
marginal physical product of capital is fixed in both sector so 
the real wage paid to capital must fall in the sector where the 
price for the sector's output falls; namely, the sector producing 
importables.
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least simultaneously with increases in military might.
5. THE REDUCTION OF THE LEVEL OF IMPORTS ARGUMENT.
The trade deficits of the period 1868 to 1881 in particular 
caused a great deal of concern to the government. Smith has pointed 
out:
"Amongst the strongest motivations of industrial policy was
(2)the desire to balance Japan's foreign payments."
The Meiji government seemed to believe that one of the 
methods it should use to reduce the level of imports and bring 
equilibrium to the balance of payments was to encourage the expansion 
of domestic industry through the use of subsidies. In this way it was 
hoped that domestic industry could compete with imported goods and thus 
reduce the level of imports.
6. THE REVENUE ARGUMENT
It was argued that the Meiji government needed to intervene 
in foreign trade by imposing a tariff so that the central government 
could raise the additional revenue it required. This argument seemed 
to be based on the need for more flexibility in public finance policy. 
Count Matsukata, for example, stated that more flexibility would have 
been given to fiscal policy if tariffs could have been varied "with 
the varying demands of the Imperial Treasury or with the conditions of
(1) See Beasley, Restoration_, op. oit. , pp. 370-371.
(2) T.C. Smith, Political Change> op, cit., p. 48.
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commerce and industry. „ ( 1)
These are the six arguments which gave support to the belief 
that there was a need for government intervention in the Japanese 
economy for the period 1868 to 1899, economic intervention which 
possibly could take the form of the use of tariffs. There may have 
been more arguments which the Meiji government used to support its 
economic policies but to my knowledge there were none which could 
possibly have required the use of a tariff to achieve these economic 
policy targets.
(1) M. Matsukata, "Japan's Finances" in S. Okuma, Fifty Years of New 
Japan (Smith Elder and Co., London,1909), Vol. 1, p. 371.
Also see Beasley, Restoration_, op. oit., p. 367.
38
SECTION III
From this discussion of the economic targets of the Meiji 
government it has been determined, amongst other things, that the 
authorities used subsidies in one form or another. In particular, that 
the authorities used production subsidies. But let it be assumed that 
all the usual types of subsidies were used to influence the allocation 
of resources in the economy. With this assumption it will be 
demonstrated that the assertion by Baba and Tatemoto quoted earlier is 
most probably incorrect. They stated that the Japanese economy, after 
foreign trade was introduced, "specialized in lines of production in 
which it had comparative advantage" because little, or virtually no, 
tariff protection was possible. In terms of diagram 1 this is assumed 
to mean that production took place at the Paretian optimum point of 
production, P’, where the DRT=FRT (although not at the true optimum of 
P* where the samurai were fully employed as well).
The general-equilibrium trade model will be used here as well 
to help the analysis which follows. The assumption made here, that 
there were no domestic distortions in the Japanese economy, will be 
relaxed later on. The question to be asked is: would the Japanese
economy have produced at the optimum point of production (represented as 
P' in diagram 1) if a tax-cum-subsidy had been introduced into the 
economy? A subsidiary question to ask is: what would have happened to
the level of welfare reached by the Japanese community if tax-cum-
subsidies had been used?
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The first type of subsidy to be considered is the tax-cum- 
subsidy on exportables.(1) In diagram 2 the free trade production point 
is represented as P . An export subsidy will tend to encourage the 
production of the exported good X. The tax on Y, needed to pay for the 
subsidy to X, will discourage the production of Y. The change in 
domestic commodity prices (which includes the export tax-cum-subsidy) 
will encourage production to take place at P£s on the production- 
possibility curve where the domestic price ratio is equal to the DRT. 
Trade still takes place along the international price line (?'c' is 
parallel to PESC£S). Since the domestic price ratio has been changed 
from the international price ratio through the use of export subsidies, 
the community indifference curve will not be tangent to internal price 
line but tangent to the domestic price line. The use of subsidies to 
exportables not only distort production, they also distort consumption, 
which implies a loss of welfare for the community on both counts
In diagram 3 the initial free trade production point is shown
again as P . A production subsidy (tax) used to encourage (discourage)
the production of Y (X) is introduced. As a result production now takes
place at P°. Domestic commodity prices are uninfluenced by this
production tax-cum-subsidy so consumption takes place at C but theP s
distortion in production caused by the production subsidy implies a loss 
in welfare (Ups < U")-
There are various forms that a tax-cum-subsidy on factors use
(1) The analysis which follows in this section relies to some extent on 








may take. A subsidy (tax) on both the factors in one industry will
operate in the same way as a production tax-cum-subsidy. Similarly a
subsidy (tax) on the same factor in both industries also acts like a
production subsidy; this subsidy (tax) would only change the effective
factor price ratio by the same amount in both industries. A subsidy
(tax) on one factor in one industry, however, would cause a differential
in the factor price ratio between industries. This means production
takes place inside the production set, OAB in diagram 3. The production-
possibility curve would shrink (except at the corners) if this last type
of subsidy (tax) on factor use was applied at every level of output.
Also this type of tax-cum-subsidy will cause the economy to produce at a
point where DRT^FRT. This is depicted as the economy producing at P_,c
r  b
on the shrunken production-possibility curve. Domestic commodity prices
are left unchanged by this subsidy so consumption can take place at Cp^.
Again there would be a loss of welfare (no matter which kind of the tax-
cum-subsidies on factor use was used) because of the use of a„ (2 )distortionary subsidy (U < U ). 'r b
So far it has been shown that tax-cum-subsidies on exportables, 
production and factor use tend to encourage the economy to move away 
from the optimum free trade production point. A tariff would do the
(1) In terms of the Edgeworth box-diagram the economy operates off the 
contract curve at all levels of output except when all factors are 
used to produce Y or X.
(2) The tax-cum-subsidy on factor use of the form of subsidizing 
(taxing) both factors in one sector and taxing (subsidizing) one 
factor in the other sector would have the same sort of effect on 
resource allocation as the tax-cum-subsidy just on one factor - 
the case discussed in the main text.
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same thing. The correct sized tariff on the imports of Y will raise the 
domestic price of Y relative to X enough to induce production to shift 
from P'' to P°. But the use of a tariff will alter not only the relative 
price paid to domestic producers but also the relative commodity price 
paid by consumers. Thus instead of consumption taking place at , as 
would be the case if production subsidies were used to shift production 
to P°, consumption takes place at when a tariff is used. The use of 
a tariff to get the economy from P' to P°, in other words, causes a 
greater loss in welfare than when a tax-cum-subsidy on production is 
used (U^ < Up^), a welfare loss which ignores the effects on social 
welfare of expenditures made possible by the tariff revenue raised by 
assuming that this revenue is redistributed in a non-distortionary 
manner. This difference in the loss of welfare caused by the use of a 
tariff and the loss caused by the use of a tax-cum-subsidy on production, 
to move the economy to the same point on the production-possibility 
curve, may be called the consumption loss. Both forms of government 
intervention would have caused a production loss, however; the welfare 
loss caused by the economy moving away from the optimum production point.
Finally a tax-cum-subsidy on consumption will not alter the 
prices as paid to producers and, therefore, will not induce the economy 
to move away from P'’. The presence of this tax-cum-subsidy will alter 
the domestic prices, as seen by consumers, away from international prices 
so that the economy will not consume at C' but at say C which also
implies the community has suffered a loss in welfare (U < U^).
L* ü
What has been demonstrated, with the aid of diagrams 2 and 3 is 
that it is not only tariffs which causes a small economy, free of 
domestic distortions, to be diverted from its optimum position of
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production (the production point where, to cite Baba and Tatemoto, the 
economy "specialized in the lines of production in which it had 
comparative advantage.
There are two possibilities which might upset this conclusion. 
The first is if the highly unlikely event occurred that the various 
types of subsidies were applied to such a degree that they offset each 
other so that the Japanese economy ended up back at the optimum point of 
production. The second possibility is related to the first. If the 
tax-cum-subsidies were used only to eliminate distortions in the economy, 
the economy would be taken back to the optimum level of production.
The second possibility is taken up first. It was argued in
the previous section that probably there were distortions in the Japanese
economy. The authorities might have used subsidies for the purpose of
eliminating these distortions, thus taking the economy back to the
optimum point of production. But it was also pointed out that there
were other government economic targets not concerned with distortions.
If the authorities attempted to achieve these targets as well by using
tax-cum-subsidies, production distortions would have been created - the
economy would have been diverted away from the optimum point of
(2)production. This would not have occurred if the first possibility
(1) The implicit assumptions are made by Baba and Tatemoto that the 
Japanese economy was relatively small (this eliminates the 
possibility of foreign distortions caused by monopoly power) and 
that there were no domestic distortions.
(2) This is assuming that more than just a tax-cum-subsidy on 
consumption was used, which was the case.
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had t a k e n  p l a c e  -  t h e  v a r i o u s  ty p e s  o f  s u b s i d i e s  o f t s e t  each  o t h e r .
The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  h a v in g  happened  seems t o  be  v e ry  low in d e e d .
The c o n c l u s i o n  r e a c h e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  s t i l l  seems to  s t a n d  
up ;  t h a t  t h e  t a x - c u m - s u b s i d i e s  u sed  by th e  J a p a n e s e  a u t h o r i t i e s  would 
have  te n d e d  to  c a u s e  th e  J a p a n e s e  economy to  be  d i v e r t e d  away from  th e  
optimum p r o d u c t i o n  p o s i t i o n .  T h e re  i s ,  how ever ,  a s m a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  t a x - c u m - s u b s i d i e s  d id  n o t  c a u s e  t h i s  to  happen  f o r  t h e  
r e a s o n s  j u s t  e x p l a i n e d .  What i s  c e r t a i n  i s  t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  government 
d id  n o t  f o l l o w  a f r e e  t r a d e  p o l i c y  as  d e f in e d  i n  s e c t i o n  I ,  nam e ly ,  a 
p o l i c y  w hich  does  n o t  a l t e r  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  exchange  r a t e  and does  n o t  
a l t e r  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  to  p ro d u c e  and consume as  p ro v id e d  by t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s .
(1) The J a p a n e s e  community may s t i l l  have  been  w orse  o f f  i n  t h i s
s i t u a t i o n  th a n  i f  a f r e e  t r a d e  p o l i c y  had been  used  i n s t e a d  (even  
i f  d i s t o r t i o n s  t o o k  th e  economy away from t h e  optimum p r o d u c t i o n  
and c o n su m p tio n  p o i n t s )  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  r e s o u r c e s  u sed  up i n  
a d m i n i s t e r i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  s u b s i d i e s  ( t a x e s ) .
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SECTION IV
The analysis and results carried out in the previous section 
will help to establish what policy tools would have been the Paretian 
first-best ones to have employed in order to reach the identified 
government economic targets. The two cases of identified domestic 
distortions will be considered first.
A proposition established by Bhagwati and Ramaswami is:^
"If there is a distortion the Paretian first-best policy is to 
intervene with a tax (subsidy) at the point at which the distortion 
occurs."
In the case of the first distortion identified by Japanese 
governments in the Japanese economy between 1859 and 1899 (the factor 
price rigidity case) the Paretian first-best policy tool needed to 
relieve the unemployment problem, therefore, would have been a tax-cum- 
subsidy directed at encouraging the employment of labour in Japanese 
industry. In the initial period after the introduction of trade, when 
there was possibly factor immobility, the correct use of a tax-cum- 
subsidy on factor use would have brought the economy from G, in diagram
(1) The proposition is stated in this form in Jagdish Bhagwati,
V.K. Ramaswami and T.N. Srinivasan, "Domestic Distortions, Tariffs 
and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results",
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 77 (6) (Nov./Dec. 1969), 
pp. 1005-1010. In this article a more rigorous treatment is 
given for finding the basic results established by Jagdish Bhawati 
and V.K. Ramaswami in "Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory 
of the Optimum Subsidy", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 71 
(1) (Nov. 1963), pp. 44-50.
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4,^^ where the country is shown as not gaining from trade (U < U^), 
back to P, which represents the full employment production point; 
ignoring that there was unemployment amongst the samurai.
The form of the tax-cum-subsidy on factor use should have been
a tax on factor use in the industry producing X until factor prices in X
were the same as those ruling when the economy produced at the
(2)production point P before trade was introduced. The tax revenue
could then be used up subsidizing the employment of labour in the 
industry producing Y.
The use of an optimum factor tax-cum-subsidy to induce the 
economy to produce at P would have meant that the country was better off 
than it was during autarky because the country would have been able to 
use international trade to increase its consumption possibilities while 
continuing to produce at P. This implies that a tax-cum-subsidy on 
factor use would have been a superior policy tool to have used than a 
prohibitive tariff (U > U ), although it should be pointed out that of 
all the different sized tariffs that could have been used, a prohibitive 
tariff would have been the best as it would have allowed the economy to 
reach a higher level of welfare than any other. (U is the highest
(1) Diagram 4 reflects some of the results shown in diagram 1 although 
the production possibility curve CD has been left out of diagram 4. 
This diagram will also be used to demonstrate additional results, 
as will be seen below.
(2) After the introduction of trade the marginal revenue product of 
capital and labour would have risen by the same amount in the 
industry producing X because of the increased relative price of X, 
and the immobility of factors causing the marginal physical 
products of factors producing X to remain constant. The 
appropriate tax on factor use would implicitly tax away this 






social indifference curve that can be reached using a tariff.)
Since the tax-cum-subsidy on factor use would be of the same 
size for both factors then this form of government intervention may 
equally be called a production tax-cum-subsidy; the revenue from the 
tax on the production of X being employed to subsidize the production of 
Y. But whichever title is given to the tax-cum-subsidy, the tariff was 
a second-best policy tool to use to overcome the market imperfection 
being considered here. This is assuming that the country did not 
initially gain from trade. If the country did initially gain from trade 
while producing at the production point G in diagram 4 (this case is not 
shown) then the use of a free trade policy, which meant that 
unemployment remained, would have made the country better off than if a 
tariff had been used. A free trade policy would have been an inferior 
policy tool to have used, however, compared to a tax-cum-subsidy on 
factor use or production as the application of this policy tool would 
have allowed a production gain over the free trade policy. (This result 
is not demonstrated in diagram 4.) In other words, a tariff would have 
been a Paretian third-best policy tool to have used in the particular 
circumstances set out here - when the country gained from trade.
Presuming factors became more mobile after 1868, but that 
there was still some downward rigidity in the real wage paid to labour, 
(unemployment amongst the samurai is ignored) the appropriate use of a 
tax-cum-subsidy on factor use would have allowed production to take 
place along AB but south-east of P; the extent to which the economy 
could have moved along AB would have depended on how much more flexible 
the real wage rate became and how much more mobile factor became after 
the introduction of trade. If the real wage rate remained totally
50
inflexible downwards, and assuming that the terms of trade altered in 
such a way as to cause the real wage paid to labour to fall had there 
been factor price flexibility, then no matter how discriminately a tax- 
cum-subsidy on factor use may have been applied, and no matter how 
mobile factors of production may have been, the economy could have just 
regained fully employment by being induced to produce at P (the pre­
trade production point); only at this point on the production 
possibility curve would the factor price ratio have been such that the 
real wage rate was just high enough to bring about full employment; all 
real wage rates, implied by points of production on AB south-east of P, 
would have been too low to bring full employment. The use of a 
production tax-cum-subsidy could not have allowed the economy to reach 
any higher level of welfare and still attain full employment than that 
reached by using a tax-cum-subsidy on factor use; the economy would 
still have ended up producing at P if the production tax-cum-subsidy was 
appropriately applied.
As above, a tariff would have been an inferior policy tool to 
have used compared to the optimum tax-cum-subsidy on factor use or 
production. To bring about full employment a prohibitive tariff would 
need to have been applied. The consumption loss involved in using a 
tariff would have meant that the tariff would have been inferior to a 
production tax-cum-subsidy (U < Upg) as a policy tool to use to 
eliminate unemployment. It follows that in this case where factors are 
mobile and factor prices rigid downwards a tariff would have been the 
second-best policy tool to have used to eliminate unemployment amongst 
the non-saumvai labour force during the early Meiji era.
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In this case where factors were mobile it is more likely 
(relative to the factor immobility case) that the Japanese economy 
gained from the comparative static benefits of international trade. The 
economy is shown, in diagram 4, as gaining from international trade 
with the economy producing at H. In addition, diagram 4 demonstrates 
the possibility that not only would a free trade policy allow the 
economy to be better off than had a prohibitive tariff been used, but 
that this policy would be superior to the application of a production 
tax-cum-subsidy which brought about full employment (Up > Ups > U^). 
Whether it was optimal from a political point of view to follow this 
free trade policy along with there being unemployment is another matter.
Before determining the Paretian first-best policy tool that 
needed to be used to solve the unemployment problem amongst the samurai, 
something needs to be said about the nature of the production- 
possibility curves representing the production side of the Japanese 
economy when the samurai is excluded and included in the labour force.
At the optimum points of production including and excluding the samurai 
in the labour force (represented at P on AB and P* on CD respectively 
in diagram 1) the factor price ratios implied by these points are the 
same. (This is true of all points on AB and CD with the same slope; 
the same marginal rate of transformation.) This means that if the 
economy is at P , a tax-cum-subsidy on factor use which alters the 
factor price ratio will not induce the economy to move to P*.
It follows from these observations that if the economy is 
initially at P' the kind of policy tool required to bring full 
employment to the samurai, and take the economy to P*, is one which does 
not alter the factor price ratio but which increases the real wage paid
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to labour. Such a policy tool would be expansionary monetary and fiscal 
tools, although, because of the extra effective demand created by such a 
policy, the exchange rate will need to be devalued in order to maintain 
balance of payments equilibrium. The forms in which these tools could 
have been applied are numerous but the application needed to be non- 
discriminatory, such that domestic factor and commodity prices did not 
change. If the economy was initially on the production possibility 
curve, AB, at a point other than P^; for example, because of factor 
price downward inflexibility the economy needed to be at P to maintain 
full employment amongst the non-samurai workforce after the introduction 
of international trade; then again some form of monetary-fiscal policy 
was required to encourage the provision of employment opportunities for 
samurai. Certainly a tariff would not have improved the employment 
position of the samurai. The prohibitive tariff that was needed to 
bring full employment to the non-samurai sector of the labour force 
would not have raised the employment rate amongst the samurai; the 
prohibitive tariff would have induced a real wage rate which had been 
inadequate to bring employment to the samurai during autarky, so why 
should the same tariff, imposed after trade was introduced, increase 
the level of employment amongst the samurai when it had been inadequate 
to do this job before? The use of a prohibitive tariff, instead of the 
use of expansionary monetary and fiscal tools and a tax-cum-subsidy on 
production or factor use, to solve the total unemployment (non-samurai 
plus samurai unemployed) problem would have made the Japanese community 
worse off (U < U* in diagram 1).
Thus out of this discussion it has been established that the 
Paretian first-best policy tool that should have been used to eliminate 
unemployment amongst the Japanese labour force in the early Meiji era
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was an optimum tax-cum-subsidy on factor use or production and 
expansionary fiscal and monetary tools. For the period 1858 to about 
the early 1870s, a period during which unemployment amongst the samurai 
was not regarded as a problem, the first-best policy tool would have 
been an optimum tax-cum-subsidy on factor use, or production, alone. 
Certainly, compared to these policy tools, a tariff would have been an 
inferior policy tool to have employed in an attempt to reduce the level 
of unemployment throughout the whole period 1858 to 1899.
Before leaving this case of a domestic distortion something 
needs to be said about what possible effect the presence of tariffs and 
subsidies after 1858 might have had on the gains from trade argument 
presented in section II. It was demonstrated previously that the 
Japanese economy might not have gained from trade if factor price 
rigidity and factor immobility was present, all other things remaining 
the same except for the introduction of trade. But the presence of 
tariffs and subsidies after 1858 meant other things did not stay the 
same. The use of tariffs immediately after 1858, where it is assumed 
there was complete factor immobility, would have tended to shift the 
point of production, represented as the point G in diagram 4, towards 
the optimum point of production (P). In this case the welfare of the 
community would have tended to be raised by the presence of tariffs, 
compared to the totally free trade situation, although, in the initial 
hypothetical circumstances depicted in diagram 4 for the period 
immediately after trade was introduced in 1858, the Japanese economy 
would have been better off with no trade rather than a situation of 
trade, no tax-cum-subsidies and a tariff less than a prohibitive tariff.
Thus the presence of non-prohibitive tariffs in the Japanese 
economy in the initial period would not have allowed the economy to gain
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from trade if this economy did not gain from trade without the use of 
tariffs. If, on the other hand, the economy did gain from trade in this 
initial period, when no tariffs were present, then the application of 
the limited tariff protection available to the Japanese authorities 
would have reduced the gains from trade, but the economy still would 
have gained from trade, the tariff not being high enough to reintroduce, 
or maintain, autarky.
As factors become more mobile after 1868, but assuming the
downward rigidity of wages persisted, the welfare level reached by the
community might have moved above the autarkic level of welfare (U^ in
diagram 4). This possibility is shown in diagram 4 when the economy
produces at the production point H (U < U ). In this case the presencet r
of three per cent ad valorem tariff might have tended to diminish the 
level of welfare reached by the community below the free trade level. 
When a country gains from trade and factor price rigidity is present, 
the use of an incorrect sized tariff would lower the level of welfare 
reached by the community below the free trade level. The correct sized 
tariff would raise the welfare level reached above the free trade
level. (1)
These possibilities can easily be seen in diagram 4. If the 
economy was initially at the production point H, a tariff which took 
the production point onto an international price line parallel but above 
EH (the new production point would still be inside the production set
(1) The term "incorrect" does not mean non-optimum and the term
"correct" does not mean optimum. An "incorrect" sized tariff means 
one which takes the country below the free trade level of welfare 
when factor price rigidity is present and above the free trade 
level of welfare when a "correct" sized tariff is used. An optimum 
sized tariff may be thought of as one which takes the country to 
the highest level of welfare possible in the circumstances, even 
though full employment is not reached.
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OAB; i . e .  t h e r e  was s t i l l  unemployment) would make th e  c o u n t r y  b e t t e r  
o f f  i f  t h e  consum ption  l o s s  d id  n o t  t o t a l l y  o f f s e t  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  g a in .
A t a r i f f ,  w hich  to o k  t h e  p o i n t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  on to  a p r i c e  l i n e  below EH, 
would have  made th e  c o u n t r y  unam b ig u o u s ly  w orse  o f f .
Very much th e  same s o r t  o f  t h i n g  c an  be s a id  a b o u t  t h e  t a x -  
c u m - s u b s id i e s  on p r o d u c t i o n  u sed  a f t e r  1868. I f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  tax -c u m - 
s u b s id y  had b een  o f  t h e  c o r r e c t  s i z e ,  how ever ,  t h e r e  i s  l e s s  a m b ig u i ty  
a b o u t  w h e th e r  t h e  c o u n t r y  g a in e d  from t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  t a x - c u m - s u b s id y  
compared to  t h e  c a s e  o f  a t a r i f f ;  t h e  r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
c o n su m p tio n  l o s s  to  be  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  a s  t h e r e  i s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
u s e  o f  t a r i f f s .  ( I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d e te r m in e  w h e th e r  o t h e r  ty p e s  o f  
s u b s i d i e s  w ere  used  by t h e  M e i j i  governm ent b u t  p r o d u c t i o n  s u b s i d i e s  
w ere  c e r t a i n l y  u s e d . )  What can  be  added to  t h e  p r e v i o u s  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h a t  
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a p r o d u c t i o n  t a x - c u m - s u b s id y  o f  t h e  i n c o r r e c t  s i z e  
and k in d  m igh t  have  made th e  J a p a n e s e  community w orse  o f f  t h a n  under  
a u t a r k y .  B hagw ati h as  shown t h a t  i f  a s u b s id y  ( t a x )  on t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o f  i m p o r ta b l e s  ( e x p o r t a b l e s )  o f  a l a r g e  enough s i z e  i s  im posed , t h e  
economy may end up b e in g  w orse  o f f  t h a n  when t h e r e  was a u t a r k y .
T h is  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  shown i n  d iag ra m  4. By t a x i n g  X and s u b s i d i z i n g  Y 
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p o i n t  i s  ta k e n  from  H to  F. At t h i s  p o i n t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
w i t h  some t r a d e  t a k i n g  p l a c e ,  t h e  c o u n t r y  i s  w o rse  o f f  n o t  o n ly  compared 
t o  f r e e  t r a d e ,  b u t  a l s o  compared to  a u t a r k y  (U^ < U^). T h is  i s  n o t  a 
p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  c a s e  w here o n ly  t a r i f f s  a r e  u t i l i s e d ;  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a t a r i f f  c o u ld  o n ly  have  t a k e n  th e  economy, a t  w o r s t ,  to  
t h e  a u t a r k i c  l e v e l  o f  w e l f a r e ,  b u t  no lo w e r ,  a ssum ing  t h a t  t h e r e  was
(1) J a g d i s h  B hagw ati ,  "The G a in s  from  T ra d e  Once A g a in " ,  Oxford 
Eoonomio Papers , V o l .  20 (1 9 6 8 ) ,  pp . 1 37 -148 .
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full employment bouh in autarky and after the application of the 
prohibitive tariff.
If the production of exportables (importables) had been 
subsidised (taxed), the country might also have been worse off, than 
if there had been no trade, as long as exports were inferior in social 
consumption. This possibility is not shown in diagram 4 as the problem 
of inferior goods has been assumed anyway, which seems to be a reasonable 
assumption about the Meiji economy. (See section II above for this 
assumption.)
From this analysis it follows that assuming there was factor 
price rigidity present in the Japanese economy and no other distortion, 
there is no way of knowing whether the Japanese economy gained from the 
comparative static benefits of trade at the same time that tariffs and 
subsequently subsidies were imposed (unless, of course, the impossible 
task was accomplished of actually measuring the welfare gains and 
losses from trade for the period being considered). The outcome 
would have depended on the extent of factor price rigidity and factor 
mobility, the size of the change in commodity prices after trade was 
introduced and whether the tariffs and subsidies imposed were of the 
correct size, given the path of adjustment from the initial free trade 
position of production and consumption to the autarkic position of 
production and consumption and beyond. There may have been no correct 
tariff, or production tax-cum-subsidy, if the path of adjustment had 
always been below the international price line EH in diagram 4. In the 
case of the tariff, even if the path of adjustment of production had 
been above EH at some stage, if the consumption path of adjustment was 
always below U there would have been no tariff of the correct sizer
(1) See section II above for a more detailed discussion of this point.
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except a zero tariff.
The second set of distortions identified in the infant- 
industry case, namely, externalities of various kinds and capital 
market imperfections, also should have been removed by intervention 
with a tax (subsidy) at the point where the distortion occurred. For 
example, the problem of risk should have been attacked by providing 
better market and production information to all who needed it; 
technological externalities should have been offset by creating pilot 
plants and/or subsidizing private firms to do the learning, so long as 
the knowledge gained was made freely available to those who wanted it; 
labour training externalities could have been eliminated by the 
authorities establishing training facilities of various kinds and/or 
arranging for those generally trained to pay directly or indirectly for 
the costs of the training received from privately owned enterprises. 
This should have been, at least, the general line of attack on these 
problems; a line of attack which the Meiji government employed.
The use of tariffs, on the other hand, would have created 
consumption losses in the attempt to eliminate the learning 
externalities. In addition a tariff would not necessarily have 
stimulated the sort of processes required to overcome the externalities 
in the infant industry. The use of tariffs, in an attempt to create 
the environment required to assist the process of gaining experience of 
new techniques of production in the infant industry, may rather have 
only attracted firms into the industry which used technically 
inefficient methods of production and also tended to drive out of the
(1) See W.W. Lockwood, The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, 
passim.
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industry firms previously willing to invest in developing the new 
techniques of production; the tariff gives no direct incentive to 
firms to invest in learning new techniques of production but rather 
only provides the incentive for the industry to expand production which 
may, or may not, indirectly encourage the learning process. Similar 
sorts of remarks also may be made with respect to the training of 
labour; the tariff provides no direct assistance to the training of 
labour in general skills and, therefore, the tariff may not assist in 
this task. Finally, it is not at all clear that the application of a 
tariff would have assisted a firm in determining the degree of risk 
involved in investing in the infant industry for the firm needs to 
assess the risks after the tariff has been removed; just the situation 
which did not exist. Rather the Japanese authorities should have 
assisted the assessment of these risks by directly subsidising the 
collection of the relevant information and making it readily available 
to all entrants, or potential entrants into the industry.
So from the production, and the consumption side, the tariff 
would have been an inferior policy tool to have used to eliminate the 
distortions created by the presence of infant industries in the Japanese 
economy. Direct production tax-cum-subsidies of the appropriate kind 
would have been the first-best policy tools to have used, if they were 
required at all to allow the development of an infant industry.
In the case of one infant industry, however, there is some
(1) This is a very brief statement of the points made by Baldwin in 
criticisms of the use of tariffs to protect infant industries. 
See R.E. Baldwin, "The Case Against Infant Industry Protection", 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 77 (1969), pp. 295-305.
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doubt as to whether government assistance was required to establish it. 
From 1878 on the Japanese authorities did provide various forms of 
assistance to the infant cotton textile industry; in particular, model 
mills of two thousand spindle each were established by the government 
and credit facilities were provided to private firms establishing 
cotton spinning mills. Yet the first economically successful 
enterprise in this field came in 1883 with the Osaka Cotton Spinning 
Company establishing itself without government assistance and proceding 
to pay a dividend of six per cent from the first year of production and 
thirty per cent five years later. Once this firm had shown that
production had to be of a relatively large scale (the Osaka Company 
began production with ten and a half thousand spindles compared to the 
average firm size, up to 1883, of two thousand spindles) and that steam 
power needed to be used instead of water power (as had previously been 
the case) new firms soon followed in successfully establishing 
themselves in the industry. Whether the success of this industry in 
establishing itself would have been so dramatic without the initial 
government assistance given before 1883 is open to doubt, but it would 
appear that a reasonable case could be made, based on the historical 
facts just presented, for stating that no government assistance, tariff 
assistance or otherwise, was required to establish the infant cotton 
spinning industry in Meiji Japan. (This probably was not the case in 
other industries, however, where a higher level of technical skill and
(1) See K. Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan (Tokyo, Japanese Society 
for the Promotion of Science, 1956), p. 15 ff.
Also see J. Hirschmeier, "Shibuzawa Eiichi: Industrial Pioneer" 
(esp. pp. 225-229) in W.W. Lockwood,The State and Economic 
Enterprise in Japan> op. cit.
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knowledge was required in production.) This is not to say that some 
assistance was not required to compensate the learning firm(s) for any 
reduced profits caused by the relevant externalities to be found in 
this infant industry; but compensating a firm for these reduced 
profits and providing assistance to establish the infant industry can 
be two different things.
To summarise the discussion so far in this section it has 
been shown that given the two cases of domestic distortions in the 
Japanese economy, as implicitly identified by the Japanese authorities 
for the period 1866 to 1899, that the lack of tariff autonomy did not 
act as an impediment in eliminating these economic distortions; the 
appropriate tax-cum-subsidy and monetary and fiscal tools would have 
been the Paretian first-best policy tool to have used for this task, 
and not a tariff. What would have been the Paretian first-best policy 
tools to have used to reach the other economic targets of the Meiji 
government?
The third economic target identified in section II was that 
of changing income distribution. Within the framework of the model 
used so far, with fixed factor supplies and perfect competition, the 
ideal policy tool to have used to redistribute income would have been 
lump-sum taxes and transfers of the revenue raised. If the basic 
assumption of the model did not hold a combination of tax-cum-transfers 
could have been devised which brought about the desired redistribution 
of income in a non-distortionary manner. It is true, however, that in 
practice it would have been unlikely that the optimum selection of tax- 
cum-subsidies could have been devised to reach the desired target, even 
if the Meiji government had had perfect knowledge. It is possible, in
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fact, that the distortions created by the inappropriate use of taxes 
(subsidies) might have made everyone worse off after the introduction 
of trade than during a state of autarky.^ This argument, however, 
does not show that a tariff would have been the first-best policy tool 
to have used to redistribute income; the use of the appropriate taxes 
(subsidies) correctly applied would have been the Paretian first-best 
policy tool to have used to redistribute income in Japanese economy of 
the Meiji era, and not the use of tariffs.
The fourth target, increased industrial production, required 
the use of a production tax-cum-subsidy if the Paretian first-best 
policy tool was to be used for the task. Implicitly this has already 
been shown above in diagram 3; a tax on the production of X (say 
agriculture) and a subsidy on the production of Y (say manufacturing 
industries) would increase the level of industrial production along AB; 
a tariff, applied to increase industrial production to the same level 
as that achieved by a production tax-cum-subsidy (to P° in diagram 3), 
would create the extra welfare loss of a consumption loss. A subsidy 
(tax) on a single factor used in Y(X) would also be an inferior policy 
tool to use as it would create a distortion in the factor market and 
thereby take the economy inside the production set OAB. To produce the 
desired amount of Y (achieved when the economy produces at P° on AB) 
the production point on the contracted production possibility curve
(1) This point has already implicitly been made above when considering 
the inappropriate use of a production tax-cum-subsidy (which 
amongst other things would redistribute income) which made the 
country worse off compared to autarky. Samuelson has made the 
point far more generally. See P.A. Samuelson, "The Gains from 
Internation Trade Once Again", Economic Journaly Vol. 72 (1962), 
pp. 820-829.
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would be on a price line below that reached if a production tax-cum- 
subsidy is used {viz. below P°C ) . (This case is shown in diagram 3.)
I J
So again the use of a tariff would have been an inferior policy tool to 
have used to increase the level of industrial production to some given 
level in the Meiji economy; a production tax-cum-subsidy would have 
been the Paretian first-best policy tool to have used.
This argument is in terms of comparative static analysis; 
what happens when economic growth is allowed for in the trade model?
In this case it is possible that the use of a tariff, instead of a 
production tax-cum-subsidy, would have resulted in the Japanese economy 
becoming worse off, even though the economy had experienced some 
economic growth. This possibility is demonstrated in diagrams 5a and 
5b. In diagram 5a a production tax-cum-subsidy increases the output of 
Y (manufacturing) to Y. Growth takes place and the economy must gain 
welfare from this change in the economy if the output of Y is still 
constrained at Y. However, if a tariff is used for the same purpose, 
the economy may actually be worse off after this economic growth has 
taken place. This possibility is shown in diagram 5 b . ^  Of course 
this possible loss of welfare as a result of economic growth, 
immiserizing growth, can only take place over a certain range of output. 
Eventually the economy could grow large enough that, even with 
constraining the output of Y to Y with the use of a tariff, the economy 
would find itself on a higher social indifference curve than U.
(1) This possiblity is demonstrated in J.N. Bhagwati, "The Generalized 
Theory of Distortion and Welfare", in Bhagwati, et. al. 3 Trade, 
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The next policy objective of the Meiji government to be 
discussed is that of reducing imports to some level with the purpose of 
maintaining balance of payments equilibrium. On this occasion a tariff 
is the Paretian first-best policy tool to use to reach the desired 
objective. In diagram 6 the country is shown as reaching a certain 
level of welfare (U) after a tariff has been used. As can be seen in 
the diagram, the appropriate application of a tax-cum-subsidy on 
production, or on consumption, or on a single factor, to allow the 
country to reach the same level of welfare would not reduce imports by 
as much as the use of a tariff. This implies that if the authorities 
wished to reduce imports to the level achieved by the use of tariffs, 
the particular tax-cum-subsidy would need to be increased; this would 
reduce the level of welfare attained below that reached after using a 
tariff.
If the economic target of the Meiji government had been just 
to reduce the level of imports, and no more, then a tariff would have 
been the Paretian first-best policy tool to have been used to reach this 
target. Such a target may be thought of as one only concerned with 
reaching self-sufficiency in the Japanese economy or, in other words, 
reducing the volume of trade. But, as far as it was possible to 
determine, this was not the actual economic target of the Meiji 
government during the period 1868-1899. Rather the economic objective 
of reducing the level of imports was aimed only at achieving balance-of
(1) A mathematical proof of this proposition, and that of using a
production tax-cum-subsidy to increase the level of production in 
a sector to a given level, is provided by Jagdish Bhagwati and 
T.N. Srinivasan in "Optimal Intervention to Achieve Non-Economic 
Objectives", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 36 (1) (January 
1969), pp. 27-38. Diagram 6 is based on one used by Johnson, 





payments equilibrium, and not at achieving self-sufiiciency.
Given that this was the case then it should be questioned 
whether a tariff would have been the first-best policy tool to have used 
to reach this target. The policy tools usually singled out as being the 
one most suited for maintaining balance-of-payments equilibrium are that 
of the government occasionally altering the exchange rate as required, 
or, even better, of allowing the exchange rate to f l u c t u a t e . T h e  
argument usually raised against the use of a fluctuating exchange rate 
is based on the proposition that the uncertainty of international trade 
is increased because of the possible unexpected alterations in the 
exchange rate. As a result, the volume of trade taking place when a 
fluctuating exchange rate is used to manage a country’s international 
monetary arrangements is lower than when a fixed exchange rate is 
maintained and alternative tools used to maintain balance-of-payments 
equilibrium.
To answer this criticism brief reference needs to be made to 
the historical facts. Where countries have allowed the exchange rate 
to fluctuate the exchange rate has not shown wide and unpredictable
(1) The reasons why the use of a fluctuating exchange rate is superior 
to occasional alterations in the exchange rate by government 
decree are surveyed in Anne 0. Krueger, "Balance-of-Payments 
Theory", The Journal of Economic Literature> Vol. VI (1) (March, 
1969), particularly pp. 17-18.
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oscillations.^^ This implies that the use of a flexible exchange rate 
did not increase the amount of uncertainty in international trade 
between these economies using flexible exchange rates and the outside 
world; in short, these economies did not experience chaos in their 
international trading relations with the rest of the world because of 
their use of a flexible exchange rate.
The final argument established earlier was that the Meiji
government needed to use tariffs to raise revenue and give greater
flexibility to the revenue-raising side of fiscal policy. It was
pointed out earlier, when considering the income redistribution
argument, that the Paretian optimum tax is a lump-sum tax of some sort.
The use of this tax system would not have created any distortions in the
(2)economy whereas the use of a tariff would have done just that. Again
it seems reasonable to suppose that if the strong assumptions needed to 
show that a lump-sum tax is the Paretian first-best tax are violated, 
that a set of taxes, not including the use of a tariff, could be devised 
which did not create distortions. It also seems reasonable to expect 
that these taxes would have provided flexibility to fiscal policy, 
although perhaps not all the flexibility that the Meiji government 
required for it to reach all its economic targets as soon as possible.
(1) The U.S. dollar (between 1862 to 1879) and the Canadian dollar 
(between 1950 to 1962), for example, were allowed to fluctuate.
Also see L.B. Yeager's study of the Austrian and Russian experience 
of the use of a fluctuating exchange rate between 1879-91.
L.B. Yeager, "Fluctuating Exchange rates in the Nineteenth Century: 
The Experiences of Austria and Russia", in R.A. Mundell and 
A.K. Swoboda (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969), pp. 61-90.
(2) It is assumed that the revenue raised by either taxes or a tariff 
is spent by the government in exactly the same way.
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SECTION V
What was determined in the previous section, amongst other 
things, was that a tariff would have always been, at least, the Paretian 
second-best policy tool to have used to achieve the identified economic 
targets of the Meiji government. This means that in a world of perfect 
flexibility in the use of policy tools the lack of tariff autonomy was 
not a constraint on the Meiji government in its attempts to reach its 
economic objectives for a superior policy tool was always theoretically 
available to reach the economic targets the Meiji government set for 
itself.
But would the Meiji government always have used these 
alternative policy tools? For a number of reasons it possibly would 
not. The first, and most obvious reason, was that the Meiji did not 
possess perfect knowledge. The second reason is that the Meiji 
government may have been precluded from using the non-tariff policy 
tools to reach the relevant economic objectives. If this case of 
constrained flexibility in the use of policy tools existed in Meiji 
Japan would not a tariff have been the optimum policy tool to have used 
in these circumstances to achieve government goals? This case will be 
considered below but before doing so the issue of the lack of perfect 
knowledge will be discussed first.
The proposition that there was a lack of perfect knowledge 
about the optimum use of policy tools explains some of the actions of 
the Meiji government. In particular, the government would not use a
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flexible exchange rate, or even a devaluation of the exchange rate, to 
bring equilibrium to the balance-of-payments which was in deficit for 
most of the period considered here; by the time Japan found herself on 
the silver standard, more by accident than design, in 1878, the 
exchange rate had come to be regarded as fixed by the authorities.
When drastic action was taken during the period 1881 to 1885 to remove 
the balance-of-payments deficits a deflationary monetary and fiscal 
policy was used for this task.
The lack of perfect knowledge did not mean that the Meiji 
government was precluded from using the correct policy tool to reach a 
given target. On occasions the Meiji government, by chance, appears to 
have used the theoretically correct policy tool. This seems to have 
been the case when the government aided infant industries and attempted 
to encourage the expansion of industrial output with the use of the 
correct type of production tax-cum-subsidies - at least the correct 
type of subsidies if not the correct kind of taxes. Since it would 
appear that the Japanese authorities, judging by their statements 
opposing the lack of tariff autonomy and the fact that tariffs were 
imposed after 1899, would have used tariffs between 1858 and 1899 had 
they been allowed to do so, it follows that at least part of the reason 
why the Japanese authorities chanced upon employing the theoretically 
correct policy tool was the fact that they were precluded from 
utilising tariffs.
Apparently even less intentional was the Japanese authorities 
implicit depreciation of the exchange rate, a policy action which 
tended to bring the balance of payments nearer to equilibrium. This 
was the result of the fact that the Japanese economy was on the silver
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Standard from 1878 until 1897 (the year when the Japanese economy went 
onto the gold standard) and that the price of silver depreciated in 
terms of gold during this time period. Since Japan did most of her 
trading with countries on the gold standard these facts implied a 
depreciation of the Japanese exchange rate. Usually these implicit 
depreciations were not large enough to eliminate the Japanese trade 
deficits in the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s, although the sharp fall in the 
price of silver, relative to gold, in the early 1890s saw the balance 
of trade in approximate equilibrium for this period.^
Turning to the second reason mentioned above, of why the 
Meiji government may not have employed other policy tools in place of 
tariffs, it could be argued that the government did not possess the 
flexible taxation system (in the early Meiji period at least) which was 
required if the government wished to introduce all the tax-cum- 
subsidies, recommended in the previous section, to enable this 
government to reach its economic objectives. If this was the case then 
a tariff becomes appealing as a policy tool to be exploited for its use 
not only provides protection to import competing industries in need of 
assistance but also it provides revenue (assuming a prohibitive tariff 
is not used) which the government then may employ to finance economic 
development projects. While this method of raising revenue does impose 
a consumption loss (assuming there are no consumption distortions 
present in the economy which are offset by the tariff) and possibly a
(1) For general information on the de faeto devaluation of the Japanese 
exchange rate see H.T. Patrick, "External Equilibrium and Internal 
Convertibility: Financial Policy in Meiji Japan", The Journal
of Economic History, Vol. XXV (1965), pp. 187-213. On the factual 
information about the growth of Japanese trade during the Meiji era 
see Baba and Tatemoto, "Foreign Trade", op. cit.
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production loss (depending on the sort of domestic distortions in the 
economy and whether the tariff is imposed optimally to eliminate these 
distortions, if any) on the community, whereas the use of lump-sum 
taxes do not, the revenue raised may finance highly profitable 
investment projects which otherwise would not be taken advantage of by 
the community because of the government's limited revenue raising 
facilities.
There is a certain coqency in this line of argument for making
use of tariffs,^ an argument which appears to underlie the views of
Takahashi, and Ohkawa and Rosovsky (as cited above in the introduction to
this essay) although they do not make this point in anywhere near enough
detail. But the question that needs to be answered is whether the
government needed to intervene in the first place by financing these
investment projects. The only essentially economic argument supporting
government intervention in the economy is if there was some impediments
in the operation of the market which prevented the Pareto-efficient
(2)allocation of resources. If no such impediments existed then the
government need not intervene in the economy in order to improve the 
social welfare, i.e. the development, of the economy, for economic 
incentives to private individuals should have been adequate for inducing
(1) This argument was presented, accepted and accordingly analysed in 
relatively general terms in J. Vanek, "Tariffs, Economic Welfare 
and Development Potential", Economic Journal, 81 (1971), pp. 904- 
913. Vanek fails to make the sort of general observations made in 
the main text below.
(2) This argument ignores income distribution consideration; these 
will be returned to below.
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them to invest in socially profitable development projects.
But clearly there were areas of market distortions in the
Japanese economy in the Meiji period, as was pointed out in section II
above, which called for government intervention. Whether, or not, the
lack of flexible government revenue raising facilities prevented these
distortions from being eliminated to the optimum degree, assuming the
authorities had perfect knowledge, is, however, an issue open to debate.
An historical fact that should be taken into account in assessing this
issue is that, unlike less developed countries of today, the late
Tokugawa and early Meiji governments did possess a well developed
taxation system which provided enough revenue for the government to
establish a number of industrial projects, build and run railway and
(2)telegraph systems and begin to modernise the defence system. In
addition the authorities could have used expansionary monetary policy 
to assist in financing the government expenditures. Such a policy may, 
or may not, have been inflationary depending on the amount of 
underutilised, or unutilised, resources in the economy. If inflation 
did result then the expansionary monetary policy was an indirect (but 
distortionary) tax on real cash balances held by the public. The Meiji 
government did in fact employ this policy tool for financing government
(1) This is not to say that the government should not invest in these 
projects, as long as it allocates resources efficiently according 
to the market determined factor and product price ratios. But by 
so doing it has not increased the economic welfare of the 
community if a private firm had been willing to make these 
investments. On the other hand, it also has not caused a 
deterioration or loss of welfare in the community if the 
government allocated the resources it controlled efficiently.
(2) In particular see E.S. Crawcour, "The Tokugawa Heritage" (esp. 
p. 32), in W.W. Lockwood, The State and Eoonomie Enterprise in 
Japan, op. oit.
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expenditures to some extent during the 1870s, but deficits in the 
balance of payments caused by this inflation (although more 
fundamentally caused by the authorities' attachment to a fixed exchange 
rate) induced the government to reverse this policy in the 1880s to one 
of inducing lower rates of inflation.
This sketch of the relevant historical facts indicates that 
the amount of revenue raised by these methods may have been adequate 
for the task of providing the subsidies required to offset the 
initially identified distortions, or at least in the longer term when 
factors of production became more mobile and factor prices more flexible. 
What still has to be taken into account is the possibility that the use 
of tax-cum-subsidies in turn may have created subsidiary economic costs. 
In particular, because of the Japanese government's limited revenue 
raising facilities it would have been forced to raise revenue via non­
lump-sum taxes, or via taxes not imposed at the point of distortion in 
the economy, which almost certainly would have created consumption and/ 
or production distortions elsewhere in the economy. In addition, there 
would have been administrative costs involved in raising tax revenue in 
the methods mentioned above. Also there was the administrative costs 
of distributing the subsidies and, finally, probably the subsiduary 
cost of not being able to apply the subsidy at the actual point in the 
economy required but rather indirectly subsidising in part economic 
activities which did not require assistance.
On taking all these economic costs of applying tax-cum- 
subsidies into account it may have transpired that the Japanese 
community would have been better off if it had been free to apply a 
tariff. In the case of tariff, while a consumption loss is imposed,
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no further costs from economic distortions created from raising revenue 
are i m p o s e d . Also the administrative costs of imposing a tariff may 
have been lower, compared to a tax-cum-subsidy, for it would have been 
relatively easy to police the imposition of tariffs at the limited 
ports of entry of imports, while there were no administrative costs 
involved with providing the production subsidies implicitly supplied by 
the imposition of tariffs. However, there almost certainly was the 
subsidiary cost involved with using a tariff of not being able to 
apply the tariff with precision at the most efficient point required to 
assist the economy to reach the desired economic objective. But 
whether, or not, in the case of the Meiji economy, the costs of 
imposing a tax-cum-subsidy turned out to be greater than the costs that 
would have resulted from applying a tariff is an empirical question. 
Nonetheless, it may be possible to provide at least some qualitative 
observations which may help to provide a partial answer to this question.
Such an answer may begin by noting that the administrative 
costs of imposing a tariff to provide revenue probably would have been 
less than using alternative methods to raise the revenue needed to 
provide an explicit production subsidy. As pointed out above, the 
costs of administering a tariff probably would have been relatively low 
compared to the major method of raising revenue in Japan in the late 
Tokugawa and early Meiji period; namely, a land tax based on the 
agricultural sector which was imposed via a relatively complex 
administrative structure and which also induced costs to be incurred by
(1) This statement assumes that no subsidiary production distortions 
are created by the tariff; the tariff is assumed to just tend to 
offset production distortions. If this is not the case then this 
implied distortionary cost must also be taken into account.
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tax payers in their attempts to evade the taxes i m p o s e d . A l s o  as 
implied in the previous paragraph, the administrative costs of 
providing the implicit subsidy for production via a tariff certainly 
would have been less than in the case of a production subsidy; the 
administrative costs of providing the production subsidy via a tariff 
was zero but certainly was some positive amount in the case of an 
explicit subsidy provided out of government tax revenue.
The issue of the likely relative size of the subsidiary 
distortions created by applying a tax-cum-subsidy compared to a tariff 
is a far more complex topic than the one just discussed. To begin this 
aspect of the discussion consideration will first be given to the issue 
of the distortions created by raising government revenue to finance the 
provision of subsidies.
It is assumed for the time being that there is full employment 
in the early Meiji period. In addition a number of what seem to be 
reasonably realistic assumptions will be made about the Meiji economy. 
First, it is assumed that there was a production externality in the 
manufacturing sector (which produced the importables Y) which caused an 
over-production of agricultural commodities (produced in the sector 
providing exportables X) compared to the Pareto-optimum level. In 
order to correct for this distortion a land tax is levied on the 
agricultural sector to raise revenue to finance a production subsidy, 
but this tax is assumed to cause production and consumption distortions.
(1) On this question of evasion of the land tax see James Nakamura, 
"Agricultural Production in Japan, 1878-1922", in W.W. Lockwood
(ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Modem Japan, op. cit. 
and J. Nakamura, Agricultural Production and the Economic 
Development of Japan 1873-1922 (Princeton University Press, 1966)» 
Chapters 2 and 4.
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The production distortion caused by this land tax would tend to cause 
the over-production of Y and the under-production of X. This means 
that this production distortion would go in the opposite direction to 
the production distortion caused by the externality in the 
manufacturing sector. For the time being it is assumed that these 
distortions are not offsetting and that the distortion resulting from 
the externality is larger. The consumption distortion created by the 
imposed land tax would tend to cause an over-consumption of importables 
(Y) and an under-consumption of exportables (X).
These assumptions are depicted in diagram 7 where, because of 
these distortions, the economy is shown as producing at P and consuming 
at C. In addition, these distortions of the relevant price ratios are 
shown to be identical in size, an assumption which will be returned to 
below. Now the provision of the production subsidy out of government 
revenue to offset the production distortion will improve the welfare of 
the community. But in the set of circumstances depicted in diagram 7, 
with the land tax still being maintained at its initial level, the 
community would have been better off with the use of a tariff. The 
reason, of course, being that the tariff affects the product prices 
as seen by both consumers and producers; in other words, in a 
distortion free economy, the application of a tariff causes a distortion 
in both the production of national income and the way this national 
income is valued in consumption; and what is more the changes in both 
the relevant price ratios are in the right direction, of raising the 
price of Y (importables) relative to the price of X (exportables), for 
there to be an improvement in the community's welfare. With both the 
consumption and the production distortions being offset by the tariff 




tariff than the application of a small production subsidy, where this 
subsidy only influences the product price ratio as seen by producers. 
Indeed, because the initial production and consumption distortions are 
assumed to be of the same size, the application of a tariff of the 
correct size would allow the economy to go t;o the optimum production 
point where all assumed distortions are just offset; viz. the tariff 
is the first-best policy tool, equal to the separate use, if it were 
administratively possible, of the correct forms of production and 
consumption tax-cum-subsidies to offset the relevant distortions. If 
these distortions were not equal, but went in the direction depicted 
in diagram 7, then the application of a tariff would still have allowed 
the community to have reached a higher level of welfare, than the 
application of a production subsidy, for the reasons outlined above.
Clearly this result is based on assumptions which if relaxed, 
in order to comply more closely with the historical facts, may not be 
valid. The first assumption to be reconsidered concerns the direction 
of the production distortion. If this distortion caused by the 
application of the land tax more than completely offset the production 
distortion caused by externalities in the manufacturing sector (Y), 
then the economy may have produced at say V' in diagram 7. In this 
case a small production subsidy given for the production of X (not Y) 
unambiguously would have improved the community's welfare, even though 
the consumption distortion persisted. This is not the case had a tariff 
been applied; the application of a small tariff on importables (Y) 
would have reduced the consumption distortion but increased the 
production distortion (the production of Y would have been subsidised by 
the tariff), thus it is not certain that a tariff would have improved
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the welfare of the community. (1) Whether this case of an initial over-
(1) This possibly also can be demonstrated mathematically by employing 
a model devised by Bhagwati, Ramaswarai and Srinivasan in "Domestic 
Distortions", ibid. It can be shown that the welfare-function 
U(Ci,C2) (where Ci is the consumption level of the exportables and 
C2 the consumption level of importables) can be manipulated to 
give
dU = U2[dXi (Pf~Pt) + (Xi-CO dpf + (Pc~Pf) dCj. [1]
= marginal utility derived from commodity i which is assumed to 
be positive.
p^ . = the world price of exportables relative to importables, or
the average terms of trade. If there is no monopoly in trade 
then pf = FRT.
Pt = DRT = -dX2/dXi, as seen by producers.
Pc = DRS as seen by consumers.
Assuming that there is no monopoly power in trade means that 
dp^ = 0. (This is an assumption that will be returned to in 
the main text below.) If there is a production distortion and a 
consumption distortion pc^p and p ^p_. Thus equation [1] reduces to f t c f
dU = U2[dXi (p -p ) + (p -p ) dC!] . [2]t t c t
The application of a small tariff will cause the production of 
exportables to fall (dXi negative) and the consumption of 
exportables to rise (dCi positive). In the case of interest in 
the main text (p^-p ) is positive and (p -p^) is also positive. 
Thus the first termtwithin the brackets fn equation [2] is 
negative, and the second term is positive. Thus it is not 
possible to say whether dU will be positive or not.
If a production subsidy is used to encourage the production 
of the exportable dXi is positive while dCi is zero. As a result 
dU is positive, which means that in this case the community 
unambiguously gains from the application of a subsidy.
Of course other cases can be demonstrated using equation [2]. 
In particular it may be shown that the application of a small 
tariff will cause an unambiguous rise in welfare; this will occur 
if (p^-p ) is negative and (p -p ) is positive. Also with this 
assumption about the relative signs of these price ratios, plus 
the assumption that | p p t | = |p -p^|, the tariff may bring the 
economy to the optimum production and consumption point. At this 
point |p -p I = |p -p I = 0 and, therefore, dU = 0, which is what 
is required for the Pareto-optimum to be achieved. This is the 
case demonstrated in diagram 7, with the economy initially 
producing at P and consuming at C.
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production of importables (Y), relative to the Pareto-optimum 
production point, is a reasonable historical possibility is open to 
conjecture, although it would seem reasonable to assert that overall 
the net production distortion rather led to an over-production of X 
relative to Y.
There is no need to become involved with considering this 
assertion in more detail without first considering the other relevant 
assumptions made above. The assumption was made that the land tax 
would have been maintained at its initial level even though a tariff 
was applied. Whether or not this is a reasonable assumption to make 
is impossible to say because a tariff was not applied during the period 
being considered. As easily can be shown, lack of precision on this 
point makes it very difficult to determine whether a tariff would have 
been a superior policy tool to have applied compared to a tax-cum- 
subsidy. If the land tax was not applied, and the revenue from the use 
of a tariff is utilised to meet any government expenditures, then the 
consumption distortion imposed by the land tax would have disappeared 
and the initial production distortion almost certainly would have been 
such that there was an over-production of X relative to the Pareto- 
optimum production point. In this case the application of a small 
tariff, where there is no land tax being imposed, may have made the 
community worse off compared to the case where a land tax and a small 
production subsidy was applied.
This possibility is demonstrated in diagram 8. The initial 
production position is at P as a result of a production distortion.
(It is assumed that the imposition of a land tax does not impose a 
production distortion. The relaxation of this assumption need not
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influence the results outlined here.) The imposilion of the land tax 
causes a consumption distortion which causes the economy to be on the 
community indifference curve Ui. The application of the production 
subsidy would allow the economy to go to U2; there is an unambiguous
improvement in welfare in the community with the application of this
production subsidy (U2>Ui). If a tariff is imposed, with no land tax 
being applied, the initial position of consumption, before the 
imposition of the tariff, is at C3. After applying the tariff the 
production distortion will be reduced but a consumption distortion will 
be created so that the economy goes to say C2. This means that the 
community is worse off after the application of the tariff (Ui<U3).
Also, in the possible outcome demonstrated in diagram 8, the economy 
is worse off from the application of a tariff, with no land tax being 
imposed, compared to where a land tax and a production subsidy is 
applied (U2>U1).(1)
There appears to be little point in discussing the case of 
relaxing the assumption that there is full employment in the economy 
for again the result as to which policy tool was preferable, a land- 
tax-cum-production-subsidy or a tariff, would depend on the assumption 
as to whether, or not, the land tax was maintained after the tariff 
was imposed; even if it were maintained the size of land taxes imposed 
would become relevant for determining the conclusion reached about the
(1) This result could be confirmed by reference to equation [2] in the 
previous footnote and carrying out the appropriate analysis 




relative superiority of a particular policy t o ol.^
It would seem reasonable to assume, however, that the land tax
would have been maintained at very much the same level after a tariff
was introduced as before its introduction. The reason for making this
assertion is that the authorities in the early Meiji period, judging by
their stated views, were particularly eager to develop manufacturing
industry in Japan and were quite prepared to employ government
(2)intervention to achieve this objective. It follows that these
authorities would have tended to have utilised all the revenue raising 
facilities open to them to achieve their economic goals for the 
Japanese economy, which implied that the land tax would have been 
maintained even if a tariff had been available for revenue raising 
purposes. If this surmise is correct then in the case of the Japanese 
economy of the early Meiji period where tax distortions were present, 
a tariff may well have been a preferable policy tool to have used, 
compared to a tax-cum-subsidy. Before coming to a more definite 
conclusion of this matter, however, something still has to be said 
about the likely nature of the production distortions. It was asserted 
above that there was an over-production (under-production) of the 
exportable X (importable Y) relative to the Pareto-optimum. The 
reason for this assertion is based on the belief that the production 
externalities in the manufacturing sector were likely to be far greater
(1) Obviously if the land tax were maintained but the size of the land 
was next to insignificant then the results outlined above, where 
the land tax is removed, would remain virtually untouched.
(2) See Beasley, The Meiji Restoration3 op. cit.y especially Chapter 
XIV and follows.
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than the production distortion created by the land tax. There is no 
factual evidence to support this belief, and it does not seem possible 
to provide this evidence if for no other reason than because of the 
practical problems involved with measuring the size of production 
externalities, but this belief does not seem to be unreasonable. If 
this assertion is correct then, as shown above, the conclusion reached 
above still stands concerning the superiority of a tariff over a tax- 
cum-subsidy in a situation where certain types of distortions are 
created by the tax system.
So far three a priori reasons have been provided to indicate 
that a tariff may have been a superior policy tool for the Meiji 
authorities to have used than tax-cum-subsidies; namely, the relative 
sizes of the administrative costs of imposing taxes and providing 
subsidies, and the subsidiary distortionary costs created by imposing 
taxes, made tariffs less costly to apply than tax-cum-subsidies. But 
something still has to be said about the subsidiary costs imposed by 
the use of tariffs, instead of providing subsidies, to correct for 
distortions in the economy. This point was touched upon to some extent 
in the previous section when discussing the virtues of subsidies, 
compared to tariff, for correcting distortions in an infant industry.
As was pointed out in that discussion, on a priori grounds it would 
appear that a tariff may not assist in any way in eliminating the basic 
cause of the distortion in the infant industry whereas an appropriately 
applied subsidy would. What is more, the Japanese authorities appear 
to have employed the correct type of subsidies for assisting the infant 
Japanese modern manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, it may have been
(1) See pages 57 and 58 above.
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that a tariff would have provided subsidies in a less distortionary, 
and more precise, manner in the attempt to achieve the other economic 
goals of the Meiji authorities, than direct subsidies, because of the 
existence of impediments placed in the path of the application of the 
most desirable forms of direct subsidies.
Before coming to any sort of conclusions about the overall 
virtues, or lack of them, of tariffs, compared to tax-cum-subsidies, 
for achieving the economic goals set by the Meiji authorities, 
attention should be given to determining if the use of a tariff 
fortuitously may have allowed a single distortion to be offset, for 
which a tariff was the first-best policy tool for the task, even though 
it was not the intention of the authorities to offset this distortion. 
The standard case cited where a tariff is required as a first-best 
policy tool is where a distortion is created by the country concerned 
having monopoly power in international trade. The immediate question 
to ask is whether the Japanese economy for the time period being 
considered possessed any monopoly power in trade. The factual evidence 
would indicate that it did not. During this period Japan was not a 
large enough importer - viz. it bought too small a proportion of the 
world exports to influence import p r i c e s . A l s o  Japan was not in 
this period a significantly large exporter of her major exports; she 
only supplied eight per cent of the world silk market and nine per cent 
of the world tea market. Also it would appear from the evidence that 
any cut in the supply of these exports by Japan would soon have been 
taken up by silk and tea producers in China, a country which was a far
(1) This view, and the facts which follow are to be found in Huber, 
"Effects on Prices", op. oit.3 pp. 622-624.
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larger producer of these commodities at this time. (1)
Despite the fact that a tariff was not required to correct 
any external distortions in trade in Japan, for none apparently existed 
during the period of interest, the qualifications that have been made 
in this section about the various administrative and subsidiary costs 
of applying tax-cum-subsidies have raised doubts about the conclusion 
derived from the analysis in the previous section; namely, that tax- 
cum-subsidies of the appropriate form would have been the first-best 
policy tool to have used to achieve the economic objectives that the 
Meiji government had set for itself and the Japanese economy. However, 
the remarks made in this section about the a priori virtues, or 
disadvantages, of tariffs compared to tax-cum-subsidies really do not 
settle the issue as to which policy tool would have been the least 
costly for the Meiji authorities to have used except to raise the 
apparently quite reasonable possibility that tariffs after all may have 
been the first-best policy to have employed to achieve at least some 
economic policy goals set by the Meiji authorities.
Yet even if it so happened that, in the constrained and 
distortionary revenue raising situation that the Japanese economy 
found itself in, a tariff would have been the first-best policy tool to 
have used, to reach the economic targets of the Meiji government, it 
does not follow that the Japanese community would have been better off 
had a tariff been used compared to the actual situation that existed 
during the period of interest. In presenting this point attention will 
concentrate on the non-economic policy goal set by the Meiji government
(1) A more detailed discussion of this issue is to be found in Huber, 
"Effects on Prices", ibid.
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of expanding the size of manufacturing industry in Japan to some level, 
assuming that there were no more production distortions to be 
eliminated by such an action. If this assumption is correct then 
should the Meiji government have achieved this objective then it would 
have created a distortion in the economy. But the authorities 
presumably were not able to achieve this goal because of the limited 
revenue raising facilities available and the lack of tariff autonomy. 
Thus, this constraint on the use of these economic policy tools may be 
seen as fortuitous historical circumstances which prevented a possible 
serious misallocation of resources. Had the constraint on the revenue 
raising facilities been maintained, but the tariff had been free to be 
applied, the application of this policy tool would have allowed the 
non-economic production goal for the manufacturing sector to be 
achieved. If this was the case then any benefits derived from the 
application of the tariff, instead of limited production subsidies, 
may have been more than offset by the distortions that resulted from 
expanding industrial production to non-Pareto-efficient levels. In 
other words, the constraint placed on the Meiji authorities in the use 
of tariffs, and given the constraints on the raising of tax revenue, 
may be seen as a fortuitous situation which prevented the Japanese 
government in the Meiji period from making serious economic mistakes, 
which would have tended to make the Japanese community worse off 
compared to the actual situation that existed in the last quarter or 
so of the nineteenth century.
The discussion up to now has essentially been within the 
framework of a comparative static analysis to establish the virtues of 
one set of policy tools, over another, in allowing the Japanese 
authorities to attain certain economic goals in the least costly manner.
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This analysis has not said anything directly about ehe relative virtues 
of these economic policy tools in aiding the rate of economic growth of 
the Japanese economy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
The most obvious place to begin such a discussion is to consider what 
would have happened to the level of savings, and, therefore, the rate 
of capital accumulation, had tariffs been available for use. If the 
application of a tariff had caused the Japanese community to be worse 
off in the comparative static sense as, for example, outlined in the 
previous paragraph, then there would have been a smaller real national 
income available out of which savings could have been made. Thus, for 
a given marginal propensity to save the level of savings would have 
fallen, the rate of capital accumulation would have fallen, and, 
therefore, the rate of growth of real national income would have fallen 
as a result of the application of the tariff.
Such a conclusion possibly would need to be qualified by 
taking into account any repercussions the tariff may have had on the 
savings ratio as a result of changes in the distribution of income.
For example, if the application of the tariff caused income to be 
redistributed away from groups in Japanese society with a low marginal
(1) This assumed change in the rate of growth of real output as a
result of a fall in the rate of growth of capital is based upon 
the assumptions of the neoclassical growth model where there are 
two factors of production, capital and labour, constant returns 
to scale and no technological change. Also it is assumed that for 
the economy’s rate of growth to alter as a result of the change in 
the rate of growth of the capital stock the economy departs from 
the steady state growth path; if the economy was always on this 
growth path the growth rate of output would not alter in response 
to the change in the growth rate of capital accumulation. The 
ideas for this discussion of the implications of protection for 
capital accumulation are based on those to be found in W.M. Corden, 
"The Effects of Trade on the Rate of Growth", in Bhagwati et. at. 
(eds), Trade3 Balance of Payments and Growth_, op. cit.
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propensity to save, to those with a higher marginal propensity to save, 
then the overall marginal propensity to save will have risen. This 
rise in this overall marginal propensity to save may have offset the 
fall in savings induced by the comparative static fall in national 
income brought about by the introduction of tariff protection. As a 
result the introduction of tariff protection may have caused the rate 
of growth of real output to rise, not decrease.
Perhaps more important, for assessing the effects of the use 
of tariffs on the economic growth performance of the Japanese economy 
in the late nineteenth century, is to determine the likely 
repercussions the use of a tariff would have had on the rate of 
technological change in the Japanese economy. Had the tariff been 
available for use and it had been applied so severely that it virtually 
shut off all trade, or at least considerably reduced the level of trade, 
with the outside w o r l d , t h e n  simultaneously the major source of 
embodied and disembodied technological change would have been 
eliminated, or considerably reduced. In this situation, no matter how 
much the savings ratio may have grown in response to the imposition of 
tariff protection, the rate of growth of the Japanese economy certainly 
would have been slower compared to the actual economic growth 
performance of this economy in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Even assuming that the tariff was not so severely applied as 
just indicated, it does not appear unreasonable to argue that this
(1) This is not an unlikely possibility, at least in the early days 
after the Ansei Treaties came into operation, for the Tokugawa 
authorities expressed great misgivings about the virtues of 
international trade. See Beasley, The Meiji Restoration3 op. ait. 3 
p. 109 ff.
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policy action would not have been as effective as the application of 
the limited tax-cum-subsidies, available to the Meiji authorities, 
which were directed at the development, and/or learning, of the 
required technological knowledge. The reason for this statement is 
essentially the same as that presented when discussing the virtues of 
the use of the appropriate tax-cum-subsidies, over tariff protection, 
to assist in the development of an infant industry.
The emphasis of the analysis in this section, and 
particularly in the last few paragraphs, has been to indicate that 
nothing decisive can be said about whether or not the economic 
development in Japan in the Meiji period was hindered by the lack of 
tariff autonomy. While it is clear that no definite case can be made 
out to show that the Japanese economy did not suffer a loss from the 
lack of tariff autonomy, it also cannot be shown that the Japanese 
economy necessarily would have gained from the application of tariff 
protection. And even if it definitely could be shown that the 
appropriate application of tariff protection would have improved the 
allocation of resources, and increased the rate of growth of output, 
in the Japanese economy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
the Japanese community may not have been better off compared to the 
actual economic situation that existed in this era because so much 
depended on whether, or not, the tariffs were indeed appropriately 
applied and whether, or not, the initial tax system was maintained 
after the tariff was imposed.
Certainly the qualified conclusion reached here is at
(1) See the discussion on pages 57 and 58 above.
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variance with the rather categorical statement by Takahashi, cited in 
the introduction, that the lack of tariff autonomy meant that "many 
obstacles were put in the path of Japan's modern manufacturing 
development". Nor does this conclusion support the alternative view 
put by Sinha that subisidies "largely circumvented" the lack of tariff 
autonomy, certainly not after one has taken into account the fact that 
tax revenue had to be raised in some distortionary manner to finance 
these subsidies. The simple fact of the matter is that the empirical 
evidence is not available and is unlikely ever to become available, to 
allow one to say whether, or not, Japan's economic development was 
hindered in the last quarter of the nineteenth century because of the 
lack of tariff autonomy.
This conclusion was essentially derived via a process of 
considering how the economy could achieve more Pareto-efficient 
outcomes by using one policy tool, or a combination of policy tools, 
instead of another. Since the aim of the previous discussion was to 
determine whether, or not, the economic development of the Japanese 
economy was hindered by the lack of tariff autonomy in the Meiji 
period income distribution considerations have been put to one side. 
However the economic models employed above to implicitly assume that 
no one need be made worse off if, by a change in the economy, the 
community moved onto a higher social indifference curve; if someone 
was made worse off a non-distortionary tax-cum-transfer mechanism 
would be available to tax the gainers from the change, and transfer 
the revenue received to those who lost from this change, so that no 
one, on balance, is made worse off.
Clearly such a non-distortionary tax-cum-transfer mechanism
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did not exist in Meiji Japan. But this does not mean that, instead 
of the emphasis given in the analysis above, the application of a 
tariff definitely would have allowed the Japanese community to reach 
a higher level of social welfare than it actually attained. Probably 
in the short-run immediately after the introduction of trade a high 
tariff would have minimised the income distributive effects of 
international trade, something which the limited tax-cum-transfer 
system available to the Japanese authorities could not achieve. As 
a result the level of social welfare reached by the Japanese community 
in this period with the aid of a tariff may have been higher, after 
allowing for income distributive effects, than that achieved in the 
actual situation, even though this situation may have meant that a 
higher social indifference curve was attained than could have been 
reached had a tariff been applied. But in the longer term the 
Japanese community may have been made worse off by imposing a tariff, 
even after allowing for income distribution effects, compared to the 
actual economic situation that evolved in Meiji Japan, for the reason 
that tariff-free international trade possibly allowed a higher rate 
of technological change and a higher level of savings and, therefore, 
a higher rate of economic growth in Japan than for the case where 
tariffs were applied. Indeed it may not be necessary to allow for 
income distribution effects, by making ethical judgements about income 
distribution changes, if it is accepted that social welfare is 
increased when every individual in the community is made better off by 
a change in the economy. This case may have held for the Meiji 
economy for in the tariff-free situation all members of the Japanese 
community may have been better off, in terms of real incomes received, 
compared to the hypothetical alternative where tariffs were imposed.
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This is obviously a surmise for so much depends on how vigorously the 
tariff was imposed. If it was imposed so that income distribution 
considerations do have to be taken into account in assessing whether 
the Japanese community was made worse off by not possessing tariff 
autonomy then the social welfare function for this community would 
need to be known for the period of interest.
What makes it that more difficult in assessing whether, or 
not, the Japanese community found themselves on a lower social 
welfare function, compared to the hypothetical alternative situation 
where Japan possessed tariff autonomy, is that the social welfare 
function for the Japanese community, during this period of Japan 
virtually being without tariff autonomy, did not only contain elements 
concerned with income distribution considerations, but also elements 
in recognition of the political-economic fact that Japan's economic 
autonomy had been compromised by the trade treaties with the Western 
powers. In other words, the Japanese of the time saw the issue of the 
lack of tariff autonomy in political-economic terms, not just in the 
economic terms in which this issue has been discussed in this essay.
To conclude some brief observations will be made about this political- 
economic view of this topic.
There certainly were potential political-economic 
repercussions, resulting from the lack of tariff autonomy, which may 
well have considerably reduced the political-economic independence of 
Japan. For example, the lack of tariff autonomy may well have allowed 
such a degree of dislocation in the economy after the introduction of 
international trade that the country became seriously politically 
divided, thus creating an excuse for political interference by the
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Western powers; interference which may have considerably hindered
(2)the economic development of the Japanese economy.
Even before the Meiji Restoration some Japanese had come to 
realise, however, that the introduction of international trade did not 
necessarily imply the potential political subjugation of Japan by the 
Western powers; indeed if Japan was to maintain its political 
independence it had to trade, which implied that tariffs had to be 
less than prohibitive, in order to be able to purchase the technical 
know-how essential for the modernisation of the economy and, therefore, 
essential for the modernisation of Japan's military forces up to a
(3)level capable of protecting Japan from external aggression. Thus
the argument that the tariff was required as a policy tool to prevent 
the economic disruption of the Japanese economy, and, thereby, prevent 
the interference of foreign powers in Japan's domestic politics came 
to be rejected by at least some influential Japanese.
Instead the arguments explicitly, or implicitly, put forward 
to indicate that the Japanese economy required tariff protection were
(1) Such a set of, what appear to be reasonable, possibilities, in 
the light of the historical experiences that other nations have 
had in their contact with the Western powers, is outlined by 
Beasley in The Meiji Restoration, op. cit., pp. 108-109.
(2) For example, the Western nations may have imposed direct 
constraints on the setting up of industries in Japan which could 
have competed with the outputs of industries in Western 
economies.
(3) See Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, op. eit., pp. 207 ff. The 
most decisive event which appears to have brought about this 
change of opinion was the bombardment of the Shimonsaki Straits 
and the destruction of the Chöshü batteries in August 1864 by 
the Western powers.
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those outlined in section II above, although at least some Japanese 
still saw the lack of tariff autonomy as a political issue in that this 
nation had lost national self-respect as a result of Japan having to 
abide by the trade treaties. Assuming that this was the case means 
that it is that more difficult to specify the social welfare function 
and, therefore, that more difficult to show that the Japanese community 
overall did not lose social welfare as a result of not possessing 
tariff autonomy. This would be the case even if it could be shown that 
the Japanese community, based on strict economic efficiency arguments, 
had not suffered a reduction in national income as a result of it not 
being free to employ tariff protection. Indeed, even if it could be 
shown that all members of the Japanese community had been made better 
off by the use of the alternative policy tools available to the 
Japanese government, compared to the situation where tariffs were 
employed, and, therefore, income distribution effects do not need to be 
taken into account in order to judge if the Japanese community had 
suffered a loss of social welfare because of the lack of tariff 
autonomy, the social welfare function (containing elements in 
recognition of the political-economic reality of the lack of tariff 
autonomy) would still need to be known before any such judgement could 
be made.
(1) See the discussion on this issue at the bottom of page 82 above.
ESSAY II
THE ECONOMIC DEBATE OVER THE USE OF TARIFFS BY THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE ANTE-BELLUM 
PERIOD, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THEIR APPLICATION
TO THE IMPORTS OF COTTON TEXTILES
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For well over a century there has been an off and on debate 
as to whether, or not, a tariff should have been imposed on cotton 
textiles imported into the United States after 1815. The conclusion 
arrived at by such writers as Taussig has been that from the point of 
view of the infant industry argument the tariff should have been 
applied to protect the infant cotton textile industry. The issue then 
became one of determining when the tariff should have been removed.
A good deal of the discussion in this essay will be devoted to this 
latter question; in other words, determining by what time the infant 
textile industry had grown up.
In the first section of this article an economic model is 
constructed which provides criteria for determining when the tariff 
could have been removed and yet still ensure the survival of the 
infant industry. As is made clear in this section, this model will 
not give exact answers to the question of when, from an optimum point 
of view, the tariff should have been removed from the cotton textile 
industry, but it will help to clarify the issues involved with 
imposing and removing a tariff from an infant industry and assist in 
assessing the arguments presented by two of the main spokesmen in the 
debate on this question; namely, Taussig and David. The criteria, 
for determining when the tariff should have been removed from the 
infant cotton textile industry, are applied in section II. In section 
III there is a discussion of aspects of the analysis provided by David
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concerning the infant industry argument as it appiied to the cotton 
textile industry.
But the infant industry argument is not the only argument 
used to support the view that this industry should have received 
government assistance in one form or another. The discussion in 
section IV will discuss the reversible economies of scale argument for 
government assistance. In this section, however, there will also be a 
digression from the central topic in this essay, in that an attempt 
will be made to determine whether there were other than constant 
returns to scale, and if so whether these scale economies were variable 
over different levels of output. In section V a discussion will become 
more general in order to encompass the other arguments stated by 
American political leaders to support the provision of government 
assistance to the cotton textile industry, and manufacturing industry 
in general, in the 1820s. Also some brief comments will be made about 
the income distributive effects of the tariff protection provided in 
the ante-bellum period. The final section of this essay will be 
devoted to making a few pertinent concluding remarks.
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SECTION I
In  t h i s  s e c t i o n  an  a t t e m p t  w i l l  be made to  d e v i s e  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  s im p le  means o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  when t h e  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
an  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r y  sh o u ld  be rem oved. B e fo re  em barking  on such  a 
p r o j e c t  i t  w i l l  be n e c e s s a r y  b r i e f l y  t o  p r o v id e  t h e  r e a s o n s ,  u s u a l l y  
r e g a r d e d  a s  b e in g  a c c e p t a b l e  by n e o - c l a s s i c a l  e c o n o m is t s ,  why th e  
g i v in g  of  governm ent a s s i s t a n c e  to  an i n f a n t  i n d u s t r y  may be d e s i r a b l e .  
I f  t h e  economic f a c t s  do n o t  conform  w i t h  t h e s e  g rounds  f o r  g iv in g  
governm ent a s s i s t a n c e  th e n  p resu m ab ly  t h i s  a s s i s t a n c e  sh o u ld  n o t  be 
g iv e n ,  o r  i f  i t  h a s  been  p ro v id e d  i n a d v e r t e n t l y  th e n  th e  optimum t im e  
to  remove t h i s  a s s i s t a n c e  i s  im m e d ia te ly ,  u n l e s s  some o t h e r  economic 
g r o u n d s ,  n o t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r y  a rg u m e n t,  c o u ld  be 
found  f o r  g i v in g  a s s i s t a n c e  to  new, o r  to  be e s t a b l i s h e d ,  i n d u s t r i e s  i n
v. CDt h e  economy.
The b a s i c  i n g r e d i e n t  i n  t h e  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r y  a rg u m e n t ,  which 
p r o v id e s  g rounds  f o r  tem p o ra ry  governm ent i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  
a r e  l e a r n i n g  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  o f  one  form o r  a n o th e r  i n  t h e  i n f a n t  
i n d u s t r y  w hich  c a u s e s  t h e  f i r m ,  which m ig h t  i n v e s t  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  to  
e a rn  a p r i v a t e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  low er  t h a n  th e  s o c i a l  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on 
t h i s  in v e s tm e n t .  Because  o f  t h i s  red u c e d  p r i v a t e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  i t
(1) Such a l t e r n a t i v e  g rounds  may be t h a t  th e  rem oval o f  t h e  t a r i f f  
c r e a t e s  a c o s t  i n  th e  form  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  unemployment i n  th e  
p r o t e c t e d  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d /o r  t h a t  i t  a g g r e v a t e s  d i s t o r t i o n s  p r e s e n t  
in  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  th e  economy. These i s s u e s  w i l l  be r e t u r n e d  to  
l a t e r  on in  t h i s  s e c t i o n .
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either becomes unprofitable, from a private point of view, to invest 
in the industry, or if private investments are made these investments 
in the industry are below the social optimum level. In order to 
compensate the infant firm for the fall in the private rate of return 
the government will need to intervene temporarily in the market until 
such time as the existence of the learning externalities have been 
eliminated.
Simply to show that there is learning taking place in the 
industry is not sufficient grounds for government intervention. If it 
is possible for the infant firm to internalise all the benefits 
resulting from its investments in learning, and can borrow funds, to 
be invested in the learning process, at a rate of interest which does 
not discriminate against the infant industry, then there is no need for 
government intervention. If the assumption, that the capital market 
operates In this manner, is not supported by the facts then there are 
grounds for government intervention to overcome the imperfection in the 
capital market.
To clear away this issue, so that attention may concentrate 
on the other arguments supporting government intervention to assist an 
infant industry, reference will be made here to the apparent historical 
facts concerning the competitive state of the ante-bellum capital 
market in New England. Although this capital market most certainly did 
not operate perfectly, it also does not appear to have discriminated 
against the infant cotton textile industry (in fact it may have
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discriminated in favour of this industry). Thus to have provided
assistance only for the benefit of the cotton textile industry to
overcome, or compensate for, the general imperfection in the capital
market would have created a distortion in the economy which may have
offset any benefits that may have resulted from assisting the cotton
(2)textile industry. Any imperfections in the capital market should 
have been reduced, or removed, for the benefit of all sections of the 
ante-bellum economy, in which case there would have been an unambiguous 
improvement in Pareto-efficiency. Thus the apparent lack of perfection 
in the New England capital market did not provide definite grounds for 
government economic intervention for the specific benefit of the cotton 
textile industry.
Whether, or not, there were learning externalities in the 
ante-bellum infant cotton textile industry is an issue which will be 
discussed in the next section. For the time being it will be assumed
(1) On the facts supporting this assertion see P.A. David, "Learning
by Doing and Tariff Protection: A Reconsideration of the Case of
the Ante-Bellum United States Cotton Textile Industry", Journal 
of Economic History3 Vol. 30 (1970), pp. 535-536 and the 
references there cited. Also see Lance E. Davis, "Capital 
Mobility and American Economic Growth", in R.W. Fogel and
S.L. Engerman (eds), The Reinterpretation of American Economic 
History (New York, Harper and Row, 1971), particularly pp. 293- 
296.
(2) If the capital market imperfection creates an equal distortion in 
all sectors of the economy then the allocation of resources in the 
economy is distorted away from the social optimum, assuming that 
all other markets are perfect. But to remove this distortion in 
only one of the sectors of the economy (the infant industry) will 
create another price distortion which may offset any benefits, 
particularly in the short-run, which may result from this 
government intervention. This, of course, is the standard second- 
best argument, as presented, for example, by R.G. Lipsey and
K. Lancaster, in "The General Theory of Second-Best", Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 24 (1956-1957), particularly pp. 18-20.
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that there were these externalities, at least to begin with, and that a 
tariff was imposed to overcome this market imperfection. For a 
number of reasons this was not the best form of government 
intervention; a tax-cum-subsidy of the appropriate form would have 
been a superior policy tool to have applied. But this statement is less 
likely to be valid if certain assumptions are not met; the 
assumptions being that taxes could have been raised in a non­
distortionary manner, subsidies were provided to just those learning 
activities which required assistance and that the administrative costs 
of providing the appropriate tax-cum-subsidies were zero. Assuming 
that these assumptions are met, the first reason, briefly stated, why 
a tariff is an inferior policy tool is that a tariff would create a 
dead-weight consumption loss whereas a tax-cum subsidy would not.^^
The second reason is that a tariff is an imprecise method of assisting 
an infant industry whereas an appropriate subsidy is not. More
specifically, a tariff does not actually directly assist the learning
(2)process and as a result the required learning may not be done. It
is worth demonstrating this latter point with a priori arguments in 
order to provide, in addition, instances of the sort of learning 
externalities that may take place in an infant industry.
(1) Proofs on this point are provided by H.G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade 
Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions", in Baldwin 
et al., Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments (Amsterdam,
North-Holland Press, 1965) and J. Bhagwati, V.K. Ramaswami and 
T.N. Srinivansan, "Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory
of Optimal Subsidy", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 77 (1969), 
pp. 1005-1010.
(2) R.E. Baldwin, "The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection", 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 77 (1969), pp. 295-305.
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A firm is faced with the situation that if it invests in 
learning a new technology this knowledge will unavoidably become 
available to other firms already in the industry, or potential 
entrants to the industry, at a unit price below the average cost of 
developing this knowledge. As a result the learning firm who is 
investing in this learning will tend to have higher average costs of 
production than the following firms who, rather than invest in this 
learning, wait for this learning to be done by others and subsequently 
reap the benefits for little or no cost to themselves. A tariff is 
imposed which is assumed to raise the market price of the industry's 
output and, thereby, raises the profitability of the learning firm as 
well as that for the other firms in the industry. But it is still 
more profitable not to invest in learning since the externality 
continues to exist and the tariff does not just compensate those firms 
whose private profits are reduced by the presence of the learning 
externality. Thus no firm in the industry has the incentive to invest 
in the new technology even with the tariff in place.
Similarly, if the form of learning required is that of 
establishing the extent of the risks involved with investing in the 
infant industry, a tariff, will not of itself encourage the investment 
in this type of learning; the externality, of the firm which invests 
in the industry automatically signalling the prospects of survival in 
the industry by remaining in business, or withdrawing from the 
industry, still exists after the tariff is imposed and the tariff does 
not specifically subsidise the firm for the risks taken.
Finally, if labour trained in general skills by the firm 
leaves this firm, to be employed in rival firms, before the firm has
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received the market rate of return on this investment then this firm 
suffers a fall in private profits as a result of this learning 
externality. But as in the previous examples, tariff protection does 
not directly provide assistance for the learning to be done, but 
provides assistance whether investments in learning are being made, 
or not. As a result the learning may not be done since it may be more 
profitable not to invest in the relevant types of learning and wait 
for other firms to do this investing.
Tariff protection may assist in an indirect fashion in 
encouraging certain types of learning, however, if the imposition of a 
tariff induces learning to take place in an unavoidalbe way. If, for 
example, learning is related to the amount of output produced, and/or 
gross investment made, over time, then tariff protection, by tending 
to encourage a greater level of output to be produced, and/or gross 
investment to be made, in an industry than would otherwise be the case, 
would indirectly induce learning to take place. Alternatively, or in 
addition to the previous possibility, the tariff may encourage a firm 
into the industry who finds it profitable, at least initially, to 
invest in learning as other firms are slow to follow the leading firms 
into the industry and, thereby, take advantage of the learning 
externalities. In other words, the learning externality is small, at 
least to begin with. In time, firms may be quicker to follow in which 
case the extent of this externality may increase, implying that more 
government assistance may be required as the industry becomes older in 
order to overcome the more prevalent learning externality.
Despite this apparently limited ability of tariffs to 
encourage the required type of learning it will be assumed that
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learning did take place in response to the imposition of tariff 
protection. What is more the application of a tariff to assist the 
infant cotton textile industry of the ante-bellum period may have been 
the first-best economic policy tool to have employed for this task if 
the assumptions mentioned earlier, required for an appropriate tax-cura- 
subsidy unambiguously to be superior as a policy tool, to assist in 
overcoming externalities, compared to a tariff, were at considerable 
variance with the historical economic realities. This was a 
possibility. Certainly the administrative costs of imposing a tariff 
would have been lower than the costs of administering a tax to raise 
revenue and subsequently administering this revenue to subsidise the 
relevant types of learning in the cotton textile industry. In addition, 
the United States federal government of the ante-bellum period was 
constrained in its ability to raise tax revenue as is to some degree 
evidenced by the fact that about seventy five per cent of federal 
revenue raised during this period was done with the use of tariffs.
It follows that the federal government may have had to employ a highly 
distortionary tax, if the political realities would allow it to use a 
tax at all, in place of a tariff to raise the revenue to finance the 
subsidy. Finally, it is not certain that the subsidy provided would 
have been absolutely appropriate for the task; in other words, 
resources may have been wasted (the costs increased above what they 
would otherwise have been) in subsidising the incorrect economic 
activities.
(1) L.E. Davis and J. Legier, "The Government in the American Economy, 
1818-1902: A Quantitative Study", The Journal of Economic
History, Vol. 26 (1966), pp. 514-552.
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Obviously it would take empirical facts to determine whether, 
or not, a tax-cum-subsidy would have been a less costly economic policy
tool to have used, compared to a tariff, to assist the infant cotton 
textile industry. The facts, however, are not available to settle 
this m a t t e r . B u t  what can be said with some certainty is that 
within the context of the political-economic realities of the United 
States ante-bellum economy one should not be categorical in asserting 
that a tax-cum-subsidy, especially if it was inappropriately applied, 
would have been a superior policy tool, compared to a tariff, to have 
applied to assist the infant cotton textile industry of the ante­
bellum period.
With the tariff protection assisting learning in the infant 
industry where there are learning externalities, at least to begin with, 
the question becomes one of when should the tariff be removed, for the 
traditional infant industry argument contains the element in its 
presentation that assistance be given only for a temporary period. A
(1) In the study by David, "Learning by Doing", ibid. 3an attempt is 
made to settle this matter by providing some relevant facts. In 
particular David provides evidence which is supposed to indicate 
that the sort of learning that took place in the infant cotton 
textile industry in the ante-bellum period would have been 
influenced relatively little by tariff protection, whereas the 
application of the appropriate production subsidy would have 
stimulated this learning to a far greater degree. If this were 
the case then tariff protection would have tended to be a far 
more costly way of protecting the industry to gain a given amount 
of learning, compared to the use of an appropriate subsidy. As a 
result, even with the limited taxing facilities open to the United 
States federal government, it may have been preferable to have 
employed a tax-cum-subsidy to protect the infant cotton textile 
industry than applying tariff protection. In section III below 
this evidence will be discussed to determine whether David has 
shown that the use of tariffs were "a largely redundant set of 
measures" (David, „"Learning by Doing", op. oit. 3 p. 600). For 
the time being, however, it will be asserted that the evidence 
David provided is not convincing on this matter.
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number of answers may be given to this question. One possible answer 
is that the tariff is removed when the temporary learning period comes 
to an end, the assumption being that the learning externalities cease 
when the learning ceases. This need not be the optimum time to remove 
the tariff, however, if the industry devises methods for internalising 
the externalities in the industry before the learning period is at an 
end. This is not an unreasonable possibility since if the tariff is 
not specifically compensating learning firms for the reduction in 
private profits caused by the learning externalities the industry still 
has the distinct incentive to develop and apply institutional and/or 
economic devices to eliminate the e x t e r n a l i t i e s . A s  a result the 
externalities may well disappear before the learning ceases in which 
case an alternative answer to the previous question could be that the 
tariff should be removed when the externalities are internalised, even 
though learning may continue to take place in the industry.
A serious practical problem with this approach to the issue 
of determining the optimum time to remove the tariff from an infant 
industry is that some measure, no matter how vague, has to be obtained 
of the extent of the externalities in the industry over time. This 
may very well not be possible because of the difficulty of determining 
if learning externalities exist or not, for what may appear at first 
sight to be an externality may turn out not to be the case. For 
example, trained labour moving from one firm to another may not be 
evidence of an externality if, (a) the trained labour has paid for its
(1) Examples of the devices that the industry may employ are that the 
apprenticeship system is used, where the apprentice pays for his 
general training by being paid a wage, during the training period, 
below his marginal revenue product, and technical knowledge is 
paid for by using the patent system.
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own general training in one way or another and/or, (b) the jobs left 
vacant by trained labour leaving a firm are filled by equally well 
trained workers who have been trained by other firms (which is a 
reasonable possibility in an industry composed of many firms). Also, 
even if technical know-how is moving between firms this information 
may be more than adequately paid for by the payments made for patents. 
Thus it does not seem unreasonable to assert that it may well not be 
possible to determine if externalities exist, or not, which in turn 
implies that it may not be possible to determine when is the optimum 
time to remove the tariff from the infant firm, even if it can be 
shown that learning is taking place in the infant industry.
What is more, even if it can be demonstrated that 
externalities do exist in this industry over the whole period of 
interest this does not necessarily create grounds for maintaining the 
tariff protection for the whole of this period if these externalities 
fall to a level which are equal in degree to those which exist in the 
rest of the economy. In this case there is no distortion created, by 
these externalities, in the relative price ratios as seen by producers 
Thus the infant cotton textile industry should not receive any more 
favourable treatment than the rest of the economy. Since a tariff 
cannot be applied to all sectors of the economy (e.g. the non-trading 
sector), and assuming subsidies cannot be applied, the tariff 
protecting the infant cotton textile industry should be removed once 
there is this equality in the degree of externalities in all sectors
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of the e c o n o m y . B u t  once again there is the piactical problem of 
determining when this occurs.
Because of this great uncertainty about being able to 
determine the optimum time to remove the tariff from the task of 
assisting an infant industry it may be preferable to apply a completely 
different criterion (or criteria) for determining when a tariff should 
be removed from the infant industry. An alternative criterion, and one 
which is discussed in more detail below, is that the tariff is removed 
when the industry can be assured of surviving without tariff protection. 
While this general criterion may not give the guidance required to 
determine the optimum time to remove the tariff it may, in practice, be 
as good a criterion to employ as any other in a situation where it is 
extremely difficult to determine whether externalities are present, or 
not, over the whole period that may be of interest. For example, use 
of the criterion that the tariff be removed when learning comes to an 
end may not give an accurate guide as to when the tariff should be 
removed if the learning externalities cease, or are reduced to a level 
equivalent to that found in the rest of the economy, well before this 
date, whereas it is possible that removing the tariff when the industry 
can withstand foreign competition without tariff protection is closer 
to the optimum policy action. What is more, this latter criterion also 
incorporates a notion in the infant industry argument which has been 
present in it since the time that John Stuart Mill enunciated his
(1) Other complications may be thought of, concerning the timing of
the removal of the tariff from an infant industry, once one places 
the analysis of the learning infant industry, which is being 
assisted by government intervention, within a general equilibrium 
framework. Such complications are suggested, for example, by the 
analysis in Chapter 7 of P.K. Bardhan, Economic Growth,
Development and Foreign Trade (New York, John Wiley, 1970).
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version of the argument; namely, that tariff protection should only
be applied temporarily until such time as the industry can survive
without the aid of government assistance; if the industry could not
eventually withstand foreign competition alone then tariff protection
should not be applied in the first p l a c e . T h i s  is an advantage
over the alternative criteria, mentioned above, for determining when
the tariff should be removed (when learning ceases, or when the
externalities cease, if this happens first) for the industry may still
not be able to survive foreign competition alone and unassisted after
the tariff has been removed in accordance with either of these criteria,
in which case the tariff should not have been applied in the first
(2)place, even though externalities were present in the industry. The
obvious reason why the tariff should not have been applied is that the 
industry would never be in a position to repay the community, after 
the tariff is removed, for the cost of the protection previously 
provided. This implies that the resources implicitly allocated to 
assisting the industry were wasted in the sense that they could have 
been employed more productively elsewhere in the economy.
The reason given above for employing the criteria of removing 
the tariff from the infant industry as soon as this industry can
(1) Mill stated: "But it is essential that the protection should be 
confined to cases in which there is ground of assurance that the 
industry which it fosters will after a time be able to dispense 
with it." J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy (Toronto 
Press, 1965), p. 919.
(2) Of course the proviso could be added to these alternative 
criteria that the industry protected by the tariff should also be 
able to survive eventually without protection.
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withstand foreign competition without protection was based on the 
practical consideration of not being able to determine with a reasonable 
degree of certainty that learning externalities existed over the 
relevant period of time, or existed to a great enough degree, in this 
industry. As will be argued below in the next section, in connection 
with the actual case of the ante-bellum United States cotton textile 
industry, there is indeed some difficulty in establishing whether 
externalities existed, or existed to a great enough degree, in this 
industry over the whole period of interest. Thus it would appear 
worthwhile to discuss in more detail the notion, that the tariff 
should be removed from an infant industry as soon as the industry can 
survive without this government aid, before applying this general 
criterion to determine when the tariff possibly should have been 
removed from this particular infant industry.
To identify more specifically when the infant industry will 
stand unassisted by a tariff it is assumed, as above, that initially 
learning externalities exist in the infant industry and that tariff 
protection will induce learning to take place in the industry. The 
other assumptions in the simple economic model devised here are as 
follows. There are no tariffs imposed on inputs into the infant 
industry so that the actual tariff rate and the effective tariff rate 
are identical.^
Imports of the homogeneous product produced by the infant 
industry have a c.i.f. import price of OP . (See diagram 1.) The
(1) This is a reasonable assumption to make in respect of the 
historical case to be discussed below.
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supplies of this import are infinite. There is no further learning to
be done by foreign producers and transport costs remain constant.
Thus the c.i.f. import price remains constant over time. A specific
tariff is imposed of P T which is not altered once it has been imposed.m
The infant industry produces a homogeneous product. Domestic
demand is represented by the schedule DD’. Since the domestic price
cannot rise above OT (because of competition from foreign producers)
or fall below OP (because the industry is too small to influence world m
p r i c e s ) t h e  demand curve facing the infant industry is TEGP"^. This 
schedule does not shift over time.
All firms investing in the industry are assumed to have used 
up all long-run economies of scale and are operating at the beginning 
of the long-run diseconomies of scale. The short-run average costs 
(SAC) curve (which incorporates normal profits) for each firm in the 
industry is the normal U-shape. If learning takes place in the firm 
the SAC curve shifts downwards. As the industry expands the price of 
factors of production rise. This is assuming that the position of the 
factor supply schedules do not shift over time, which is what is 
assumed here.
While certainly not all these assumptions accurately 
represent the United States cotton textile industry of the early 
nineteenth century, these assumptions are maintained in order to 
concentrate the analysis on the infant industry which is expanding its 
level of production only because of learning, while at the same time a






tariff is being imposed on competing imports. By relaxing the 
assumptions that there is no further learning in foreign countries, 
that transport costs are constant, supplies of imports are infinite 
and that factor supply schedules do not shift over time, will only 
complicate the analysis without clarifying the issues which the 
following analysis will attempt to demonstrate.
For simplicity the discussion which follows concentrates on 
the leading firm in the industry which is also assumed to be the same 
firm throughout this discussion. Immediately after the tariff is 
imposed, which is not a prohibitive tariff, the infant firm is 
established and it earns normal profits. With the passing of time 
SAC fall as the firm learns the relevant knowledge; SAC fall to say 
SAC^ in diagram 1. The increased profits earned by the leading firm, 
and because of learning externalities, new firms are attracted into 
entering the industry. A repercussion of this change is that factor 
prices are forced to rise. The industry's supply schedule becomes 
AS^. Absolutely less of the product is now imported although the 
domestic product price is still OT.
The leading firm continues to learn and earn quasi-rents.
Again new firms are drawn into the industry so that eventually all of
the domestic demand is supplied by the infant industry. Once the
industry's supply schedule cuts the demand schedule below E the
domestic price for the product will fall even though the administered
tariff is still P T. In other words the operational tariff has fallen m
below the administered tariff.
By the time the industry's supply schedule has reached BS^ 
the leading firm's SAC under conditions of constant factor prices has
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reached SAC^. (In actual fact the leading firm w Lli operate on a SAC
curve above SAC^ because factor prices have not remained constant but
have risen since the tariff was imposed.) In such circumstances it
could well be argued that the tariff should be removed for the
industry will survive, although only the leading firm would initially
remain in business after this policy action. (This argument is based
on the assumption that the leading firm has already earned an adequate
rate of return on its investment in learning.) But while the tariff is
being applied the fact that the minimum point of the SAC curve for the
leading firm would fall to the level of OP once the industry producedm
along the supply schedule BS^, and if factor prices remained constant, 
cannot be directly observed since factor prices are above the level 
they were at when there was only one firm in the industry. Instead, 
an alternative criterion needs to be found which is more likely to be 
easily observable. Such a criterion, for determining when the tariff 
should be removed, is when the minimum point of the SAC curve for the 
leading firm actually has reached the c.i.f. import price of the product 
produced, given the actual factor prices ruling in the market. This 
criterion, for simplicity, is called criterion A.
If no more learning took place the industry would continue 
to operate along the same supply schedule indefinitely, say the 
schedule BS^ in diagram one. The removal of the tariff when this 
learning ends may still leave the community better off than if no 
tariff protection had been provided. The initial cost of the 
protection provided is the production loss, measured by area NMP^Q 
diagram one, and the consumption loss, measured by area HEG. The 
subsequent measure of the production loss will vary as the supply
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schedule shifts down over time. With the removai of ihe tariff the
gain to the community from tariff protection is measured by the gain
in producers’ surplus below the international price line, which is
represented by the area P QB in diagram one. If this benefit to them
community were to continue indefinitely and was discounted at a low 
enough rate of social discount then these benefits may well be greater 
than the discounted costs of protection in the initial periods. 
Implicitly this means that the industry has passed the Mill-Bastable 
test for providing tariff protection to an infant industry; that is 
not only should the industry eventually be able to survive without 
tariff protection but also that the discounted benefits of the saving 
in costs to community of the industry coming into existence and 
surviving without protection should be equal or greater than the
discounted costs of the protection provided during the period of
4 (1) nurturing.
Learning may instead continue while the tariff is applied so
that, along with the forces of competition in the industry, the
domestic product price is induced to fall to OP . In this casem
obviously the administered tariff imposes no price distortions on the 
economy as the operational tariff is zero. The criterion for removing 
the tariff at this point is called criterion B.
The tariff administrator possibly will not know when the 
domestic price for the product has become equal to the c.i.f. import 
price simply because there are no imports of the product. Because of 
this ignorance the tariff is maintained. The industry continues to
(1) On the Mill-Bastable test see M.C. Kemp, "The Mill-Bastable Infant 
Industry Dogma", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 68 (1960), 
pp. 65-66.
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learn. The domestic price for the product falls to OP^. The domestic 
producers eventually find foreign markets which purchase the 
industry's output at the f.o.b. export price OP^. So the industry 
begins to export some of its product even though the full tariff is 
still being applied. The criterion for removing the tariff when the 
product begins to be exported is called criterion C.
Of course there is a whole host of criteria between 
criterion A through to criterion B which could be e m p l o y e d i n  each 
case the industry would survive after the tariff was removed. Also 
each of these criteria is assumed to pass the Mill-Bastable test. 
However, removing the tariff before criterion B is reached implies that 
marginal, and some intramarginal, firms in the industry may become 
unprofitable enterprises and are forced out of the industry. If the 
social cost of the resulting unemployment is weighted heavily enough in 
the welfare function of the decision makers it may be decided that the 
optimum decision is that the tariff should not be removed, even though 
the industry would survive if the tariff were removed.
Another complication involved with removing the tariff once 
criterion A is reached, or at least before criterion B has been 
attained, is that if there are other unchanged tariffs in the economy 
the removal of one tariff will alter the relative commodity price 
ratios in the economy, alterations which may make the community worse
(1) After criterion B has been met it does not matter, from the point 
of view of altering resource allocation, whether or not the 
administered tariff is removed for the operational tariff is zero 
anyway.
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o f f . ^  Thus it may be advisable for the authorities to continue to
impose the tariff. But this problem could also arise in the case of
criterion B, where the operational tariff has become zero. In this
situation, however, there is nothing the authorities can do about the
operational size of the tariff on the commodity concerned, although
they could improve the community’s welfare by appropriately altering
(2)the tariff rates on other commodities. Perhaps not too much should
be made of this complication, eminating from the theory of second-best, 
because, as will be seen in the next section, the analysis is only 
concerned with the production of a particular type of cotton cloth 
which no doubt did not loom large in the United States economy in the 
early nineteenth century; in other words, it seems reasonably safe to 
employ partial equilibrium analysis for the test at hand and not 
introduce complications resulting from general equilibrium 
considerations.
Before embarking on the exercise of employing these various 
criteria for assessing when the United States cotton textile industry 
grew up, at least with respect to the production of certain types of 
cotton cloth, there is a practical complication involved with applying
(1) Assume that there are two protected goods X and Y, and an 
unprotected good Z. Removing the tariff protection from X 
increases the price differential between X and Y and reduces the 
price differential between X and Z. The overall result may be an 
increase in the distortions in the economy, thus making the 
community worse off. This of course is the second-best (an 
economy with added constraints imposed upon it) argument touched 
upon previously in this section.
(2) What would be required is a lowering of the tariff rate on all
commodities so that the price differentials are on average 
unambiguously reduced. For more on this point see M. Bruno, 
"Market Distortions and Gradual Reform", Review of Economic 
Studies3 Vol. 39 (1972), pp. 373-383.
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criterion B that needs to be recognised. To obtain some idea of the 
c.i.f. import price of particular types of cotton textiles in the 
United States (import prices not available in the United States 
sources of statistical information on imports as these textiles ceased 
to be imported some time before criterion B was reached), the f.o.b. 
export prices of these textiles from the major exporting country,
Great Britain, would need to be consulted. The problem with the 
British statistical sources for the early nineteenth century, however, 
is that they do not provide any price data, directly or indirectly, 
on the exports of low-count cotton cloth. While the export prices of 
various broad classifications of cotton cloth can be indirectly 
calculated from the British Parliamentary Papers of the early 
nineteenth century (by employing the information provided on the value 
of exports and the quantity of exports) this information is not 
available in enough detail for the 1820s and 1830s; in particular,
there is no export price data available for sixteen count cotton cloth
. , (1)or below.
(1) There is a fair amount of detail in the Parliamentary Papers on 
the exports of cotton cloth to the United States up to 1826, but 
even in this period the classification of cloth types is not fine 
enough for the purposes of the analysis which follows. After 
1826 the classifications become even more aggregated. See 
Parliamentary Papers, 1817, Vol. 14, pp. 284-287; 1819, Vol. 16,
pp. 95-120; 1828, Vol. 19, pp. 283-313; 1829, Vol. 17, pp. 259-
268 and 1837-38, Vol. 37, p. 106.
The view expressed in the main text on the lack of adequate 
export price data for cotton cloth, is supported by a statement 
made in the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1924) to 
the effect that for the period 1810 to 1881 "data on cloth prices 
and costs comparable to data for American cloth is generally 
unavailable". All that is available is price data, for the 
period 1812 through to 1860, for "7/8 - 72 Read Printers". This 
cloth, composed of seventy two warp threads per inch and eighty- 
eight weft threads, has a thread count higher than the types of 
low count (under 16 counts) cloth which is of interest in the 
analysis below. Cf. Statistical Abstract, op. cit., p. 281, and 
Appendix B of the same volume.
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To avoid these problems attention could concentrate instead 
on criterion C. But even here there are potential practical 
difficulties with applying this criterion that should be taken into 
account. If the infant industry exports some of its output it is 
assumed that the international trading market is perfectly competitive. 
The implication of this assumption is that the United States producer 
of cotton cloth must sell his product at a f.o.b. export price at 
least as low as the c.i.f. import price of the same quality cloth.
If the export market is not perfectly competitive then a complication 
is introduced into utilising criteria C, for determining when the 
tariff should be removed, in that it implies that it is a possibility 
that the f.o.b. price of the domestic good could be above the c.i.f. 
import price and yet some of the domestic product is still profitably 
exported. The type of imperfection that may have existed in the less 
developed export markets of the early nineteenth century was that 
where trade had to be of a bilateral nature with these markets because 
of the constraints imposed by the lack of adequate foreign exchange 
markets to facilitate transactions with these trading areas; for one
(1) The cost of transporting this cotton cloth to the export (third) 
market should not introduce a consideration which will disprove 
the generality of this statement. If the c.i.f. import price in 
the United States was lower than the export f.o.b. price from this 
country for the identical domestic product, then the addition of 
the same sized transport costs from the United States to the third 
market would make the c.i.f. price, in the third market, of the 
commodity initially transported to the United States lower than 
the c.i.f. price of the United States produced commodity. If this 
export market was competitive the commodity supplied by the United 
State producers could not be sold in this market (unless this 
producer or trader was prepared to accept a loss by reducing the 
price of his product). Only when the f.o.b. price of the United 
States produced product was at least equal to, and probably lower 
than, the c.i.f. price in the United States of the imported 
product could the United States product be profitably sold in 
export markets.
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reason or another imbalances in trade could not be met by payments in
foreign exchange or specie. Thus trade in commodities was forced into
balance (or close balance) between trading p a r t n e r s . T h i s  may have
been the early trading experience that the United States had in South
America. In these circumstances it is possible, although not
necessarily so, that the price paid in these less developed markets
for the same quality imported commodity could have varied between
suppliers to such an extent that it implied that the f.o.b. price of
this good in the exporting country was above the c.i.f. import price
in this country. Whether such a price differential would have
persisted for any length of time seems unlikely if buyers and sellers
of exports from the less developed markets in time became reasonably
well informed of the barter prices being offered for these commodities
and behaved accordingly to maximize their profits. Also this lack of
sophistication in foreign exchange markets was not the case in all the
more remote export markets that the United States exported to in the
early nineteenth century. In China, for example, by the mid-1820s
United States traders were paying for goods bought from China with
(2)bills of exchange drawn on London.
Thus it would appear that criterion C would still give a 
reasonable good idea of when the infant industry could withstand
(1) R.C.O. Matthews discusses this sort of problem when trading with 
less developed export markets in the early nineteenth century.
Cf. R.C.O. Matthews, A Study in Trade Cycle History (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 77.
(2) R.C.O. Matthews, A Study in Trade-Cycle History3 op. cit., p. 79 
and M. Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of Chinas 1800- 
1842 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1951), Chapters I and 
VI.
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foreign competition without tariff protection if it is known that the 
commodity produced by the infant industry is being exported to markets 
where the foreign exchange market is reasonably well established, and/ 
or where this commodity has been exported to less developed markets 
for a reasonable length of time.
123
SECTION II
After Samuel Slater arrived in the United States from
England in November 1789, armed with a comprehensive knowledge of the
technology being used in England to produce cotton textiles, the
United States cotton textile industry began to progress towards a
state where firms in the industry could survive against foreign
competition with the aid of the non-prohibitive tariff protection
p r o v i d e d . B y  1803 there were four factories in the country
(2)producing cotton yarn using modern machinery. Hand looms were used
to turn the yarn into cloth.
The ad valorem tariff that began to be applied from July
1789 up until April 1816 was introduced to raise revenue for the
(3)Federal government. Of course, a repercussion of this tariff was
to provide protection for the young cotton textile industry. But to 
determine whether the industry was in need of protection, on the 
grounds that it was an infant industry, it first needs to be 
convincingly demonstrated that there were externalities present. A 
quotation from James Montgomery (who in turn obtained his information
(1) Cf. James Montgomery, The Cotton Manufacture of the United States 
Contrasted and Compared with that of Great Britain (Glasgow:
John Niver Jr., circa 1840), p. 147 ff.
(2) F.W. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States (New York:
G.P. Putman, 1910, Fifty Edition), p. 127.
(3) Cf. H.L. Stettler, Growth and Fluctuations in the Ante-Bellum 
Textile Industry (Ann Arbor, University Microfilm, 1971), 
particularly Table 73, p. 189.
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f rom G.S.  W h i t e ^ ^ )  i s  w or th  c i t i n g  i n  f u l l  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  t y p e s
of  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  t h a t  a p p e a r  t o  have e x i s t e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .
( 2 )Montgomery w r o t e  a s  f o l l o w s :
" I n  1798 Mr. S l a t e r  e n t e r e d  i n t o  p a r t n e r s h i p  w i t h  O z ie l  
W i l k in s o n  (and o t h e r s )  . . . .  He b u i l t  h i s  second M i l l  on t h e  Eas t  s i d e  
o f  P a w tuc ke t  r i v e r ;  . . . .  A s h o r t  t im e  a f t e r w a r d s  t h e  hands  i n  t h i s  
M i l l  r e v o l t e d ,  o r  s t r u c k  work f o r  h i g h e r  wages;  f i v e  or  s i x  o f  them 
went  t o  Cumberland ,  and e r e c t e d  a s m a l l  M i l l ,  owned by E l i s h a  W ate rs  
and o t h e r s :  f rom t h e s e  men and t h e i r  c o n n e c t i o n s ,  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r i e s
were commenced i n  v a r i o u s  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  and ,  i n  f a c t ,  most  of 
t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  e r e c t e d  from 1790 to  1809,  were b u i l t  by men who 
had d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  drawn knowledge o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  f rom 
P a w t u c k e t ,  t h e  c r a d l e  o f  t h e  American  C o t t o n  M a n u fa c tu r e .  Some of h i s  
s e r v a n t s  s t o l e  h i s  p a t t e r n s  and m o d e l s ,  and by t h a t  means h i s  
improvements  were soon e x te nde d  ove r  t h e  c o u n t r y ;  . . . . "
The r e t e l l i n g  of  t h e s e  e v e n t s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  were 
p o s s i b l y  a t  l e a s t  two forms o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  i n f a n t  
c o t t o n  t e x t i l e  i n d u s t r y  o v e r  t h i s  p e r i o d .  The one  form was s k i l l e d  
l a b o u r  l e a v i n g  t h e  employment o f  a f i r m  which  had i n v e s t e d  i n  
d e v e l o p i n g  t h e s e  g e n e r a l  s k i l l s  b e f o r e  t h i s  f i r m  had r e c e i v e d  an 
a d e q u a t e  r a t e  of  r e t u r n  on i t s  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t r a i n i n g .  ( T h i s  form of  
e x t e r n a l i t y  m igh t  n o t  have e x i s t e d ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  t h e  S l a t e r  
and p a r t n e r s  company; t h i s  f i r m  m igh t  have  e a rn e d  an a d e q u a t e  r a t e  of
(1) G.S.  W hi te ,  Memoir o f  Samuel S la te r  ( P h i l a d e l p h i a :  p r i v a t e l y  
p r i n t e d ,  1836 ) .
(2)  Montgomery, The Cotton M anufacture , op. o i t . } pp. 152-153 .
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r e t u r n  on i t s  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  g e n e r a l  t r a i n i n g  b e f o r e  t h i s  l a b o u r  l e f t  
i t s  employment . )
The o t h e r  form o f  e x t e r n a l i t y  was c a u s e d  by r e l e v a n t  
t e c h n i c a l  knowledge becoming a v a i l a b l e  t o  f o l l o w i n g  f i r m s  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  a t  a p r i c e  be low t h e  c o s t  of  p r o d u c i n g  t h i s  knowledge .
D e s p i t e  t h e s e  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  wh ich  t ende d  to  lower  t h e  
p r i v a t e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on t h e  i n v e s t m e n t s  made by S l a t e r  and h i s  
b u s i n e s s  p a r t n e r s  i n  t h e  c o t t o n  t e x t i l e  i n d u s t r y ,  t h e y  p r o s p e r e d  
w i t h  t h e  a i d  o f  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n .  In  1806 James S l a t e r  was j o i n e d  by 
h i s  b r o t h e r  John  who had e m i g r a t e d  from England .  They i n v e s t e d  i n  a 
new m i l l  wh ich  was p r o d u c i n g  i n  t h e  S p r i n g  of  1 8 0 7 . ^ ^  Thus n o t  on ly  
was t h e  i n f a n t  f i r m  s u r v i v i n g ,  i t  was e x p a n d in g .
I t  seems r e a s o n a b l e  t o  c o n c lu d e  from t h i s  l i m i t e d  e v i d e n c e
t h a t  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  were p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  p r i o r  t o  1807 and ,
( 2 )t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  were g rounds  f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r y .
Also  t h e  ad valorem t a r i f f  o f  f i f t e e n  p e r  c e n t ,  which  was b e in g  
( 3 )a p p l i e d  i n  1807,  was a d e q u a t e  f o r  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  s u r v i v a l .  The 
g e n e r a l  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n d u s t r y  m ig h t  have needed p r o t e c t i o n  i n  
1807 and e a r l i e r  i s  n o t  i n  d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  a r r i v e d  a t  
by T a u s s i g .  He w r o te  t h a t  " t h e r e  m igh t  have  been  room f o r  t h e  
l e g i t i m a t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  to  t h e  c o t t o n  m a n u f a c t u r e r  a s  a
(1)  Montgomery,  The Cotton Manufacture, op. c i t . 3 p. 153.
(2)  The p r e s e n c e  of  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  i s  o n l y  n e c e s s a r y  g rounds  f o r  
a s s i s t a n c e ;  t h e  i n d u s t r y  h a s  t o  p a s s  t h e  M i l l - B a s t a b l e  t e s t s  a s  
w e l l .
(3) Cf . S t e t t l e r , Growth and F luctuations3 op. c i t . , p.  189.
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young industry." The reason he came to such a conclusion was that
"the growth of the cotton manufacture, however certain to have taken 
place in the end, might have been subject to much friction and loss". 
This friction and loss was being caused by "the eager competition of 
well-established English manufacturers, the lack of familiarity with 
the processes, and the long-continued habit." Certainly in the
light of the modern statement of the infant industry argument these 
competitive weaknesses in the industry did not provide grounds for 
giving protection of the >oung industry; Taussig did not indicate 
that externalities needed to have existed in the United States cotton 
textile industry prior to 1808. Thus while accepting Taussig's 
conclusion concerning the need for the government to assist the infant 
industry prior to 1808 his reason for arriving at this conclusion is 
not acceptable according to the modern version of the infant industry 
argument; which of course is not surprising since Taussig made his 
comments well before the insights provided by the relevant modern 
economic theory were discovered.
Despite the fact that the tariff protection provided was 
adequate to ensure the survival of the infant industry in 1807 
political events intervened to cause the implicit tariff to rise
(1) Taussig, Tariff Historyop. cit.3 pp. 33-34.
(2) Taussig, Tariff History3 op. ait. 3 p. 33.
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between 1807 and 1 8 0 9 . Other factors which contributed to the 
relative attractiveness of the cotton textile industry as an area of 
investment were; firstly, the decline of the ocean carrying trade 
most probably lowered the opportunity cost of capital invested in the 
cotton textile industry; and, secondly, the fall in the price of raw 
cotton between 1807 and 1809 reduced the short-run average costs of 
cotton textile production. All these factors combined to encourage 
the expansion of the cotton textile industry.
The expansion of the domestic industry was interrupted
between 1809 and 1812, but began to expand between 1812 and 1815
because of political events interfering again with international
(2)trade. But once uninhibited international trade resumed in 1815
some firms in the United States cotton textile industry found 
themselves unable to survive against foreign competition. This was so 
even though the industry was being protected by an ad valorem tariff
(3)of twenty five per cent. Apparently the implicit tariff rate in
existence between 1812 and 1815 was higher than twenty five per cent.
(1) The price of cotton textiles rose from $20.31 per piece in 1807
to $24.25 in 1809. (Cf. A. Cole, Wholesale Commodity Prices
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938.)) If the supply 
curve for cotton textile imports was perfectly elastic, and there 
were imports to begin with, then the rise in the price of cotton 
textiles was equivalent to a rise in the implicit tariff. The
rise in price could not have been due to a shift to the right of
the demand schedule, unless imports ceased altogether at some 
point before the full rise in the price of cotton textiles.
(2) The political events, which resulted in these interruptions to 
international trade, were caused by the strained diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Great Britain resulting 
from these two nations' involvement in the Napoleonic Wars.
(3) Cf. Stettler, Growth and Fluctuations, ibid.
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The i m p o r t a n t  f a c t  to  n o t e  was t h a t  t h e  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r y  was
s u r v i v i n g  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  c o m p e t i t i o n  even i f  i t s  s i z e  was be in g
r e d u c e d  b e c a u s e  o f  m a r g i n a l ,  and some i n t r a m a r g i n a l ,  f i r m s  h a v in g  to
l e a v e  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  C e r t a i n l y  t h a t  s e c t i o n  of  t h e  i n d u s t r y  p r o d u c in g
c o a r s e  c l o t h  was a p p a r e n t l y  i n  no need o f  i n c r e a s e d  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n
i n  o r d e r  t h a t  i t  m igh t  s u r v i v e .  The f i r m  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e
i n d u s t r y  which was u s i n g  t h e  l a t e s t  power loom t e c h n o l o g y  r e c e n t l y
d e v e lo p e d  i n  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  by Lowell  and M o o d y , n a m e l y  t h e
Bos ton  M a n u f a c tu r in g  Company, n o t  o n l y  made p r o f i t s  i n  1815 and 1816
( 2 )
b u t  i n  1816 t h e  f i r m  was b u i l d i n g  i t s  second m i l l .  P o s s i b l y  t h e
changed  t a r i f f  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  1816 induced  t h i s  f i r m  to  b u i l d  i t s
(3)second  m i l l ,  b u t  i t  can  be a rgued  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  up u n t i l  1817 t h e  
changed  l e g i s l a t i o n  a f f o r d e d  no i n c r e a s e d  p r o t e c t i o n .  The r e a s o n  i s  
t h a t ,  f i r s t l y ,  t h e  ad valorem  t a r i f f  was n o t  i n c r e a s e d .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  r e v i s e d  sys te m  of  impos ing  a minimum v a l u a t i o n  of  tw e n ty  f i v e  c e n t s  
p e r  ya rd  on c o t t o n  t e x t i l e  i m p o r t s ,  and of  t h e  t a r i f f  d u t y  b e in g  
c a l c u l a t e d  on t h i s  v a l u a t i o n  i f  t h e  c . i . f .  im p o r t  p r i c e  was be low 
tw e n ty  f i v e  c e n t s  p e r  y a r d ,  meant  t h a t  i n  1816,  b e c a u s e  t h e  c . i . f .  
im p o r t  p r i c e  o f  c o a r s e  c o t t o n  t e x t i l e s  was a b o u t  tw e n ty  f i v e  c e n t s  a 
y a r d ,  v e r y  l i t t l e ,  i f  any ,  added p r o t e c t i o n  was p r o v id e d  by t h e
(1)  Lowel l  o b t a i n e d  h i s  i d e a s ,  needed  f o r  b u i l d i n g  a power loom, 
w h i l e  v i s i t i n g  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  i n  1810 to  1812.  By t h e  Autumn of  
1814 L o w e l l ,  w i t h  t h e  h e l p  o f  Moody, had c o n s t r u c t e d  h i s  f i r s t  
r e l i a b l e  power loom. C f . G.S.  Gibb,  The Saco-Lowell Shops 
(Cambr idge,  H arva rd  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 0 ) ,  pp.  8 -14 .
(2)  Cf.  G.S.  Gibb,  The Saoo-Lowell Shops, op. c i t . , p.  27.
(3)  In  f a c t  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  t h e  m i l l  was begun b e f o r e  t h e  new t a r i f f  
l e g i s l a t i o n  was p a s s e d .  C f . C a r o l i n e  F. Ware, The Early New 
England Manufacture (New York ,  Johnson  R e p r i n t  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  
1 9 6 6 ) ,  p.  66.
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changed tariff l e g i s l a t i o n . T h e  level of protection did increase, 
however, as the c.i.f. import price of coarse cotton textiles fell 
from 1817 on.
From these facts it follows that the building of a second
mill by the Boston Manufacturing Company was probably not induced by
the changed tariff legislation of 1816 unless the directors of this
company could foresee a fall in the c.i.f. import prices; which was
a possibility. Whether, or not, the price fall was forecast a
director of the company, one Nathan Appleton, was later prepared to
admit in a letter dated August 1827 that, to cite a paraphrase by
(3)McGouldrick of part of this letter; "even the 1816 tariff minimum
rate (a specific duty) was unnecessary for coarse cloth of the
Waltham-Lowell type (the type of cloth produced by the Boston
Manufacturing Company)". Another director of the company, Patrick
(4)Jackson, was privately admitting the same point as early as 1817.
But even if this company needed the minimum valuation (which 
gave added protection from 1817 on) to ensure its survival, this 
argument is not of central importance for the infant industry argument. 
What first needs to be shown in some way is that the Boston
(1) Cf. Taussig, Tariff History, op. ait., p. 30.
(2) Taussig believed that the tariff rate only increased from 1818 
on. Stettler disagrees with this view by arguing that British 
import prices began to fall in 1817. Cf. Taussig, Tariff 
History, op. oit. 3 p. 30, and Stettler, Growth and Fluctuations, 
op. oit., p. 219 n.
(3) Cf. P. McGouldrick, Hew England Textiles in the nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 272,
34 n .
(4) Cf. McGouldrick, Hew England Textiles, ibid.
130
Manufacturing Company, which was now the leading firm in that part of 
the industry producing coarse cotton cloth, was suffering a reduction 
in private profits because of the presence of externalities. If it 
can be shown satisfactorily that there were externalities present at 
this time then possibly the tariff should have been maintained, but 
the tariff rate need not have been increased in order to ensure the 
firm’s survival; at least this was the opinion of the directors of 
the Boston Company. If there were no externalities, or externalities 
equivalent to those found in the rest of the economy, then the tariff 
should have been removed altogether.
By 1814 the United States authorities had devised more 
rigorous ways of internalising potential technological externalities; 
in particular the patent laws were being enforced. For this reason, 
amongst others to be mentioned below, the Boston Company was prepared 
to sell machinery to other firms from 1817 on. Also this firm was 
prepared to enter into licencing agreements and leasing agreements with 
other companies. It is interesting to note that in the case of a 
leasing agreement signed with the Dover Factory Company in 1821 there 
was a specific provision made which was an attempt to prevent 
technological externalities. The provision reads that the Dover 
Company "will not communicate to others, or for the interest of others, 
such information as they may receive under this agreement, but will 
adopt such measures as the said Boston Manufacturing Company shall 
communicate for the purpose of preventing publicity to such things as 
the said parties shall require not to be made public."
(1) Boston Mfg. Co. M.S.S., Dover Factory Company agreement dated 
October 12, 1821; cited by Gibb, Saco-Lowell, op. cit.3 p. 43.
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Possibly the company did not manage to internalise all the 
technological externalities that it wished, but probably the company 
did not suffer the relative losses, caused by technological 
externalities, incurred by Samuel Slater in the 1790s and in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century when the patent system was not so 
rigorously applied.
The other reason why the Boston Company was prepared to 
allow others use of the inventions over which it possessed property 
rights was that apparently the company directors were patriotic men 
who wished to see the United States cotton textile industry develop to 
the extent that its output might replace i m p o r t s . I f  this was so 
then it would appear that the firm was prepared to accept at least 
some fall in private profits, as a result of externalities, for which 
it expected no compensation from the state. Of course it is unlikely 
that the United States political system knew of this attitude and, 
therefore, did not take this attitude into account when drafting and 
passing tariff legislation.
There were certainly externalities created by the Boston 
Company being prepared to bear the risks involved with establishing 
its enterprise, and demonstrating by its survival that it was a viable 
business proposition to produce cotton textiles of the Waltham-Lowell 
type. This externality was particularly pronounced during the period 
of the new market conditions created in 1815 and 1816 by the resumed 
inflow of British cotton textiles into the United States.
(1) Cf. Gibb, Saco-Lowell Shops, op. oit., p. 40.
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The final possible externality was created if labour, 
trained in general skills by the Boston Company at its own expense, 
left the company before this company had earned the full return on 
this investment in training. In the early years of its existence the 
company probably incurred losses because of this externality. However, 
the cotton textile industry learned how to devise means for 
internalising these externalities. For example, by at least the 1840s 
a skilled cotton textile labourer in Lowell could only be employed by 
another mill if this labourer had discharge papers from his previous 
employer. If not, the labourer was not employed.^ In other words 
the mills in Lowell attempted to set up a monopsonistic labour market 
for themselves. If this scheme was successful then the wage skilled 
labour would have received would have been below his (or her) marginal 
revenue product. The surplus would have gone to the company employing 
this labourer as a return on the previous investment in training. It 
is not known how scrupulously this agreement between the employers was 
adhered to, but even if the agreement was broken, or if this labour 
moved outside the Lowell area to be employed in other cotton textile 
firms not party to the agreement, it seems reasonable to assert that by 
the 1840s if a firm lost a trained labourer the company would have been 
able to fill the vacancy by re-employing another trained labourer of 
equal skill. Thus the overall loss to the firm might have been as small 
as the costs of hiring labour.
A much easier method for internalising this labour training 
externality would have been for the firm to have paid labour, during 
its period of on-the-job general training, a wage below its marginal 
revenue product; in other words the labourer would have born the cost
(1) Cf. f’ibb, Saao-Lowell Shops3 op. ait., p. 88.
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of the training. (The advantage of this institutional procedure for 
internalising this externality, over the method requiring collusion 
between companies in order to create a monopsonistic labour market, is 
that collusion agreements were always liable to break down, 
particularly during times of high unemployment.) Such a method for 
covering the costs of training labour, or at least partly covering the 
costs of training labour, is what is partly involved in the operation 
of the labour market institution called the apprenticeship system.
While the Boston Company may not have consciously realised it, this 
company's use of the well-established institution of the apprenticeship 
system was its attempt to enternalise labour training externalities.
The historical evidence cited above indicates that 
externalities existed in the United States cotton textile industry in 
the mid-1810s. How long these externalities persisted after this date, 
however, is an issue which requires separate consideration. In the 
case of risk bearing by the Boston Company in the mid-1810s it may well 
have received an adequate rate of return by the 1820s, on the 
investment it made in determining the risks involved in producing 
coarse cotton cloth, as a result of the tariff protection provided.
As for the other areas of apparent market failure in this infant 
industry, institutional devices were available to this industry to 
internalise the relevant externalities so that any transfer of technical 
knowledge between firms, and/or training costs incurred in order to 
provide labour with general skills, was paid for, by those obtaining 
the property rights over the technical knowledge and/or labour skills,
^^ According to Gibbs; "For the apprentices there was much honour but 
li'tle pay involved." Cf. Gibb, Saoc-Lowett Shops, op. ext., 
p. 91.
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to the extent that the costs of providing labour training facilities 
were indirectly covered and/or an adequate rate of return was received 
by those who did the initial investing in developing technical 
k n o w l e d g e . W h a t  is more these institutional devices were utilised 
by the cotton textile industry in an attempt to repair these break­
downs in the market. Whether their use reduced the level of 
externalities to zero, or reduced them to the level where the costs of 
tariff protection needed to compensate producers for these externalities 
were greater than any benefits received, is an empirical issue which is 
not an easy one to settle, if it can be settled at all.
What must be emphasised is that the mere evidence of the 
transfer of knowledge between firms in the New England cotton textile 
industry in the ante-bellum period is not in itself evidence of 
learning externalities which inhibited the expansion of the industry; 
it also has to be demonstrated that the institutional deviced utilised
(1) The fact that the Boston Company, out of a sense of patriotism, 
was prepared to allow other firms exploit the technical 
knowledge it had developed without charging the full price for 
this information implies that it was willing to accept a lover 
rate of return on its investment in developing this knowledge 
without seeking compensation.
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to overcome any learning externalities were inadequate for the 
t a s k . W h i l e  this may have been the case in the early years of the 
development of the industry, it does not seem particularly convincing 
to argue that a competitive, profit maximizing, industry was incapable 
of discovering and instituting devices for effectively closing off 
major sources of externalitieSjespecially since the tariff protection 
provided to the industry did not directly compensate those firms 
suffering any reduction of profits as a result of the existence of
(1) This point does not appear to have been fully realised in the 
recent historical literature on this topic. Ishikawa in 
referring to this question of the transfer of technical knowledge 
in the cotton textile industry states that technical information 
that is "easily transmitted" to other production units is 
"grounds for the justification of tariff protection".
(T. Ishikawa, 'Conceptualization of Learning by Doing: A note on
Paul David's 'Learning by Doing and .... the ante-Bellum United 
States Cotton Textile Industry'", Journal of Economic History,
Vol. 33 (1973), p. 859.) Taken by itself this view is not grounds 
for tariff protection if this transmission of information takes 
place along with a process of adequate payments being made for 
this information. Perhaps what Ishikawa really meant is that 
payment was not made, or inadequate payment made, for in a later 
and related footnote he does refer to the problem of internalising 
labour training costs and technical information. From the point 
of view of the historical facts cited, his discussion of this 
point is inadequate, however, because he only refers to the 
"discharge certificate" agreement amongst the Lowell mills to 
inhibit the movement of skilled workers between firms, but does 
not mention the apprenticeship system, or the use of the patent 
system, both of which were utilised by this industry to 
internalise these types of externalities. Also in the case of 
technical information being discovered by many firms in the 
industry (which is the case Ishikawa is interested in) and not by 
just a few leading firms, any loss in private profits a firm may 
experience as a result of technical externalities may be offset 
by technical externalities which are in its favour (technical 
information is obtained at a price below its true value to the 
receiving firm). Cf. Ishikawa, "Conceptualization", op. cit. 3 
p. 859, n 19.
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the existence of externalities.Possibly the industry did not 
satisfactorily overcome the externality problem, but it appears 
reasonable to have ones doubts on this matter.
Because there are these apparently valid misgivings about
whether externalities did exist for any length of time in the New
England cotton textile industry after the mid-1810s, or if they did
exists there are doubts as to whether by say the mid-1820s they were
greater in degree than the externalities to be found in the rest of
the economy in general, it would appear reasonable to employ the
criteria developed in the previous sections, for the reasons outlined
(2)there, for determining when the tariff should have been removed 
from this industry.
Since apparently learning externalities did exist in this 
industry in 1815, and some indeterminate time thereafter, it would 
seem acceptable to argue that to begin with, at least, assistance 
should have been given to that part of the cotton textile industry
(3)producing coarse cotton cloth. But since a tariff was used to
assist the production of coarse cotton cloth this does not mean that
(1) If the firm was directly compensated then it seems more 
reasonable to argue that the externalities may have persisted 
until such time as learning ceased in the industry. Indeed one 
of the provisions of providing this assistance should have been 
that the externality be allowed to persist so as to allow the 
easy flow of new technical knowledge, and/or labour skills, to 
other firms, thereby encouraging the expansion of the industry.
(2) See pages 107-117 above.
(3) Taussig also held this view, although for different reasons. 
Taussig, Tariff History3 op. oit., p. 35. The reasons provided 
by Taussig will not be discussed here, except to assert that they 
were not founded on the modern version of the infant industry 
argument.
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tariff protection should not have been given to firms producing other 
types of cotton cloth as well. If this protection had not been given 
not only would firms in that part of the industry producing medium and 
fine cotton cloths have been forced out of business but possibly firms 
producing coarse cloth as well. The reason is that because these 
various cloth types were substitutes for one another a reduction of the 
tariff on cotton cloth types other than coarse cloth would have meant 
the leftward shift in the demand schedule for coarse cloth. Depending 
on how close the various cloth types were substitutes for one another, 
it is possible that the leftward shift of the demand schedule was so 
great that the firm (or firms) producing coarse cloth was eliminated 
from the industry. This result would follow no matter how high the 
tariff was on coarse cotton cloth.
Having imposed the tariff, when should it have been removed
from the infant industry? Of the criteria established in the previous
section for determining when the tariff should be removed criterion C
is the easiest to use. The official figures show that cotton cloth
was first exported from the United States in 1826.^  From this year
on the cotton textile industry exported some of its output in every
(2)year up to 1860 and after. It is also known from supplementary
sources that the cotton cloth exported was of the coarse variety, and
(1) "Commerce and Navigation Reports", 1826, 19th Congress, 2nd 
Session, House Executive Documents, Nos 120-131.
(2) Collated official figures of the value of cotton cloth exports 
begin in 1831. See Statistical Abstract of the United States,
No. 1 (1878), p. 119.
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also that the industry was exporting to South American as early as 1823
and 1824.^^ If these early exports were made for the purpose of
exploring the potential of the export market it is possible that the
f.o.b. price obtained for these exports was below the domestic price
for coarse cotton cloth; in other words, these exporting ventures were
unprofitable if the export markets were perfectly competitive. This
does not necessarily mean that the operational tariff was not already
(2)zero but it does raise doubts in this regard.
Perhaps greater room for doubt on this matter is that this 
evidence of exports of coarse cotton cloth being made in the early 
1820s concerns exports to South America; markets which may not have 
been perfectly competitive for the sorts of reasons outlined in the
(3)previous section. Rather attention should concentrate on finding
evidence of exports to markets in the early nineteenth century which 
were more likely to have been competitive. One such competitive
(1) The following is a quotation from Caroline Ware: "In 1823
a Boston shipper, William Boardman, placed thirty-four hundred 
yards of brown and bleached sheeting aboard a ship 'bound for 
Rio Janiero and a market', and in 1824 he sent two loads, one of 
about two thousand and the other of sixteen thousand yards out to 
Buenos Aires." Cf. Caroline Ware, The Early New England. Cotton 
Manufacture (New York, Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966), 
p. 189. Ware cites as her source Boardman Papers, Invoice Book, 
1823, February 28 and October 28, 1824.
(2) If the domestic price was already below the c.i.f. import price, 
(OP in diagram 1) and the f.o.b. price received for exports was 
below the domestic price, the operational tariff was still zero 
under these circumstances. However, if the domestic price was 
above OP and the f.o.b. price received for exports was below 
this price then the existence of exports is not an indication 
that the operational tariff was zero.
(3) See pages 120-121.
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market, as was pointed out above, was China. (1)
By 1842 it is known that some five hundred thousand pieces
of "American cotton manufactures from Lowell" were sold in China
(2)against competition from Great Britain and elsewhere. But this
trade had begun, on a small scale, a decade-and-a-half before for in
1826 "the invoices show the exportation to China of American cottons
(3)to the extent of about $15,000." For every year, from this date on 
into the nineteenth century, American cotton manufactures were sold in 
this market.
Nor was it just in the China market that American cottons 
were providing competition for British manufacturers. By 1833 the 
British producers were complaining of competition from the United States 
interfering with their export trade to Mexico, Brazil and the whole of 
South American, and "was even threatening to encroach upon the
(1) Actually, to be more specific, the export market at Canton. More 
can be added to the previous discussion, on page above, on the 
likely competitive nature of this market in the late 1820s by 
referring to the evidence given to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company (China Trade) 
and the East India Company's Affairs (Lord's Report), both 
published in 1830. (See Parliamentary Papers, 1830, Vols 5 and 
6.) References are made in these reports to the sale of American 
produced coarse cotton cloth in the China Market. But there is 
no indication that this cloth was sold at unprofitable prices, or 
that the c.i.f. sale price of this cloth was higher than that paid 
for similar cotton cloth produced in other countries.
(2) M. Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-42,
op. o i t pp. 185-186. Greenberg draws his evidence from 
R.B. Forbes, Remarks on China (1842).
(3) T. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, Barnes and Noble 
Inc., 1941), p. 73. The invoices are from Hunt's Merchants 
Magazine, Vol. 11 (July-Dee., 1844), Table, p. 55.
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Mediterranean Trade". Perhaps it is not advisable to use this last
piece of evidence to draw the conclusion that the operational tariff
in the United States on coarse cotton cloth was zero by 1833, because
the export markets referred to may not have been perfectly competitive
by this date. But there is alternative evidence available to indicate
that at least by 1833 this operational tariff was indeed zero. In a
speech, in the United States Congress in 1833, by Nathan Appleton
addressed to the Verplanck Bill, he stated that coarse cloth now could
not be imported from England even if there had been no duty and even
(2)in the case of finer goods competition was not feared.
Thus 1833 should be taken as the latest date at which the 
operational tariff on coarse cotton cloth became zero. There is also 
some tentative, but reasonable, grounds for believing that this tariff 
was zero by as early as 1826 for the New England cotton textile 
industry was apparently able to compete in competitive export markets 
by this date. But certainly there is no need to debate whether, or 
not, the tariff on coarse cotton cloth, imposed to protect the infant 
industry, should have been removed in 1833 or later; the tariff had 
already been removed, and possibly some years earlier, as a result of 
competition between domestic producers of coarse cotton cloth. Thus 
at least the tariff on coarse cotton cloth was not imposing a welfare 
loss on the United States community in 1833, although possibly it was 
rather the lack of this tariff protection which was imposing a welfare 
loss, while tariffs were still being imposed at the same level on
(1) A, Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade 1794-1858
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1934), pp. 80-81.
(2) Congressional Debatesj IX, pp. 1216-1217 and p. 1379.
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other commodity imports, because of the second-best considerations 
mentioned in the previous section. As was pointed out there, the way 
to overcome this latter problem, if present, was for the tariffs on 
these other commodities to be lowered.
Also indicated in the previous section, allowing the tariff 
on a commodity to remove itself may not have been the optimum policy 
to have followed when providing temporary tariff protection to an 
infant industry. Instead, perhaps criterion B should have been applied 
to determine the earliest date at which the tariff removed itself.
This information, plus some estimate of the date when criterion A was 
met, would provide a range of time during which the tariff could have 
been removed and the industry would have survived foreign competition. 
Within this range may have been the optimum time to have removed the 
tariff. However, as pointed out earlier, no detailed price data is 
available for the British f.o.b. price of coarse cotton cloth, thus it 
is not possible to determine when criterion B was met. As a result 
the date of 1833 has to be taken as the latest date when the tariff 
could be removed in the certain knowledge that part of the industry 
producing coarse cotton cloth would have survived without tariff 
protection.
Nevertheless it is possible to determine when the domestic 
price of coarse cotton cloth might have begun to fall relative to the 
c.i.f. import price of this cloth. This would have begun to occur 
when imports of this cloth ceased. This happened in 1817 when no more 
imports of previously imported coarse cotton cloth from India, entered
(1) See pages 117-118 above.
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the United S t a t e s . I n  other words, the tariff change of 1816 
made the tariff prohibitive in the case of coarse cotton cloth. But 
this fact does not necessarily imply that in 1817 the industry could 
have withstood foreign competition without tariff protection.1 (2) 34 To 
determine the earliest date when the infant industry could have 
survived without government assistance attention should concentrate on 
determining when criterion A was met. There are certainly practical 
problems involved with applying criterion A but some idea of the 
position of the leading firm's (Boston Company) short-run average 
costs, relative to the c.i.f. import price, can be obtained by observing 
the profit rate for this company over time.
It is known that in 1817 the Boston Manufacturing Company 
paid its first dividend of twelve and a half per cent on paid in
(3)capital. Actually the company had earned profits in 1815 and 1816
(4)but these profits must have been retained by the Company. Between
1817 and 1821 the dividend rate averaged nineteen and a half per cent
(1) American State Papers, Cormeree and Navigation, II, pp. 64, 126, 
182, and American State Papers, Finance, III, p. 33.
(2) If the supply schedule for the domestic industry had an adequately 
small slope then the industry may not have survived without tariff 
protection even though imports had ceased. Since the supply 
schedule is the marginal cost curve for the industry, by the 
supply schedule cutting the world free trade price line this 
implies that at least one firm in the industry would survive the 
removal of the tariff. On the other hand, if the supply schedule 
did not cut this price line, which was more likely the smaller 
slope of the supply schedule, then this indicated that no firm in 
the industry would survive the tariff being removed.
(3) Ware, New England Cotton, op. cit., p. 66.
(4) Profits per yard of cotton produced by the company were about 
nine and a quarter cents per yard in these years. Ware, New
England Cotton, op. cit., p. 114.
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and in 1822 it rose to twenty seven and a half per cent. Now if
the tariff had been removed in 1817, and if other things had remained 
unchanged, it can be shown that the dividend rate for the company 
would have remained positive for this period.
In the first column of table 1 is data on the profit per
yard earned by the Boston Company between 1817 and 1822. While a
detailed account is not given by Ware of how the manufacturing costs
per yard were calculated it is assumed that adequate provision has been
(2)made for these costs, in particular for capital costs. In the
second column of the table is the specific tariff on coarse cotton 
textiles of six and a quarter cents per yard. It is assumed that the 
full tariff operated right throughout the period. In the last column 
of the table is shown the percentage drop in profits per yard that 
would have resulted if the tariff had been removed and other things had 
remained unchanged.
(1) Ware, New England Cotton, op. oit. 3 pp. 140-141,
(2) Provision is made for capital costs but no indication is given of 
how these costs are calculated. Cf. Ware, New England Cotton, 
op. ait.j Chart. Ill, p. 114.
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TABLE 1
Profits per yard 




tariff per yard 










(cents per yard) (cents per yard) (cents per 
yard)
%
1817 11.00 6.25 4.75 56.8
1818 10.25 6.25 4.00 61.0
1819 11.25 6.25 5.00 55.5
1820 8.50 6.25 2.25 73.5
1821 9.25 6.25 3.00 67.5
1822 9.00 6.25 2.75 69.5
* These profits per yard were calculated as the difference between 
the price per yard and the costs per yard (made up of the cost of 
cotton, overhead costs and labour costs). The source for this data is 
Ware, New England Cotton, op. o i t pp. 114 and 188.
145
The percentage fall in dividends should have been equal to 
the percentage fall in profits per yard if the same number of yards 
were produced by the firm after the tariff was removed as before, and 
assuming that other things remained the same. From these assumptions 
it follows that instead of the Boston Company earning, on everage, a 
dividend of nineteen and a half per cent between 1817 and 1821 it 
would have earned a dividend rate of about 7.2 per cent. In 1817 the 
dividend rate would have been 5.3 per cent and in 1822 it would have 
been 8.2 per cent. Given the risks involved with investing in the 
infant industry in 1817, and that the yield on United States government 
securities were six and a half per cent in 1817 and seven per cent in 
1820,^^ it is likely that the dividend of 5.3 per cent would have been 
regarded by the Boston Company as being below normal profits; in other 
words, in 1817 the short-run average costs, which included normal 
profits, would have been regarded as being totally above the c.i.f. 
import price. If the tariff had been removed in 1822, however, it is 
almost certain that the Boston Company would have survived, even if the 
assumptions made above held in reality.
In actual fact these assumptions are not likely to have 
applied. It is quite possible that the operational tariff was, by 
1822, zero, remembering that imports of coarse cotton cloth had ceased 
by 1817 and, therefore, the operational tariff is likely to have 
fallen from that date on as the infant industry expanded production.
If this was the case the removal of the administered tariff in 1822 
would have left the dividend rate of twenty seven and a half per cent
(1) Joseph Martin, Century Edition of the Boston Stock and Money 
Markets (Boston, by the author, 1898), p. 183.
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for that year unchanged. Alternatively the operational tariff should 
have at least fallen below the six and a quarter cents per yard, in 
which case the dividend rate would have been above the calculated 8.2 
per cent.
In addition, if the operational tariff was greater than zero 
in 1822 then the removal of the tariff would have tended to cause 
firms to leave the industry, or at least reduce their level of 
production, thus tending to reduce the unit costs of production in the 
industry in general. Firms in the industry also could have adjusted 
their output and input levels to the new product and factor prices in 
order to maximize profits. (This adjustment is not allowed for in the 
previous calculations.) If this sequence of events held in reality 
then the profit rate for the Boston Company, after the tariff was 
removed in 1822, would have been higher than that calculated above.
Taking all these considerations into account it does not 
appear unreasonable to believe that the ante-bellum infant cotton 
textile industry could have withstood the effects of the tariff being 
removed as early as 1822. Whether this was the optimum policy 
prescription to have followed would have depended on whether, or not, 
uncompensated externalities of a large enough size still persisted in 
the industry at this time. As has been emphasised above, it does not 
seem possible to provide convincing evidence to show that these 
externalities existed in this industry to a large enough degree by the 
mid-1820s to warrant tariff protection. As a result it may well have 
turned out that 1822 was the optimum time to have removed the tariff.
Of course a later date may have been the optimum time to have abandoned 
this form of government intervention, but by 1833, at the latest, the
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operational tariff was zero in any case, and thus there was no choice 
in the matter by this time of determining when to remove the tariff 
from imports of coarse cotton cloth.
The result that a case could be made for stating that the
optimum time to have removed the tariff on coarse cotton cloth, or at
least for stating that the earliest time the industry could have
withstood foreign competition without tariff protection, was 1822 is
at variance with the conclusion come to by Taussig. Taussig wrote as
follows: "Probably as early as 1824, and most certainly by 1832, the
industry had reached a firm position, in which it was able to meet
foreign competition on equal t e r m s . i n  the case of that part of
the industry producing cotton cloth of the Waltham-Lowell type this
conclusion is open to question; the tariff probably could have been
removed before 1824 and the industry most probably would still have
survived. In his later writings Taussig became even less harsh in
his assessment of United States tariff policy: "In my Tariff History
.... I am disposed to allow a longer time for the trial of protection
to young industries, and to admit the probable usefulness not only of
the imposition of the duties in 1816, but of their protection in 1824, 
(2)1828, and 1832." There was no need for this qualification in the 
case of the tariff imposed on coarse cotton cloth.
Taussig, in his discussion of this issue, does not appear to 
be concerned with the optimum time to remove the tariff, but rather
(1) Taussig, Tariff History, op. cit. y p. 136.
(2) T.W. Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1915), p. 262n.
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with the idea that when the tariff was removed on coarse cotton cloth 
every firm and mill in that part of the industry producing coarse 
cotton cloth should survive; namely, Taussig was implicitly applying 
criterion B. If this supposition is correct then there really was no 
need to become concerned by the fact that the tariff on coarse cloth 
was maintained after this criterion had been reached since no welfare 
loss was being imposed on the community by the imposition of this 
tariff.
Care has been taken to note that only the tariff on coarse 
cotton cloth should have been removed some time from 1822 on. This 
does not mean that the tariff could have been removed from imports of 
close substitutes for coarse cotton cloth. If this happened, say as 
late as 1830, it is possible that in response the demand schedule for 
coarse cotton cloth would have shifted so far to the left that the 
infant industry might very well have been driven out of existence, 
although the industry may have survived through just supplying export 
markets. Also, that part of the cotton textile industry producing 
close substitutes for coarse cotton cloth may have required to be 
treated as a separate infant industry, in which case the tariff on 
these goods needed to be maintained. To determine the point in time 
when the tariff on these imports of close substitutes should have been 
removed would require the application of a similar analytical procedure 
to that outlined in this section.
These conclusions concerning when the tariff should have 
been removed say nothing about whether or not the community earned an 
adequate rate of return on its investment in encouraging the expansion 
of the infant industry; the price of this investment being the cost
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of providing tariff protection. While no such calculation is made 
here, because of the obvious lack of information required to make such 
a calculation, it is possible to make a reasonable case for the view 
that the community did at least earn an adequate rate of return on its 
investment in that part of the cotton textile industry producing 
coarse cloth; in short, this part of the industry passed the Bastable 
test for giving assistance to an infant industry.
To begin with it is assumed that the tariff imposed on close 
substitutes for coarse cotton cloth only had the effect of protecting 
the infant industry producing these substitute products, and that this 
tariff protection is not counted as part of the cost of the tariff 
protection used to protect that part of the industry producing coarse 
cotton cloth. In other words, only the cost of applying the tariff on 
coarse cloth is counted as the cost of tariff protection for encouraging 
production of this commodity. There are certainly problems in assigning 
the costs of protection to various parts of an industry producing 
various products, so perhaps this assumption is not unreasonable.
The cost to the community of tariff protection is the
production and consumption loss in each period of time that the
operational tariff is above zero. In diagram 1 these costs in the
initial period are represented by the area EHG (consumption loss) and
area NMQP (production loss). The area MEHG represents the tariff m
revenue raised and area TMN the producers' surplus.^ By the time
the domestic industry's supply schedule begins to cut the foreign
supply schedule, P P' , some of the costs of tariff protection are rr J m m
(1) This analysis ignores the repercussions of changes in income 
distribution on the community's welfare.
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being offset by the gain in producers’ surplus below the c.i.f. import
price line. Once the operational tariff is zero, in which case the
industry's supply curve is at CS^, there are in this time period only
gains in producers' surplus, represented by the area P GC, and nom
production or consumption losses. If these gains (which will become 
even larger if the industry continues to lower its supply schedule 
through learning) continue into perpetuity, and all gains and costs of 
protection are discounted at a low enough rate of discount, then the 
community most certainly will have gained from bringing the infant 
industry into existence; the present value of the benefits would be 
greater than the present value of the costs of tariff protection.
The tariff protection provided to that part of the infant 
industry producing coarse cotton goods in ante-bellum New England 
certainly imposed costs and created benefits in a similar manner to 
that just outlined, with the operational tariff eventually becoming 
zero. Now if all the costs and benefits of this tariff protection were 
discounted at a low enough rate of social discount then the result 
would certainly be that the United States community gained from 
providing this assistance. Of course, if the costs of imposing a 
tariff on close substitutes are also included in the costs of tariff 
protection for coarse cotton cloth production then this result is not 
so certain. Finally it must be emphasised that in this analysis the 
repercussions of changes in income distribution on social welfare have 
been ignored; the gain to the community, in income created as a 
result of tariff protection, may have caused a redistribution of 
income (which could not be altered because of the constraints on the 
tax-cum-subsidy system) which was regarded as being so undesirable that 
the community lost social welfare as a result of protecting the infant
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industry.
Now that the question of income distribution has been raised
it might well be appropriate to conclude this section with a few
comments concerning the debate over the effect on regional income
distribution of the tariff protection given to manufacturing industries
in the United States during the ante-bellum period. In an article by
Pope an attempt was made to determine the direction of change in the
distribution of per capita income between regions as a result of an
increase in the t a r i f f . B e c a u s e  the analysis is comparatively
static (short-run) and not dynamic (it does not take into account
changes over the longer term) Pope has to make some crucial
assumptions. The one crucial assumption, recognised by Pope, is that
(2)factor supplies are fixed within regions. If this assumption is
not made then it is possible that the relocation of factors of 
production in response to factor price differentials, caused by the 
increase in the tariff, would eliminate per capita income differentials 
between regions. In other words, if factors of production were mobile 
most probably only aggregate income within regions would change as a 
result of an increase in the tariff.
The other crucial assumption, this time not recognised by 
Pope, is that there is no learning in the young United States 
manufacturing sector. If this assumption is relaxed then it is 
possible, even if factor supplies are assumed fixed, that in the
(1) C. Pope, The Impact of the Ante-Bellum Tariff on Income 
Distribution", Exploration in Economic History, Vol. 9 (Series 2) 
(1972), pp. 375-421.
(2) Pope, "Income Distribution", op. cit., pp. 411 and 420.
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longer-term the tariff did not distribute income from the South to the 
North-East even though the comparative static analysis may show that 
this did h a p p e n . T h i s  might have happened if, because of learning, 
the domestic price of domestically manufactured products fell so low 
that manufactured goods, including cotton textiles, began to be 
exported. In this case the total world market for raw cotton might 
have become larger than it would have been if no domestic textile 
industry had been established, so that on balance over the long-run no 
income is distributed between regions. This analysis is only 
speculation; no claims are made that this would have been the outcome 
under the assumption of fixed regional factor supplies. But certainly 
Pope's general equilibrium model would need to be reconsidered with 
learning introduced as a variable before firmer conclusions could be 
drawn from it.
The criticism of Pope's article, implied by these brief 
comments, is that there does not seem to be much worth in estimating 
comparative static results, which is what Pope has done, for an 
economy in which dynamic factors were at work which would have 
influenced the final outcome. In short, Pope's work is by no means 
the last word on the regional income distribution debate (not that
(1) See Pope, "Income Distribution", op. oit., p. 416 for a
discussion of the cases where, in the short-run, income decreases 
for the Southern owners of slaves and land. Pope actually finds 
that a tariff increase may have distributed income in favour of 
the South. B.D. Baack and E.J. Ray have presented alternative 
evidence to show that the opposite may have been the case. See 
B.D. Baack and J. Ray, "Tariff Policy and Income Distribution: 
The Case of the United States 1830-1860", Exploration in Economic 
History, Vol. 11 (Series 2) (1973-74), pp. 103-121. However, the 
point made below in the main text with respect to Pope's analysis 
can equally be made about the Baack-Ray approach.
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Pope said it was); more reasonable models incorporating dynamic 
effects have yet to be built and tested before the income distribution 
effects of tariff changes are fully understood for the United States 
economy of the ante-bellum period.
It may appear that these comments, about the measurement 
problems involved with estimating the effect of tariff protection on 
regional income distribution in ante-bellum United States, has strayed 
from the central themes of this essay. But as will be seen in section 
VI below, these observations (and those to be made in section V 
concerning income distribution) take on some importance when assessing 
the appropriateness of the tariff policy adopted by the United States 
government of the early ante-bellum era.
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SECTION III
In an article by D a v i d i n  1970 the debate was revived as
to whether or not government assistance should have been given to the
United States infant cotton textile industry in the ante-bellum period,
whether the tariff should have been the policy tool used to provide
this assistance, and finally when should the tariff have been removed,
given that it was used to assist the industry? To take the first
issue first - whether or not assistance should have been given to the
infant textile industry - David was well aware of the fact that it
needed to be shown that learning externalities existed in the infant
industry before a case could be made for government assistance. The
sort of externalities he was concerned with identifying were
technological and labour training externalities and not externalities
caused by risks being borne by leading firms. Thus David set himself
the task of providing empirical support "for the contention that
externalities in the form of learning and training effects derived
from regular commercial mill operations did play a significant part in
the reduction of costs and rapid expansion of cloth production in the
(2)ante-bellum era."
In an attempt to achieve this objective a proxy for learning 
(cumulative time (T) and cululative output (Q) were used alternatively) 
was attached to a Cobb-Douglas production function. This function was
(1) P. David, "Learning by Doing, op. oit. y pp. 521-601.
(2) David, "Learning by Doing", op. cit. y p. 539.
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then estimated for the period 1834 to 1860, using data from a sample 
of six firms which produced coarse cloth of the Waltham-Lowe11 type 
(under 16 counts). It was found that the coefficient for the learning 
proxy (for both T and Q) was statistically significant. By multiplying 
this coefficient estimate by the rate of growth of the learning proxy 
it was shown that the rate of growth of total productivity resulting 
from learning declined during each of the decades from the 1830s on, 
so that by the 1850s learning contributed only a half a percentage 
point per annum on average to the growth rate of total productivity.
Now, as indicated above, David set himself the task of 
determining whether or not there were learning externalities, yet at 
no time during the discussion of the regression results does he show 
that the demonstration of the existence of learning also demonstrates 
a reduction in the private profits of the firms in the six-firm sample, 
as caused by the presence of externalities, over the period 1834 to 
1860. In fact it is difficult to see how the model employed by David 
could possibly have shown that there were externalities; information, 
other than the regression results from the estimation of a production 
function, would be required. In particular it needs to be shown that 
there were weaknesses within the economic market system in the ante­
bellum period which prevented individuals, or groups, within the cotton 
textile industry from maintaining full property rights over the 
benefits resulting from their investment in learning. While there was 
some discussion of this point in the part of David's article not 
concerned with the empirical results, the evidence of externalities 
cited was limited in terms of the historical information provided and,
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therefore, m i s l e a d i n g . N o  mention was made of Lhe enforcement of 
patent agreements, the use of the apprenticeship system, or the use of 
the "discharge certificate" system by employers of labour; all methods 
employed by firms in the cotton textile industry in an attempt to 
appropriate all the benefits derived from their private investments in 
learning. This is not to say that all learning externalities in the 
industry were necessarily internalised by the application of these 
institutional devices, but as was pointed out above, there is 
reasonable a priori grounds for believing that the competitive, profit 
maximizing, cotton textile industry was capable, especially in the 
longer term, of instituting methods to internalise the major, if not 
all, externalities. Any externalities that may have persisted may not 
have been any greater than those found in the rest of the economy in 
general. Thus there was no grounds for special government assistance 
to the infant cotton textile industry once this point in time had been 
reached.
Assuming that learning externalities existed, at least at the 
beginning of the period to be considered, the next question to be 
discussed is whether a tariff should have been applied to assist the 
infant industry. In a world of perfect knowledge, and the allowance 
of great flexibility in applying economic policy tools, a tariff should 
not have been applied as it was at best a second-best policy instrument. 
But if this flexibility in applying policy tools was not available 
then a tariff may emerge as the best policy tool available to the
(1) The brief discussion provided by David on this issue is found on 
pp. 537-538 in "Learning by Doing", op. oit.
(2) See the discussion on pages 108-109 above.
157
government. As David points out, such an argument is diminished, 
however, if it can be shown that the tariff provided little 
or no assistance to the infant industry in its attempts to do the 
required learning, while, if the government had had limited taxing 
facilities available to it to finance a relatively small subsidy, a 
subsidy (if accurately directed at assisting the required learning) 
produced better results than a tariff, in terms of the learning done.
It is reasonable to believe that the United States government of the 
ante-bellum period did have this limited taxing power. Thus the 
question becomes one of establishing whether learning was of a type 
which would not have been assisted, or assisted to a relatively limited 
degree, by a tariff, whereas a relatively small but appropriate subsidy 
would have been more efficient at stimulating the required learning.
To establish what type of learning took place in the ante-bellum cotton 
textile industry is the central objective of David's paper.
To provide information on this matter David suggests that if 
it can be shown that learning is best measured by the proxy cumulative 
time (T), instead of the proxy cumulative output (Q), then this 
indicates that learning was not of a type where increased output was 
required to stimulate this learning. Instead, establishing a limited 
number of pilot plants, where time could be devoted to learning and 
developing the relevant technical know-how and skills required by the 
industry, would have been a more effective form of government 
intervention. In this case only a relatively small subsidy would be
(1) David's clearest statement of this argument is in his "The Use
and Abuse of Prior Information in Econometric History: A Rejoinder
to Professor Williamson on the Antebellum Cotton Textile Industry", 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 32 (1972), particularly pp. 709- 
710. Also see "Learning by Doing", op. cit., pp. 585-586 and p. 
591.
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required to establish these pilot plants needed to stimulate the 
learning dependent on time. Application of tariff protection, whose 
direct effect would have been to encourage the growth of output, would 
have been of little, if any, use in stimulating this type of learning.
On the other hand, if the learning taking place was best measured by 
cumulative output, then tariff protection for the infant industry would 
have been more effective at stimulating this form of learning. In this 
case a stronger argument could be presented for assisting this industry 
with this variety of government assistance.
To determine what type of learning took place cumulative time 
(T) and cumulative output (Q) are used alternatively in the regression 
model discussed above. The regression results obtained, using the six- 
firm sample, do not provide any immediate evidence to show that one 
learning proxy is superior to another for they give equally good 
regression results; a finding to be expected since the simple 
correlation coefficient of ln Q on ln T is 0.999.^^
To determine which learning proxy should be preferred evidence
outside these regression results is turned to. The first of the
arguments devised is based upon additional regression results obtained
from estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function for the Blackstone
(2)Manufacturing Company. Zevin is also cited as pointing out that
there was monopsony in the labour market supplying the cotton textile 
industry. If this was the case then it is easily shown, if it is 
assumed that there was other than increasing returns to scale, that the
(1) David, "Learning by Doing", op. oit.} p. 574, fn. 76.
(2) Cf. David, "Learning by Doing", op. oit.3pp. 575-581.
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ratio
aL + a K
should be less than the relative share of labour in the 
(1)firm’s gross value added. It is found that by using the results
from the Blackstone regression V (the regression using T) that this 
result is obtained. Such a result is not obtained by using the results 
from the Blackstone regression IV (the regression using Q). Thus, in 
the case of the Blackstone company the regression using T instead of Q 
described the assumed production realities more closely. In addition 
it is found that for the regressions for the six-firm sample the value 
for a is similar to that in the Blackstone regression V. Also, theL
estimates of
aS + aK
for the six-firm sample, using the results in
regressions V and IV, are similar to those for Blackstone regression V. 
On the basis of the argument that there is a need to reconcile the 
results for the six-firm sample with the Blackstone results (because 
all the firms discussed operated in a similar economic environment) 
David decides that these similarities in the regression results provide 
the reason for nominating cumulative time as the relevant measure of 
learning taking place in these firms.
This argument is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.
First of all it is not generally agreed in the relevant literature that
monopsony did exist in the labour market serving the cotton textile
(2)industry in the ante-bellum period. But assuming that this monopsony
did exist throughout the whole of this industry in New England it does 
not seem unreasonable to expect the regression results for the sample-
(1) The a 's are the coefficient estimates for the production function1where L and K stand for labour and capital inputs.
(2) P.M. McGouldrick, New England Textiles3op. oit. > pp. 34-38, for 
example, states that monopsony was not present in this market.
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firms to diverge in a similar manner as those for the Blackstone company.
As pointed out above, the coefficient estimates for the six-firm sample
aLdo not show such a divergence: the ratio --- - --  for the six-firm6 a + aL K
sample, using the results in regressions V and IV in table 3 in David's 
paper, are s i m i l a r . P e r h a p s  part of the reason for this lack of 
similarity of the results for the Blackstone Company and those for the 
sample firms is due to biases that may be present in the coefficient 
estimates computated by David.
As is obvious from the procedure employed by David of 
comparing the coefficient estimates of one regression equation with 
those of another, it has to be assumed that unbiased estimates of the 
regression coefficients are obtained. This was probably not the case 
for the regression results obtained by using the aggregated data from 
the six-firm sample. To demonstrate this point one begins by noting 
that the Cobb-Douglas production function, for a single firm, takes the 
following general form (when written in log form)
InY = InA + alnL + 3lnK.
To measure the average value of the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function for a number of firms the form of the function 
should be, in the two firm case, written as
InYi + lnY2 = InAi + I11A2 + ailnKi + 0t2lnK2 + ßilnLi + ß2lnL2. 
Assuming (*i = 0,2 and 3i = 3 2  then
ln(Y iY2) = ln(A!A2) + alnOC^) + 3ln(L!L2),
or more generally
n n n n
E ln Q . = E In A. + otE ln K. + 3E ln L . 
i i i  1 i 1 i 1
(1) David, "Learning by Doing", op. cit., p. 565.
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Thus the data that appears in the regression equation to estimate the 
parameters of the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function should be 
geometric sums, not arithmetic sums/^ Only if the data enters the 
regression model in this form are the estimated coefficients truly 
comparable with the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function estimated 
for the single firm, where no aggregation of the data inputs are 
required in order to estimate these parameters.
However the data, that are employed to estimate the 
parameters for the aggregated production function for the six-firm
Yisample, are of the form ln Z -— , ln Z K and ln Z L ; in other words,
l 1 1
the data enters the regression equation in the form of the logarithms
of arithmetic sums, and not as the logarithms of geometric sums. Thus
there are measurement errors in the data employed by David to estimate
the parameters of the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function. As a
result the coefficient estimates of this function will be biased, and
(2)biased in an indeterminate direction. This is not the case with the
coefficient estimates for the single Blackstone firm (this is assuming 
that there are no other sources of bias in the estimates) where the 
data enters the regression model in the correct form required to provide 
unbiased estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production function.
The implication of this observation is that the comparison of 
the biased coefficient estimates for the six-firm sample with the
(1) This point was first noted by L.R. Klein, "Macroeconomics and the 
Theory of Rational Behaviour", Econometrica, Vol. 14 (1946), pp. 93- 
108.
(2) Where there is more than one independent variable and these 
variables are subject to measurement errors the bias in the 
coefficient estimates using ordinary least squares may be either 
upwards or downwards. Cf. H. Theil, Economic Forecasts and Folicy 
(Amsterdam, North-Holland Press, 1958), pp. 326-329.
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coefficient estimates for the Blackstone Company may show a greater 
similarity than would exist if the unbiased estimates were compared.
The bias may go in the opposite direction, however, in which case the 
unbiased coefficient estimates derived from the two samples may be more 
similar than David indicates. Also, comparing the regression estimates 
for the six-firm sample with one another may give misleading results if
aT
the coefficient estimates are biased. In particular, the ratio
“l + \
for the six-firm sample using unbiased coefficient estimates may be 
quite different, and the relevant unbiased coefficient may diverge in a 
way opposite to that noted by David for the Blackstone Company 
regression results, for regressions alternately using the variables InQ 
and InT. Thus this possible presence of aggregation bias in the 
coefficient estimates does raise doubts about the comparisons of 
regression results made by David to assist in deciding what type of 
learning was taking place in the cotton textile industry.
Other potential sources of bias in the coefficient estimates 
derived by David are discussed in the next section. As will be shown 
there these biases appear to be relatively small and, therefore, can be 
safely ignored.
There are other weaknesses with the criteria employed by
(1) Unfortunately it is not possible to re-estimate the data for the 
six-firm sample used in the regression model, by calculating 
geometric sums instead of arithmetic sums from the raw data, since 
the source providing this information does not present it in a 
disaggregated form; only as arithmetic sums. (This statement is 
not quite accurate; the output data does appear in a disaggregated 
form, but not the data for labour and capital-service inputs.)
See L.E. Davis and H.L. Stettler, "The New England Textile 
Industry, 1825-60: Trends and Fluctuations", in Output
Employment and Productivity in the United States After 1800, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Income and Wealth, 
XXX (New York, Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 227-232.
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David to support his choice of cumulative time as the more accurate
measure of the learning taking place in the cotton textile industry,
but these issues are adequately discussed in the article by Ishikawa so
there is no need to cover this ground here.^^ The thrust of these
criticisms is to indicate that David’s use of outside information, to
show that cumulative time probably measures the type of learning that
took place in the cotton textile industry, is not convincing. On the
other hand, as Ishikawa points out, nor is there any reason to believe
that cumulative output should be accepted as the proxy most accurately
(2)measuring the type of learning that took place.
Yet even if it had been persuasively shown that cumulative 
time did more accurately measure the type of learning that took place, 
this does not necessarily mean that tariff protection of the cotton 
textile industry would not have stimulated at least some aspects of the
(3)learning process in this infant industry. This point was touched
(4)upon in section I above, although it is an issue taken up in more
(1) Ishikawa, "Conceptualization", op. oit., p. 852, footnote 3.
(2) Ishikawa, "Conceptualization", ibid.
(3) David does not actually directly deny this possiblity for he stated 
that "blanket subsidies [as provided by the Tariff of 1824 onwards] 
were a largely redundant set of measures". (David, "Learning by 
Doing", op. oit. 3 p. 600.) In his "Rejoinder" David also stated 
that ".... most of the subsidies afforded the cotton producers 
under the tariffs were subsidies in redundant learning...."
(David, "Rejoinder", op. oit.yp. 709. Emphasis added in both 
quotations, except for the emphasis of "redundant" which was in 
the original.) Ishikawa, on the other hand, rather overstates 
David’s position for he interprets David as concluding ".... that 
blanket subsidization through tariffs was redundant...." (Ishikawa, 
"Conceptualization", op. oit., p. 851.) This is not quite the 
stance David took as the statements cited above indicate; he 
thought that tariffs were "largely redundant" but not completely so.
(4) See the discussion on page 104 above.
164
detail in Ishikawa's article, where a number of mechanisms are proposed
via which learning may have been stimulated by increased output and, by
implication, via tariff p r o t e c t i o n . I f  a tariff did stimulate this
learning then this economic policy tool, whose use was relatively
unconstrained by political-institutional considerations, may have turned
out to have been a superior policy tool to have applied to assist the
infant cotton textile industry than an appropriate production subsidy,
which could not have been applied to any great degree because of the
constraints placed on the raising of tax revenue to finance this subsidy,
and possibly also because of constraints placed on the giving of direct
government subsidies, even if the tax revenue was available to finance
(2)them. If this was not the case, perhaps after taking into account
the costs of financing the subsidy with revenue raised via probably a 
distortionary tax, plus the administrative costs of raising this revenue 
and providing the subsidy, it still may have turned out that a tariff
(1) Ishikawa, "Conceptualization", op. oit. s pp. 856-859.
(2) While a tariff on a commodity provides an indirect subsidy to the 
relevant import competing industry, this fact probably is not as 
obvious to the general voting public as would be the case if the 
same sized subsidy was financed out of government revenue. Because 
of this relative overtness in the government giving a direct 
subsidy there may be political blocks placed in the way of the 
attempted use of this subsidy, whereas the application of tariff 
protection does not face this problem to the same extent because of 
the hidden nature of the subsidy provided by the tariff. This 
argument is perhaps not all that convincing for the ante-bellum 
period for the spokesmen for the Southern agricultural interests 
were only too well aware that the tariff imposed was providing a 
subsidy to manufacturing in the North-East. Calhoun, for example, 
stated that; "We (the agricultural interests of the South) are 
the serfs of the (tariff) system, - out of whose labour is raised, 
not only the money paid into the Treasury, but the funds out of 
which are drawn the rich rewards of the manufacturers and his 
associates in interest." Cited by Pope, " Income Distribution", 
op. oit., p. 378, from Richard K. Cralle (ed.), Reports and Public 
Letters of John C. Calhoun (6 Vols, New York, D. Appleton and 
Company, 1855), VI, p. 10.
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was the first-best policy tool to have applied in this constrained 
situation. ^
This line of argument, of course, provides a different
(2)emphasis, compared to that given by David, to this debate over the 
provision of tariff protection to the ante-bellum United States cotton 
textile industry. What appears to be clear is that whether, or not, a 
tariff was the second-best policy tool to have used compared to the 
limited use of a production tax-cum-subsidy is an issue still to be 
resolved despite David's attempts to settle this debate.
If the tariff did induce learning, and given that a tariff 
was applied to assist the infant United States cotton textile industry, 
the question to be answered is when should this tariff have been 
removed, assuming that there was an institutional constraint on the use 
of tax-cum-subsidies in place of tariffs. This question is not asked 
directly by David, but he does seem to have had this question in mind 
when he states that, although the discounted costs and benefits of 
tariff protection needed to be compared, "it seems one would have a hard 
job making a case for the halting [of the ] very limited way in which 
lower tariffs were programmed for the 1830s under the terms of the 1833 
Compromise Act - much less in defending the continuation of the duties
(1) This argument is a brief repetition of the relevant remarks made 
in section I on page 105 above. See this page for an
applification of the points just raised.
(2) As the previous discussion suggests, David came down on the side 
of tax-cum-subsidies (subsidies which were used to establish pilot 
plants) as being the most economically desirable and effective 
means, compared to tariff protection, of nurturing the infant 
cotton textile industry in the United States. Cf. "Learning by 
Doing", op. oit.j pp. 891 and 600, and "Rejoinder", op. oit. s
p. 710.
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on cotton goods in the period 1842 to 1860."^^
This conclusion is based upon the results from the regression
model which shows that in the case of the six-firm sample learning
contributed a relatively, and absolutely, small amount to the growth
(2)rate of total productivity in these firms. What is implicitly being
assumed by David is that learning externalities were directly related 
to the amount of learning taking place and, therefore, the optimum time 
to remove the tariff is when learning ceases, or virtually ceases.
But, as was pointed out at the beginning of this section, the empirical 
evidence to show the presence of learning does not necessarily indicate 
that externalities were present in the industry. It is possible that 
the industry learnt to internalise its learning externalities to a 
degree where no tariff protection was desirable, even though learning 
was observed to be present after 1834.
What is more, even if there were externalities over some of 
the period covered by the six-firm sample (1834-1860), the question of 
when the tariff should have been removed really does not arise if 
David's empirical results are narrowly interpreted. Learning is only 
identified as taking place in firms producing coarse cotton cloth, and 
not in the production of any other types of cloth. Thus these results 
stricly only allow something to be said about when the tariff on coarse 
cotton cloth should have been removed between 1834 to 1860; tariffs on 
other cloth types may need to have remained as learning was still
(1) David, "Learning by Doing", op. ait. ^ p. 599.
(2) David "Learning by Doing", op. cit., pp. 598-599.
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taking place at a high enough rate in that part of the industry 
producing these commodities after this learning had virtually ceased in 
the production of coarse cotton cloth.
But, as was shown in the previous section, the operational 
tariff on coarse cotton cloth was zero by 1833, thus anything these 
empirical results have to say on this matter essentially has been pre­
empted. What is more, 1833 may have been the optimum time to have 
removed this tariff if learning externalities had been adequately 
internalised in that part of the industry producing coarse cotton cloth.
If these empirical results are interpreted less strictly to 
mean that the learning identified as taking place in the six-firm 
sample after 1833 also indicates learning taking place at the same rate 
in parts of the industry producing other than coarse cloth, and that 
there are learning externalities present, then similarly a tariff on 
the cloth types produced by these firms may not have assisted this part 
of the industry; the relevant operational tariff may have been zero 
by 1834, or become zero of its own accord before the learning ended.
Of course, this observation is only raising a possibility, a possibility 
which would require further empirical testing. The problem with 
providing such a test is that the information on cotton textile exports 
from the United States in the 1820s, and later, is not available in 
adequate detail. What can be said, however, is that there is some 
limited alternative evidence to indicate that the tariff on some finer 
types of cotton cloth, with counts above the sixteen count cloth, may 
have been zero by 1833. It may be remembered that when citing the 
speech by Appleton in 1833 he stated that coarse cotton cloth could not 
be imported from England even if there had been no duty and even in the
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case of finer goods competition was not feared. This statement is
ambiguous as to whether this means that the operational tariff on the
finer types of cotton cloth was zero by 1833, but this is not an
unreasonable inference to draw from this statement. Of course, this
inference may not be correct, or Appleton's statement may be incorrect;
in either case the operational tariff on the finer cotton cloth types
(2)would not have been zero in 1833.
A complication is introduced into the process of deriving 
these conclusions if allowance is made for the removal of the tariff on 
substitutes for certain types of cotton cloth; even though the 
operational tariff may be zero on a particular commodity the domestic 
production of the commodity may still be receiving some tariff 
protection via tariffs imposed on substitutes. However, this 
complication intrudes whether one employs the criteria that the tariff 
is removed from the commodity where learning has ceased in the production 
of this commodity, or any of the other criteria employed in the previous 
section. Thus it does not appear too unreasonable to ignore this issue
(1) See page 140 above.
(2) The argument developed by Ishikawa to indicate that tariff 
protection may have been of some assistance to the ante-bellum 
infant cotton textile industry (see Ishikawa, "Conceptualization", 
op. oit.y pp. 859 and 861) is to some degree negated if the tariff, 
when applied, turned out to be operationally zero. While there 
certainly is some theoretical worth in indicating that a tariff, 
with a positive operational size, would have assisted the industry 
to learn, from a practical point of view this result is of little 
benefit if the tariff applied to directly assist the industry 
could not have had an operational value above zero. This was 
certainly the case for the tariff on coarse cotton cloth, at least 
by 1833. Yet Ishikawa appears to be, at least in part, interested 
in the type of learning, which might have benefited from some 
tariff protection, that took place in the production of this cloth 
type (the Waltham-Lowell type) in the United States in the ante­
bellum period after 1833. See Ishikawa, "Conceptualization", op. 
ait. 3 p. 856, fn. 13; p. 857, fn. 14; and pp. 859-861.
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of tariffs on substitutes in determining which criteria applied for 
determining the optimum time to remove the tariff on a particular 
imported commodity.
If it is assumed that the tariff induced no learning in the 
industry then according to David "it is hard to view United States 
tariff policy towards the industry as anything but a means of 
redistributing income in favour of the cotton textile producers".
This view is not necessarily completely accurate for the whole period 
that the tariff was maintained on certain types of cotton cloth. The 
operational tariff on these cloth types became zero in time; the 
earliest of these dates may have been 1824, the first year for which 
there is firm official evidence of the United States cotton textile 
industry exporting coarse cotton cloth; so that no income distribution 
was implied by the maintenance of these tariffs after these dates were 
reached.
(1) David, "Learning by Doing", op. ait., p. 600.
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SECTION IV
A possible excuse for government intervention, in the form of 
assistance to the cotton textile industry for the period 1834 to 1860, 
could be that there were economies of scale in the industry still to be 
taken advantage of during at least part of this period. Whether or not 
there were indeed economies of scale still to be taken advantage of is 
a statistical fact which David proceeded to try and determine. The 
conclusion that David came to, based on his statistical manipulation of 
the empirical facts, was that "No support for tariff arguments grounded 
on the existence of significant scale effects can be found in the 
outcome of the statistical tests reported .
Accepting, for the time being, that the statistical tests for
economies of scale were satisfactorily performed, the implication of
this statement, that somehow the tariff can assist a firm to take
advantage of economies of scale, is incorrect. To indicate the error
that has been made assume that there are a number of firms in the
industry which still have to reap the full advantage of economies of
(2)scale. The statements which follow (without supporting proofs) are
also based upon the usual oeterus paribus assumption. A tariff is
(1) David, "Learning by Doing", op. oit.3 p. 571.
(2) This assumption is rather a tenuous one to make because it implies 
an unstable competitive structure in the industry. Nevertheless 
the assumption is maintained, although the question of structural 
instability will be returned to in the next two paragraphs.
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imposed. If there are still imports of the product produced, the 
domestic product price will rise and domestic firms will earn additional 
quasi-rents. In addition, most probably the level of output will fall, 
if the firms are profit maximizers, as they move up the average cost 
curve in order to maximize profits. If there are no imports then the 
domestic product price might rise, or it might remain unchanged; it 
certainly will not fall. In either of these circumstances the increased 
tariff will not encourage the industry to expand its output, but instead 
most probably the firms in the industry will earn increased monopoly 
profits. The only way for a government to encourage a firm to take 
advantage of economies of scale is for the government to provide a 
subsidy. ^
Thus even if the sample firms had still to take advantage of 
economies of scale this fact does not in any way strengthen the argument 
for giving tariff protection to the cotton textile industry. Nor is it 
certain that if there had been economies of scale still to be used up 
that the government should have intervened by applying a production 
subsidy. To explain this point is is assumed that there are economies 
of scale to be earned in an industry where there are a number of 
separate firms producing the industry's output. In these circumstances 
it would be to the advantage of firms in the industry to merge until 
all the economies of scale have been used up. Any firm that did not 
merge, and thereby did not take advantage of the economies of scale, 
would tend to be driven out of business, as the product price was
(1) Analytical proofs of these statements are easier to provide if
there is only one firm experiencing economies of scale. For this 
case and the diagrammatic proofs to support the statements made in 
the main text see M.W. Corden, "Monopoly, Tariffs and Subsidies", 
Eoonomioa, Vol. 34 (February 1967), pp. 50-58.
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forced down via competition between producers, unless the single firm
by itself could expand its output to the optimum level. Perhaps a
subsidy, which encouraged firms to merge, might hurry this process
along, but the market could be relied upon to eventually ensure that
the economies of scale in the industry were taken advantage of. ^  ^
One might add that if there is growth in demand for the goods produced
(in other words the demand schedule shifts to the right) then again
economies of scale in the industry will eventually be taken advantage
(2)of without government assistance.
This analysis implies an indirect method for determining 
whether or not there were economies of scale in the firms comprising 
the six-firm sample. If economies of scale were still to be earned in 
these firms in 1834 then one would expect that with the passing of time 
these firms would produce an increasing proportion of the industry's 
total output as firms merged, or were driven out of business if they 
did not take advantage of these scale economies. Exactly the opposite 
appears to have happened; both the proportion of New England, and the 
proportion of Massachusetts, output produced by the sample firms 
declined over time. The evidence in Table 2 indicates that rather 
these firms were entering an area of production where increasing costs,
(1) Had there been only one firm in the industry then there would not 
have been the competitive market forces present to induce this 
firm to take advantage of all the economies of scale available. 
This case is not applicable as there was more than one firm in the 
cotton textile industry.
(2) In fact it has been argued that the growth in demand in the United 
States for cotton textiles contributed half of the growth of total 
domestic cotton production from 1815 to 1833. Cf. R.B. Zevin,
"The Growth of Cotton Textile Production After 1815", in R.W.
Fogel and S.L. Engerman (eds), The Reinterpretation of American 
Economic History} op. cit., pp. 122-147.
173
and decreasing returns to scale, might have been experienced; at least 
from 1838/40 on. The reason for this statement is that if firms in a 
perfectly competitive industry, in increasing their level of output to 
maintain their share of the industry’s growing output, have to 
experience diseconomies of scale, they will tend not to increase their 
output to the level required to maintain this share. Thus a falling 
share going to a group of firms is evidence that these firms are not 
experiencing economies of scale, but rather constant returns to scale, 
or even possibly decreasing returns to scale.
But the evidence in table 2 of possible decreasing returns to 
scale is rather slim. If for no other reason, this evidence must be 
treated with caution because of the aggregation problem; the total 
output figures for New England and Massachusetts do not distinguish 
between coarse and other types of cotton cloth, yet the six-firm sample 
produced coarse cotton cloth. Because of this weakness in the data it 
is necessary to provide a more formal test of economies of scale.
TABLE 2
Proportion of New England Proportion of Massachusetts
Year Output Produced by the Output Produced by the
Sample Group (%). Sample Group (%)•
1838/40 10.5 27.4
1848/50 8.5 20. 2
1858/60 8.0 17.2
Source: L.E. Davis and H.L. Stettler, "The New England Textile
Industry, 1825-60: Trends and Fluctuations", in Output3
Employment and Productivity in the United States After 18003 
National Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Income and 
Wealth, XXX (New York, 1966), Table A-l, pp. 234-236;
Table 4, p. 221.
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Such a test will be provided here for the reason that there 
are some weaknesses in the statistical procedures employed by David to 
determine whether there were economies of scale in the six-firm sample. 
In addition, the following discussion will be interested in determining 
not only if there were economies of scale, but also whether the 
elasticity of substitution between factors in the production function 
for the six-firm sample were other than one (in other words, whether 
the production function was other than a Cobb-Douglas) and also if the 
elasticity of scale (a term which will be explained below) varies with 
the scale of operation in the sample of firms. While this intended 
discussion diverts from the central theme of this essay; namely, the 
issue of government intervention to protect the United States ante­
bellum cotton textile industry; it is worthwhile to provide this 
econometric analysis in order to provide further statistical information 
about part of the United States cotton textile industry of the ante­
bellum period.
David's procedure for estimating economies of scale was not 
satisfactory because he utilised a Cobb-Douglas production function 
without showing whether other forms of the production functions more 
accurately represented the production process. Such an omission in 
itself is not important, but if the elasticity of substitution was 
other than one then the estimates of economies of scale using a Cobb-
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Douglas production function can be seriously biased. (1)
To handle this problem a CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) production function, of the following form, is used
Y = A(G,t) (6L~P + (1-6) K"P)"y/p,
1 (2)
[1 ]
where O, the elasticity of substitution, is equal to 1+P*
The variable Y is the yardage of cotton cloth produced, L is labour 
inputs measured in man-hours, K is capital inputs measured in spindle- 
hours, and 6 is the relative share of value added going to labour. 
A(G,t) represents the learning and technological change terms. It is 
assumed that learning and technological change is Hicks-neutral. The
(1) Cf. G.S. Maddala and J.B. Kadane, "Estimation of Returns to Scale 
and the Elasticity of Substitution", Econometrica> 35 (1967), pp. 
419-423. It should be noted as well that using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, instead of CES production function, will not 
necessarily give biased estimates of the amount of technical 
change, or the amount of learning, that took place in the six-firm 
sample. It can be shown that
-  G/G + A/A + 6(L/L) + (1-6) (K/K) +(l/$5 (1-6) (K/K-L/L)1 2,
where L represents labour inputs and K represents spindle inputs.
If ö^l but &/K has a value close to L/L then the CES specification 
of the production function has little influence in determining the 
size of A/A and G/G. On this point see R. Nelson, "The CES 
Production Function and Economic Growth Projections", Review of 
Economies and Statistics3 43 (August, 1965), pp. 326-328. This 
happens to be the case with the data employed in, and results 
obtained from, David's study. For the period 1833-1839 
(K/K-L/L)2 is 0.00187 and for the period 1855-1859 it is 0.00063. 
These results are based upon the data provided in David, "Learning 
by Doing", op. cit.y Table 6, and accompanying notes to this table, 
pp. 594-595.
(2) David included raw cotton in the production function. Since a 
fixed relationship was assumed between cloth output and raw cotton 
inputs this input served no useful purpose in the model. This 
input variable is, therefore, dropped from the CES production 
function specified here. It can easily be shown mathematically 
(but not shown here) that this procedure of omitting this input is 
correct if the assumption of the fixed relationship between cloth 
output and raw cotton inputs is also correct. On this fixed 
coefficient assumption see David, "Learning by Doing , op. cit.y 
p. 547.
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parameter y is the scale term.
To aid the testing procedure for the hypothesis that there 
are no economies of scale equation [1] is rewritten as follows
Y/L = A(G,t)Ln [6 + (1-6) (K/L)_P]“U/P [2]
where r| = y-1. This non-linear function is converted into a linear 
function by taking a Taylor expansion around p = 0 of the logarithm of 
the non-linear f u n c t i o n . T h e  following result is obtained, after 
omitting third order and higher terms,
ln(Y/L) - ln A(G,t) + n ln L + y(l-6) ln(K/L),
- l/2upS (1-6) [ln(K/L)]1 2. [3]
The form of the learning index that will be used to estimate 
this equation is cumulative output. Technological change is assumed to 
take place at a constant exponential rate; the size of this constant 
rate has yet to be estimated. Thus, in a simplified form, the function 
to be estimated is
In(Y/L) = a^ + a3 InQ + a2t + a3 InL + a4 ln(K/L),
+ a5[ln(K/L)] . [4]
The immediate problem that arises when it comes to estimating
this function, while using the same data as that employed by David, is
(2)that of multicollinearity. This problem is reflected in the facts
(1) This technique for linearising a CES production function was first 
devised by Kmenta. Cf. J. Kmenta, "On the Estimation of the CES 
Production Function", International Economic Review, 9 (1967),
pp. 180-189.
(2) This is in addition to the problem of aggregation bias mentioned 
in the previous section. This problem will need to be ignored in 
the regression exercises carried out below.
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that the simple correlation coefficient between t and InQ is 0.9734 and 
between ln(S/L) and fln(S/L))1 2 it is -0.9982. As a result of this 
problem of multicollinearity the regression results for equation [4] 
(see regression 1 in table 3) are poor.^^
One way to overcome this problem is to drop variables from 
the regression model. The repercussion of doing this will be to bias 
the estimates of the coefficients remaining in the regression model.
The direction of this bias can be determined, and it will also be 
possible to obtain some idea of the order of magnitude of this bias.
It will be particularly useful to know the direction and the order of 
magnitude of this bias for the estimate of the coefficient for ln L, 
which is the coefficient which indicates the extent of the economies of 
scale.
The extent of the bias of a coefficient estimate for an 
included independent variable, caused by omitting an independent 
variable from the regression model specification, can be measured by
Asubstituting the relevant values into the term b, , a. , , ; b. .... is ° h,k+l k+1 h,k+l
the coefficient estimates found by regressing the omitted independent
variable, k + 1, on the included independent variables (this is called
the auxiliary regression); ä is the true estimate of the coefficient
for the variable k + 1  when this variable is included in the
(2)regression. In the case of regression 1, in table 3, a^_ is most
(1) The reason for this poor result may not only be caused by 
multicollinearity but also be due to an incorrect specification 
of the regression model.
(2) Cf. H. Theil, Principles of Econometrics, (Amsterdam, North 
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probably negative and the value of b^_ is positive. It follows
that if the variable t is omitted from equation [4], and the model is
re-estimated, then it is to be expected that the value of ln L should
fall relative to zero. This, in fact, happens as a comparison of the
results in regression 1 and 2 demonstrate. Also, the absolute
magnitude of the fall in the value of the coefficient estimate for ln L
(2 )is not large; the fall is 0.0089.
In regression 2 the value of wou-^ most probably be
(3)positive. The value of b ^  ln L is also positive. Thus if
ln (K/L) were omitted from equation [4], as well as the variable t, the
coefficient estimate for ln L would rise relative to its value in
regression 2. This occurs, as is evidenced by comparing the results in
regression 3 with those in regression 2. Again the absolute magnitude
of the change in value of the coefficient estimate for ln L is not
(4)large; the rise in its size is 0.0056.
Thus the biases in the coefficient for ln L, caused by 
omitting independent variables t and ln (K/L) from equation [4], appear
(1) The value of this coefficient from the estimated auxiliary 
equation is 12.7049, which is significant at the 95 per cent 
level.
(2) By multiplying the values for ä and b ,  ^ together it is
found that 0.0007 x 12.7049 = 0.0088. This result accords with 
the magnitude of the bias mentioned in the text; which is what 
one would expect.
(3) The value of this coefficient is 0.0089 but it is not 
significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level.
(4) This result also accords with the theoretical estimate;
0.0089 x 0.6215 = 0.0055.
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to more or less offset each other. The benefit of omitting these 
variables is that now the coefficient estimate for ln L in regression 
3 is significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level 
according to the two tail test. This is also true of all the other 
regression coefficients in regression 3. ^
The result that the scale coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the 95 per cent level is different from that
(2)obtained by David. Although his estimate of the size of economies
of scale, -0.2262, (where Q is the learning index) is almost the same 
as the estimate in regression 3, David finds his estimate is not 
significantly different from zero. One hesitates to conclude, however, 
that the reason for this discrepancy in these results is due to the 
fact that David failed to specify a CES production function.
The reason for this hesitancy is as follows. The test 
procedure for determining economies of scale, using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, is simplified if the function is written in the 
following form
0 aKY/L = A(G,t) L (K/L) , [5]
where 0 = a + a - 1, the learning index is Q and the coefficient for K. L
t is set equal to zero. The estimate of 0 was found to be -0.2262 
(the same as David’s estimate) and the t-statistic took the value
(1) If the independent variable [In (K/L)]1 2 had been omitted, instead 
of In (K/L), then the production frunction form being estimated 
would be a Cobb-Douglas. The estimate for the scale term in this 
case is -0.2262; in other words, the same value as David 
estimated. See David, "Learning by Doing", op. cit. 3 Table 5, 
Regression Model IV, p. 572.
(2) David, "Learning by Doing", op. oit. 3 p. 570 ff.
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-2.4872. David, on the other hand, using the following form of the
Cobb-Douglas production function
(a -1) a
Y/L = A(G,t) L K , [6]
found exactly the same value for the measure of economies of scale but 
calculated the t-statistic for the scale term to be -1.75. Thus it 
would appear that David made a calculation error of this t-statistic, 
and it is this error which has caused the discrepancy between the 
independent results reported here and David's results.
(1) The error actually made was that the formula used by David to
develop the required test statistic was incorrect. This formula 
employed was
A  A A A
SE1 2 = SE2 + SE2 - 2 SE, T , Trai-a2 ai a 2 InLInK [1 ]
where SE stands for the estimate of the standard error, for the
a irelevant coefficient, squared. (See David, "Learning by Doing", 
op. ait. s p. 572.) The error lies in the fact that the sign of 
the third term on the right-hand side should be a plus, not a 
minus.
To sketch out the reason why this should be so the general theory 
of testing linear combinations of coefficients will be drawn upon. 
(See, for example, D. Huang, Regression and Econometric Models 
[New York, Wiley, 1970], p. 118.) For the relevant regression 
equation estimate to be statistically analysed,
/\ /% /\
In Y/L = 8o + Bi ln Q + 82 ln K + 3s ln L,
the hypothesis to be tested is that
A /V
82 +  83 - 0.
In vector form this may be written as
A
6"  8 =  0
where
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I t  c a n  be  shown t h a t  &' = (0 011 )
E ( 6 " ß -  0 ) 2 = s 2 6" (X"X)- 1 6 [2]
= s 2 .
P
s 2 i s  SE i n  e q u a t i o n  [1] ab o v e  an d  s 2 i s  t h e  e s t i m a t e d
P a r a 2
v a r i a n c e  f o r  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  r e g r e s s i o n  e q u a t i o n .  E q u a t i o n  [2]  
may be  w r i t t e n  o u t ,  g i v e n  t h e  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  v e c t o r  6 , i n  t h e  





The t e r m s  i n  b r a c k e t s  a r e  t h e  i n v e r s e s  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  e l e m e n t s  
i n  t h e  c o v a r i a n c e  m a t r i x .  When t h e s e  e l e m e n t s  a r e  m u l t i p l i e d  by 
s 2 t h e y  become e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  s q u a r e d  f o r  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t  e s t i m a t e s  plus  a  s i m i l a r  t e r m  i n d i c a t i n g  
t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  i n v e r t e d  c o v a r i a n c e  b e t w e e n  I n s  an d  InK. I n  
o t h e r  w o r d s ,  e q u a t i o n  [3] i s  t h e  same a s  e q u a t i o n [ l ]  above  
e x c e p t  t h a t  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e  t h i r d  t e r m  i s  a p l u s ,  n o t  a m i n u s .
I f  e q u a t i o n  [3] i s  u s e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  SE ( s 2 i n  e q u a t i o n
a i - a 2 p
[ 3 ] )  i t s  v a l u e  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  be  0 . 0 0 8 4 3  and i t s  s q u a r e  r o o t
i s  0 . 0 9 1 8 .  The t - s t a t i s t i c  o f  ß 2 + £ 3  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  - 2 . 4 6 4 1 .
T h i s  v a l u e  i s  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  v a l u e  c a l c u l a t e d  f rom  t h e
a l t e r n a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o b b - D o u g la s  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n
d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  m a in  t e x t  ( t h e  t - s t a t i s t i c  f o r  t h i s  c a s e  was
- 2 . 4 8 7 2 ) ,  b u t  t h i s  s m a l l  d i s c r e p a n c y  i s  no d o u b t  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e
p r e s e n c e  o f  r o u n d i n g  e r r o r s .  The r e s u l t  fo u n d  by D av id  f o r  t h i s
t - s t a t i s t i c  c a n  be  fo u n d  by s u b t r a c t i n g  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  t e r m
2 s 2c 1 , , ,  T from t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  t e r m s  on t h e  r i g h t -  l nK lnL
hand s i d e  o f  e q u a t i o n  [ 3 ] ,  and c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  T h i s  t - s t a t i s t i c  was e s t i m a t e d  t o  be  
- 1 . 7 9 ,  w h ich  i s  j u s t  u n d e r  t h e  v a l u e  D av id  c a l c u l a t e d  ( w h ic h  was 
- 1 . 7 5 ) ;  a g a i n  t h i s  d i s c r e p a n c y  i s  no d o u b t  due  t o  r o u n d i n g  
e r r o r s .
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It also seems reasonable to conclude that by specifying a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, instead of a production function 
with an elasticity of substitution other than one, that no undue bias 
has been introduced into the estimate of economies of scale for the 
six-firm sample. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the 
production function is not a CES function, or some production 
function other than a Cobb-Douglas. It can easily be shown that 
even if the elasticity of substitution is significantly different 
from zero, if, in the auxiliary equation of (InK/L)1 2 on the other 
included variables in equation [4], the coefficient of InL is small 
then very little bias will be introduced into the estimate of 
economies of scale using a Cobb-Douglas production function.
To actually calculate an unbiased estimate of the
elasticity of substitution, or even just an unbiased estimate of the
relative value of this parameter compared to one, employing the
regression model in equation [4], it becomes difficult because of the
biases caused by omitting variables from this equation in order to
avoid the problem of multicollinearity. The bias caused by omitting
(2)t from this regression model is a negative one. On omitting
ln K/L the resulting bias is also negative, and of the order of
(1) This statement follows from the formula for determining the
bias resulting from omitting variables from the regression
model. If b ,. is small then b. . .a, is also likely toh ,k+l h,k+l k+1
be small.
(2) The actual change in the value of (InK/L)2 is -0.0009. The 
calculated change is -0.0007 times the value of the coefficient 
for (InK/L)2 in the auxiliary equation of t on the included 
variables in regression 2 in table 3, which is 1.1947. This 
gives a calculated value of the bias of -0.0008.
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magnitude of about -0.2000.^^ This subsequent downward bias, caused
by omitting ln K/L from the regression model, causes the value of the
coefficient for (InK/L)1 2 to change sign between regression 2 and 3.
What this implies is that while the value of the coefficient for
(InK/L)2 in regression 3 is the only one significantly different from
zero of the three values calculated for this coefficient, this does
not mean that the elasticity of substitution is necessarily less than
(2)one; the downward biases in this coefficient estimate, caused by
omitting variables from the regression model, appear to be so great 
that the true value of this coefficient may be positive, or at least 
not significantly different from zero. Thus it is not possible to say, 
from the results presented in table 3, whether, or not, the production 
function for the cotton textile industry was other than a Cobb-Douglas.
While this may appear to be a rather negative result, a 
positive aspect of the previous exercise is that it does indicate how 
important it is to keep track of likely biases that may be caused to 
coefficient estimates resulting from omitting variables from the 
initial regression model. Had this not been done above one may well 
have drawn the apparently incorrect conclusion that the true production 
function for the cotton textile industry for the ante-bellum period 
was other than a Cobb-Douglas with an elasticity of substitution less 
than one.
(1) The actual fall in the value of the coefficient for (InK/L)2 
between regression 2 and regression 3 is -0.1974; the calculated 
change is -0.2309 (0.6215 x -0.3176).
(2) a3 = -1/2 pp6(l-6) = -0.0819. Now 6(1-6) and p are all positive, 
therefore, p is positive and a is less than one. If a3 was not 
significantly different from zero then p would be zero and ö equal 
to 1, which is the Cobb-Douglas case.
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Returning to the issue of the measured statistical 
significance of diseconomies of scale in the six-firm sample, this 
fact may just be a reflection of aggregation bias in the data employed 
in the regression, and that actually these firms experienced constant 
returns to scale. This latter case would certainly be easier to 
explain in terms of economic theory, whereas the diseconomies of scale 
case is not; had these firms experienced diseconomies of scale 
continually over the period 1834 to 1860, which implies that in a 
perfectly competitive industry these firms produced at non-optimum 
points on their cost functions, these firms should have been driven 
out of business. This did not happen. Rather than this apparent 
inconsistency being explained by errors being made in estimating the 
production function, it is possible to provide an explanation based on 
the assumption that the cotton textile industry was not perfectly 
competitive for some of the time period being considered. The sort 
of market imperfection in mind is that these firms possessed some 
special technical knowledge which allowed these firms to earn quasi­
rents. These rents would have allowed these firms to operate on the 
increasing average costs (decreasing economies of scale) portion of 
their average cost curves and yet they still would have remained in 
business; indeed these firms should have operated along this section 
of their costs curves in order to maximize their profits.
In time, however, these quasi-rents should have been reduced 
as new firms were attracted into the industry by the quasi-rents and,
(1) The point where marginal costs equalled marginal revenue would
have been at a level of output where there were increasing costs, 
assuming that the average and marginal cost schedules were 
normally shaped.
186
therefore, competition increased in the industry. In response to 
this competitive pressure the sample firms would have found the need 
to adjust the level of their output in order to reduce the level of 
the diseconomies of scale. To determine if this did occur what needs 
to be observed is if the elasticity of scale in the six-firm sample 
did vary over time.
An attempt to provide such observations begins with 
defining the term scale elasticity. In the case of a general 
production function
Y = f(X!, ... ,X ) n [7]
where Y is the output of the factor inputs, (Xx, ... ,X^ ) the scale 
elasticity is defined as
B 3f Ai 
£ "i-l 3Xt Y ’
[8]
which is the sum of the marginal output elasticities of the factors 
of production. Thus in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production
function of the form
ln Y = a ln L + 3 ln K 
the scale elasticity is
e = a + 3-
But this scale elasticity may vary with the level of output. 
To test, in a preliminary manner, if this was the case in the 
production function for the six-firm sample this function was tested
(1) Some of the theoretical discussion which follows draws on the
paper by V. Ringstad, "Some Empirical Evidence on the Decreasing 
Scale Elasticity", Eoonometrioa, Vol. 42 (1974), pp. 87-101.
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to determine whether the measure of diseconomies of scale in these 
firms was stable over different levels of output. Since output per 
head and time are highly correlated in the data sample (the simple 
correlation coefficient between Y/L and time is 0.9187) this is 
equivalent to measuring the stability of this measurement of scale 
economies over t ime.^
A Cobb-Douglas production function of the form specified in
equation [5] above is employed, where Q is employed as the proxy for
learning and the coefficient for time (t) is set equal to zero. The
usual method of testing for the stability of coefficient estimates is
(2)to utilise some variation of the Chow-test. The disadvantage of
this test is that it is not possible to test the stability of a 
particular coefficient in a regression equation (assuming there is more 
than one coefficient estimated in the regression equation). A 
technique that does overcome this problem is to make appropriate use of 
a dummy variable/1 23'* Equation [5] is rewritten, with a dummy variable 
included as
ln Y/L = 0O + 3i ln Q + 0i ln L + a ln(K/L),
+ 02 (D ln L), [9]
(1) This point will be explained in a little more detail below.
(2) G. Chow, "Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two 
Linear Regressions", Econometrioa, Vol. 28 (1960), pp. 591-605, 
and F.M. Fisher, "Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients 
in Two Linear Regressions: An Expository Note", Econometried, 
Vol. 38 (1970), pp. 361-366.
(3) This technique is discussed in J. Johnson, Eoonometvio Methods3 
2nd Edition (London, McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 204-206.
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where D = 1 for observations over a certain time span, or for InL 
taking certain values,
= 0 otherwise.
If 0i and 02 are both significantly different from zero then the scale 
elasticity takes the value 0i + 02 for a certain time span, or values 
of InL, and 0i on all other occasions. This in turn implies that the 
scale elasticity is not stable over time.
The regression equation of the form presented in equation [9] 
was estimated with
D = 0 for the period 1834 to 1847 (the first fourteen 
observations in the data sample)
= 1 otherwise (1848 to 1860).
From 1848 on all values of Y/L are larger than the values of this 
variable before this date, thus choosing the period 1848 to 1860 is 
equivalent to testing the stability of the diseconomies of scale over a 
certain range of values of Y/L.
The results of this esimation (regression number 2) may be 
compared in table 4 with the results obtained by leaving out the dummy 
variable (regression number 1). The coefficient for DlnL is 
significantly different from zero at a significance level just under 95 
per cent according to the two tail test of the null hypothesis. Thus
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that the scale elasticity does vary over time and with the level of 
Y/L. What is more the scale elasticities decrease as the level of
Y/L increases; in other words, the diseconomies of scale appear to 
fall over time. This result conforms with the conjectures made earlier 
about the behaviour of the six-firm sample in response to increased 
competition in the domestic cotton textile industry.
It is possible to provide further tests to determine whether 
the scale elasticity varied over different levels of output, and at the 
same time supply far greater detail, compared to the previous test, as 
to how much the scale elasticity may have varied. The production 
function is transformed into the nonhomogeneous form^^
ln(Y/L) + Y(ln(Y/L))2 = 3o + 3i ln Q + 0 ln L,
+ a ln(K/L) [10]
which has a scale elasticity of
L = 0-+2Y In(Y/L))* [11]
In other words, the size of the scale elasticity varies with the level 
of output per head.
To determine an acceptable estimate of Y a nonlinear maximum
likelihood estimation procedure has to be employed; in fact the
(2)procedure used is that described by Box and Cox. Briefly the method
(1) This form is suggested by M. Nerlove, "Returns to Scale in 
Electricity Supply", in C.F. Christ (ed.), Measurement in Economies 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963).
Clearly other transformations of the production function, to test 
for variable scale elasticities, are possible, but the one 
presented in equation [10] will be adequate for the purposes 
required here.
(2) G.E.P. Box and D.R. Cox, "An Analysis of Transformations",
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society_, Series B, Vol. 26 (1964), 
pp. 211-243.
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of estimation is as follows. The dependent variable in equation [10] 
is a parametric transformation of ln(Y/L) which may be written as 
ln V . Equation [10] becomes, when written in stochastic form,
lnV^ ^ = 3o + 3i ln Q + 0 ln L + a ln(K/L) + y. [12]
The term u is a random term with an assumed mean of zero and normally 
distributed with constant variance. The logarithm of the likelihood 
function is
In i = constant - y  In o2 + ln J(y; Y/L)
- " (ln(V(T>) — ßo — ßi ln Q - 0 ln Ln=l
2
- a (InK/L)) [13]
where n = 27 (the number of observations in the data sample). 
J (Y; Y/L) = S d ln V<Y>i=l d(InY/L)
(1)is the Jacobian of the transformation. v~' For the transformation 
employed
lnV(Y) = ln(Y/L) + y (ln(Y/L))
the Jacobian to be utilised in equation [13] is
n (l + 2 y ln(Y/L)). 
i=l
(1) If there had been no parametric transformation of ln(Y/L) there 
would have been no need to introduce the Jacobian into the 
likelihood function as the Jacobian would have taken the value of 
1 (or lnJ=0). However, in the case of the transformation of the 
type used in equation [12], to find the likelihood function in 
relation to the original observations, the normal density function 
needs to be multiplied by the Jacobian of the transformation. In 
other words, the Change-of-Variable Theorem has to be applied. On 
this theorem see J. Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York, 
Macmillan, 1971), pp. 213-214. Also see Box and Cox, "An Analysis", 
op. cit.} p. 215.
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To find the maximum likelihood function in equation [13] two 
steps in the estimation process are required. In the first step a 
given value of y is specified and the values of 3o, 3i, 9 and a are 
found by minimizing
£(ln(V^) — 3o — 31 ln Q - 91nL - aln(K/L)) . [14]
In other words the likelihood function is maximized for a given value 
of y, which is the standard ordinary least-squares problem.
The value of the residual sum of squares (RSS) from this
regression equation estimation is next used to estimate the variance of
the likelihood function fG1 2 = ). With this estimate, plus thev n-k J
estimated value of J(y;Y/L), for the given y, the maximum value of the 
likelihood function for the particular y can be estimated, which is 
essentially finding the value, except for a constant, of the function^
ln £ = “I In o2(y) + ln(n(l + 2y ln V)}. [15]
This two step procedure is repeated for a number of values 
of y to find the maximum value for In £. The estimation of equation 
[9] above does assist, however, in giving some rough guidance as to 
the likely value of y. Those results indicate that 0 is negative and 
that its value decreases as ln(Y/L) increases; i.e. £ decreases as 
Y/L increases in value. This implies, in terms of equation [11], that 
y should be greater than zero.
The results of applying this procedure are given in table 
5; the maximum values of the likelihood function are shown for a range
(1) The last term on the right-hand side of equation [13] is a





















* The t-statistic is shown in parenthesis. This coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent level according 


































of values of y. The value of y which provides the highest value is 
that where y = 0.04. The estimated value of 0, for this value of y, 
is also shown in table 5. With this information the value of e was 
calculated for the range of output per head produced by the six-firm 
sample. The results of these calculations are depicted in figure 1 
with a fitted curve.
Not too much weight should be given to these results for the
results shown in table 5 indicate a rather flat distribution curve,
/\implying that y = 0.04 may not be significantly different from zero.
In fact it is not. The 100(l-r]) per cent confidence region for y can 
be calculated from
(ln Vx(Y) * ln W Y)) < 1/2X2fYl (n) 1 1 6  J
LV. > Ywhere (Y/L)^ is the number of independent components of y, which is 
one in the case of equation [10]. At the 95 per cent level, with one 
independent component of y, l/2x2 takes the value of 1.92. By plotting 
the left-hand-side of equation [15] for a range of values of y
(y = 0.04 and y are on the other trial values of y) it is found that at 
about the value of y = -0.03 equation [16] becomes an equality. This 
implies that y = 0.04 is not significantly different from zero at the 
95 per cent level of significance.
This result is not totally unexpected for the sample size is 
not large. (Adjusted for degree of freedom the sample size is 23, 
otherwise it is 27.) Had the sample size been much larger, and the 
true value of y was indeed significantly different from zero, then 
there would have been a larger probability of showing that this indeed 
was the case. Consider the likelihood equation in the form
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l n  &(y ) = c o n s t a n t  -  7 7  l n  + ln [TI( l+2Yln  Y / L ) ] .  117]
2  n -k
For y=0, l n J = 0 ,  i m p l y in g  t h a t  by s p e c i f y i n g  a Cobb-Douglas  p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n  th e  sample  s i z e  d o es  n o t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  J a c o b i a n  i n  
e q u a t i o n  [ 1 7 ] .  However,  t h e  l a r g e r  n,  when Y ^ »  t h e  l a r g e r  th e  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  J a c o b i a n  becomes.  Now i f  t h e  second  term i n  e q u a t i o n  [17] i s  
l a r g e r  f o r  y = 0  than f o r  some v a l u e  o f  Y>0 » i t  i s  s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
th e  s i z e  of  t h e  J a c o b i a n  f o r  t h i s  y >0 more th an  o f f s e t s  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  
so t h a t  In £ ( y >0) > In £ ( y=0 ) .  T h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  
l o g  o f  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  f u n c t i o n  f o r  some v a l u e  o f  y > 0  and y=0 i s  more  
l i k e l y  to  be marked t h e  g r e a t e r  i s  n and t h e  c l o s e r  t o g e t h e r  a re  th e  
v a l u e s  o f  RSS(y=0) and RSS(y>0 ) ,  even th ough RSS(y=0) < RSS(y >0 ) .  The 
v a l u e s  o f  t h e  RSS f o r  y= 0 and f o r  v a l u e s  o f  y  c l o s e  t o ,  but  g r e a t e r  than  
z e r o ,  a r e  indeed  c l o s e  f o r  the  r e g r e s s i o n s  u s i n g  th e  s i x - f i r m  d a t a  
s am p le .  Thus i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  had th e  sample s i z e  been f a r  l a r g e r  
t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  o f  y >0 ( s a y  y=0 . 0 4 )  may 
have proved to be d i f f e r e n t  from z e r o .  T h i s  i s  pure s p e c u l a t i o n  but  
t h e s e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  do r a i s e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  th e  v a l u e  o f  y  may 
have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from ze ro  ev en  though t h e  r e s u l t s  
o b t a i n e d  from u s i n g  th e  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  d a t a  sample  do n o t  i n d i c a t e
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that this was so.
Again the statistical results obtained from this econometric 
exercise do not add much to our knowledge about the form of the 
production function for the six-firm sample from the United States 
ante-bellum cotton textile industry. But similarly in this exercise, 
as in the previous one (of attempting to determine the elasticity of 
factor substitution), the positive result is to be found in the lesson 
to be learnt concerning the methodology of applying econometric 
techniques in economic history. In this particular case it is that if 
reasonably sophisticated regression techniques are to be applied large 
data samples are likely to be required. Such a requirement may prove 
to be a serious handicap in applying these techniques since large, 
accurately measured, data samples are a relative scarce commodity in 
the discipline of economic history.
(1) A crude experiment was carried out of increasing the size of n 
but assuming that the RSS(y) for various values of y did not 
change with the sample size, and assuming that the value of 
(l+2ylnV), for each y, was the average value of this term for 
the original sample. The result was that the differences in the 
value of the logarithm of the likelihood function between various 
values of y became more marked; namely, the value of y = 0.04 
become statistically more significantly different from y = 0.00.
(2) The regression results obtained may also have been improved if 
alternative specifications of the dependent variable in equation 
[10] had been employed. An alternative specification that was 
employed - [ln(Y/L) - 0 (Y/l_) ] - produced results no better (in 
fact slightly worse) than those obtained from using the previous 
transformation discussed in the main text.
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SECTION V
There are other reasons why a government might need to 
intervene in the market other than just to assist an infant industry, 
or to allow an industry to take full advantage of economies of scale. 
Certainly the United States politicians of the 1820s were aware of 
this fact. This is to be seen in a summary, provided by Edwards, 
of the debate which took place between December 1823 and April 1824 
in the House of Representatives on the new tariff bill. While this 
summary of the debate might not cover all the reasons expressed about 
this time of why the government should intervene in international trade 
with a tariff, the list of reasons provided in the debate is fairly 
comprehensive. However one of the arguments used in the debate, the 
infant industry argument, has already been dealt with so there will be 
no further discussion of this argument here.
The main argument for government assistance set forth in the 
debate maintained that a tariff was needed to achieve full employment. 
The existence of unemployment does not mean, however, that a tariff 
was needed to achieve the full employment objective; the appropriate 
policy tools to have used were nondiscriminatory monetary and fiscal 
policy, and any balance of payments problems caused by such a policy 
being handled by alterations of the exchange rate. If these policy
(1) R.C. Edwards, "Economic Sophistication in Nineteenth Century
Congressional Tariff Debates", Journal of Economic History, XXX 
(4), (December 1970), particularly pp. 818-821.
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tools were not available for use by the government then a production 
tax-cum-subsidy would have been a superior policy tool than a tariff. 
Finally, if a tax-cum-subsidy could not be applied then it does not 
follow that a tariff should have been applied if the community wished 
to maximize its welfare; the community might still have been better 
off with free trade and unemployment present than with full employment 
achieved by using a tariff.
These propositions are demonstrated in diagram 2. This
diagram represents the standard general equilibrium trade model.
Because of factor price rigidity the community has unemployed resources
and, therefore, produces inside the production possibility set, OAB;
the community is depicted as producing at Pi and consuming at Ci.^^
For this reason the community can only reach the social indifference
curve Ui* If the community applies fiscal and monetary policy in a
nondiscriminatory manner the community could produce at P2 and consume
(2)at C2 . If, instead, a prohibitive tariff is used to reach full
employment the community would consume and produce at P 3. Even a 
tariff less than a prohibitive tariff may make the community worse off 
than a policy of free trade. A production tax-cum-subsidy, which moved 
the economy to produce at P3, is superior to a tariff for it allows the 
community to consume at C4 , which is a consumption point on a higher 
social indifference curve than either the free trade case or the
(1) Exactly where inside the production set the economy will find 
itself will depend on the degree of factor mobility and the degree 
of factor price rigidity.
(2) The unemployment here is assumed to be caused by a general lack of 
effective demand and not due to the sharp alteration of the 






prohibitive tariff case (U4>U1>U3).
It should be emphasised, however, that the result that the 
policy of using a tariff to achieve full employment is worse than the 
policy of free trade combined with unemployment is not a perfectly 
general result. It is quite easy to show that the opposite result is 
possible if diagram 3 is drawn differently.
Another argument presented to support the application of 
tariff protection was that there was a need to prevent short-term 
dumping. The implicit reasoning used at the time in this dumping 
argument seems to have been that firms in the United States were 
capable of competing in the domestic market with imports sold at 
"normal" c.i.f. import prices plus the then current level of import 
duty. If, however, foreign producers were prepared to reduce their 
prices below "normal" prices, in other words, below the average costs 
of production for foreign producers, for short periods of time, which 
is what happened in the case of cotton textiles in 1815 and 1816,^^ 
then temporary unemployment was created and short-term losses were 
incurred by domestic producers.
(1) The facts on this episode are to be found in N.S. Buck, Anglo- 
American Trade 1800-1850 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1925), pp. 138-139.
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If this indeed was the reasoning implied in the dumping 
argument, then the first-best policy was some form of industrial 
insurance policy which compensated for, otherwise uncompensated, sharp 
falls in real income as a result of short-term dumping. However, after 
taking into account the costs of administering such a proposal, and the 
difficulties of determining who was to obtain compensation and how much 
compensation was to be paid, it may have turned out that a tariff was 
less costly to impose. If a tariff was applied it should be noted that, 
as in the case of the infant industry argument, this assistance is only 
meant to be of a temporary nature.
It was also argued that there was a need to
(2)strategic industries, 
was not a tariff but a production tax-cum-subsidy.
Again the first-best policy
(3)
establish 
tool to have used 
If the tax-cum-
(1) This form of the dumping argument seems to be the most reasonable; 
dumping is unlikely to have taken place over the long-term as no 
firm in a competitive industry could sustain the losses involved 
with dumping. The case where long-term dumping is feasible is if 
a monopolist producing in the exporting country can practice 
market discrimination (by charging a lower price for its output in 
the export market than in the domestic market) in order to 
maximize profits. But in the case of the British cotton textile 
industry of the first half of the nineteenth century there were 
many producers which made the industry competitive. It follows 
that long-term dumping was highly unlikely in this industry, 
although short-term dumping was a possibility.
(2) Edwards refers to this argument as being one for the protection of 
defence industries. (Edwards, "Economic Sophistication", op. cit.3 
p. 821.) Other sources, however, give the distinct impression 
that politicians, at least during the 1810s, had a wider view than 
just the need to establish defence and military industries.
Rather the emphasis was on the need to establish strategic 
industries so that the United States could become more economically 
independent of Europe. In particular see Ware, "New England 
Cotton", op. oit.y pp. 9-10.
(3) H.G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade", op. cit., pp. 30-34, and Bhagwati 
and T.N. Srinivasan, "Optimal Intervention to Achieve Non-Economic 
Objectives", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 36 (1969), pp. 27-38.
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subsidy could not be applied, and the government insisted on achieving 
its objective of creating strategic industries, then a tariff would 
need to be used as a last resort. (This is assuming that quantitative 
restrictions on trade could not be used.)
A final argument used to support the need for the use of the 
tariff was that the tariff was required to raise revenue. In the case 
where the authorities have no access to less distortionary methods of 
raising revenue then the tariff may need to be used. Of course, in the 
case of coarse cotton cloth the tariff on this item almost certainly 
did not raise any revenue whatsoever from about the mid to late 1820s 
on.
This revenue raising aspect of the tariff debate revives the 
issue of the income distribution effects of the tariff touched on 
earlier in this essay. If the tariff does raise revenue then to 
determine the income distribution effects of a tariff clearly one must 
also determine how this tariff revenue is spent. An extreme 
hypothetical example from the ante-bellum period should explain this 
point. A tariff, the revenue from which was spent mainly on aiding the 
creation of public work projects in the southern states, should not 
have had the same effect of redistributing income away from the South 
as the case where the tariff revenue was spent "neutrally" between 
North and South. This point naturally raises further doubts about 
Pope's results, for Pope made the assumption that the tariff revenue was
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spent neutrally between r e g i o n s . O b v i o u s l y  this assumption needs 
to be tested against the facts.
What evidence there is readily available to test this 
assumption indicates that the revenue raised by the tariff in the ante­
bellum period was not spent neutrally between regions but rather 
disproportionately in the South; in particular in the Old South. To 
demonstrate this point some basic facts must be stated. In the ante­
bellum period the tariff raised about three quarters of federal 
(2)revenue. On the federal expenditure side military expenditure made
up just less than forty per cent of the total, administrative expenses 
about half and public works the rest.
To make something of these facts it is assumed that each type 
of government revenue was spent in such a way that the same proportion 
of each revenue type went to a given category of expenditure. It is 
also assumed that military expenditure increased per capita income by 
the same amount in the North as in the South. This is a reasonable 
assumption since there was an "Indian problem" at the western frontier 
of both regions in the ante-bellum period. If the North-East is 
considered as a separate region, as distinct from the North-West, then 
the South was certainly gaining, on a per capita income basis, from 
federal military expenditure, at the expense of the North-East.
(1) Pope assumed that tariff revenues were distributed to consumers 
in lump-sum payments. Pope, "Income Distribution", op. oit., 
p. 404. In the article "Tariff Policy and Income Distribution", 
op. oit., by Baack and Ray, no mention is made of what happens to 
the revenue raised by the tariff.
(2) This fact plus the others which follow are to be found in the 
article by L.E. Davis and J. Legier, "The Government in the 
American Economy, 1818-1902: A Quantitative Study", ibid.
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It is not known whether the expenditure on public works was 
biased between regions. What is known, however, is that administrative 
expenses, which made up about half the total federal expenditures, were 
spent mainly in Washington D.C. It seems reasonable to conclude, 
therefore, that the transfer of income via the expenditure of tariff 
revenue was biased towards the South, in particular the Old South, and 
away from the North, in particular the North-East.
Within the South, however, there were regions which were 
fairing worse than others from this form of income transfer between 
regions. The calculated per capita federal government expenditure in 
the region comprising Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee was 
about a quarter to a third of the per capita expenditure in the New 
England s t a t e s . T h u s  for this East-South-Central region, at least, 
the way the tariff revenue was spent only seems to have aggravated the 
first-round income redistributive effects of imposing the tariff; that 
is if the imposition of the tariff did have the effect of transferring 
income out of this region.
A number of reservations must be made about these conclusions. 
First, although the tariff revenue may have been spent in a particular 
region it is certain that not all this revenue was transferred to the 
residents in this region; some of the revenue must have been used to 
pay the owners of factors of production who resided outside the region. 
It is not known how important this "leakage" effect was.
The second reservation regarding these conclusions is more
(1) Cf. Davis and Legier, "The Government", op. cit., p. 529, Table 1.
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important. It should be noted that only income transfers have been 
considered; no mention has been made of the redistribution of the 
benefits resulting from these federal expenditures which were mainly 
paid for out of tariff revenues. But the type of expenditures made by 
the federal government during the ante-bellum period predominantly 
created public goods which produced benefits for many, if not all, 
members of the United States community, although no individual paid 
directly for these benefits. The public good concept would have 
applied particularly to the expenditures on defence and administration. 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to accurately measure the 
size of the benefits that these public goods created for the 
communities of particular regions. The reason is that the benefits of 
these public goods were not, and most probably could not be, valued in 
the market via the purchase and sale of these goods.
Thus while it may be possible to say something with some 
certainty about the first-round regional income transfer effects of 
imposing a tariff, and spending the tariff revenue, during the ante­
bellum period, nothing can be said with any certainty about the 
regional transfer effects on social welfare in the United States of 
this government intervention. Since it is welfare distribution that 
we should be interested in, the conclusion must be that for the ante-
(1) Musgrave has pointed out that where the public good becomes an 
intermediate good by entering the production function of a 
private good - a good which can be valued in the market - it 
should be possible to measure the benefits produced by the public 
good. R.A. Musgrave, "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Theory of 
Public Finance", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 7 (1969), 
p. 800. It is difficult to visualise, however, how defence and 
administration by the federal government of the ante-bellum 
period would have become intermediate goods for the production 
of marketed private good.
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bellum period the first-round regional distributive effects of the 
tariff on social welfare are not measurable, given the present state 
of the art for measuring the benefits produced by public goods.
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SECTION VI
This discussion of aspects of the debate on tariff protection 
in the United States in the ante-bellum period has concentrated most 
attention on issues related to the application of this form of 
government intervention to the infant cotton textile industry during 
this epoch. The aspect of that discussion which requires to be related 
to the remarks made in the previous section is the question of whether, 
or not, a tariff may have been the first-best policy tool to have 
employed to assist in achieving some of the economic objectives of the 
United States government of the early ante-bellum period.
As was pointed out with respect to the provision of government 
assistance to the infant cotton textile industry, a tariff may have been 
the first-best policy tool for this task if certain conditions were in 
fact met. This general line of argument - that the tariff may, in 
particular realistic circumstances, have been the first-best policy to 
have employed to assist in achieving certain government economic 
objectives - may be strengthened if the analysis is expanded to 
incorporate consideration of the other economic goals, discussed in 
the previous section, which the United States federal government may 
have set for itself. As that discussion indicated, a tariff may very 
well have been the first-best policy tool available to this government 
in the 1820s, and later for that matter, to provide some safeguards 
against short-term dumping, allowing the creation of strategic 
industries and also to provide the federal government with by far, on
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average over the ante-bellum period, its major source of revenue.
In order to relate these observations to the discussion specific to
the cotton textile industry, it should be noted that the application
of import duties on cotton textiles in the 1820s and later may have
been required to allow the federal government to achieve in part each
of these economic policy objectives. Certainly recent past experience
in the United States had shown that this industry had to contend with
short-term dumping, and in the eyes of some the industry could have
been thought of as being strategic in that its survival ensured that
the United States now could immediately supply its own needs of, what
could be regarded the essential commodity, cotton cloth, in times when
its trade with Europe was interrupted; not an unlikely possibility in
the light of the then recent lessons of the 1800s and 1810s. Also the
tariff on cotton textiles would have assisted in the raising of
government revenue. This was so, even though the operational tariff on
the coarser types of cotton cloth may have been zero, as the finer
cotton cloth types were imported into the United States right through
(2)the ante-bellum period.
(1) The issue of unemployment is ignored here as it is assumed that 
the first-rbest policy tool was one of free-trade, even though 
there was unemployment in the economy. This might not have been 
so, in which case a tariff was also the first-best policy tool 
available to the federal government to assist it in creating full- 
employment .
(2) The percentage of the value of merchandised general imports made 
up of the value of the imports of cotton manufactures (which 
included yarn) was 9.3 per cent in 1860, 12.1 in 1850, 9.5 in
1830 and approximately 14.5 in 1820. The figures used to calculate 
these percentages are taken from Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1937 (Washington, D.C., 1960),
Tables Ul-15, p. 538 and U73-93, p. 547. These percentages tend 
to overstate to some extent the importance of these imports of 
cotton manufactures as a revenue source as some imports were re­
exported. But if there were re-exports of other commodity imports 
as well then this overstatement may be minimal. Finally, there is 
no estimate for 1820 of total imports, therefore, the estimate for 
1821 was used in the above calculation for 1820.
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Thus while it may be argued that, despite the political- 
institutional constraints imposed on the United States government in 
its ability to raise tax revenue and provide certain types of subsidies, 
a tax-cum-subsidy may have been the first-best policy tool to have 
applied to assist the infant cotton textile industry (not that this view 
is convincing as has been argued above), it does not necessarily follow 
that the optimum form of government intervention would not have been one 
of imposing a tariff on cotton textile imports; rather such a policy 
action, plus the imposition of a tariff on other relevant imports, most 
probably was the first-best approach to have taken in the constrained 
circumstances if the federal government was to be able to reach its 
other relevant economic policy objectives. This line of argument does 
not undermine the previous analysis concerning the removal of the tariff 
from the infant cotton textile industry. All that needs to be added to 
that analysis is the qualification that if, according to some criterion, 
the tariff should be removed from parts of this infant industry, this 
tariff may need to be maintained in order to allow the government to 
meet its other economic goals. Obviously, by applying criterion B, or C, 
this qualification becomes redundant, and only if the tariff were to be 
removed once criterion A had been met, or before criterion B was 
satisfied, is this qualification of relevance.
These conclusions are drawn without any reference to the 
income distributive effects caused by applying either of the relevant 
policy tools (namely, the tariff, limited tax-cum-subsidies, or totally 
free trade) available to the United States federal government in the 
early ante-bellum period. Yet in the early ante-bellum period, at 
least, the agricultural interests in the Southern states were
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particularly concerned about the income distributive effects of 
imposing the tariff on imports, compared to a policy of free trade; 
for this particular economic interest group the imposition of the tariff 
was seen as a tax on themselves, amongst others, and a subsidy to the 
North-Eastern manufacturing i n t e r e s t s . W h e t h e r ,  or not, the 
imposition of the tariff distributed income, or rather welfare, away 
from the South towards the North-East is not yet known, as was 
emphasised in the previous section and at the end of section II above.
But the Southern agricultural interests thought that the imposition of 
the tariff reduced their real income in the period immediately after the 
tariff was imposed, or after the tariff was increased, and this is the 
view which will be accepted for the sake of the argument now to be 
presented.
How does this assumption influence the conclusions just 
arrived at above? Those conclusions were derived from the notion that 
if a particular policy tool was applied the economy would have been 
moved more efficiently, and closer, to the desired economic policy goals 
set for the economy; in other words, the economy would have been moved 
closer to the constrained Pareto-efficiency position; than would have 
been the case if one of the alternative policy tools had been applied. 
But this concept, from welfare economics, of Pareto-efficiency does not 
provide the only, although necessary, basis for determining which policy 
tool is the first-best to apply if some groups, or individuals, in the 
community are being made worse off, and others better off, by the
(1) A survey of the historical literature concerning the though-to-be 
distributive effects of the tariff is provided by Pope in "Income 
Distribution", op. ait. 3 pp. 376-383.
212
application of these policy tools. Clearly it is no use allowing for 
the income distributive effects, that resulted from imposing a tariff 
in the early ante-bellum United States, by allowing for a tax-cum- 
transfer-payments system, which would have transferred income from the 
gainers to the losers from traffic protection, thus presumably making 
every individual better off from the application of such a policy tool; 
no such public finance policy instrument was available to the federal 
government. Instead the ethical social welfare function has to be 
introduced for consideration before anything definite can be said as to 
which policy tool was the first-best to apply.^ This involves, first, 
that the income distributive effects caused by applying each policy tool 
are known. The size of the changes in income distribution, if any, 
caused by applying a particular policy tool are then weighted by the 
appropriate weights in the social welfare function. Only after these 
steps have been carried out is it possible to determine which policy 
tool allows the highest level of social welfare to be achieved and, 
therefore, which policy tool is the first-best. Since the relevant 
weights in the social welfare function are not known, and to determine
(1) If the imposition of the tariff, or some other policy tool, had 
made every individual better off, by providing each with more 
social welfare, then it reasonably could be argued that there is 
no need to introduce ethical considerations into the analysis 
for determining which policy tool was first-best, even though 
the distribution of income was altered by applying each of these 
policy tools in turn. But probably this did not happen in the 
case of the application of the tariff in ante-bellum United 
States, thus the social welfare function has to be introduced 
into the analysis.
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them would r e q u i r e  t h e  making of  v a l u e  j u d g e m e n t s , s t r i c t l y  i t  i s  
no t  p o s s i b l e  to  say  i f  t h e  t a r i f f ,  o r  i f  any o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  p o l i c y  
t o o l  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  was t h e  f i r s t - b e s t  p o l i c y  t o o l  f o r  t h e  U n i t ed  
S t a t e s  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i n  t h e  a n t e - b e l l u m  p e r i o d ,  to  have a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  
a t t e m p t  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  economic p o l i c y  g o a l s  t h a t  t h e  f e d e r a l  
government  may have s e t  f o r  i t s e l f .
T h i s  i s  an i n d e f i n i t e ,  and n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  
c o n c l u s i o n  to  have r e a c h e d ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  t h e  p r i c e  t h a t  has  to  be p a id  
i f  t h e  t o o l s  of  w e l f a r e  economies  a r e  to  be a p p l i e d  to  t h e  t a s k  o f  
u n r a v e l l i n g  t h e  w e l f a r e  economic i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
g o v e rn m e n t ’ s t a r i f f  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  a n t e - b e l l u m  p e r i o d .  Of c o u r s e ,  i f  
one i s  p r e p a r e d  to  i g n o r e  t h e s e  income d i s t r i b u t i o n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a s  
be in g  o f  l i t t l e ,  o r  no ,  i m p o r t a n c e ,  t h e n  someth in g  more d e f i n i t e  can be 
s a i d  a b o u t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  such  a p o l i c y .  Under such  
a s s u m p t io n s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
f e d e r a l  governm en t ,  i n  t h e  e a r l y  a n t e - b e l l u m  p e r i o d  a t  l e a s t ,  i n  i t s  
a t t e m p t  t o  r e a c h  i t s  economic p o l i c y  g o a l s ,  may n o t  have been a s  
i n e f f i c i e n t  a s  some have d e p i c t e d .  Indeed  i t  may w e l l  have been  t h e  
most  e f f i c i e n t  p o l i c y  o p t i o n  t h e n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s .
(1) P e r h a p s  a p e r t i n e n t  comment by Samuelson i s  w or th  c i t i n g  a t  t h i s
j u n c t u r e .  "At  some p o i n t  w e l f a r e  economics must  i n t r o d u c e  e t h i c a l  
w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n s  from o u t s i d e  economics .  Which s e t  o f  ends  i s  
r e l e v a n t  i s  d e c i d e d l y  not a s c i e n t i f i c  q u e s t i o n  of  economics .  
. . . . T h e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n  i s  a s  b road  and empty a s  l a n g u a g e  
i t s e l f  -  and a s  n e c e s s a r y . "  Economic h i s t o r i a n s  who w ish  to  
e x p l i c i t l y ,  o r  i m p l i c i t l y ,  a p p l y  t h e  t o o l s  of  w e l f a r e  economics  
to  economic h i s t o r y  p rob lem s  p e r h a p s  would be w ise  to  b e a r  t h i s  
o b s e r v a t i o n  by Samuelson i n  mind.
(The q u o t a t i o n ,  w i t h  em phas i s  on t h e  o r i g i n a l ,  i s  f rom "Comments 
on W e l f a r e  Econom ics" ,  i n  J . E .  S t i g l i t z  ( e d . ) ,  The C o llec ted  
S c ie n t i f i c  Papers o f  Paul A .  Sconuelson (Cambridge,  Mass. M. I . T .  





ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 
AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN RESPONSE TO 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC FINANCE PROBLEMS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE THIRTEEN NORTH AMERICAN 




The conflict of interests between the American colonists and 
the British government over matters of public finance between about 
1763 and 1775 is one of those topics on the causes of the American 
Revolution which has tended to be left to social historians to study 
and discuss, even though their kit of analytical tools may not be equal 
to the task. Possibly because of the lack of technical expertise in 
the field of public finance theory, social historians have tended to 
turn to sociological, and/or psychological, theories of group behaviour 
in the hope of finding the key which would make the behaviour of the 
conflicting parties, particularly the American colonists, understandable 
in the decade or so leading up to the American Revolution. The results, 
so far, of this sort of analysis have been received with some scepticism 
by some historians.
Economic historians, on the other hand, while considering the 
question of the level of taxation and the economic costs imposed on the
(1) See, for example, J.P. Greene, "The Social Origins of the American 
Revolution: An Evaluation and an Interpretation", Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 88 (1) (March 1973), pp. 1-22.
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American colonists by distortionary taxes, in general, have failed
to place their studies within the wider framework of aspects of public
finance theory. In particular, this "taxation-only" approach, which
economic historians have tended to adopt as a means of providing
partial answers to the question of the political behaviour of the
colonists in response to the British government’s public finance
policies in the 1760s and 1770s, as they influenced the American
colonists, fails to take into account the public expenditures made by
the British government in North America and elsewhere, which might have
benefited the American colonists. As a result this analytical approach
is limited in what it allows to be said about the political-economic
behaviour of the British government and American colonists in response
to the clash of interests over public finance policies. The exception
to the "taxation-only" approach was the study by R.P. Thomas in which
an attempt was made to take into consideration the size of expenditures
made on providing land, and sea, defence and colonial administration
(2)for the British North American colonies. The potential weakness of
these calculations was that the special economic properties of the 
collectively consumed goods and services (public goods) provided by the 
British government were not taken into account. This oversight might 
not have been important if the objective was merely to provide numbers
(1) The literature on this topic is quite large. Some of it will be
considered below. The largest section of this literature has been 
devoted to measuring the economic burdens created by the 
Navigation Acts; the most recent addition to this literature, 
where a bibliography of the relevant articles may be found, is by 
G.M. Walton, "The Burdens of the Navigation Acts: A Reply",
Economic History Review, Series 2, Vol. 26 (1973), pp. 687-688.
R.P. Thomas, "A Quantitative Approach to the Study of the Effects 
of British Imperial Policy on Colonial Welfare: Some Preliminary




for the balance sheet of tax revenue as against the value of any 
benefits received from the expenditures made possible by this tax 
r e v e n u e . B u t  if the objective is to understand the political- 
economic behaviour of the British government, and the American 
colonists, concerning the public finance policies of the British 
government with respect to the North American colonies in the two 
decades leading up to the American Revolution, then should not the 
economic properties of the collectively consumed goods provided as part 
of these policies be taken into account in any attempt to fathom this 
behaviour? Intuitively it would seem that they should, and, therefore, 
in the discussion which follows aspects of the theory of collectively 
consumed goods will be utilised to determine whether, or not, this 
theory does allow a deeper understanding of the political-economic 
behaviour of the British governments, and the American colonists, 
between about 1754 and 1775, and beyond.
In the next chapter the relevant economic theory of pure 
collectively consumed goods will be outlined in order to provide the 
theoretical foundations for the discussion which follows. From this 
theory will be derived a number of hypotheses which will be tested in 
the subsequent chapters against the relevant facts, taken from the 
history of the British American colonies and Great Britain from about 
1754 through to 1775 and beyond. Every attempt will be made to present 
any analysis, or interpretations, in the form of testable hypotheses, 
and to test these hypotheses where possible, in order to give a
(1) Thomas does appear to be implicitly assuming in his valuations of 
the benefits received that the total expenditure on public goods 
equals the total benefits received. It is, of course, highly 
unlikely that this would have been the case.
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reasonably rigorous structure to the discussion. If these hypotheses 
tend not to be disproved by these tests then they should provide the 
beginnings of at least a partial, but consistent, explanation of the 
political-economic behaviour of the American colonists, and British 
politicians, in the two decades which led up to the American 
Revolution.
If such an acceptable core of relevant theoretical tools can 
be found from such a procedure of testing of hypotheses this will be a 
step forward, for it would appear from the literature on this piece of 
Anglo-American history that there is a serious lack of any proven 
theoretical tools, from any of the social sciences, being employed in 
analysing the events leading up to the American Revolution and which 
would assist in giving a deeper overall understanding of the causes of 
the American Revolution. This is not to say that theories from the 
social sciences have not been brought to bear on this subject but, as 
was pointed out above, these theories have been found wanting by some 
historians. Thus there apparently is a hiatus in the body of 
knowledge on the subject of the American Revolution - in that 
apparently there are no analytical tools from the social sciences 
which are capable of organising and interpreting the major historical 
material which makes up the relevant events leading up to the 
Revolution - which obviously needs eliminating if possible. While the 
present effort does not expect to fill this gap in this field of 
knowledge, it does hope to close the gap somewhat; the extent to 
which it is closed is a matter of opinion based on the evidence to be 
presented below.
Before progressing on to discuss the major part of the theory
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to be tested and utilised in this study, it should be pointed out that 
this public finance theory is a part of economic theory which is right 
on the border with political science theory, or on the border with 
aspects of the theory of international relations if the subject relates 
to the political relations between at least two countries instead of to 
political groups within a country. What this implies is that the 
present study needs to take an interdisciplinary approach to the 
subject of attempting to develop an overall theory to explain the 
American Revolution; which is what one would expect, given the likely 
complexity of the political relations between the thirteen American 
colonies and Great Britain. The need, for example, to use the tools 
of analysis utilised in the discipline of international relations in 
this particular study is simply demonstrated by remembering that by 
1776 the American colonies had come to regard themselves as a separate 
country - with the enunciation of The Declaration of Independence - 
and, therefore, obviously the American Revolution was a conflict of 
interests between two countries. The branch of the social sciences 
particularly concerned with this type of general social phenomena is 
international relations.
The analytical tool which international relations specialists 
often bring to bear on the subject of the conflict of interests is game 
theory. This theory will also be used here, although with a certain 
reserve. But before reaching this stage in the analysis, this game 
theoretic framework will need to have been carefully prepared by 




ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVELY CONSUMED GOODS
The services provided by the British government's 
expenditures on providing external defence for her North American 
colonies between 1754 and 1775 possessed two economic properties common 
to the services provided by goods which are collectively consumed but 
not directly paid for; namely, the property of non-rivalness in 
consumption and that of non-excludability from c o n s u m p t i o n . F o r  the 
time being only the first of these properties of public goods will be 
discussed.
No matter how much each individual consumes of the supply of 
a pure public good this consumption does not alter the supply of the 
pure public good available for others in the community; in other words, 
the supply of the pure public good is the same for every individual in 
the community. This property of non-rivalness in the consumption of 
collectively consumed goods does not mean that each consumer derives 
the same subjective benefits from the services provided by this good; 
the level of individual benefits received would depend upon the tastes 
and real incomes of the consumers of the services supplied. The 
"average" individual living in the British North American colonies,
(1) This classification of the properties of pure public goods was 
suggested by R.A. Musgrave, "Provision of Social Goods", in 
J. Margolis and H. Guitton, Public Economics (London, Macmillan, 
1969).
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for example, probably derived more total, and/or marginal, benefits 
from the expenditures on external defence in North America, needed to 
defeat the French and subdue and contain the Indians between 1754 and 
1775, than the "average" individual residing in Great Britain, who was 
not exposed to the attack of the enemy, or potential enemy, in North 
America. Yet the American colonists' consumption of the supply of 
external defence for North America should not have interfered with the 
supply of these services also provided to those resident in Great 
Britain.
Samuelson^^ demonstrated that this property of pure
collectively consumed goods leads to the conclusion that for the supply
of these goods, provided out of the community's own resources, to be
Pareto-efficient, the sum of the marginal rate of substitution for each
nindividual between the public good and a private good (EMRS^) must
equal the marginal rate of substitution between these goods in
production (MRT). If the private good is taken as the numeraire then
nthe efficiency condition becomes EMRS^ = MC (the marginal cost of
producing the public good). In addition, if the public good is
produced under conditions of constant returns to scale, the tax-price
that will need to be charged, in order to just finance this efficient
level of expenditure on the public good, is that where the sum of the
nunit taxes imposed on individuals (Zt_^ ) just equals the marginal cost 
of producing the public good.
The size of the tax-price charged to each individual per
(1) P.A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure", Review 
of Economies and Statistios3 Vol. 36 (1954), pp. 387-389.
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unit of public good consumed need not follow any detailed rule for the
economy to reach the efficient allocation; all that is required is 
nthat £t^ = MC. Nevertheless one tax rule, to finance the provision of 
public goods, has been singled out for particular attention; namely, 
that the unit tax-price charged a consumer of the public good, t^, 
should equal the MRS for that c o n s u m e r . B e s i d e s  this tax rule - 
the Lindahl solution - leading to an efficient supply of the public 
good, it has the attraction of appearing to be an equitable system of 
taxation for the unit tax-price imposed on each individual is equal to
(1) The Pareto-efficient condition for the provision of collectively 
consumed goods is based upon the assumption that the economy is 
distortion free. This assumption is obviously unlikely to be met 
in practice for, in particular, the tax system employed to finance 
the provision of these goods probably will create distortions in
the economic system. The sum of these costs, created by thendistortionary tax system, at the margin (ZMTD) should be included 
in the costs of supplying the collectively consumed good. The 
efficiency condition becomes
n nEMRSi = MC + EMTD^.
This topic is discussed in more detail by A.B. Atkinson and 
N.H. Stern in "Pigon, Taxation and Public Goods", Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 41 (1974), pp. 119-128.
To provide revenue to cover the actual costs of the collectively
consumed good provided the condition Zt^ . = MC still should hold. 
This implies that
n n n
ZMRS. = £t, + ZMTD.. l i l
The Lindahl case, therefore, should be 
MRS. = t. + MTD..l i  l
The term "tax-price" may in this general case be defined to 
include the costs of the distortions to the individual created by 
the taxation system.
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the marginal benefits received from consuming the public good. But
this appearance, of the fairness of this tax system, is only
illusionary for whether or not the Lindahl tax-price is equitable
would depend on the collective value judgements of the community.
By imposing the Lindahl tax-prices it may well be concluded that the
resulting income distribution is undesirable and that an alternative
set of tax-prices should be imposed which, while still just financing
the efficient provision of the collectively consumed goods, achieves
a more desirable distribution of income as seen by the members of the
community. But in an economy where collective decision-making is
required to assess proposals to provide public goods out of the
community’s own resources it is not possible, if we accept as valid
(2)Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, that the community will unanimously 
agree on the appropriate income distribution and, therefore, the 
desirable tax-prices to be charged to each individual. For this 
reason when it comes to the practical issue of establishing what is an 
equitable set of tax-prices for a community to charge, for the 
financing of the efficient supply of public goods, there is really no 
way of determining what these tax-prices should be.
Despite the practical weakness of the concept of an 
"equitable tax system" to pay for the provision of collectively
(1) This point has been made by a number of people. See, for example, 
P.A. Samuelson, "Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation", 
in J. Margolis and H. Guitton, op. cit. 3 and L. Johansen, Public 
Economics (Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1965), Chapter 6.
(2) The most recent statement by Arrow on this theorem is in his 
"Values and Collective Decision-Making", in P. Laslett and 
W.G. Runciman (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1967), Vol. 3, reprinted in E.S. Phelps (ed.),
Economic Justice (Penguin, 1973), pp. 117-136.
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consumed goods, it does seem to be a worthwhile exercise to adopt the
general strategy incorporated in the Lindahl solution approach and
compare, if possible, the benefits received from the expenditures by
the British government, on collectively consumed goods on the North
American continent, by various groups of colonists, with the taxes
paid to the British authorities by these groups, plus the costs created
by a distortionary tax system, and any other distortionary costs
created by the imposition of British administrative p r o c e d u r e s , i n
order to analyse the political-economic behaviour of these groups in
response to the British government's public finance policies in the
North American colonies. Basically what is in mind is a test of the
hypothesis that the political-economic activity of an individual, or
group, in response to a government's public finance policy, is a
function of the inequality between the benefits received from public
(2)goods and the tax-prices paid by this individual, or group, for 
these public goods. The assumption is made that other things remain 
the same.
To test this hypothesis no attempt will be made to measure 
the marginal rates of substitution, and unit tax prices for individuals, 
for there is no reason to believe that the Lindahl unit tax-prices 
should be regarded as being any more equitable than the case where the
(1) See footnote 1 on page 223 above on the need to take into 
account the costs of distortions in order to determine the 
efficient provision of public goods.
(2) It must be emphasised at this stage of the discussion that the 
term "tax-price" is meant to include the costs of distortions 
created in the British North American colonies by the British 
government's public finance system, and not just the total amount 
of any unit taxes actually paid. This is how this term should be 
interpreted both here and below.
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total amount of taxes paid by an individual is equal to the total 
amount of benefits received from a public good by this individual. 
Rather, some rough observations will be made about the likely incidence 
of the taxes paid by the colonists, compared to the incidence of the 
benefits received by them, and compare this with the observed political 
behaviour of various groups of colonists. Clearly this implies a very 
rough test of the hypothesis, hut no more rigorous tests will be 
attempted simply because of the lack of relevant information. This 
observation raises the need to discuss the important second general 
property of pure collectively consumed goods.
In order to assess the marginal, or total, benefits derived 
by an individual from a collectively consumed good this individual 
needs to reveal his preferences for this good. However, collectively 
consumed goods possess the property of non-excludability from 
consumption; in other words, individuals benefit automatically from 
the services provided by the pure collectively consumed good because 
it is not possible, at reasonable cost, to exclude individuals from 
consuming the services provided by this good once it has been 
s u p p l i e d . I t  follows that if the revelation of preferences for the 
collectively consumed good services were to be used for the purposes 
of assessing the tax-price to be charged to individuals, to finance 
the production of this good, then a rational individual, wishing to 
maximize the net benefits available to himself out of his own income,
(1) Goods and services which are collectively consumed may also
possess the property that it is possible, at reasonable costs, to 
exclude from consumption. Such goods and services may be termed 
private collectively consumed goods, in order to distinguish them 
from the collectively consumed goods referred to throughout the 
main text which are assumed not to have the property of 
excludability.
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would under-report his true preferences in order to reduce the tax- 
price that he has to pay for the collectively consumed good, for he 
would still benefit in full from the services provided by this good.
The over-reporting of preferences for the benefits received 
from collectively consumed goods is also possible. Assume that the 
revealed preferences are not to be used, or used to a minimal degree, 
to determine the tax contribution of an individual, and also that the 
tax-price imposed on an individual is below his true preferences for 
this good. In these circumstances it would be in this individual's 
interests to overstate his preferences for the collectively consumed 
good in an attempt to induce an increase in the supply of the public 
good; this might be so even if this meant that the tax-price charged 
to this individual was increased, but it was still lower than his true 
preferences.^
Clearly these possibilities for misrepresenting preferences 
have to be borne in mind when interpreting the political-economic 
behaviour of the American colonists and the British authorities with 
respect to the provision of, and payment for, the defence of the 
British North American colonies between 1754 and 1775. However, this 
discussion of the likely behaviour of individuals towards collectively 
consumed goods was implicitly in terms of there being an infinitely 
large number of consumers, in which case the effect of a single 
individual mis-stating his preferences on how much more the rest of 
the community needs to be taxed in order to pay for the collectively
(1) The possibility that preferences for collectively consumed goods 
may be over-stated, as opposed to under-stated, has been 
emphasised by E. Malinvaud, "A Planning Approach to the Public 
Good problem", Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 73 (1971), 
pp. 96-112.
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consumed good would be infinitely small. Because of this lack of 
market interdependence one would expect the incentive for the 
individual to misrepresent his preference to be great. In the case of 
the provision of external defence for the North American colonies, 
however, there were rather large coalitions of consumers who were 
represented through various political institutions. For most, but not 
all, of the time being considered here it seems reasonable to assert 
that there were basically only two coalitions, the British on the one 
hand and the North American colonists on the other. In this small 
number case the degree of market interdependence between consumers 
concerning the provision of, and payment for, external defence is not 
going to be insignificant. Any attempt to grossly misrepresent 
preferences by one coalitiion of consumers would considerably influence 
the payments that need to be made by the other coalition(s) of 
consumers. In this small number case, in other words, the threat of 
not cooperating, by not paying an "adequate" share of the costs of 
providing the collectively consumed good, can be directed at the other 
coalition(s), whereas in the large number case this threat cannot be so 
directed at any group in particular, except all the other individuals 
who pay for the collectively consumed good. Since there is this 
difference in the way threats can, or cannot, be directed it seems 
reasonable to suppose that behaviour, regarding the revelation of 
preferences with respect to collectively consumed goods, might differ 
in the small number case compared to the large number case; in the 
small number case, relative to the large number case, there might be 
greater pressure on a coalition to reveal its preferences more 
accurately.
This conjecture may be considered within the framework of two
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person non-zero sum g a m e s . A  number of conditions are imposed on 
the games considered here in order to demonstrate the nature of the 
problem. Later on these assumptions will be reconsidered in order to 
take account of the historical realities of the circumstances being 
considered. There are only two players, both of whom has perfect 
knowledge of two possible courses of action (strategies) which can be 
taken. Each course of action taken by one player alters the payoff 
(utility) received by the other player. All payoffs for each strategy 
are known by both players; in other words, there is perfect foresight. 
The game is static in that the payoff matrix does not alter over time, 
and the game is played only once. Finally, no communication is 
allowed between the players.
A collectively consumed good is consumed by the two 
coalitions. If these consumers cooperate (C-strategy) and share the 
costs of providing the good, the net payoff to each consumer is 
represented in the top left-hand box of the payoff matrix in game 1 
shown below. (Consumer II's payoffs for each outcome are the numbers 
shown on the left-hand side in each box.) If the first consumer does 
not pay for any of the costs (D-strategy), but consumer II continues 
to pay for the collectively consumed good, the net payoffs are those 
shown in the top right-hand box of the payoff matrix. The other 
possible payoffs resulting from alternative strategies adopted are also
(1) A discussion of collectively consumed goods within this game
theoretic framework is to be found, for example, in W.H. Riker 
and P.C. Oordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory 
(Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1973), pp. 223-224, Chapter 9 
and pp. 296-300.
230




CT d tI I
8,8 -4,10
0 1 4^ 0,0
In this particular game each coalition has the incentive, if 
it wishes to maximise its own utility (payoff), to adopt the 
competitive strategy of not contributing towards the payment for the 
collectively consumed good. If both these coalitions do adopt the 
competitive, or uncooperative, strategy the outcome will be that the 
collectively consumed good will not be produced. But this outcome is 
still preferable for a particular coalition than if it found itself 
unilaterally providing the public good (-4 is less than zero). Thus 
the uncooperative strategy dominates and there is the strong incentive 
to behave competitively. This game is usually called the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game.
The nature of the strategic problem in the large number case 
may be more accurately depicted by altering the previous payoff matrix
(1) While the payoffs of only two strategies per player are shown, 
introducing more strategies would only make the analysis more 
cumbersome without clarifying any of the issues involved.
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to that shown in game 2.^^ In this case the individual player (I) 
is considered as being a very small part of the total alliance (A). 







the rest of the alliance still receives a positive payoff, and indeed 
a payoff only a little less than if I and A both played cooperatively, 
since by I not paying the total alliance suffers only a slight 
reduction in the revenue it receives to finance the provision of the 
collectively consumed good, compared to the situation where I paid.
The central strategic problem in this game is that faced by I when 
playing cooperatively, for the risk is that A may not cooperate. If 
this were to occur I has to pay considerably more towards the 
provision of the collectively consumed good and, thereby, receives a 
negative payoff. Thus I should determine, and take into account, the 
probability of A cooperating before committing himself/herself to play 
either cooperatively or uncooperatively. If this subjective 
probability is low then for I the strategy of playing uncooperatively
(1) This game, and the discussion associated with it, is based on the 
argument presented by R. Hardin in "Collective Action as an 
Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma", Behavioural Science_, Vol. 19 
(1971), pp. 472-481.
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dominates the cooperative strategy no matter which strategy A plays.
(If A plays cooperatively it is rational for I to play uncooperatively; 
if A plays uncooperatively it is still rational for I to play 
uncooperatively [0>—4]-)
In fact this subjective probability is likely to receive a 
low value. The general a priori reasoning behind this statement is 
that each individual (or group) in the alliance sees the game from the 
point of view of I, from where the form of game for I is a Prisoner's 
Dilemma game. More specifically, each individual realises that his/her 
optimum strategy is to behave uncooperatively. Even if the actual 
individual concerned may not wish to behave in this manner, for he/she 
realises that only by cooperation will all individuals be better off 
than arriving at the situation where the collectively consumed good is 
not provided, I will realise that others will behave uncooperatively 
because it is in their own self-interest to do so, and/or because of 
the difficulty of organising and reaching agreement within the alliance 
(even if there is an element of potential cooperation amongst 
individuals) to create the cooperation required to make it possible to 
provide the collectively consumed good.^^ Based on this realisation, 
plus the fact that the behaviour adopted by A is the aggregate net 
behaviour adopted by all individuals, I should tend to attach a low
(1) This latter argument may not appear to be all that convincing, but 
there may be cases where institutional blocks, or poor 
communications, prevent the formation of an alliance, which 
behaves cooperatively, for reasons other than self-interest. But 
as pointed out below in the main text, whatever the reason for the 
uncooperative behaviour of A, it is in I's self-interest not to 
play cooperatively. This implies that there must be at least an 
element of self-interest in the explanation of the uncooperative 
behaviour of the alliance, since this behaviour of the alliance is 
composed of the behaviour of individuals.
233
probability to the strategy of the alliance behaving cooperatively.
Thus it is in the self-interest of the individual not to behave 
cooperatively, whatever strategy is adopted by A.
The form of the payoff matrix shown in games 1 and 2 is 
more likely to arise in the large number case where a relatively small 
sized coalition, or individual, is unlikely to gain a net positive 
benefit from providing the collectively consumed good unilaterally; 
the reason being that the total costs of providing any positive amount 
of the collectively consumed good are very likely to be high relative 
to the total gross benefits which the small coalition itself receives. 
In the small number case, however, while the net benefits of 
unilaterally providing any positive amount of the public good may be 
negative as well, it is more of a possibility (compared to the large 
number case) that the net benefits may be positive because the 
relatively large size of the coalition will receive larger total gross 
benefits from any positive expenditure on public goods, compared to 
that received by a small coalition. The case where a coalition, by 







net benefit is shown in the payoff matrix for game 3. (1)
This game, where if both parties adopt the competitive
strategy the outcome has the lowest payoff for both, has been called
(2)the Chicken game. The nature of the strategic problem in this game,
if the coalitions have to adopt their strategies simulteneously, cannot 
communicate and the game is played only once, is that if one coalition 
adopts the cooperative strategy the other has the incentive to pre-empt 
and, thereby, maximize its own utility. Mindful of this possibility 
both coalitions may adopt the uncooperative behaviour which will make 
both worse off than if one behaves cooperatively. This behaviour might 
be so even though the minimax strategy for both is one of cooperation. 
But there is the apparently stronger possibility that the players will 
behave cooperatively in this game than would be the case in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
The Chicken game, and possibly game 2 as well on occasions, 
begins to approximate the relevant facts of part of the period of
(1) A discussion of this game in connection with the theory of
collectively consumed goods is to be found in G. Brennan, "Game 
Theoretic Aspects of Lindahl Budget Theory", Revista Di Diretto 
Finanziario E Zoienza Delle Finance, Vol. XXIX (1970), pp. 155-181.
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For the Prisoner's Dilemma game T>R>P>S, and for the Chicken 
game T>R>S>P.
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history of interest here; a point that will be returned to below.
But these models, as presented, are based upon assumptions which are 
at variance with the relevant historical facts. For example, 
communication between the British and the colonists was possible, 
strategies did not have to be adopted simultaneously, the game was 
played many times with changes in strategy being possible, and all 
payoffs were probably not known. Allowing for these realities does not 
necessarily increase the chances of the adoption of cooperative 
behaviour by both players. Information communicated by each coalition 
about its preferences for the collectively consumed good may tend to 
be misleading or incorrect. In this way a coalition may hope to induce 
the other into committing itself to a strategy of unilaterally 
providing the collectively consumed good. Also there may be some 
urgency about making the decision to provide the collectively consumed 
good which may induce one of the coalitions to provide the good 
unilaterally. Once one coalition has taken upon itself to provide this 
good the other only has to adopt the competitive strategy to maximize 
its own utility.
While the misrepresentation of preferences, and more 
generally uncooperative behaviour, is a distinct possibility in the 
large number case of the provision of collectively consumed goods, 
whether or not coalitions of consumers of collectively consumed goods 
in the small number case misrepresent their preferences for these 
goods, and behave uncooperatively is not an issue that should be 
conjectured about. Rather the hypothesis concerning relevant behaviour 
in these circumstances should be exposed to testing against the 
relevant facts. One means of carrying out this test would be to 
perform controlled experiments, taking account of the relevant
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historical facts in such experiments. However, there is no reason why 
these experimental results should hold in real situations where the 
actual environment in which decisions and actions were taken can never 
be reproduced in important respects. In particular, if the basic 
structure of a gaming model was not changed from one game to another, 
the outcome of the game would depend on how threats were communicated, 
when the threat was made and how these threats were interpreted, all 
factors which may change markedly from one play of the game to another.
A more direct and, because of the considerations just 
mentioned, a more satisfactory approach is to test the relevant 
hypothesis against the historical facts. One hypothesis to be tested 
is that coalitions of consumers of the collectively consumed goods 
provided, or to be provided, in the period from about 1754 to 1775, via 
the expenditures on the North American continent by the alliance of 
these coalitions, tended to misrepresent their preferences for these 
goods. A more general hypothesis that also will be considered is that 
the coalition of consumers behaved uncooperatively in the process of 
providing these collectively consumed goods and paying for these goods. 
This hypothesis implies an argument other than just the 
misrepresentation of preferences; for example, a coalition may show a 
preference for the public good, a preference which is not precisely 
enough revealed for it to be used to assess a coalition's Lindahl tax- 
price, but disputes the tax-price charged to finance the goods 
production with arguments based on income distribution considerations.
A problem with attempting to test these hypotheses is that 
of being able to arrange the tests in such a way that other factors 
are not present which could explain in part, or in full, the historical
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events used to test the hypothesis. Thus great care will need to be 
taken in interpreting the historical evidence that will be employed to 
test the hypotheses stated above.
Testing these various hypotheses in varying historical 
circumstances will be at the centre of the discussion which follows.
But in order to assist with this task, and to extend the analysis based 
on previously established results, the game theoretic framework 
outlined above will be used on occasions as a tool to organise the 
discussion, although assumptions will be altered in order to allow for 
the relevant historical facts. The advantage of exploiting this 
analytical tool is that it necessitates the explicit statement of the 
likely optional strategies available to all the bargaining coalitions, 
and the likely relative payoffs, associated with these strategies, to 
both coalitions - not just one of the coalitions, as tends to be the 
case in some analyses of the events leading up to the American 
Revolution - before anything reasonably satisfactory can be said about 
the reasons for a particular outcome to the conflict of interests 
between the British government and the American colonists.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE ANGLO-COLONIAL DEFENCE ALLIANCE PRIOR TO 1763
In this chapter the discussion will concentrate on the period 
prior to 1763. The first hypothesis to be considered against the 
historical facts is whether consumers of a collectively consumed good, 
whose true preferences for the good were greater than the tax-price 
charged, and whose revealed preferences were not used to determine the 
tax-price, tended to overstate their revealed preferences for this good. 
The present test of this particular hypothesis should be seen as just 
an introductory exercise in preparation for the further testing of 
other hypotheses to be carried out below.
Prior to 1754 the British North American colonies were 
expected to provide their own local defence in times of peace. As far 
as the provision of defence to meet external threats to colonial 
security was concerned the defined policy position was not so clear; 
it was undetermined as to what proportion of the costs of this defence 
the American colonists were expected to bear. Nonetheless, a loose 
military alliance between the British and the American colonists did 
coalesce on occasions to confront the French to the north of the New 
England colonies. The British government, however, apparently was not 
eager to acquire further colonial possessions in this area, as is 
reflected by the fact that, despite the defeat of the French in limited 
engagements by the alliance of Anglo-Colonial forces, on a number
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of occasions prior to 1754, the only permanent territorial gain 
enforced on the French was that of Arcadia acquired in 1713 with the 
signing of the Treaty of Utrecht.
For at least some inhabitants of the northern British
colonies there apparently were commercial advantages, and gains to be
made on religious grounds, if the Roman Catholic French administration
was removed from the North American continent. Against these gross
gains need to be compared the taxes that would have to be paid in
order to allow the attainment of these gains. Possibly the American
colonists interpreted the imprecise situation on how much they had to
pay, as a proportion of the cost of ejecting the French administration,
as implying that it would be less (possibly considerably less) than
(2)the likely benefits to themselves. Also the colonists possibly
expected that they would not, if past experience was anything to go by, 
be expected to bear the costs of administering any new territorial 
acquisition in North America. If this was the case then it is 
reasonable to expect that at least some groups in the colonies would 
have tended to overstate their revealed preferences for the objective 
of having the French administration removed from the North American 
continent.
To test this statement inferences need to be drawn from
(1) R.W. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence: The International
History of the Revolution (London, John Wiley, 1965), pp. 4-5.
(2) The colonists did implicitly pay taxes to finance the expeditions 
against the French by providing troops, and feeding British 
troops and sailors stationed in Massachusetts in preparation for 
one of these expeditions. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence3 
op. cit.3 pp. 2-4.
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observations made of the political behaviour of some colonists for 
this period. An anonymous Frenchman, for example, observed in about 
1711 that the Americans from Massachusetts were "zealous for conquest 
- business and religion both stood to g a i n " . T h i s  zeal was tempered 
by the colonists having to pay an implicit tax to achieve this aim, 
namely, that of feeding the British troops and sailors assembled in 
Massachusetts to invade the St Lawrence valley.
A problem with attempting to establish a single 
interpretation of this latter behaviour is that not only were the 
colonists called upon by the British government to pay an implicit tax, 
but also the colonists had been irritated by the British government's 
slow response in providing the promised military assistance to the 
colonists. Nevertheless, a partial interpretation of these 
observations could be that at least some members of the colonial 
community tended to overstate their preferences for the collectively 
consumed good, which was the military victory over the French in North 
American, as long as the tax-price that needed to be paid by them to 
achieve this objective was low, relative to the benefits likely to be 
received. The imposition of a tax related to these revealed 
preferences caused these inflated preferences to be altered downwards 
in an attempt to avoid paying this tax. On the other hand, the 
hesitant behaviour of the British government in providing assistance to 
the colonists could also be interpreted as an attempt to understate its 
preferences, as revealed to the colonists, as a strategy to try to 
induce the American colonists into bearing a greater share of the
(1) Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, ibid.
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burden needed to expel the French from the North American continent.
Clearly this interpretation of this behaviour is speculative; 
far more evidence is required in order to test the hypothesis that 
preferences for the collectively consumed goods provided by the British 
and colonial administrations were misrepresented. Such evidence is 
available for the period 1754 to 1763, the period of the Great War for 
the Empire.
By 1753 the French were again in conflict with the British
government, and particularly its American colonies, over territorial
(2)claims on the North American continent. The average political-
economic behaviour of colonial leaders and the British government in 
response to this threat is well known, so there is no need to go into 
any great detail in describing this behaviour.
Initially it was thought by the British government, and some 
leading American colonists, such as Benjamin Franklin and Governor
(3)Shirley, that the French encroachment on the territory claimed by 
the British colonies could be repulsed by the unified actions of the
(1) This title for the war was suggested by L.H. Gipson in "The 
American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great War for the 
Empire, 1754-1763", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXV (1950), 
pp. 86-104.
(2) On the origins of this conflict, and how this conflict developed, 
see P.L.-A. Higonnet, "The Origins of the Seven Years’ War", 
Journal of Modem History, Vol. 40 (1968), pp. 57-90.
(3) R.C. Newbold, The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of 1754 (New 
York, Vantage Press, 1955), p. 30.
L.H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution
(15 vols, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1936-70), Vol. V, pp. 123- 
124.
j .A . Henretta, "Salutory Neglect"y Colonial Administration under 
the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1972), p. 337.
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colonies without any assistance from Great Britain. Early efforts at
forming a military alliance of the colonies met with little success;
Virginia was given virtually no assistance to meet the French
encroachment in the Ohio Valley. A more formal attempt at trying to
unify the colonies at the Albany Congress also came to no avail.
While the proposals for a union of the colonies was adopted by this
meeting of colonial representatives,none of the colonial
legislatures approved of the plan; the plan was rejected by some,
others postponed action, while others never brought up the plan for
discussion. The major reason for this explicit, or implicit, rejection
of this plan by the colonial assemblies is thought to have been that
the transfer of powers from the colonies to a central authority was
regarded as being too drastic; in particular, that this central
authority would have had the power to raise revenue, for the purpose
of providing external defence, on a proportionate scale larger than
(2)previously had been the case in the colonies.
The hesitant behaviour of the colonies, in forming an 
effective military alliance to meet the French threat, was allowing the 
military situation to deteriorate to the point where the British
(1) Not all the colonies were represented at this conference; New 
Jersey and all the southern colonies, except Maryland, did not 
send representatives.
(2) Newbold, The Albany Congress, passim.
G.L. Beer, British Colonial Volicy, 1754-1763 (New York, Macmillan, 
1922), Chapter II.
243
government regarded it as being essential to provide military aid,^ 
in response to calls for assistance from the colonial assemblies, in
(2)order to ensure the survival of the British North American colonies. 
This assistance was of such a level and nature that the colonies were 
still called upon to voluntarily provide a proportion of the defence 
costs out of their own resources, in order to make the total military
(1) The British government was not impressed with the military
performance of the colonists, and critical of the inability of 
the colonists to form a military alliance amongst themselves. 
Newcastle in writing to Hardwicke commented: "Tho' We may have 
Ten Times the Number of People in Our Colonies, They don’t seem 
to be able to defend Themselves, even with the Assistance of Our 
Money ...." (Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 5, 1754, cited 
from Henretta, "Salutary Neglect"3 op. cit. 3 p. 338.) Yet, on the 
other hand, "The first point we have laid down is, That the 
Colonies must not be abandon'd." (Newcastle to Walpole, June 29, 
1754, cited from Higonnet, "The Origins", op. cit. 3 p. 72.) To 
meet this policy objective of the Newcastle ministry "Something 
must be resolv'd and that Something must be (if possible) 
Effectual." (Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 21, 1754, cited 
from Henretta, ibid.) Three days later something was resolved, 
which was that Braddock received his commission to lead the 
British-Colonial military forces against the French in North 
America.
Why this constrained application of military force was 
employed, instead of the processes of diplomacy, to meet the 
French challenge in North America, and the possible explanation 
of why the employment of this military technique for solving this 
particular conflict of interests led to the eventual declaration 
of war by Great Britain on France on 18th May, 1756, is discussed 
by Higonnet in "The Origins", ibid.
(2) This decision was made before the arrival in England of the news 
that the colonies had failed to adopt the Albany plan, although 
this piece of evidence of the uncooperative behaviour of the 
colonists only confirmed the evidence already available to the 
British government on this matter (which was the lack of 
assistance given to Virginia to fight the French). Actually the 
British government was not in favour of the Albany plan, but this 
was not known by the colonists and, therefore, this rejection 
should not have influenced the colonial assemblies' response to 
the plan. S.M. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1933), p. 21 ff.
244
effort successful. But such a voluntary scheme for providing the 
required supply of this collectively consumed good met with little 
success in 1755. In brief, according to Pargellis: "Colonial
assemblies refused to play the merely contributory, cooperative part 
assigned to them. They assembled few recruits to be drafted into the 
British regiments; they voted little money to form a command fund; 
they supplied few provisions and no wagons.
Nor did the colonies show in 1756, or 1757, what the British
authorities regarded as a desirable level of cooperation in repulsing
the French. Lord Loudoun, the British commander at this time, in fact
was of the opinion that "it is the constant study of every Province
here to throw every Expense on the Crown, and bear no part of the
(2)Expense of the War themselves."
In late 1757 the decision was made to partially compensate
(3)the colonies for any military assistance provided by them; a
policy which Pitt had previously opposed. The new financial 
arrangement induced a greater effort from the colonies, even though
the colonies were not fully compensated for the expenses they incurred
(4)in fighting the war.
(1) Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, op. oit., p. 35.
(2) Correspondence of William Pitt, I, p. 55, cited by L.H. Gipson, 
The British Empire, op. oit., Vol. VII, pp. 70-71.
(3) L.H. Gipson, The British Empire, op. oit., Vol. X, pp. 40-41.
(4) Some minor payments already had been paid to the colonies in 
1756. L.H. Gipson, The British Empire, op. oit., Vol. X, pp. 
50-51.
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The military expenditure provided by the colonies, either paid
or unpaid for by the British government, varied on a per capita basis
from colony to colony.^ The colonies of New York, Connecticut and
Massachusetts gave relatively more support to the alliance, while the
colonies of Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland and North and South
Carolina gave the least. This variation in the response from colony
to colony to the task of assisting with external defence may possibly
be partly explained by local economic considerations - for example,
in the southern colonies there was a relatively large slave population
which was concerned with the possibility of there being a slave revolt;
in other words, a relatively high wage rate needed to be offered in
these colonies to white males in order to induce them to enlist in a
military force; but this consideration only should have influenced
the number of men that the colony provided for the defence effort and
not necessarily the size of the total expenditure on external defence
- or religious reasons, as in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where the
pacifist views of the Quakers may have had some political weight,
although it has been argued that as far as Pennsylvania is concerned
(2)this influence should not be over emphasised. But it does appear
to be more than a coincidence that the colonies which provided the 
greatest support to the external defence effort apparently were those 
most exposed to the threat from the enemy. Such a coincidence is in 
need of more careful scrutiny to determine if such a relationship was 
statistically significant. Before attempting to provide such a test,
(1) Gipson, The British Empire9 op. oit., Vol. VII, Chapters VI and 
XI.
(2) T. Thayer, "The Political Party of Pennsylvania", Pacific Magazine 
of History and Biography> LXXI, pp. 19-43.
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however, there is first a need to analyse the political-economic 
behaviour of the British government, and the American colonists in 
general, with respect to the provision of external defence for the 
colonies between 1753 and about 1761, when the campaign against the 
French came to an end in North America.
To begin this analysis it seems reasonable to ask why the 
British government should have contributed at all to the external 
defence of the colonies, and why, especially after 1757, it should have 
contributed apparently such a large proportion of the resources needed 
to defeat the French in North America. To be able to answer these 
questions the discussion needs to begin by concentrating on determining 
the likely relative size of the valuation placed by the British, 
compared to that placed by the American colonists, on the gross benefits 
to be received from protecting the American colonies.
(1) It may be argued that before attempting to establish this 
information approximately this discussion should begin by 
determining why the British government should have wished to become 
involved in any sort of military conflict with the French at this 
time, let alone specifically direct resources to assisting the 
North American colonies in this confrontation. The answers 
provided by Higonnet to this question are that the Newcastle 
ministry was to some degree misled by the colonial governors (in 
particular Dinwiddle of Virginia and Shirley of Massachusetts) as 
to the aggressive intentions of the French authorities in North 
America, and that diplomacy in Europe for various reasons failed.
(G. Higonnet, "The Origins", op. oit.> pp. 59-65, pp. 72-73 and 
p. 77 ff.) But given that this was the case the question then 
emerges as to why the British government should contribute so much, 
if anything, to the war effort in North America in order to protect 
the thirteen colonies. The argument that Higonnet recognised, but 
did not expand upon, is that if the British had decided that it was 
not worth the expense to protect the colonies, and that the 
colonies should be left alone to fight their own battles with the 
French over who possessed the administrative and authoritative 
control over the western wilderness (and possibly the thirteen 
colonies themselves), then the Seven Years War almost certainly 
would not have occurred, even if the British government did not 
have accurate information on the nature of the conflict of
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interests over frontier land, and that the mechanisms of diplomacy, 
and those who operated them, were not sufficiently efficient. 
Higonnet makes the point; "In a sense, nationalism, imperialism, 
or commercial rivalry were the basic causes of the conflict in 
that, very clearly, if no one had cared about Trade, or North 
America, or Albion’s perennial perfidy, this particular war would 
not have occurred." (Higonnet, ibid.3 p. 89.) These issues are 
then dismissed from view. The purpose of the discussion which 
follows in the main text is to discuss the economic elements of 
these considerations in more detail from the British, and the 
colonists', point of view, taking the attitudes of the French as 
given.
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It seems reasonable to assume, other things being the same, 
that the value of the gross benefits a coalition will receive from 
external defence will depend on the size of the real income that the 
coalition controls. While there are no reliable estimates of the total 
real income for the British North American colonies, or Great Britain, 
for the 1750s, it can be said with some certainty that the total income 
for Great Britain was greater than that for the colonies for this 
period.
Clearly the tastes of the coalition consuming the services 
produced by the collectively consumed good would also determine the 
value of these services; not just the total income of the coalition. 
Now it seems reasonable to assert that the "average" American colonist 
would have had tastes such that he valued the gross benefits, which 
flowed from the defeat of the French on the North American continent, 
more highly than the "average" citizen living in Great Britain, other 
things being the same. (This view is based on the obvious fact that 
the colonists stood a far greater risk of finding themselves under the 
political control of the French, considered to be pressing in from the 
western wilderness, and the north, than did the person residing in 
Great Britain.) But despite this possibility, the total gross benefits
(1) The population of the United Kingdom in the 1750s was some nine-and 
a-half times that of the total population in the colonies for the 
same period. Given what is generally known about the economies of 
these areas at this time, it seems improbable that the per capita 
income in the United Kingdom was so much lower than that for the 
American colonies as to cause the total income of the United 
Kingdom to be lower than that for the colonies. The relevant 
population statistics are to be found in P. Deane and W.W. Cole, 
British Economic Growth, Second Edition (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), Table 2, p. 6, and Historical Statistics 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 
1960), Series Z 1-19, p. 756.
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received by the British population, from defeating the French in North 
America, might have been the same, or greater, than those received by 
the colonists. Part of the explanation of this possibility is that 
Great Britain in the 1750s had a larger total income than the American 
colonies. Another part of the explanation must be that the British 
population, or their political representatives, had tastes for the 
benefits to be derived from defeating the French such that they valued 
the total benefits at least as highly as the colonists.
If the British government did make such a valuation of the 
gross benefits to be received from the defence of the colonies in the 
1750s, the question that emerges is why should the British government 
have had the tastes to make such a valuation possible. In implicitly 
answering this question, J.P. Greene has observed that the relatively 
rapid growth of the two-way trade between Great Britain and the British 
American colonies during the first half of the eighteenth century had 
made the colonies into an important economic trading partner for the 
British economy. The British political leaders apparently realised 
this and consequently came to the conclusion that the British American 
colonies should not be controlled in any way by the F r e n c h . T h i s  
argument certainly provides a possible explanation of why some British 
politicians had developed the tastes needed to value the benefits of 
defending the American colonies highly enough to induce them to expend 
British government resources on defeating the French. This line of 
reasoning does not explain, however, why the British government only
(1) J.P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection, An Analysis of the
Preconditions of the American Revolution", in S.G. Kurtz and 
J.H. Hutson, Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 43-45.
250
gave relatively tentative assistance to the colonies in the early stages
of the war with the French, while the Newcastle ministry was still in
power, but subsequently provided such relatively strong support to the
colonists, in the sense that the relative value of resources contributed
by the British government to the British-Colonial alliance, compared to
that provided by the colonies, grew over time from 1754 on; in
particular growing sharply from December 1756 through to April 1757 and
again in mid-1757.^^ Why was there this lag in the response of the
British government in increasing its share of contributions to this
(2)military alliance when Great Britain had declared war on France back 
in mid-May 1756? A reasonably consistent explanation of this behaviour 
should be possible.
To begin such an explanation a number of, what appear to be
(1) The absolute size of the contribution made by the British 
government to the alliance also grew over time as the conflict 
between the British and French governments escalated. The rise in 
this variable is not what is of interest here.
(2) The evidence of this changing share is that the British
subsidization of the colonists' own war effort went from meeting 
none of the costs the colonists bore in providing military 
assistance, to compensating them for, on average, forty-six per 
cent of the costs incurred for levying, paying and clothing of 
colonial troops, and one hundred per cent for the expenditures on 
arms, ammunition and provisions. In addition, the British 
government increased its own expenditures on the British army and 
navy after Pitt took over the management of the war effort. (See 
the discussion on page below for more detailed information.)
But it must be emphasised that it is not possible to be specific 
as to exactly how the share of resources contributed to the Anglo- 
Colonial alliance, as it operated in North America, varied over 
time. The basic reason for this statement is that the war was so 
far-flung that it does not seem reasonable to determine precisely 
the expenses Great Britain incurred in the North American theatre 
of war. This point is emphasised by the fact that Pitt came to 
realise that the war in North America would be won via the campaign 
in Europe. Are all the costs of this campaign, therefore, to be 
assigned to the expenses incurred by the Anglo-Colonial alliance?
251
reasonable, assumptions need to be made. It will be assumed that the 
British in 1753-54 did put a higher value on the total gross benefits 
to be derived from the defeat of the French in North America, than did 
the American colonists. It was regarded, by both the British 
government and the American colonies, that the worst possible outcome 
for both was if the French defeated their military alliance; and that 
each member of the alliance (where the colonies as a whole are taken 
to be a single ally) could have defeated the French on the North 
American continent without any assistance from the other ally,^^ 
although the net value of this outcome (after allowing for the costs of 
defeating the French, costs which are assumed to be the same for both 
allies) for the ally expending the resources on external defence would 
have been less than in the case where the other ally had been of more 
assistance. The ally which behaved uncooperatively would, by this 
behaviour, maximize the value of the net benefits it received from the 
defeat of the French. What these assumptions imply is that the payoff 
matrix for the various strategies available to the allies was similar 
to that for the Chicken game discussed above, although the payoff 
matrix in this case is asymmetric, because the British are assumed to
(1) This assumption appears to be reasonable. Gipson, for example, 
observed: "Potentially the British colonies undoubtedly had the
strength with little or no direct aid from the mother country to 
drive the French out of the advanced positions they had taken at 
the expense of the frontier settlers and traders." Gipson, The 
British Empire3 op. oit.3 Vol. VII, p. 140. This also would 
appear to have been the implicit view held by Newcastle in 1754, 
for in his statement that, "Tho' We may have Ten Times the Number 
of People in Our Colonies They don't seem able to defend 
Themselves, even with the Assistance of Our Money....," the 
implication is reasonably clear that he thought the colonists were 
capable of defeating the French at the western frontier without 
any further assistance from Great Britain, if only they would 
coordinate their efforts. (Cited from Henretta, "Salutary 
Neglect", op. oit.s p. 338.)
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have received a greater net benefit, than the colonists, from adopting 
the strategy of unilaterally providing the collectively consumed good, 
while the other ally behaved uncooperatively.
If this was indeed the form of the payoff matrix in 1753-4, 
and later, there was a greater economic incentive for the British 
government to follow the minimax strategy; of behaving cooperatively 
by incurring the full cost of external defence from the beginning of 
the war, and thereby minimizing the risk of receiving no, or negative, 
benefits, which would have been the case if both members of the alliance 
had behaved uncooperatively. But other considerations did not make this 
behaviour certain. The payoff matrix may not have been asymmetric, but 
rather symmetric, in which case there was the greater possibility that 
bargaining would have taken place between the British government, and 
the colonists, over how much each should contribute to the defence of 
the colonies. What was also important was that there was time to 
bargain over this issue; the military situation in 1753-4 was not that 
pressing that a decision had to be made immediately concerning what 
proportion of the cost of external defence was to be borne by each ally.
As mentioned above, the British government had proposed that 
the colonists unify their defence efforts and confront the French 
unaided by Great Britain. The colonists did not oblige; they remained 
fragmented in their military efforts so that individual colonies faced 
the French virtually alone. This behaviour possibly implicitly 
communicated to the British government the information that the payoff 
for the colonies was reduced, compared to what the British initially 
regarded their payoff as being, for the strategy of the colonies 
unilaterally providing external defence. This implied that there was
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cooperate to some degree. This strategy apparently did not work all 
that well; perhaps for the reason that this threat was not all that 
severe since the colonies would have had the time to organise themselves 
into a more coherent military force should the French have come too near. 
Also there was always the possibility that the British would change 
their minds and provide more military assistance. To encourage this 
possibility the colonies had to continue to appear to be militarily 
helpless. The gamble worked for the colonists once Pitt took over 
directing the British war effort.
This line of analysis should be supplemented by acknowledging, 
to begin with, the fact that there were a relatively large number of 
players in this coalition-formation game; there were thirteen colonies 
and Great Britain in the game. Considering this game as just the 
colonies playing it amongst themselves, and ignoring for the time being 
the behaviour of the British government, the game as seen by a single 
colony took on the form of the second game discussed in the previous 
chapter; the n-Prisoners' Dilemma game. For the single colony the 
optimum strategy, from the point of view of self-interest, while the 
rest of the colonies behaved cooperatively by forming a military 
alliance, was for the colony not to cooperate. In addition, if the 
single colony cooperated there was always the danger that the rest of 
the alliance would not cooperate, in which case this colony would find 
itself in the position of fighting the French alone. If it managed to 
succeed in this military venture it probably would have created a 
negative not benefit for itself, whereas the rest of the colonies would 
have automatically benefited from its efforts. But probably a more 
important consideration was that this colony would be mindful of the 
fact that the other colonies individually probably would see the game
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now less incentive, as viewed by the British government, for the 
colonies to behave cooperatively. The danger posed by the increased 
possibility of the colonies behaving, and continuing to behave, 
uncooperatively apparently convinced the British government that they 
should provide some assistance to the colonies, if these colonies were 
to remain part of the British Empire.
Certainly members of the British government had come to
realise by September 1754 (that is before the news of the colonies'
response to the Albany Plan) that the colonies were most likely to
continue to behave uncooperatively and not unite their defence effort.^
As a result an alternative technique had to be found to induce the
colonists into contributing towards some form of military alliance.
For the time being Braddock was sent off to the Colonies with some
British troops with instructions to draw on the resources in the
(2)colonies to supplement his efforts to repulse the French. The
military assistance provided by the British was not enough in itself to 
defeat the French at the western frontier; the hope of the British 
government possibly being that the strategy of not providing the full 
amount of assistance needed to defeat the French would expose the 
colonists to the dangers threatened by the enemy if they did not
(1) This realisation is expressed in a memorandum from Townshend to 
Newcastle, September 13, 1754, cited by Henretta, "Salutary 
Neglect"3 op. c i t p. 339.
(2) This was not the only reason for commissioning a British army 
officer to lead the military forces in North America; he was also 
sent there as part of the constrained retaliation policy that the 
British government believed would bring the conflict of interests 
over frontier land to an end. But certainly another aspect of the 
British government's reason for sending Braddock to the American 
Colonies was to organise their defences into a more unified form.
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as having a similar form as it saw the game itself; which implied in 
turn that there was a relatively high probability that the alliance 
would behave uncooperatively. In these circumstances this colony would 
no doubt decide, in its own self-interest, to behave uncooperatively no 
matter how the alliance behaved. Such political-economic behaviour bore 
a relative small risk of being the worst strategy to adopt while the 
French were still some distance away and the British were still likely 
to contribute substantially to the war effort. In short, the payoffs on 
the side of the game for the individual colonies took the form of a one­
sided Prisoners' Dilemma game.
The British probably also implicitly saw the colonies' side of 
the game in this form and, therefore, realised that there was a 
relatively small probability of the colonies behaving cooperatively. In 
addition, the payoffs for the British side of the game, as pointed out 
above, took the form of a one-sided Chicken game. This appears to have 
been the case in mid-1754 during the Newcastle ministry ("The first 
point we have laid down is, That the Colonies must not be abandon'd.") 
and became even more so when Pitt obtained policy-making power; in other 
words, the opportunity cost rose, of running the risk of losing the 
American colonies by not cooperating in the alliance - at least this cost 
rose as seen by its war-time political leader.
The explanation for Pitt putting such a relatively high value 
on the safety of the colonies was distinctly economic in nature. It has 
been observed by one historian, for example: "Pitt belongs to that 
small group of eighteenth century statesmen who, accepting the repeated 
opinions of merchants, came to believe that England's wealth, and 
therefore her greatness, was tied up with the colonies. Most ministers
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would have subscribed to the general dictum that the 
precious a possession to be lost, but never with the 
intensity with which Pitt subscribed to it."^
colonies were too 
same passionate
For Pitt it was important that the colonies be safeguarded
from the French political control because of their economic value to
(2)Great Britain. '
The implication of Pitt coming to political power was that 
the British government implicitly ceased to bargain over the share 
Great Britain should bear of the costs of the external defence of the 
American colonies. The level of assistance to the colonies, and the 
proportionate share of the costs of the military effort in North 
America borne by Great Britain, was increased in Pitt's short first 
term in office between December 1756 and April 1757 and yet again after 
the Pitt-Newcastle ministry was created on the 29th June 1757. The form 
that this assistance took was the dispatching of more British troops to 
North America and the direct and indirect subsidization of the military
(1) Pargellis, Lord Loudoun3 op. cit.3 pp. 228-229. In a similar vein 
Sherrard observed of Pitt's political-economic ideas: "[The] virtue 
[of war] lay in promoting and safeguarding trade. Pitt's ultimate 
aim was to make war pay by removing rivals and securing markets."
0.A. Sherrard, Lord Chatham3 Pitt and the Seven Year War (London, 
John Lane, 1955), p. 262.
(2) Such a view goes back to at least 1746 when Pitt approved of the 
suggestion made in a memorial from Bedford to Newcastle (March 24, 
1746) that the French Empire in North America should be secured by 
the British. The reasons provided for this recommendation were 
that; (a) the fish and fur trade would be attained; (b) these 
territories would be debarred from supplying the sugar islands with 
provisions; (c) trade with old France would be greatly reduced; 
(d) no longer would France be able to obtain supplies from North 
America to build ships of war, thereby reducing her naval capacity 
and (e) expulsion of the French would secure the British colonies. 
(Cf. Kate Hotblack, Chatham's Colonial Policy (London, George 
Routledge and Sons Ltd, 1917), pp. 45-46.)
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expenditures made by the colonies; in other words, Pitt hoped to gain 
the cooperation of the colonies by paying for it. Put in game theory 
terms, Pitt hoped to gain the cooperation of the colonists via a process 
of making side-payments^ to the colonies.
Within the ministry there was no opposition, to begin with,
to Pitt's methods to achieve his desired military objectives in North
America. As a result this military assistance was agreed to by
(2)Parliament. 1 23
Another element which also possibly influenced Pitt's decision 
to subsidise the colonies' defence efforts was that the military 
situation for the British allies in America had deteriorated even
(3)further in 1757; an urgent decision needed to be made by either
ally, or both, to increase the expenditure on external defence. Since 
the British unilaterally decided to increase this expenditure the 
colonists were left to make the riskless strategic decision of deciding
(1) The use of side-payments could arise if one of the players (in a 
game of two players, for example) regarded that he/she was not 
receiving a large enough share of the net benefits from the joint 
strategy of cooperation. As a result he/she threatens not to play 
cooperatively. In order to prevent this occurrence, the other 
player raises the net benefit going to the dissatisfied party by 
making payments, out of his/her own resources, to this player. In 
other words, via this process of making side-payments, the net 
benefits resulting from joint cooperation may be distributed.
This general approach to the problem of distributing the net 
benefits of defeating the French in North America appears to have 
been employed by Pitt from late 1756 on. On the topic of side- 
payments see M. Shubik, Games for Society, Business and War: 
Towards and Theory of Gaming (New York, Elsevier, 1975), passim.
(2) 0.A. Sherrard, Lord Chatham, op. cit.3 p. 254.
(3) L.H. Gipson, The British Empire3 op. cit.3 Vol. VII, Chapter 2.
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to behave uncooperatively, unless the British implicitly paid them 
side-payments for their services contributed to the military alliance.
The game was not quite over. As the costs of the war mounted 
after 1757 so did the opposition from the ministry to Pitt's war plans. 
However, the opposition was never strong enough to sway the support 
which George II gave to Pitt's actions to attain his war objectives.
By the time the king died in 1760 the French were virtually defeated in 
America. ^
This analysis, based on a game theoretic framework, appears 
to provide a reasonably consistent explanation of the behaviour of the 
British government and the American colonists with respect to the 
question of the distribution, between the allies, of the costs, and 
gains, of defending the colonies against the French. A crucial 
implication in this a priori analysis, of course, is that the colonists 
tended to hide their true preferences for the relevant collectively 
consumed good, namely, external defence, or at least behaved 
uncooperatively in forming the military alliance. Nothing in their 
general behaviour with respect to the provision of this service appears 
to be inconsistent with this assumption. Possibly the British 
government, to begin with, also attempted to understate its preferences 
for the defence of the colonies, but military circumstances, and the 
tastes of the British political leaders for this collectively consumed 
good, induced the British to abandon this strategy.
In order to provide more substance to the previous
(1) O.A. Sherrard, Lord Chatham3 op. cit.3 p. 297 ff, pp. 314, 317,
322 and 380.
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Observation that the colonists appear to have misrepresented their 
preference for external defence in the mid-1750s, or at least behaved 
uncooperatively, the discussion now returns to the impressionistic 
observation which was made earlier that the colonies which contributed 
most, in per capita terms, to the external defence effort were those 
colonies nearest the dangers presented by the enemy. Before attempting
an explanation of this apparent fact it needs to be determined whether
u u (Dsuch was the case.
The total size of the contribution made by each colony to
external defence was based on the expenses incurred by each colony in
directly fighting the war between 1754 and 1762, and not expenses
(2)incurred for any other purposes. These estimates, shown in table 1,
may not fully reflect all the costs borne by a colony for they do not 
contain an estimate of the costs, if any, of quartering British troops. 
These estimates should not be regarded as being particularly accurate, 
at least for some colonies, for the additional reason that there is some 
difficulty in determining what part of their total expenditures in this 
period were allocated to external defence alone, instead of to other 
uses.^ Finally these estimates do not allow for the reimbursements
(1) Joseph Galloway in presenting his plan of reconciliation between
Great Britain and the colonies, on 28th September 1775, is reported 
as asserting that during the last war with France the colonies gave 
only in proportion to their remoteness to the enemy. The empirical 
analysis which is presented immediately below in the main text may 
be interpreted as a test of this assertion (hypothesis). (Cf. 
Journal of the American Congress: From 1774 to 1788, 4 Vols,
Washington, 1823, Vol. 1, p. 45.)
(2) In Gipson, The British Empire, op. ait., Vol. X, Chapters III and 
IV, are to be found estimates of these expenses.
(3) Gipson, The British Empire, ibid.
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received by each colony, from the British government, for the expenses 
incurred in providing external defence, simply because all the colonies 
were entitled to these reimbursements if it was thought that a colony 
had contributed adequately to the collective defence; in other words, 
a colony received reimbursements if the British thought it had 
cooperated adequately in the war effort. Since we are basically 
interested in the extent of the cooperation of each colony, it does not 
seem valid to allow for these reimbursements if the level of these 
reimbursements per colony themselves were an indication of a colony's 
degree of cooperation in the defence alliance.^
The population statistics for the total population in each
(2)colony in 1750 are readily available. The problem was to find a
method of quantifying a colony's location vis-a-vis the enemy and the 
other colonies. First of all dummy variables were employed for this 
task; the first dummy variable took the value one for the three 
colonies most exposed to the enemy, namely, New York, Massachusetts and 
Connecticut and zero for the other colonies; for the other dummy 
variable the value one was given to the four least exposed colonies of
(1) Since it was the British government which estimated these 
expenditures, it could be argued that they had every reason to 
understate the contributions of the colonies for the British 
government was to pay a subsidy based on these contributions. If 
this did happen (although there is no clear evidence to show that 
it did), but the understatement was approximately of the same 
proportion for all the colonies, then there would be no change in 
the relative contributions of each colony to each other. In the 
statistical tests carried out here, the concern is only with the 
relative contributions made by each colony and, therefore, there 
is no reason to be concerned about this possible understatement of 
these defence expenditures.
(2) Historical Statistics of the United States3 op. cit., series Z 
1-19, p. 756.
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Maryland, North and South Carolina and Georgia, and zero to the rest. 
Being mindful of the limited sample size (there are only thirteen 
observations), and the need to keep the degrees of freedom as large as 
possible, no more dummy viarables were employed.
Table 1
Estimate of Ranking of Colonies
Expenditures by in order of Exposure
Colony on . . to the Enemy
External Defence^ '
(in thousands of 
pounds Sterling)
New Hampshire 100 6
Massachusetts 818 2
Rhode Island 81 5
Connecticut 260 3
New York 291 1





North Carolina 31 6






(1) Source: L.H. Gipson, The British Empire before the American
Revolution (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), Vol. X, pp. 50, 64, 
70, 73, 77, 83, 87, 89-90, 93, 94-101 and 103.
An equation of the following form was estimated, using ordinary least 
squares: total expenditure on external defence per colony (E)/total
A A Apopulation per colony (P) = cl\ + c*2 dummy variable one (Di) +013 dummy 
variable two (D2) + the residual,
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i.e. (E/P)_^  = c*i + S2D i + a2D2  ^+
The results of this regression are shown in Table 2 as regression one, 
where R1 2 is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of 
freedom, D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic and the t-statistics are 
found in brackets below each estimated parameter.
One of the estimated coefficients for the dummy variables is 
significant at the five per cent level, according to the two tail test, 
and the other is nearly so, while their signs are what one would expect. 
Apparently the location of the colonies with respect to the enemy did 
influence the expenditure per capita on external defence by each colony, 
which implies that Joseph Galloway was correct in his assertion; at 
least according to this partial test of this assertion.
As a check on this result the colonies were ranked as to what 
was thought to be their relative exposure to the enemy between 1754 and 
1763. This ranking, which is shown in table 1 , ^  was used as an 
explanatory variable and regressed against the expenditure per capita. 
The results of this regression are shown as regression two in table 2. 
This variable appears to perform better than the dummy variables, the 
estimated coefficients being significant and of the expected sign, 
although the relatively low value of the D.W. statistic indicates that 
autocorrelation is present in the residuals, which would tend to inflate
(1) This ranking was based on the fact that the major area where the 
French advance was met by the British-Colonial military alliance
was along the Hudson Valley, up and across to Lake George and 
Lake Champlain, and on to the St. Lawrence River Valley-Great Lakes 
region. Certainly there is an element of judgement involved in 
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(1)the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. '
Other independent variables may also assist in explaining the 
variation in the per capita expenditure on external defence between 
colonies and at the same time help to reduce the problem of 
autocorrelation. An obvious factor which would induce a colony to 
devote some resources to defence, other than the subsidy system employed 
by the British, was the potential threat of the British government, and/ 
or the other colonies, not being willing to provide adequate external 
defence for the colony's own purposes. The extent of a colony's per 
capita expenditures possibly, however, would be determined by the amount 
spent on external defence by the other colonies; the more others spent 
on external defence the less other colonies needed to spend on providing 
this service, for they would automatically benefit from the collectively 
consumed good provided. The larger colonies, with the larger total 
incomes, however, would have the most to lose in total by being defeated 
by the French, and, therefore, possibly would tend to spend more per 
capita on defence, while the smaller colonies, benefiting from the non­
excludability property of collectively consumed goods, would as a result
(2)spend less, other things being the same.
Other than the location of a colony vis-a-vis the enemy, the 
other thing that has to be kept the same is the tastes of the colonists
(1) There are many standard discussions of the statistical implications 
of autocorrelation. See, for example, J. Johnson, Econometric 
Methods, Second Edition (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 243-249.
(2) This general idea was discussed, for example, in J.M. van Ypersele 
de Strihou, "Sharing the Defence Burden Amongst Western Allies", 
Yale Economic Essays, Vol. 8 (Spring, 1968), pp. 314-316.
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in each colony for the benefits to be derived from external defence.
The assumption that these tastes were the same does not appear to be 
unreasonable; there does not appear to be any important reason for 
believing that the colonists of any colony should have had markedly 
different tastes for the prospect of coming under the political control 
of the French.^
There is no data available for the total income of each colony 
for the 1750s. If, however, the assumption, that the per capita income 
for each colony was the same, is approximately correct, then the total 
population statistics per colony for this period should be employed as a 
proxy for the size of the total income per colony.
Total population per colony was included as an independent 
variable in the previous regression equations, to test the proposition 
outlined above. The results of this estimation are shown as regressions 
three and four in table 2. The inclusion of total population does not 
add anything to the explanatory power of the regression equation, and 
the estimated coefficients for the total population variable are not 
significant, and have a negative sign, which is opposite to that which 
one would expect from the theory presented above. The variables used as 
proxies for the location of a colony vis-a-vis the enemy are still 
significant, or nearly so.
It could be argued that the total population for each colony 
does not fairly represent the true valuation of the total benefits 
received by each colony from external defence because of the presence
(1) This assumption will be returned to below.
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of slaves in the measure of total population; slaves would tend to be 
indifferent towards a French victory, or possibly tend to desire a 
French victory, and anyway their preferences for external defence could 
not be represented through the political system via the normal political 
channels. The total white population per colony in 1750^^ was 
substituted for the total population as being the proxy to use to 
represent the total income for each colony. This proxy could possibly 
bias down the measure of total income for the southern colonies, 
relative to that for the other colonies, because of the likely higher 
average per capita incomes received by the white population in the 
colonies in the south compared to those further north. This point 
should be borne in mind when interpreting the regression results.
It was found, by experimenting, that using the logarithm of 
the white population, and the logarithm of per capita expenditure on 
defence, better regression results were obtained. The regression 
results for the logarithm of the white population and the location 
variables on the logarithm of expenditure per head of the total 
population are shown as regressions five and six, and the same 
independent variables on the logarithm of expenditure per head of the 
white population are shown as regressions seven and eight. The 
conclusions that can be drawn from these regression results are 
basically the same as those for the previous results; that the location 
of a colony with respect to the enemy was a variable generally found to 
be statistically significant, whereas the proxy variable for total 
income was not significant and always of the "wrong" sign. The
(1) Data were obtained from the Historical Statistics of the United 
Statesj ibid.
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"incorrect" sign of the estimated coefficient for the logarithm of 
white population is possibly partly due to the fact that the white 
population data is an inadequate measure of the total income going to 
the whites in each colony, or of tastes which this variable is also 
supposed to measure.
In order to allow for the problem of autocorrelation in 
regression number two, first order autocorrelation in the disturbances 
was assumed, and a computer programme, for adjusting for autocorrelation 
in linear regressions, employed to estimate the regression equation.
The results of this regression are shown as regression number nine in 
table 2. The coefficient estimates are still highly significant.^^
Given the measurement errors in the data exploited to estimate 
the relevant parameters, the regression results obtained should be 
treated with due scepticism. In particular, the proxy measures for 
total income and tastes in each colony may be grossly inaccurate 
measures of the true variables. Assuming that this is the case, these 
measurement errors will cause the coefficient estimates to be biased in 
regression numbers three to eight in table 2. This does not necessarily 
mean, however, that the coefficient estimate for the location variable 
is not statistically significant, even if the true measures of the
(1) Regression nine takes the following form 
[E/P]± = ot! + a 2Xii + a3ui_i +e±
/swhere a 3 is also estimated, along with the other two parameters, 
employing an iterative regression estimation technique. (The 
computer programme employed for this purpose is described in 
A.R. Pagan, "Non-Linear Regression and Notes on the Use of 
Programme AUTO" [mimeograph, Australian National University, 1972].) 
The value of a3, not shown in table 2, is -0.9759, with a 
t-statistic of -9.6934.
268
relevant variables were used in this estimate. Indeed, if these true 
variables were available for use, it may result in the coefficient 
estimate for the location variable turning out to be more statistically 
significant than the results shown in table 2. This possibility cannot 
be tested, of course, but nevertheless the results shown in table 2 do 
not disprove the proposition that, after allowing for other relevant 
considerations, the colonies nearest the enemy tended to behave more 
cooperatively towards the military alliance between 1754 and 1761, by 
spending more per capita on external defence, than those colonies less 
exposed to the enemy.
Such statistical results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that at least some colonies misrepresented their preferences with respect 
to external defence. If there had been no misrepresentation of 
preferences, then one would expect to find that expenditure per capita 
on external defence to be approximately the same in each colony, and not 
statistically significantly related to the location of the colony to the 
enemy, after allowing for any other relevant considerations. The 
statistical results provided above do not support this proposition.
Rather these results conform to the hypothesis that the colonies closest 
to the enemy, and, therefore, most exposed to the threat that, if the 
British government withheld the provision of some of its own external 
defence services, the enemy would inflict harm upon these colonies if 
they did not cooperate in the alliance. For those colonies furthest 
from the enemy, and/or protected from the enemy by the defence efforts 
of the other colonies, this threat should have had little persuasive 
influence because the threat could not be precisely directed at these 
colonies alone. While this was the situation this latter group of
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colonies could afford to understate their revealed preferences for the 
collectively consumed good, external defence, relative to their true 
preferences and relative to the preference revealed by the colonies more 
exposed to this threat.
An alternative hypothesis that these statistical results 
could be interpreted to support is that some of the colonies overstated 
their preferences, whereas the rest of the colonies revealed their true 
preferences. Such an interpretation is unconvincing for it is highly 
unlikely that the average colonists would have behaved in such a manner; 
to have done so implied that a colony would be required to make a larger 
contribution to external defence (allowing for other considerations) 
than the sum of the true marginal preferences for the citizens of the 
colony, which it seems reasonable to regard as irrational behaviour.
After the war with France was concluded Benjamin Franklin, and 
others, denied that the colonists had not paid their "fair" share of the 
costs of the war. In particular, in answer to the accusation that 
Maryland had not contributed anything to the common defence of the 
colonies, Franklin stated that the reason why Maryland had not done so 
was not because this colony had refused to contribute to this defence 
effort, but because disputes between factions in the Maryland 
legislature prevented funds from being allocated to external defence.
"It is true Maryland did not contribute its proportion, but it was, in 
my opinion, the fault of the government, not of the people", Franklin 
is reported to have stated in his examination before the committee of
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the House of Commons. (1)
It will be assumed that Franklin's argument is valid, and that 
Maryland's relatively small contribution to external defence was due to 
problems in her political institutions, and not the result of the 
colonists in this colony understating their preferences for external 
defence. From this assumption it follows that to test whether the 
location of a colony, with respect to the enemy, was important in 
determining that colony's per capita contribution to external defence, 
the data for Maryland should be dropped from the data sample used to 
test this proposition. This was done. The regression results obtained 
by using the smaller data sample are shown in table 3. In order to 
simplify matters, and also to maintain as many degrees of freedom as 
possible, dummy variables were not used to act as a proxy for the 
location of a colony; only the ranking of the colonies in order of 
their exposure to the enemy was employed.
There is no need to comment in detail on these results.
(2)Autocorrelation is not a problem in any of the regressions. The
location variable is still significant, whereas the variable acting as 
a proxy for total income per colony is even less significant than the 
results shown in table 2 above. Thus the hypothesis presented above is 
also supported by this evidence; that at least some colonies tended to 
understate their preferences for external defence, relative to their
(1) The Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 Vol. 13, L.W. Labaree (ed.)
(15 Vols; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959), p. 141.
(2) This conclusion is based upon the fact that the hypothesis that 
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true preferences. Despite this conclusion no comment will be made at 
this stage on Franklin's view that the colonies had paid their "fair" 
share of the costs of the war; this issue will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
The core of the argument presented so far may be summarised as 
follows. Had the external defence, supplied to protect the colonies, 
been a private good, it would have been possible, at little cost, to 
exclude individuals from benefiting from this good if they had not 
fulfilled certain contractual obligations. In this case, individuals 
would have had the incentive to reveal their true demand for the good, 
for in order to obtain the benefits provided by external defence they 
would have needed to be willing to pay, and, to have paid, the market 
price for the good. Since external defence was a pure public good, 
however, from which it was impossible to exclude from consumption at 
reasonable cost, there was no incentive for individuals to reveal their 
true preferences for the good if these preferences were to be used to 
assess the explicit, or implicit, tax-prices to be charged to these 
individuals. This implied a failure of the market mechanism to 
optimally allocate resources. To overcome this failing the market 
mechanism was replaced by the non-market mechanism of the political 
system through which the colonists, and the British, were supposed to 
reveal their preferences for external defence, and attempt to reach 
agreement over the charges to be imposed on each to finance the 
provision of external defence. While this non-market mechanism provided 
the means of supplying external defence, it did not provide an explicit 
agreement before 1763 concerning the political rules which would apply 
for assessing, and imposing, the tax—prices to be paid by consumers
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of external defence, although by 1757 the British government implicitly 
had acceded to the view that the British public would pay the major 
share of the costs incurred for the external defence of the colonies.
The basic reason why no agreement was reached was because the non- 
market mechanism, as it was operated, had not overcome the central 
problem of the non-excludability from consumption property of 
collectively consumed goods.
Perhaps in implicit recognition of this exclusion problem the
British authorities had realised the weakness of their political control
over the colonies before 1754,^^ and had made some attempts after 1748
to establish more clearly, or change, the political rules for the
(2)administration of the colonies. But even the close presence of a
serious coercive threat after 1753, as created by the French advances in 
North America, was apparently inadequate to induce the colonists to 
accept the important set of political rules devised by the British, 
concerning the explicit, or implicit, tax-prices to be charged to 
finance the external defence provided by the Anglo-Colonial alliance.
Thus the political mechanism that the British government was 
employing to overcome a failure of the market - of voluntary 
contributions to budgets to finance collectively consumed goods - was 
showing its weaknesses before 1763 when the Great War for the Empire 
came to an end. A major problem facing the British government after
(1) T.C. Barrow, "The Old Colonial System from an English Point of
View", in A.G. Olson and R.M. Brown (eds), Anglo-American Relations 
1675-1775 (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 125- 
139.
(2) J.P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection", op. oit.3 pp. 65-74.
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this date, in its administration of the North American colonies, was one 
of finding a more acceptable political mechanism for providing, and 




NON-EXCLUSION PROBLEMS PERSIST: SOME POLITICAL-ECONOMIC RESPONSES.
After 1763 the need to settle the question of the political
rules governing the tax-prices to be charged to the colonists, to
provide revenue to partly finance the production of collectively
consumed goods, did not arise directly out of the costs of the latest
war with France; the British authorities did not expect the colonists
to pay any part of the British debt created by this w a r . ^  Rather,
this issue arose out of the costs of administering the colonies, in
particular, the need to station troops in North America after 1763,
although later the emphasis shifted back to the need to raise revenue
to finance the general administration and general external (especially
naval) defence of the colonies. The reasons why the British government
decided to satisfy this need for troops to be stationed in the colonies
(2)are not clearly stated by anyone in authority but the events prior to 
1764 do indicate the general reasons for this decision.
(1) This view was put by Thomas Whately, Joint Secretary to the Treasury 
under Grenville, in Considerations on the Trade and Finances of this 
Kingdom and the Measures of Administration with Respect to those 
great Rational Objects since the Conclusion of Peace (London, 1776), 
p. 73. Also see L.H. Gipson, The Coming of the Revolution3 1763- 
1775 (New York, Harper Row, 1954), p. 56.
(2) J. Shy, Towards Lexington3 The Role of the British Army in the 
Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1965), p. 53 ff., p. 67 and p. 82.
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One of the benefits resulting from the defeat of the French,
as seen by the colonists, was the land, previously contested by the
French, west of the Allegheny M o u n t a i n s . T h e i r  attempt to occupy
this land, in violation of the agreement reached between the British
government and the Indians at the conference at Easton in December 1758,
whereby the British pledged to ensure that the Indians would not be
deprived of their land, created what the British authorities saw as a
(2)situation of potential violent conflict. In response to this
situation it was reasoned that in order to reduce this risk of violence
British troops should be stationed at the western frontier to police
any regulations concerning relations between the European colonists and 
(3)the Indians. Such a view had been established by the British
authorities before its apparent wisdom was confirmed by the out-break 
of violence, which took the form of the Pontiac Rebellion, between May 
and September 1763.
As part of this policy the territory west of the Alleghenies
(1) The British government apparently did not see this land as a 
benefit resulting from the war. R.W. Van Alstyne, Empire and 
Independence, op. cit., p. 13 cites Lord Shelburne, in a speech to 
Parliament in December 1963, as stating that the war against 
France had been fought only for the security of the colonies in 
North America. This certainly was not the only reason for fighting 
the war, but if the British were to comply with the Treaty of 
Easton (see main text, same paragraph) then the acquisition of 
land west of the Alleghenies, could not have been one of their 
objectives in fighting the war. Also see Gipson, The British 
Empire, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 308 and 312-313.
(2) Cf. J. Shy, Towards Lexington, op. cit., pp. 200-204.
(3) Cf. J. Shy, Towards Lexington, op. cit., p. 52 ff. and p. 82. 
Policing relations between the Indians and the colonists was not 
the only consideration behind the stationing of British troops in 
North America; keeping control of the non-English speaking areas 
of this continent just acquired, and attempting to make the customs 
service a more effective means of raising revenue, were also part 
of the rationale for such a policy decision.
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was, with exceptions, proclaimed out-of-bounds for the colonists, via
the Proclamation of 7th October, 1763,^ in the hope of preventing
further conflicts between the colonists and the Indians. To police this
rule, or instruction, troops were to be stationed along the frontier.
Recent experience indicated that these troops would not be provided, and
paid for, by the colonies; not only during the Great War for the Empire
but also during the more recent Indian revolt the colonists had behaved
(2)uncooperatively in providing assistance to the British army. Instead
the British government called upon the colonists to assist in the 
payment of the costs incurred in providing frontier defences while 
British troops did the policing of the frontier.
In order to facilitate agreement over the political rules to 
be employed to assess the taxes to be charged to the colonists for the
(3)collectively consumed goods (land defence) provided, the British
(1) This proclamation was the outcome of a royal instruction of 12th 
December, 1761 to the colonial governors, which was meant to 
inhibit the expansion of the colonists into areas claimed by the 
Indians as their territory. The governors were to refuse to grant 
property rights to any colonists to any of this land, except to 
those with an authorised licence to purchase such land. In 
addition, these governors were to instruct those colonists who had 
already settled in these areas to vacate this land.
Cf. "Settlements Interfering with Frontier Indians Forbidden" in 
L.W. Labaree (ed.), Royal Instructions to British Colonial 
Governors 1670-1776 (2 Vols; New York, Octagon Books, 1967), pp. 
476-478.
(2) J.M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, The Middle West in 
British Colonial Policy 1760-1775 (Lincoln, University Nebraska 
Press, 1961), p. 69 ff.
(3) Other collectively consumed goods were provided by the British 
government at this time, from which the colonists no doubt also 
benefited, in particular naval defence and colonial administration 
of various forms, but land defence was the service which the 
British authorities wished the colonists to assist in financing.
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authorities made it clear that the taxes imposed were only to be used 
to finance the provision of certain collectively consumed goods; in 
other words, it was made clear that the tax revenue was to be employed 
to provide a definite benefit, or that the benefit approach to taxation 
was implicitly used to guide policy making on this occasion. Both in 
the discussion between Grenville and the colonial representatives in 
London about the proposed Stamp Act, and in the preamble of the Stamp 
Act, it was made clear that the revenue raised via the stamp duty was 
to be used to defray the expenses "of defending, protecting and securing, 
the British colonies. . . " In fact, Grenville was more conciliatory 
than these observations would suggest for during the discussions prior 
to the introduction of the Stamp Act he had asked the colonists to 
suggest alternative methods to a stamp duty for raising the required 
revenue in the colonies.
This apparently conciliatory behaviour of the British 
government could be interpreted, however, as being an attempt to trick 
the colonists into paying more than their "fair" share of the costs of 
administering and protecting the colonies, for obviously it was to Great 
Britain's advantage to have the colonies pay as large a proportion of 
these costs as possible. While not necessarily approaching this issue, 
of the apparent reasonableness of the attitude of the British government, 
from this point of view, a number of historians have questioned, in 
particular, the sincerity of Grenville's offer to allow the colonists 
the time to raise any objections to the contents of the proposed Stamp
(1) L.B. Namier, "Charles Garth, Agent for South Carolina, Part II", 
English Historical Review, LIV (1939), and The Stamp Act (March 
22, 1765) as reproduced in J.P. Greene (ed.) Colonies to Nations 
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 42-43.
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Act, and/or make proposals about introducing alternative taxes to the 
stamp tax for the c o l o n i e s . I f  Grenville was insincere in his offer 
to negotiate over the proposed tax, then presumably he was attempting 
to hide the fact that he was trying to impose relatively uncompromising 
rules on the colonists for the payment of the collectively consumed 
services received by them, and which the British government provided.
The case against Grenville, that he misrepresented his true 
intentions concerning the method of imposing the stamp tax, mostly 
rests on the view that he offered the colonists the option of using the 
requisition scheme, as utilised during the last war (which implied that 
the colonies would be able to tax themselves), but that subsequently 
this offer was effectively withdrawn, since not enough information was 
provided to allow the colonists to take up this offer. Before 
considering what Grenville was reported as saying, when making the offer 
to negotiate over the raising of government revenue in the colonies, it 
is worth commenting on an implication of this interpretation of 
Grenville's reported statements.
If Grenville was sincere in his wish to have the colonies bear 
a "reasonable" share of the costs of protecting the colonies, then he 
needed to employ a system of taxation which was capable of raising the 
required revenue, at relatively little cost. Past experience of the 
requisition scheme had shown that this system of revenue raising in the 
American colonies did not have these properties; in particular it had
(1) Cf. E.S. and H.M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to the
Revolution (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953), 
Chapter 5, and M.G. Kämmen, A Rope of Sand? The Colonial Agents, 
British Politics, and the American Revolution (Ithaca N.Y.,
Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 109-113.
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been incapable of raising adequate amounts of finance, at a time when 
there was a relatively serious threat that if the revenues (or 
resources) were not provided relative serious harm would be inflicted 
upon the colonies. In addition, after 1763 the probability was low that 
the potential enemy (the Indians) would inflict any relatively great 
losses on the colonies, especially on the more commercialised and more 
heavily populated eastern half of the colonies, and the eastern colonies. 
With such a small threat to the colonies there was little chance of the 
British government raising the required amount of revenue by means of a 
requisition system. While Grenville may not have been aware of this 
post-1763 situation, he should have been aware of the previous results 
achieved with the requisition system. It follows that had Grenville 
offered the colonists the option of allowing them to tax themselves, in 
order to raise the revenue needed to fill the quota set for each colony, 
he was offering a revenue-raising scheme which, if this option was taken 
up by the colonists, would have meant that the required revenue would 
almost certainly not have been raised, other things being the same.
Thus if Grenville really was sincere in wanting to raise revenue from 
the colonies he would have been particularly rash in offering the 
colonists this option; an option which stood a very good chance of 
being taken up by the colonists. Also, to use such an offer as a ruse 
to induce the colonists' cooperation, on the issue of Parliament taxing 
the colonies, also appears to be a highly dangerous game to have played 
becuase of the likelihood of the offer being accepted. For these 
a priori reasons it does seem unlikely that Grenville really did offer 
to the colonists the option of using the requisition scheme to raise 
revenue, unless Grenville was indeed rash in the sense outlined above. 
The implication of this reasoning is that those historians who would
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argue that Grenville made such an offer implicitly are asserting that 
Grenville was indeed quite unthinking on this question of requisitions.
The reason why this issue cannot be easily settled is that at 
the time the offer was made to negotiate over the taxing of the colonies 
there was no statement by Grenville (or his agents), in his (their) own 
words, concerning this offer. Instead one has to rely on the reported 
statements by Grenville; reports written, at the time the proposed 
Stamp Act was being discussed, by the colonial agents in London. 
Apparently the only written statement made by Grenville himself which 
comments on the question of the requisition system was written in 1768, 
some three to four years after the initial offers to negotiate were made. 
In a letter to William Knox of 15th July, 1768, Grenville commented on 
the requisition system as follows: "It will be extremely difficult, if
not impracticable, for the Colonies to apportion a certain sum by a 
convention of deputies from each Colony... The difficulty of assessing 
the specific sums on each Colony would then fall upon the Parliament... 
And as the various circumstances of the Colonies would render it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish any permanent rate 
for the several quotas, the consequence would be that none would be 
established."
If Grenville had held these views in 1764 as well, then it 
does seem rather unlikely that he would have made the offer to employ 
the requisition system to raise revenue in the American colonies.
(1) Grenville to William Knox, July 15, 1768, "Correspondence of
William Knox, Chiefly in Relation to American Affairs, 1757-1808", 
Royal Historical Manuscripts Commission Report on Manuscripts in 
Various Collections, VI (Dublin, 1909), p. 97. Cited by Kämmen,
A Rope of Sandy op, cit.s p. llOn.
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In two meetings between Grenville and the colonial agents, to 
discuss the proposed Stamp Act, on the 17th May, 1764 and 2nd February, 
1765 respectively, Grenville implied fairly clearly that he had at least 
misgivings about the use of the requisition system; at least this is 
what can be gathered from the reports of these meetings written by some 
of the colonial agents. At the first meeting Grenville is reported as 
stating that raising revenue within the colonies themselves and 
"appropriating it [by the assemblies] would have been attended with very 
many difficulties even if it could be supposed that 26 Colonies 
(including the Continent and the West India Islands) would all have 
adopted such a recommendation..."^"^ While it is not clear from Garth's 
report of this meeting whether Grenville was not prepared to consider 
the requisition system for raising revenue, there is the fairly strong 
implication, judging from this quotation, that this was the case.
At the second meeting with a group of colonial agents, in
answer to a request by these agents, which included Benjamin Franklin in
their number, that the old system of quotas and requisitions be used to
raise revenue to pay for the defence of the western frontier, Grenville
asked the agents whether they "could agree upon the several proportions
(2)Each Colony should raise?" Even though the agents and Grenville may
not have realised it, the question was rhetorical; what each colony 
should pay involved a value judgement about what should be regarded as a
(1) Charles Garth to the South Carolina Committee of Correspondence, 
June 5, 1764, are reproduced by L.B. Namier in "Charles Garth, 
Agent for South Carolina, Part II", op. oit., p. 647.
(2) Ingersoll to Governor Fitch, February 11, 1765; as reproduced in 
E.S. Morgan (ed.), Prologue to the Revolution, Sources and 
Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis 1764-1766 (Chapel Hill, The 
University of North Carolina, 1959), p. 33.
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more appropriate level of income distribution in the colonies, a value 
judgement about which there was bound to be at least some disagreements. 
Therefore, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement the 
requisition scheme. This implication Grenville possibly implicitly 
recognised for he subsequently pointed out in this meeting that, while 
the British government did not have all the information required to 
implement the quota system, even if it did have this information there 
was no certainty that each colony would raise its appropriated revenue.^ 
This was the clearest reported case of Grenville apparently rejecting 
the requisition system, as an alternative revenue raising mechanism to 
the stamp tax, in the period 1764 to 1765.
The reported statement of Grenville to Parliament on the
9th March, 1764, on the other hand, is more ambiguous on the nature of
the option being offered to the colonists. This is unfortunate for this
was the first occasion on which the offer was made. According to one
report of the speech he stated that while he thought the stamp tax
should be used to raise revenue in the colonies he was willing "to give
the Provinces their option to raise that [i.e. the stamp tax] or some
(2)equivalent tax..." A number of interpretations of this statement are
possible, a not particularly convincing one being that the colonies were 
being offered the option to tax themselves. Another report of this 
speech, by Edward Montague, is much stronger in its implication that 
each colony would be able to raise the allocated quota in a way it saw
(1) Ingersoll to Governor Fitch, ibid.
(2) Jasper Mauduit to Massachusetts Assembly, March 13, Massachusetts 
Archives, XXII, p. 359. Cited by Morgan, The Stamp Aots op. cit.3 
p. 55.
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fit; Grenville is reported as indicating that "it would be as 
satisfactory to him if the several provinces would among themselves, 
and in modes best suited to their circumstances, raise a sum adequate 
to the expense of their own defence.
That Grenville made such an offer has been strongly questioned
by P.D.G. Thomas, the basis for his doubts being alternative reports of
(2)Grenville's speech to the Committee on Ways and Means. One such
report is that by Nathaniel Ryder, a Member of Parliament, who took down
(3)Grenville's words in short-hand while sitting in the House.
Grenville outlined the reason for the need to raise revenue via a tax on 
the colonists; namely, to defray the expenses of maintaining troops in 
North America. The most appropriate tax for this purpose was "Stamp
(4)duties ... because it requires few officers and even collects itself." 
Then came the offer to discuss the issue of a colonial tax; "He would 
likewise wish to follow to a certain degree the inclination of the 
people of North America if they will agree to the end."^^
(1) Montague to the Virginia committee of correspondence, April 11, 
1764, Virginia Gazette, October 3, 1766. Cited by J.M. Sosin, 
Agents and Merchants (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 
p. 5In. Also cited in E.S. Morgan (ed.), Prologue to Revolution, 
op. cit., p. 23.
(2) P.D.G. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis; The 
First Phase of the American Revolution 176Z-1767 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1975), pp. 73-74.
(3) The reported speech is reproduced in P.D.G. Thomas (ed.), 
"Parliamentary Diaries of Nathaniel Ryder, 1764-7", Camden 
Miscellany, XXIII (1969), Camden Fourth Series, Vol. 7, pp. 229- 
351. Referred to below as Ryder's Diary.
(4) Ryder's Diary, p. 235.
(5) Ryder's Diary, p. 235.
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This account of Grenville's offer to negotiate with the 
colonies is confirmed by the report sent by Charles Garth, to South 
Carolina on 17th April, 1764, of the debate of the 9th March; which was 
that "it was far from his [Grenville's] inclination to press any measure 
upon any part of the dominions without giving them time to be heard, 
should they have objections t h e r e t o . T h u s  in neither of these 
accounts is Grenville reported as making the offer of allowing the 
colonists to tax themselves, let alone specifically employ the 
requisition system.
On taking all these various pieces of conflicting evidence in 
account, plus the a priori argument presented above, it does not appear 
at all unreasonable to conclude that Grenville most probably did not 
offer the colonists the option of the requisition system in place of the 
stamp tax. The option that Grenville appears to have offered the 
colonists was alternative taxes, such as export and import duties on a 
range of internationally traded items, or land taxes, or any tax which 
could be applied to all the colonies, and which was imposed by 
Parliament, and not by the colonial assemblies. In a sense this offer 
to negotiate over the type of tax to be employed was subsequently taken 
up by Franklin in his evidence to the House of Commons in February 1766, 
by his pointing out that the colonists would be willing to be taxed by
(1) Charles Garth to South Carolina, quoted in L. Namier and J. Brooks 
(eds), House of Commons 1754-1790. The House of Parliament 
(3 Vols; London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), Vol. II, 
p. 660, as cited from Charles Garth, letterbook in the possession 
of Captain W. Godsal, Haines Hill, Berks.
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an "external" tax and not by an "internal" tax.^
While Grenville does not appear to have been insincere in his
offer to negotiate with the colonists over the type of tax to be
(2)imposed on the colonies, where he does appear to be open to
criticism, however, is his apparent failure to communicate to the
colonies as clearly as possible in his own words, or those of his
agents, the nature of his offer, instead of leaving his statements to
be reported and interpreted by the colonial agents. Grenville, for
example, apparently did reject advice to formally communicate his offer 
(3)to the colonies. In defence of Grenville on this issue, it should
be pointed out that the evidence does point to the strong possibility 
that he had communicated his offer through the reports of the colonial 
agents of the debate of the 9th March. That this information became 
blurred in the reports sent off to the American colonies by these agents, 
or possibly not even reported by some agents, was not the fault of 
Grenville. However, a value judgement is required in determining the 
the relative strength of such an argument.
(1) Franklin later argued in 1766 that at the February 1765 meeting
with Grenville he had made the suggestion that "a Plan for a 
General Loan Office in America be used instead of a stamp tax.
That Franklin made such a suggestion at this meeting has been 
questioned by Sosin in Agents and Merchants, op. cit.3 p. 59n, 
although Franklin's statement has been accepted by Verner W. Crane, 
"Benjamin Franklin and the Stamp Act", Colonial Society of 
Massachusetts, Transactionss XXXII (1933-1934), p. 57.
(2) Sosin also came to the same conclusion, although via a slightly 
different train of analysis. Cf. J.M. Sosin, WhitehaZl and the 
WiZdernesSj op. cit.y pp. 84-86, and Agents and Merchants3 op. cit.3
pp. 51-54.
(3) Dora Mae Clark, The Rise of the British Treasury (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1960), p. 120.
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Despite these attempts by the British government to facilitate 
agreement over an acceptable set of political rules to assist in 
financing the collectively consumed goods provided by Great Britain, 
from which the colonists b e n e f i t e d , a n  important coalition of 
colonists rejected these attempts. Was this a case of the colonists 
attempting to avoid payment of a "reasonable" share of the costs of 
providing the collectively consumed goods, in part, at least, consumed 
by the American colonists? In order to provide a reasonable assessment 
of the arguments devised by the colonists to support their position on 
the question of being taxed by the British Parliament - in other words, 
to determine whether this political behaviour was evidence of an 
understatement of the colonists' preferences for the collectively 
consumed goods provided - it would be preferable to consider only the 
statements of the more informed spokesmen for the colonists; spokesmen 
who, it is reasonable to assume, were adequately acquainted with the 
relevant historical facts employed in these arguments. For this reason 
the arguments developed by Benjamin Franklin will be considered in some
(1) Insisting that the revenue raised in the colonies by taxes imposed 
by Parliament be spent on providing facilities which would benefit 
the colonies, and the willingness to negotiate over the type of 
taxes to be used, were not the only devices used by the British 
government in its attempts to bring about agreement over colonial 
taxation. Grenville was also mindful of the notion that the tax 
imposed should be equitable in its incidence, in the sense that it 
should be a progressive tax. In speaking to the Committee of Ways 
and Means, on 6th February, 1765, he is reported as saying of the 
stamp tax that "... it takes in great degree its proportion from 
the riches of the people. As in lawsuits and commercial contracts, 
it increases in proportion to the riches." [Ryder’s Diary} 256.]
In short, not only did the British government implicitly adopt the 
benefit approach, but also the ability-to-pay approach, to taxation 
to guide its economic policy-making on this occasion. What is more, 
the government did consider the question of parliamentary 
representation for the colonies, an issue which will be discussed 
in more detail below in the main text.
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detail; because of his position in colonial society, he should have 
been adequately informed about the important relevant events which 
preceded the actions of the British government after 1763 on matters of 
public finance policy, as they affected the North American colonies.
Probably the most influential statement made by Franklin on
the matter of the British Parliament's imposing taxes on the colonists
was his examination before the committee of the whole of the House of
Commons on the 13th February, 1766.^^ While the arguments presented on
this occasion may have had little impact in bringing about the repeal of
(2)the Stamp Act, Franklin's arguments were widely reported in the 
colonies and some were subsequently re-used on many occasions, sometimes 
in a slightly altered form, by other colonial pamphleteers and spokesmen 
right up to the time of the outbreak of the American Revolution and 
beyond. Actually aspects of some of the arguments presented had been 
enunciated by others before Franklin gave his evidence, but the fact 
that Franklin employed them possibly added more credence to these 
arguments, at least in the colonies, than would have been the case had 
these views been put by a man less well known and less highly regarded.
These are not the only reasons, however, for concentrating 
attention on this evidence. The occasion of Franklin giving evidence to 
the House of Commons was a rare, reported, event where an articulate, 
informed, representative of the colonists was found in a position of
(1) The reported version of this evidence that will be cited below is 
that to be found in the Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 13,
L.W. Labaree (ed.), (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 
129-159.
(2) This is a view which was put forward by Morgan, The Stamp Aet, 
op. ait.s p. 276
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possibly being questioned immediately about his arguments, in favour 
of the colonists not being taxed by the British government, by 
potentially equally informed members of the audience. For this reason 
it would seem reasonable to suspect that Franklin needed to be 
relatively careful about what he said in case he was questioned on 
points he had raised, and facts he had cited. The final reason why this 
evidence is worth considering in some detail is that the evidence covers 
nearly all, if not all, the major complaints raised by the colonists in 
their opposition to the stamp tax. As a result of this range of issues 
discussed in this evidence some fundamentally important considerations 
were raised, implicitly or explicitly, in Franklin's answers about how 
collectively consumed goods could be effectively supplied, and paid for.
The major portion of the following discussion of this evidence 
will only be concerned with considering that evidence which had some 
clear bearing on the question of whether or not Franklin, as a colonist, 
understated his preferences for the collectively consumed goods the 
British government had provided, and were providing, for the colonists, 
or more generally, whether, or not, Franklin showed instances of 
uncooperative behaviour with respect to the question of providing 
collectively consumed goods for the colonists' b e n e f i t . N o  
consideration will be given to the constitutional issues raised in 
Franklin's evidence, although aspects of this topic will be discussed 
below, but not directly in relation to Franklin's evidence. Nor will 
the answers provided by Franklin be considered in the order in which
(1) See the end of Chapter II, page 236, for a discussion of the 
distinction between the misrepresentation of preferences, and 
uncooperative behaviour, with respect to the provision of 
collectively consumed goods.
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they appeared in the reproduced evidence, but more or less in the same 
order as the occurrence of the historical events, implicitly or 
explicitly, referred to in the questions and/or answers.
Before embarking on this exercise the point must be emphasised
that Franklin's evidence was in some respects a stage performance;
individuals symphathetic to the American colonists' cause were to ask
pre-arranged q u e s t i o n s . A l s o  Franklin's basic objective in giving
his evidence was to persuade Parliament that the Stamp Act should be
(2)repealed. This implies, of course, that Franklin probably would tend
to misrepresent relevant facts if it served his purpose. Many 
historians have noted that Franklin apparently did do this, but what has 
not been analysed is the possible extent of this misrepresentation. Nor 
has it been noted that some important economic issues were raised in 
Franklin's evidence. For these reasons it would seem to be a worth­
while exercise to consider this evidence in some detail in order to 
assess the full extent of the nature of the major economic arguments 
used against the stamp tax. From this analysis one may gain a clearer 
idea of the crucial issues which formed the basis of the opposition to 
British government economic intervention in the thirteen North American 
colonies, which in turn should indicate how this opposition might have 
been successfully overcome.
As has already been pointed out, the British government did 
not expect the British American colonists to assist in reducing the size
(1) Cf. C.B. Currey, Road to Revolution. Benjamin Franklin in England
1765-1775 (New York, 1968), pp. 156-157.
(2) Cf. C.B. Currey, ibid.3 p. 190.
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of the British national debt, mainly incurred as a result of fighting 
the last war. Yet there does seem to have been the view, held by at 
least some individuals in Great Britain, that because the British 
government had been so generous in its contribution to the efforts to 
protect the American colonies from the French, the colonists had 
incurred at least a moral debt to Great Britain, a debt the colonists 
could repay by assisting Britain with financing the costs of frontier 
defence. Franklin denied that such a moral obligation existed because, 
firstly, the last war with France was not fought for the benefit of the 
colonists, and, secondly, that the colonists had contributed adequately 
to the war effort to defeat the French.
On the first point, Franklin argued that just prior to 1755 
the colonists had been at peace with the French and the Indians but, 
because the British government had disputed the claims by the French to 
territory on the North American continent, this peace was disturbed by 
the Braddock expedition sent to protect the commercial interests of 
Great Britain, and not the interests of the American colonists. Only 
after Braddock*s defeat were the colonists in any fear of being attacked 
by the French and Indians.
As is well known, the colonists had called for assistance from 
Great Britain, and had made plans to meet the French threat, before 
Braddock*s defeat; in fact before Braddock had been appointed Commander- 
in-Chief in North America in the autumn of 1754, and, therefore, 
obviously before Braddock embarked on his campaign against the French in
(1) This argument was given in answer to question one hundred and 
twenty-three of Franklin's evidence; see Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin3 Vol. 13, op. oit.3 pp. 150-151.
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the spring of 1755. Franklin, and others, had been eager to call a
meeting of colonial representatives with the object, amongst others, of
discussing the formation of a defence alliance against the French, a
meeting which took the form of the Albany Congress in mid-1754.^^
Clearly, that some of the colonists saw the need in 1754 to form such
an alliance indicates that the colonies were not in the state of peace
with France prior to 1755, as Franklin would have had the British
Parliament believe in 1766. This point is further supported by the fact
that Washington, with the Virginian militia, was at the western frontier
in late 1753 and early 1754 attempting to repulse the French advance on
the colonies. In addition, at least some colonies in 1754 were calling
for assistance from the British government to help them repulse the
French threat. For example, in a message from the General Assembly of
Massachusetts, to Governor Shirley, dated 4th January, 1754, these
colonial representatives expressed their alarm at the French
encroachment which "threatened great danger, and perhaps in time, even
the entire destruction of this provice (without interposition of his
(2)majesty) notwithstanding any provision we may make to prevent it."
What is of interest is that no one on the House of Commons committee, 
judging from the reported examination of Franklin, was equipped with 
the facts to question Franklin's assertions on this matter; only some 
three years later was there a detailed rebuttal, by William Knox,
(1) Newbold, The Albany Congress> op. oit., p. 30.
(2) Cited by William Knox, The Controversy Between Great Britain and 
her Colonies (London, 1769), pp. 114-115. Knox provides other 
examples of calls for assistance from the colonies; i.e. from 
Virginia and the Albany Congress.
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of Franklin's presentation of this piece of colonial h i s t o r y . A t  
least some parliamentarians, however, do not seem to have accepted 
Franklin's facts. The day after the examination, Franklin reports a 
Mr. Nugent as stating in Parliament:
"But what is Austrian Ingratitude, what is the 
Ingratitude of Portugal compared to this of America?
We have fought, bled and Ruin'd ourselves, to conquer 
for them; and now they come and tell us to our Noses, 
even at the Bar of this House, that they are not 
obliged to us!"
Franklin notes that this "Clamour was very little minded. „ ( 2 )
After 1766 Franklin apparently became even more emphatic in 
his view that the British government had become unnecessarily involved 
in the affairs of the colonies leading up to the war with France. For 
example, in the margin of a pamphlet, written by Josiah Tucker,
Franklin wrote that Britain had provided troops only to protect her own 
trade and that "... she [Great Britain] sent troops to America unask'd. 
And now Brings this Account of the Expense against us, which should be 
rather carried to her own Merchants and Manufacturers." Also in 
another marginalia to the same pamphlet, in response to a statement by 
Tucker accusing the colonists that they "were moving Heaven and Earth 
with [their] Cries of Lamentations" at the time the French were 
encroaching on the colonies, Franklin asserted: "It is wonderful
whence the English drew this Notion! The Americans know nothing of
(1) William Knox, The Controversy, op. oit.y p. lOOff.
(2) Papers of Benjamin Frankliny Vol. 13, op. oit.y p. 159n.
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it. „ ( 1)
What is also of interest about these comments is that 
apparently Franklin’s private view of this aspect of colonial history 
did not vary from his publicly expressed opinion on this matter.
Despite this observation, it is more than surprising that Franklin 
should have made a mistake about the historical facts relating to the 
beginning of the war with France on the North American continent, for 
he himself, in no small way, was involved with some of the actions of 
the colonists in the preparation for this conflict. The statements by 
Franklin in his evidence do appear to be a clear example of Franklin 
understating his (and the colonists he represented) preferences for the 
collectively consumed goods (external defence), provided by Great 
Britain during the Great War for the Empire. This conclusion holds, 
despite the fact that Britain probably became involved in this war to 
defend, in part, her own particular interests, and not just the 
interests of the American colonists, for the colonists could have
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 17, op. oit., p. 360 and p. 372. 
Emphasis in the original. Tucker published the relevant pamphlet 
in 1766 but it is thought that Franklin wrote his comments in 
1770; see the editor’s note on p. 349 of the volume just cited.
The relevant views of Josiah Tucker will be considered in 
some detail below, but it is of interest to note in passing that 
Tucker and Franklin were protagonists over the issue of the 
American colonists contributing to the costs of protecting the 
colonies. Of Franklin's publicly expressed views Tucker expressed 
the opinion; "... I never believe him in any public matter, 
excepting in his Electrical Experiments ..." (To be found in 
"A Letter to Edmund Burke, Esq: Member of Parliament for the City
of Bristol, and Agent for the Colony of New York, &c. His Answer 
to this Printed Speech, Said to be Spoken in the House of Commons 
of the twenty-second of March, 1775" (1775), as reproduced in 
Josiah Tucker: a Selection from his Economic and Political
Writings, R.L. Schuyler (ed.) (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1931), p. 386n.) A similar, but not so extreme, scepticism of 
Franklin's relevant public opinions is adopted here.
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benefited automatically from the British government's expenditure on 
external defence. (They, no doubt, did benefit from this expenditure 
for otherwise they would not have asked the British government for 
assistance in helping them to fight the French.)^
This form of misrepresentation was practised by others;
(2)Dickenson, Paine, Otis and de Berdt used essentially the same 
argument developed by Franklin, as cited above. However, in the case 
at least one of these individuals (Paine) one could use the excuse 
that he was not well informed about the relevant historical facts, for 
he had only recently arrived in the colonies before writing Common Sense 
in 1776. But in the case of Franklin one could not make out the same 
case.
Given that the colonists had benefited from the protection of 
the colonies, provided by the Anglo-Colonial alliance, the question 
became: What proportion of the costs, of providing this protection,
(1) The issue of whether or not the colonists, or at least the 
colonists of Franklin's acquaintance and Franklin himself, would 
have derived benefits from the outcome of this war is one which is 
discussed in further detail in Currey, Road to Revolution, op. cit., 
pp. 187-189. It is quite clear from Currey's analysis that 
Franklin's assertions, in his evidence, that "We [the colonists] 
had ... no particular concern or interest in that dispute [with
the French over land at the frontier], and that the Indian trade 
is a British interest" were statements incorrect in fact.
(2) John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, No. VIII, 
as reproduced in P.L. Ford (ed.), The Writings of John Dickinson 
(Philadelphia, 1895) I, pp. 360-361; Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 
as reproduced in J.P. Greene, Colonies, op. cit., p. 270ff;
J. Otis, Considerations on Behalf of the Colonies, in a Letter to 
a Noble Lord (4th September, 1765); de Berdt to Dartmouth 5th 
September, 1765, Dartmouth Papers, II, 81, William Salt Library, 
Stafford, England, cited by Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 
op. cit., p. 93.
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would have been a "fair" one for the colonists to have paid? Because
of the value judgements involved in determining an answer to this
question there is no correct answer, but the attempt to find an answer
clearly provides a source of dispute that could be taken advantage of;
the dispute being over what explicit, or implicit, tax-prices should be
charged, and not over whether or not the collectively consumed good
provided was of benefit to the colonists. Franklin believed that the
colonists had paid their "fair" share of the costs. The colonists, he
argued, had contributed resources toward the execution of the last war
to the extent that the "Colonies raised, clothed and paid, during the
last war, near 25,000 men and spent many m i l l i o n s . T h e  strength of
this argument was to some degree diminished by it implicitly being
pointed out by a member of Parliament that the colonies had been
reimbursed by the British government for some of these expenses. This
was true, but they had not been reimbursed anywhere near the full 
(2 )amount. In addition, the fact that the British government saw fit to
partly reimburse the colonies for the cost of the war was "the strongest
of all proofs that the Colonies far from being unwilling to bear the
share of the burden, did exceed their proportion; for if they had done
less, or had only equalled their proportion, there would have been no
(3)room or reason for compensation".
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 13, op. ait.» answers to question
27, pp. 143-144, and question 122, p. 149.
(2) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 13, op. oit., answer to question
28, p. 144.
(3) Papers of Benjamin Franklin> Vol. 13, op. oit.3 answer to question 
122, p. 150.
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The facts Franklin used to support this line of argument were
misleading. While it is true that the colonists had raised near to
25,000 men, as Franklin stated, this was only true for the years 1758
and 1 7 5 9 ; ^  it was not true for every one of the years of the war.
In 1760 and 1761 the colonists only raised 15,942 and 8,786 men in
(2)these years respectively. And, of course, these troops were raised 
in the knowledge that Pitt had promised to reimburse the colonies for 
their efforts in fighting the war. In the period before the British 
government had made this formal promise it is highly unlikely that the 
colonies raised in the order of magnitude of 25,000 men per annum. It 
might be argued that Franklin did not mean that 25,000 men had been 
raised in each year of the war from 1755 through to 1762; only in some 
years. In a letter of 6th January, 1766, addressed to an unknown person, 
he is clearer on this point. He stated that the Colonies "cloath'd for
(3)5 or 6 years near 25,000 men." This clearly was not the case.
As for the extent to which the colonies had been reimbursed, 
Franklin used the figures from the Pennsylvanian accounts to show that 
this colony had been reimbursed for twelve per cent of the costs it had
(1) In 1758, 25,600 men were raised and in 1759 the colonies raised 
21,880 men. Gipson, The British Empire, op. oit., Vol. X, p. 41 
and Beer, British Colonial Policy, op. cit., p. 60n.
(2) Gipson, The British Empire, Vol. X, p. 42 and Beer, British 
Colonial Policy, op. cit., p. 270n.
(3) Letter to an unknown, January 6, 1766, Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 
op. cit., Vol. 13, p. 23.
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incurred contributing to the war e f f o r t . T h i s  percentage is about
(2)correct based on the figures provided by Gipson. However, if the
colonies are taken as a whole, the British government met about 46.5
(3)per cent of the costs the colonies had incurred in fighting the war.
To use the Pennsylvanian figures, to represent the extent to which the 
colonies had been compensated, was to considerably understate the 
average level of the proportion of this compensation for the war 
expenses incurred. Whether, or not, this was an intentional ploy by 
Franklin to mislead those hearing his evidence cannot be stated with any 
certainty. Possibly it was unintentional; on another occasion Franklin 
did cite the correct order of magnitude of the proportional extent to
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, op. oit., answer to question twenty- 
eight, p. 234. The figures quoted by Franklin were £500,000 for 
expenses and £60,000 for reimbursements.
(2) Gipson, The British Empire, op. ait., Vol. X, pp. 86-89.
(3) The total expenses is the sum of the expenses incurred by each 
colony as shown in table 1 above; this sum is£2,309,000 sterling. 
The total repayment to the colonies was £ 1,072,284 sterling; see 
Gipson, The British Empire, op. ait., Vol. X, p. 50. These numbers 
do not fully reflect the extent of the compensation the colonies 
received for they only cover the costs incurred for levying, paying, 
and clothing the colonial troops. The colonies, however, were also 
implicitly compensated in full for the expenditures on arms, 
ammunition and provisions, for after Pitt came to power in 1757 the 
British government became fully responsible for providing these 
instruments of war to the colonies at its own expense. (Gipson, 
ibid.) Thus the percentage of 46.5 per cent understates, to an 
intermediate degree, the level of direct, and indirect, 
compensation paid to the colonists by the British government 
between 1754 and 1762. This point serves to emphasise the 
misleading nature of Franklin’s evidence on this subject of 
compensation paid to the colonies.
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which the colonies had been reimbursed. Although, it should be 
remembered that Franklin's evidence had been rehearsed beforehand, 
therefore, the use of the Pennsylvanian figures may have been an 
intentional partial use of facts with the objective to mislead.
The argument, that since the British government saw fit to
reimburse the colonies for part of their war expenses this fact was
clear evidence that the proportion of the costs borne by the colonists
had exceeded the "fair" share the colonists could be expected to bear,
is not one totally supported by the circumstances which surrounded the
decision of the British government to reimburse the colonies. Between
the point in time when the conflict in North America with the French
took on some importance in 1754, and the time of Pitt's formal decision
to reimburse the colonies, the British authorities did not believe that
the colonies had behaved cooperatively in contributing to the external
defence of the colonies. (See the discussion in the previous chapter on
this point.) Certainly it is unlikely that Loudoun would have agreed
with the statement made by Franklin that the colonies "always have been
ready to raise money by taxes amongst themselves, and to grant large
u(2)sums equal to their abilities, upon requisition from the Crown."
Franklin, himself, knew in 1764 that this requisition system 
was not a successful method for raising revenue: "Quota's would be
difficult to settle at first with Equality, and would, if they would be
(1) In a letter from Franklin to an unknown person of 6th January,
1766 he wrote that "two fifths of their Expense" had been paid for 
by British government reimbursements. Letter from Franklin to an 
unknown, 6th January, 1766, ibid.
(2) Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 Vol. 13, op. ait., p. 149, in answer 
to question 122.
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made equal at first, soon become u n e q u a l . T h i s  opinion was reached 
by Franklin almost certainly as a result of the practical experiences 
with this revenue-raising device during the last war.
As argued in the previous section, in order to gain the 
cooperation of the colonists, Pitt decided to subsidise their war 
efforts more than ever before; in other words, Pitt implicitly employed 
side-payments in order to gain the cooperation of the colonists. This 
did not necessarily mean that the British government thought that the 
colonists were contributing a "fair" share; part of the reason why the 
British had decided on the expanded subsidy scheme was that the military 
situation had become so pressing, according to the British, that no 
further time could be allocated for discussions to determine what was a 
"fair" contribution for the colonists to pay to the war effort. The 
issue of what was a "fair" share for the colonists to pay was waived 
implicitly by the British, partly for the reason that there were more 
pressing military considerations that had to be attended to.
The other part of the explanation for this payment of 
subsidies to the colonies probably is related to Pitt's tastes for 
maintaining possession of the British American colonies. His appearance 
as the leader of the British government's war administration possibly 
would have raised the proportion of the costs the British would have 
borne, remembering Pitt's preferences for the benefits to be derived
(1) Letter to Richard Jackson, June 25, 1764, Papers of Benjamin
Franklin3 Vol. II, op. cit.3 p. 237. This view of the quota system 
conforms very much to the opinions held by Grenville, as outlined 
above. Yet Franklin did not express (apparently) this opinion 
later at the meeting of the colonial agents with Grenville, on the 
2nd February, 1765, where Grenville expressed his misgivings about 
the requisition system as a means of raising revenue in the 
colonies.
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from the victory over the French, even if the colonists had cooperated 
from the beginning in the war effort. In other words, under Pitt's 
guidance the British government possibly came to the conclusion that 
the colonies were being asked to contribute too large a share, and the 
British too small a share, to the costs of the war.
There is no way of knowing how important each of these 
considerations was in determining why the British government formally 
decided to subsidise the colonial defence expenses to the extent it did. 
Nevertheless, the strength of Franklin's argument, that the payment of 
subsidies to the colonies for their efforts during the war was evidence 
that the colonies had paid their "fair" share of the costs of the war, 
is diminished by the argument presented above; part of this subsidy may 
have been paid for reasons other than that the British government 
believed that the colonists had paid their "fair" share towards the 
costs of the war.
Franklin's argument would have been stronger if the British 
government had decided, after the war had been concluded, to reimburse 
the colonies. In these circumstances the British government would have 
been under far less duress to make the decision to subsidise the 
colonies, and the decision more likely would have been made purely for 
reasons of equity and not partly, at least, for reasons of saving the
302
military situation in North America. (1)
Also the previous comments, on the apparently uncooperative
behaviour of the colonists during the war, only needs to be slightly
qualified if allowance is made for Franklin's observation that
Maryland's admittedly poor financial support for the war against France
(2)was the result of conflicts within the legislature in Maryland. As 
was argued in the previous chapter, even if allowance is made for this 
possibility, the empirical evidence does not disprove the hypothesis 
that at least some colonies understated their preferences for external 
defence. Of course one may well ask in amazement, what were the 
politicians in Maryland doing, disagreeing so bitterly amongst 
themselves, at a time when the colonies were being so severely 
threatened by the French?
Another aspect of the issue of the share of the resources the
(1) This argument probably overstates, to some extent, the degree to 
which the British government operated under duress. The British 
authorities did have some room to bargain over the size of the 
subsidies to be paid to the colonies since the compensation for the 
colonies was paid after they (the colonies) had expanded resources 
on external defence. Nevertheless, the British government was 
bound by the promise, made by Pitt in 1757, to compensate the 
colonies for their efforts in the war "according as the active 
Vigour and strenuous Efforts of the respective Provinces shall 
justly appear to merit." (Pitt to the Governors of New England,
New York, and New Jersey, December 30, 1757, and to the Governors 
of Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, and North Carolina, of 
the same date, cited by Gipson, The British Empire, Vol. X, p. 41.) 
The British government appears to have met this promise, from the 
colonists' point of view, for any criticisms of the level of 
compensation received was directed not so much at the total size of 
the funds allocated, but rather at how these funds were distributed 
between the colonies; at least this is the conclusion arrived at 
by Gipson; "If a colony was denied what it considered to be its 
fair compensation it could, as a rule, blame its sister colony. 
Gipson, The British Empire, Vol. X, p. 51.
(2) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 13, op. oit., answer to question 
71, p. 141.
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colonists had contributed to the recent efforts to protect the colonies,
broached in Franklin's examination, was that concerning the contribution
the colonists had made during the Indian rebellion of 1763. He argued
that the military force used to suppress the Indians numbered "not above
300 regulars" and "above 1,000 Pennsylvanians".^^ It appears that
Grenville realised that these facts were incorrect and questioned
(2)Franklin about them. In reply Franklin asserted that the campaign in
the St Lawrence-Great Lakes area had been of no importance to the 
colonists; it was only the campaign in the Ohio Valley which he took 
into account. On this campaign the "provincial troops, employed in the 
war, was greater than that of the regulars. I am not certain, but I 
think so."^^
On this occasion Grenville was well enough informed to know
that Franklin was understating the British contributions to the defence
of the colonies. Even if one is prepared to play according to Franklin's
rules and only consider the campaign in the Ohio Valley led by Colonel
Bouquet, and ignore the campaign further north led by Colonel Broadsheet,
Franklin's numbers appear to be wrong. There were fourteen companies of
(4)regulars in Bouquet's 1764 campaign. Assuming that a company
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 Vol. 13, op. oit.3 answer to question 
126, p. 152.
(2) Franklin cites Grenville as asking these questions. Papers of 
Benjamin Franklin3 ibid.
(3) Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 Vol. 13, op. oit.3 answer to question 
128, p. 152.
(4) Gipson, The British Empire3 op. oit.3 Vol. IX, p. 155.
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consisted of forty m e n / ^  the number of regulars was 560 men, not 300
as Franklin initially stated. But Franklin is correct in his qualified
statement that there were more colonial troops, than regulars, on this
(2)campaign. Bouquet finally had 1,500 men in his force, which implies 
that about 940 of this number were colonists.
Again the question is raised as to whether Franklin initially 
meant to overstate the contribution of the colonists to their own 
defence. Since Franklin should have been informed on these matters 
(although there is no certainty on this issue) and had the incentive to 
be misleading in his presentation of the relevant facts on the Indian 
campaign, the balance of probabilities indicates that the answer to this 
question should be in the affirmative. However, on this occasion 
Franklin was checked on his facts so that his qualified answer was 
correct in the general form it was given.
The need to maintain British troops in North America to keep
the peace with the Indians after 1764, and defend the colonies should
this peace break down, was, of course, central to the issue of whether
the colonists should be taxed, or not, by the British Parliament.
Franklin denied that the colonists needed British troops to do the job
of defending the American colonists against the Indians; they were
(3)"able to defend themselves", he asserted. The recent experience
(1) Shy, for example, uses the number of "about 40 men" as comprising 
a company. Shy, Towards Lexington, op. oit., p. 238.
(2) Gipson, The British Empire, op. oit., Vol. IX, p. 124.
(3) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, op. oit., Vol. 13, answer to question 
127, p. 152.
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during the Indian rebellion apparently did not support this contention 
as British troops were required to assist with the fighting.^ On the 
other hand, it could be argued that the apparent inability of the 
colonists to defend themselves, without the aid of British troops, 
against Indian attacks was simply a case of the colonists playing a 
game of waiting to see if the British would do the fighting for them.
This was probably the reason for their behaviour, in which case Franklin 
probably was correct in his assessment of the colonists' military 
capabilities.
But this does not mean that the colonists did not benefit from
the British expenditures on land defence, and the administration of
Indian affairs, in order to maintain the peace at the frontier.
Franklin seems not to have denied this point for he admitted that "the
taking possession of the King's territorial rights, and the strengthening
(2)the frontier", was "conjointly a British and American interest". The
implication that can be drawn from this statement is that, since the 
colonists (or, at least, Franklin) thought that the maintenance of a 
peaceful frontier was partly an American interest, the colonists (or, at 
least, Franklin) believed that they (the colonists) were benefiting from 
the expenditures needed to keep this peace; otherwise, why should the
(1) It has been argued by B. Knollenberg that the British troops 
performed poorly during the Pontiac Rebellion. This view is 
certainly not accepted by Shy, who points out, amongst other things, 
that at least some colonists (frontiersmen) were delighted with the 
British army's performance. Cf. B. Knollenberg, Origin of the 
American Revolution: 1759-1766, Chapter IX (New York, Macmillan, 
1960), and J. Shy, Towards Lexington3 op. cit.3 pp. 137 and 147.
(2) Papers of Benjamin Franklin> Vol. 13, op. cit.> question 124 and 
its answer, p. 151.
306
colonists have had an interest in such a peace? These benefits would 
have been obtained by the colonists no matter who had been financing 
the expenditures to keep the peace at the frontier, and/or to defend 
the colonies from enemy attacks.
That at least some of the colonists had benefited from these
expenditures is more clearly i n d i c a t e d w h e n  one considers what some
individuals were saying, after the colonies had become independent
states, on the matters of Indian affairs and the protection of the new
(2)states against Indian attack. In 1787 John Jay, in one of the
letters in The Federalist, referred implicitly to the problems the new
(1) It is certain that not all colonists benefited from the 
expenditures on land defence to the same degree, indeed for various 
reasons some may have suffered a negative benefit from these 
expenditures. This issue is discussed in more detail at the 
beginning of the next chapter. But before going onto this topic 
there is first a need to demonstrate that there were some colonists, 
at least, benefiting from the expenditures on frontier defence.
(2) It should be emphasised that there is little point in determining 
the opinions of the colonists about the frontier defence, that was 
provided by the British between about 1761 and up to the time 
Franklin gave his evidence, or after, for clearly the colonists had 
the incentive to understate their preferences for this collectively 
consumed service, if the revelation of preferences for these 
services were at all likely to be used to assess the tax—prices to 
be imposed on the colonists to finance the provision of frontier 
defence. Instead, indirect methods should be employed to determine 
whether benefits were created for the colonists from the 
expenditures on frontier defence. This is the essential reason for 
considering what the former colonists were saying about the 
desirability of frontier defence, and the need to keep the peace 
with the Indians.
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states were having with the administration of their Indian affairs:^
"Not a single Indian war had yet been occasioned by
aggressions of the present federal government, feeble
as it is; but there are several instances of Indian
hostilities having been provoked by the improper
conduct of individual States, who, either unable or
unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given
occasion to slaughter of many innocent inhabitants."
To overcome this weakness in the administration of Indian affairs, Jay
suggested that the states unite more formally into a single state for
the purpose, amonst others, of handling Indian affairs in a consistent
(2)and unified manner.
This is what the British administration had realised some two- 
and-a-half decades earlier; Indian affairs had to be managed and 
policed by a central administration and not be left to the separate 
colonies to manage, if the collectively consumed good, peace between the
(1) The Federalist, B.F. Wright (ed.) (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1961), p. 199. At this point, reference should 
be made to an article by I.R. Christie, in which it is indicated 
how fruitful the exercise is to compare the administrative problems 
facing the British in the colonies in the early 1760s and the 
similar problems facing the new American states, as implied in
The Federalists. I.R. Christie, "The Historians’ Quest for the 
American Revolution", in Anne Whiteman, J.S. Bromley and 
P.G.M. Dickson (eds), Statesmenj Scholars and Merchants (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1973), particularly pp. 197-199.
(2) The Federalist3 B.F. Wright (ed.), ibid.
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colonists and the Indians, was to be maintained.^  In the face of the
lack of cooperation from the colonists, in refusing to pay in part for
the costs of administering affairs with the Indians, and the apparent
lack of effectiveness of the frontier defence provided, the British did
subsequently decide, by about 1767, to allow the separate colonies to
handle Indian affairs and, thereby, hopefully reduce the costs of
(2)administering the colonies. Indian relations subsequently
deteriorated to a point where the British government decided to
intervene again, in 1774, in an attempt to keep the peace with the 
(3)Indians.
What is clear from these observations is that Jay (and 
probably other citizens of the new states) had implicitly realised that 
the costs of the central administration of Indian affairs in the new 
states would return a benefit to the citizens living in the new North 
American states. It also seems reasonable to infer from this that it 
had been realised by some colonists, if not acknowledged, that benefits 
were to be derived from the appropriate handling of Indian affairs, even
(1) The underlying reason why this administration needed to be 
centralised may be explained via the hypothesis that it was not 
possible to exclude other colonies (or states) from benefiting from 
the peace provided by a single colony (or state) and because a 
colony (or state) probably did not bear the total cost of its own 
poor handling of Indian affairs. In order to internalise these, 
positive and negative, externalities it was probably implicitly 
recognised, by both the British administration and some Americans, 
that a centralised administration, with some powers to implement 
policies, was required to supervise relations with the Indians. As 
far as the Americans were concerned, this centralised administration 
was allowed for in the Constitution of the United States, Article 1, 
Section 8. This constitution is reproduced, for example, in
J.P. Greene, Colonies to Nations3 op. o i t p. 547-556.
(2) For more details on this point see Shy, Towards Lexington3 op. oit.3 
pp. 229-230.
(3) Sosin, Whitehall and the Wildernesss op. oit.3 p. 213ff. Some of 
the issues raised here will be returned to in the next chapter.
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if it was the British who were providing this collectively consumed good.
Also it was not denied by Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, 
that the colonists had benefited from the military presence at the 
frontier to police the peace and protect the colonies from attack by 
the Indians:
"Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, 
there has been a constant necessity for keeping small 
garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can 
doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if 
it should only be against the ravages and deprivation 
of the Indians."^
Even if the colonists had benefited from these expenditures on 
keeping the peace with the Indians, this did not mean that Franklin 
thought that the colonists should pay something towards meeting the 
costs of generating these benefits. His argument was that the colonies 
could not pay the stamp duty, imposed by the Stamp Act, because of the 
lack of specie in the colonies. When it was pointed out that the 
revenue derived from this duty would be spent in the colonies, he denied 
this would be the case; the revenue would be spent in "the conquered 
Colonies, where the soldiers are, not in the Colonies that pay it"; 
namely, the revenue would be paid to troops stationed in Canada, 
previously Spanish Florida, and in the western wilderness. Also the 
balance of trade between these colonies would be inadequate to cause any 
of this specie, paid to the British troops, to find its way back to the
(1) The Federalist3 Wright (ed.), op. oit., p. 207.
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colonies which paid the stamp duty.^
The first thing to object to in this argument is that the
Stamp Act did not state that the stamp duty had to be paid in specie;
this act did allow for the possibility that the revenue collected may
(2)be in the form of paper money. Of course, the Currency Act of 1764
was in force in the colonies and the operation of this Act may have 
acted as a constraint on the ability of the colonists to pay the stamp 
duty. This possibility needs to be considered.
While the British government tried to put some controls on 
the supply of the nominal amount of legal tender in the colonies - the 
provisions of the Currency Act stated that no paper money may be issued 
in future by the colonies, and that colonial government bills were to be 
redeemed when they were due for redemption and were not to be reissued 
- this does not mean that the British government controlled the real 
supply of money. If the rate of growth of the nominal money supply 
declined, relative to the growth in the quantity of money demanded, the 
rate of growth of nominal aggregate demand would have tended to decrease, 
other things remaining the same, in order to maintain equilibrium in the 
market for money, and thereby induce a fall in the price level. (The 
wholesale price level in Philadelphia, at least, fell in 1763, after the 
end of the war, through to 1765, rose in 1766, and fell again from 1767
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 13, op. oit., answers to questions 
14, 15 and 16, pp. 131-132.
(2) This point was made by Thomas Whately, Considerations on the Trade 
and Finances of this Kingdom, op. oit., pp. 77-78. See the Stamp 
Act as reproduced in E.S. Morgan (ed.)_, Prologue to the Revolution, 
op. oit., p. 41.
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through to 1769.)^^ A result of this fall in the price level would 
have been to raise the growth rate of the real supply of money.
Also the colonists could have adjusted to the constraint on
the supply of money by altering their demand for real cash balances.
For example, if the real rate of interest rose, because of the fall in
the rate of growth of the nominal money supply relative to the demand
for money, the cost of holding real money balances would have increased,
inducing individuals to hold fewer of these balances. In this way,
amongst others, the colonists could have adjusted their demand for
(2)money to assist them to be able to pay the stamp duty with the actual 
nominal money supply available to the colonial economies.
Perhaps most important of all, in the light of Franklin's 
remarks, any tendency for specie to flow out of the colonies would have 
been prevented by an adequate rise in the exchange rate (domestic 
currency in terms of a foreign currency); in fact, if economic 
circumstances required it, the exchange rate could have risen high 
enough to assist with an inflow of specie via international trade, and 
thereby enable an increase in the rate of growth of the real supply of
(1) A. Bezanson, et. al.3 Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia, 1935), Chart XXIX, p. 294.
(2) This is not to say that the quantity of money demanded 
necessarily fell (the velocity of circulation rose). The point 
being made here is simply that the velocity of circulation need 
not have remained constant, but could have varied, for good 
economic reasons, in response to the relative change in the rate 
of growth of the nominal money supply.
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legal tender.^  In fact the exchange rate fell in Pennsylvania in
1765-66, rose in 1767 back to the 1764 level, fell again through to
1770 and then rose back to the 1768 level. The reason for the fall of
the exchange rate has been put down to the influence of the embargo
(2)movement, which curtailed the colonial demand for British imports.
While these considerations indicate that the operation of the 
Currency Act did not necessarily reduce the colonists' ability to pay 
the stamp duty, this was a possibility if any decrease in the rate of 
growth of the nominal money supply (caused by the implementation of the 
Currency Act) lowered the price level and the level of total real output. 
In this case not only would the size of the stamp duty, in real terms, 
have risen, because of a fall in the price level, but the burden of this 
tax, as a proportion of real income, would have risen because of the 
fall in real income. These added difficulties in paying the stamp duty 
might have faced the colonists, at least in the short-run, until such 
time as enough specie had flowed into the colonies to raise the real 
supply of money to that needed to maintain full employment, real output 
and bring the price level back to its initial level. If, however, part 
of this growth of the real supply of money, needed to achieve full 
employment, was due to a fall in the price level, the price level would
(3)have remained permanently below its initial level, and thus the size
(1) The general point that the colonies could have, and did, maintain, 
or increase, their money supply via international trade, has also 
been made by R.W. Weiss, "The Issue of Paper Money in the American 
Colonies, 1720-1774", Journal of Economic History, 30 (1970), pp. 
773-774, and "The Colonial Monetary Standard of Massachusetts", 
Economic History Review, 2nd Series, 27 (1974), p. 578.
(2) A. Bezanson, Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania, op. cit., pp. 331 and 
333.
(3) This point is discussed in general terms in M.J. Bailey, Rational 
Income and the P>rice Level (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 39.
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of the stamp duties, in real terms, would have risen permanently, other
things remaining the same. This did not happen in Philadelphia, at
least; by the end of 1772 the price level was a little above what it
was in 1763.^ Even if one is prepared to put all the fluctuations in
the price level down to the impact of the Currency Act, Pennsylvania, at
least, seems to have been able to find ways of increasing the real money
supply, and possibly the velocity of circulation of money, to be able
eventually to support the initial price level to be found just before
(2)the Currency Act was introduced.
But, of course, fluctuations in the price level could have 
been caused totally, or in part, by shifts in the consumption function, 
or investment function, or the production function, or some combination 
of these variables, while the growth rate of the money supply remained 
unaltered. There were, indeed, sharp shifts in, at least, the 
consumption function as a result of the ending of the war in North 
America, and the embargo on imports from Great Britain during the Stamp 
Act crisis and the protest over the Townshend Acts. Also a colony such 
as Pennsylvania was affected by the drop in the quantity demanded, at a
(1) The moving average of the wholesale price index was about 145 at 
the end of 1762. The lowest point it fell to was about 121 at the 
end of 1768, which implies that the real size of the stamp duties, 
if they were introduced in early 1763 [they were introduced in 
1765] would have been increased by about nineteen per cent by the 
fall in the price level. By the end of 1772 this price index was 
about 149. See Bezanson, Prices of Colonial Pennsylvania, op. cit.3 
p. 294.
(2) The legal constraints on the growth of the money supply imposed by 
the Currency Act were relaxed after 1770. This point is discussed 
by J.A. Ernst, Money and Politics in America 1755-1775 (Chapel Hill, 
The University of North Caroline Press, 1973), p. 245ff.
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given price, for its commodity exports in the period 1767 to 1768.^ 
These negative shifts of the consumption function would assist in 
explaining the price fluctuations observed in Philadelphia.
Thus it is difficult to establish whether, or not, the
Currency Act, in the short-run, would have imposed any added and "large"
(2)economic burden on the colonists if they had paid the stamp duty. In
the long-run the rate of growth of the nominal money supply could have 
grown, if required by economic circumstances, through the operation of 
the mechanisms influencing the balance of payments. Above all the 
payment of stamp duty, and the expenditure of this tax revenue, need not
(3)have led to a net outflow of specie. Whether, or not, Franklin
realised this in 1766 is not possible to determine from his published 
writings.
(1) Ernst, Money and Polities, op. eit., pp. 207-208.
(2) There was one possible economic burden imposed by the operation of 
the Currency Act, not associated with the Stamp Act. Discussion of 
this issue will need to wait until the next chapter.
(3) J.M. Sosin has argued that the imposition of the Stamp Act and the 
Sugar Act would not have led to a drain of specie from the colonies 
as there is definite evidence to show that the Treasury gave clear 
instructions that the revenue raised in the colonies, via the 
imposition of these acts, was to be retained in the colonies and 
used to pay the British troops there. (Cf. J.M. Sosin, "A Post­
Script to the Stamp Act: George Grenville's Revenue Measures: A 
Drain on Colonial Specie?", American Historical Review, Vol. 63 
(1957-58), pp. 918-923.) This observation does not really meet 
Franklin's complaint, which was based on the assertion that the 
place of payment of the troops would be in "the conquered Colonies 
... not in the Colonies that pay it." Sosin needed to provide 
additional information, on the geographic location of the British 
troops in North America, before he could provide a rebuttal of some 
substance to Franklin's argument.
But really there is no need to become involved in such a fact­
finding exercise. The central point to note is that any outflow of 
specie from the colonies required to pay British troops (this is 
accepting Franklin's assertion) could have been offset via the 
operation of the exchange rate and international trade.
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Franklin, in his evidence, never actually denied that the 
colonists would not pay taxes levied by the British Parliament; only 
that they would not pay "internal taxes". On the other hand, the 
colonists would be willing to pay "external taxes" for the colonists 
would have a choice of paying, or not paying, the tax by purchasing, or 
refusing to purchase, the imported good carrying the "external tax". In 
the case of "internal taxes" apparently this option was not available to 
the colonists.Clearly such an argument is falacious in the case of 
an excise tax imposed on domestically produced goods, a point that will 
be returned to below.
As E.S. Morgan had pointed out, the American colonists do not
seem ever to have made the distinction between "internal" and "external"
taxes; they were against all taxation by the British Parliament, and
(2)Franklin almost certainly was aware of this fact. The reason
Franklin made thi6 distinction between taxes, Morgan argued, was to 
assist in the repeal of the Stamp Act. This interpretation of Franklin's 
behaviour is consistent with the other aspects of his behaviour, on the 
occasion of his evidence to the House of Commons, discussed and 
interpreted below.
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these 
observations of Franklin's political-economic behaviour, as revealed in 
his evidence, is that he was at best misleading, and on occasions was 
apparently intentionally uncooperative in his behaviour. In some of his 
statements he almost certainly intentionally attempted to understate the
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin, op. oit., Vol. 13, answers to questions 
38,40 and 59, pp. 135, 137 and 139.
(2) E.S. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, op. oit., p. 276.
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preferences of the American colonists for the collectively consumed 
goods that had been provided by the British government, and from which 
the colonists had benefited. Also he intentionally, or unintentionally, 
overstated the contribution the colonists had made to the Anglo-Colonial 
defence alliance. As was pointed out above, such a conclusion is not 
original. But besides this aspect of Franklin's evidence, other parts 
of the exchange between Franklin, and the members of the House of 
Commons, are perhaps more important for they do indicate more clearly 
the fundamental problem the British government was facing in financing 
the provision of collectively consumed goods, from which the colonists 
were benefiting, by attempting to charge the colonists for part of the 
costs of providing these goods. To demonstrate this point the 
discussion returns to the distinction Franklin made between "internal" 
and "external" taxes, and the willingness of the colonists only to pay 
"external" taxes.
In fact the colonists had paid internal taxes in the past, 
and were paying internal taxes at the time Franklin was giving his 
evidence. Those colonists who paid the prices charged, as part of the 
contract with the post-office to provide its services to these colonists, 
were contributing to the revenue which the post-office was supposed to 
raise for the state.^ The act which established the post-office in 
1711 was entitled, "An Act for establishing a General Post Office for all 
her Majesty's Dominions, and for settling a weekly Sum out of the 
Revenue thereof, for the Service of the War, and other her Majesty's
(1) The argument developed here was used by Thomas Whately in The 
Regulations Lately Made concerning the Colonies and the Taxes 
Imposed upon Them Considered (London, 1765), as reproduced in 
J.P. Greene, Colonies to Nations, op. c i t pp. 47-48.
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O c c a s i o n s T h e  war referred to was the War of the Spanish 
Succession, but the revenue raising capacity of the post-office was not 
confined only to financing this war; it was used continuously there­
after. By 1764 the post-office in North America was raising a gross
(2)revenue greater than its running expenses.
The prices charged for post-office services in North America 
were a tax in another sense as well. If a tax is defined as a financial 
contribution exacted from an individual by the state, then the charge 
imposed by the post-office, a state-run institution, was a tax.
However, the burden of this tax was probably hidden from the payer of 
post-office charges because of the immediate benefit that would result 
from the payment of these tax-prices. Also this tax burden was probably 
not apparent to this individual because of the fact that it was possible 
to exclude individuals, at little cost, from benefiting from the service 
provided if certain contractual obligations were not met; if it had 
not been possible to exclude, the Individual may have been more inclined 
to consider the tax-price charged as a burden in the sense that he/she 
could have received the benefits provided without paying for them.
The deputy post-master general in North America in 1766, 
Benjamin Franklin, denied that the post-office charges were internal 
taxes. The reason they were not, according to Franklin, was that the 
colonists had the choice of consuming, or not consuming, the services 
provided by the post-office, and if not an individual could send his
(1) Cited by Gipson, The British Empire, op. oit., Vol. X, p. 247.
(2) Gipson, The British Empire, op. oit., Vol. X, p. 247ff. There 
were other internal taxes which the colonists had paid in the past, 
but these will not be discussed here. Gipson provides a 
discussion of these taxes in the place just cited.
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post "by a servant, a special messenger, or a friend. As Franklin
must have known, this latter action would have contravened one of the
provisions of the act which established the post-office, which stated
that nobody was allowed to convey any letter, other than through the
(2)post-office, unless authorised by the post-master general. In other
words, the British government attempted to create a monopoly in the 
market which the post-office was supposed to serve.
But a far more important aspect of Franklin's answer was the 
notion that, for a tax to be acceptable, an individual should be able 
to choose between paying, or not paying, a tax. This idea was taken up 
when it was asked if the colonists would object to an excise tax being 
imposed by Parliament, since similiarly, in this case, the colonists 
could avoid paying this tax by not consuming the commodity taxed. The 
answer was that they would, "as an excise is unconnected with any
(3)service done."
Besides the inconsistency of this answer, compared to the
answers given to earlier questions about the distinction between
"internal" and "external" taxes (which hinged around the idea that in
the case of "external" taxes, as opposed to "internal" taxes, an
(4)
individual had some choice in paying, or not paying, the tax) the
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 op. oit.3 Vol. 13, answer to question 
91, p. 144.
(2) Thomas Whately, The Regulations Lately Made3 op. oit.3 p. 48.
(3) Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 op. oit.3 Vol. 13, answer to question 
93, p. 144.
(4) Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 op. oit.3 Vol. 13, particularly answer 
to question 59, p. 139.
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fundamental issue at last had been raised, and that was that for a tax
to be acceptable to the colonists it had to raise revenue to pay for a
government service from which benefits were received by the colonists.
For this reason, Franklin went on to point out, the colonists did not
object to paying an import duty, because "the sea is yours; you
maintain, by your fleets, the safety of navigation in it; and keep it
clear of pirates; you may have therefore a natural and equitable right
to some toll or duty on merchandizes carried through that part of your
dominions, towards defraying the expenses you are at in ships to
maintain the safety of that carriage. But as soon as the British
government imposed the Townshend import duties in 1767 the colonists
protested against these external taxes; indeed, the protests against
the remnant of these duties led to the Boston Tea Party in 1774,
although there may have been other economic factors in operations which
(2)also precipitated this civil unrest in Boston.
Clearly there was some essential aspect, of the issue of the 
British Parliament being able to impose taxes on the colonies, without 
causing the colonists to protest, which Franklin had failed to mention
(1) Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 op. cit.3 Vol. 13, answer to question 
94, pp. 144-145.
(2) The increased supply of tea at a given price to the American 
colonists, that would have resulted if the East India Company had 
sold some of its swollen stocks of tea in North America, probably 
would have meant a fall in the price of tea below the price at 
which colonial merchants would have bought their current stocks of 
tea, and reduced the business of those merchants which supplied the 
colonial market with tea. These economic losses, which the 
colonial merchants would have suffered, were probably of some 
importance in determining their political-economic action at this 
time, and not just the issue of being taxed by Parliament via the 
operation of the tax on tea. Also see B. Donoughue, British 
Politics and the American Revolution3 The Path to War3 1773-75 
(London, Macmillan, 1964), pp. 21-22.
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in his answer. In providing an implicit answer to this problem
Dickinson argued that the Townshend duties raised revenue, whereas the
colonists would only accept external taxes which only regulated trade.
But the only explicit, and implemented, import duty that would not raise
revenue and regulate trade (alter the direction of trade) was a
prohibitive import duty, or an implicit tax in the form of import quotas.
(In the latter case the revenue from the implicit import tax would go to
the initial holders of the import quotas in the form of monopoly profits.
Exactly who earned these profits may vary depending on who sold and
purchased these quotas.) It seems reasonable to suppose that the
colonists would not have wanted such a system of trade regulation
(2)imposed upon them. For this reason Dickinson's argument seems to
have very little worth in terms of the economic logic of his argument. 
This is not to say that Dickinson did not believe his own arguments; 
he possibly did, as probably did many of the colonists who read his 
pamphlet. The issue of the importance of rhetoric as a factor 
contributing to the American Revolution, which the observation made in 
the previous sentence has raised by implication, is one which will have 
to be returned to later on in Chapter VI below.
What appears to be a more convincing line of reasoning, to 
fill in what was missing from Franklin's argument as to what would be
(1) John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, Letter 2,
as reproduced in J.P. Greene, Colonies to Nations_, op. oit.3 p. 125.
(2) It is of some interest to contemplate what the colonists' political 
reaction would have been if the British government had disguised 
the Townshend import duties by imposing instead an export duty, and 
called it such, on certain British-produced goods exported, and/or 
on certain foreign goods exported (all of which were supposed to be 
reexported from Great Britain) to the American colonies.
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an acceptable tax for the British Parliament to impose on the colonists, 
is that not only did a tax on the colonists need to be associated with 
paying for a service provided by the British government, from which the 
colonists received a definite benefit, but also the British government 
needed to be able to exclude the colonists, at relatively little cost, 
from benefiting from the services it provided, if they refused to pay 
the tax-prices charged as part of the contract allowing the colonists 
access to benefit provided. Where the British government could exclude 
the colonists, at relatively little cost, from benefiting from the 
services produced by British government expenditures - as in the case of 
post-office services, for which the colonists had to pay the tax-price 
charged in order to benefit from these services - there were apparently 
no protests about the tax-prices charged for these services. But when 
the British government could not exclude the colonists, at relatively 
little cost, from the benefits produced by a service the British 
government provided, as in the case of naval defence, there were 
protests about the tax-prices imposed, even when at least some colonists 
recognised that the revenue raised by the payment of the tax-price was 
to be used to help finance the provision of collectively consumed
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services from which the colonists benefited.
This latter point is high-lighted in a statement by the Second
Continental Congress, made in July 1775:
"It is alleged that we contribute nothing to the
common defence. To this we answer that the
advantages which Great Britain receives from the
monopoly of our trade far exceed our proportion of
(2)the expense necessary for that purpose."
These colonial representatives implied that they benefited
from the external defence provided, but that the tax-price charged to
pay for the benefits received - the "monopoly on our trade" refers to
(3)some of the provisions of the Navigation Acts - was too high. There 
really was no way of testing this assertion without being able to
(1) It must be emphasised in passing that the strength of this argument 
is not affected by the proposition that most, if not all, the 
colonists did not receive any benefits from land and/or frontier 
defence prior to 1766, or later. While this proposition is almost 
certainly not true, as was implicitly argued above, and will be 
implicitly argued at the beginning of the next chapter, it will be 
accepted as valid for the sake of argument. In these hypothesised 
circumstances there was still the problem for the British 
government of devising a tax system to pay for the collectively 
consumed goods provided by the British, and from which the colonists 
no doubt benefited. The services provided were, in particular, the 
naval defences of the British Empire. (Clearly the statement by 
Franklin, cited two paragraphs back in the main text, implies that 
he thought that the colonists benefited from this naval defence, as 
did other colonists, or former colonists, as will be seen below.)
In other words, the exclusion problem still confronted the British 
government in the case of attempting to finance the provision of 
this collectively consumed service.
(2) Peter Force, American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of
Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates3 and Letters and other 
Notices of Publick Affairs> 4th Series from March 4, 1774 to July 
1776, Washington, D.C., 1839, Vol. II, Columns 1872-1875.
(3) In the next chapter the economic burdens of the Navigation Acts 
will be discussed in more detail.
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exclude the colonists from the benefits referred to. If the colonists 
were still prepared to pay the tax-price charged for this service, from 
which they could be excluded, then the price was not "too high" in terms 
of the preferences the colonists had been forced to reveal; the 
rational colonist would not have paid the tax-price charged if it. was 
greater than the marginal benefit to be received by this individual from 
the marginal unit of the service provided upon payment of the tax-price; 
and, therefore, this colonist could not have complained that he/she paid 
a tax-price for which he/she received a marginal benefit less than this 
tax-price.
The tax-price charged could be considered as being "too high", 
however, if the marginal cost of providing this external defence to 
another individual had been zero. In this case, for this collectively 
consumed good to have been optimally provided, the tax-price charged 
should have been zero, with no attempt being made to exclude the 
colonists from the benefits provided by this good. Any tax-price 
imposed by the mechanism of excluding consumers from consumption, if 
certain contractual obligations were not met, would have led to a tax- 
price which was "too high" relative to the optimum tax-price which was 
zero. The first-best means to finance this collectively consumed good 
in this case would have been via a system of non-distortionary lump-sum 
taxes. For obvious practical reasons such a system of taxes was out of 
the question in Great Britain, and the British American colonies, in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, in addition to the almost certain 
probability that there still would have been protests about the size of 
the lump-sum taxes imposed. In order to avoid these protests there was 
a need to employ an excluding device of some sort to make it possible to
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finance the production of the collectively consumed goods desired, and 
clearly associate the tax-price charged with a service received from 
these goods, even though this probably meant a misallocation of 
resources.
It is of interest to observe that just over a century after 
the American Revolution came to an end Knut Wickseil also noted that 
there was a need to associate an imposed tax with the benefits which 
this tax financed.
"Imagine how an enlightened and absolute ruler ... 
would organise the expenditures and taxes of his 
country ... Our ruler would try to avoid the 
appearance of burdensomeness as best he may ...
He would use fees and dues rather than tax revenue 
to cover the costs of these state services which 
are directly demanded by individuals. If the ruler 
thereby succeeded in increasing public revenue and 
expenditure 'on the quiet', that is if the imposts, 
dues and fees were not considered as taxes by the 
people, he would probably congratulate himself on 
having combined such prosperous with so slight a 
(visible) tax pressure.
The British government could no doubt congratulate themselves 
on being able to eliminate the visibility of the taxes imposed to pay
(1) Knut Wickseil, A New Principle of Just Taxation, in R.A. Musgrave 
and A.T. Peacock (eds), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance 
(London, MacMillan, 1958), p. 83. This work was first published 
in 1893.
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for the post-office services supplied in North America; the American 
colonists, with an acute eye for spotting a tax, did not realise that 
these were taxes. But Wicksell’s enlightened despot would surely have 
run into political trouble, as the British government did in North 
America, if the goods and services he provided with tax revenue had the 
property of non-excludability; a point which Wicksell never really 
recognised;unless, of course, the tax-payers were docile 
individuals, well accustomed to behaving cooperatively by contributing 
an "adequate" amount of resources to the public good.
But no matter what tax was charged, the argument could always 
be, within reason, that, from the point of view of equity, the tax was 
"too high". The British government, however, appears to have thought 
that the taxes they were attempting to impose would have caused only 
minor changes in the distribution of income between the colonies and 
Great Britain. Thomas Whately, joint secretary of the Treasury under 
Grenville, calculated that in the case of stamp duty, the revenue to be 
collected per head per annum via this tax was of the order of magnitude 
of one shilling and fourpence. "The Distribution [of this tax in the 
colonies] must be perversely partial, to make that oppressive, which if
(1) See Samuelson, "Pure Theory", op. o i t p. 240, on this point.
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equally divided would have been so inconsiderable."^^
Whether, or not, the British authorities thought the stamp
(2)duties were equitable did not influence the colonists in their 
opinion of this tax. The British government was still faced with the 
problem of trying to induce the colonists into paying this tax. Since, 
apparently, there was no excluding device available for this purpose, 
the British government attempted to overcome this apparent break-down in 
the market mechanism (for the provision of, and payment for, collectively 
consumed goods) by imposing a political mechanism on the colonists. The 
political mechanism that was employed, apparently, was too arbitrary for 
those American colonists who were touched by its operation.
That this political mechanism, employed by the British 
government, was too arbitrary was the conclusion reached by William Knox 
in about 1778, writing in his role as a British civil servant. In his
(1) Thomas Whately, Considerations on the Trade and Finances3 op. cit.3 
p. 72. Whately's calculations were based on the assumptions that 
the population of the colonies was 1.5 million people and the 
British government wished to raise the sum of £100,000 sterling per 
annum via the stamp duty. The number of 1.5 million people in the 
colonies in 1766 is about correct if only the white population is 
considered; simple interpolation of the population estimates (in 
Series Z 1-19, Historical Statistics3 op. cit.3) gives a number of 
1,520,000 (to the nearest thousand). Whether, or not, the 
assumption about the size of the revenue to be collected is correct 
is not possible to check; the size would depend on numerous 
factors such as the size of the stamp duties, relevant elasticities 
and levels of demand and supply schedules, and the effectiveness of 
the revenue collection system. But if the British government 
really only wanted to collect the amount stated, and this amount 
could be collected, the stamp duties could always be adjusted to 
just collect the amount stated.
(2) As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, some of the 
implicit and explicit taxes imposed by the British government 
probably were not evenly distributed throughout the colonial 
population, although the calculated size of these taxes, per capita, 
per annum, were low relative to the thought-to-be per capita income 
in the colonies in the 1770s.
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(1 )Consideration on the Great Question, what to he done with America ' he
pointed out that the American colonies had "no Constitution but the
King's Commission". As a result they were exposed to the legislative
power of Parliament, over which they had no constitutional control, even
when the political body passed legislation which affected the American
colonies. If this was the case, is it surprising "that the Royal
Standard has found so few followers in America, and that the Inhabitants
(2)have so generally devoted themselves to the Service of the Congress?"
While these points are valid, their enunciation does not solve
the problem of determining what the solution was to the public finance
problem facing the British government in its administration of the
colonies after 1763; a solution which would allow the colonists an
acceptable measure of control over the political mechanism employed to
impose tax-prices on them, and yet ensure that the British government
would receive an adequate amount of revenue from the colonists to
partially finance the production of the collectively consumed goods
provided for the colonists' benefit. A system of voluntary contributions
by the colonies to meet allocated quotas had proved to be inadequate and
inequitable; this had been realised by the British government and some 
. , „ (3)colonists.
(1) Reproduced in J.P. Greene, "William Knox's Explanation for the 
American Revolution", William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. XXX (1973), 
pp. 293-306.
(2) J.P. Greene, "William Knox's Explanation", op. cit., pp. 301 and 
305.
(3) See the comments, cited above, by Franklin on the question of using 
quotas. Franklin was not alone in his views on this matter; 
Hamilton described the quota and requisition system as "fallacious 
and delusive". Cf. The Federalist, op. eit., p. 233. Also see the 
main text below, pages 330-331.
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One way out of this conflict of interests was to give 
formality to an acceptable set of rules which would bind the 
participants to the political mechanism employed to provide the 
collectively consumed good. But what set of rules would be acceptable 
to all? The British government apparently, in the mid-1760s, did 
consider the proposal of offering representation to the American 
colonists in the British Parliament. But it soon became obvious that 
the colonists themselves were not receptive to the i d e a . B e s i d e  the 
practical problems of providing this representation (for example, an 
elected representative would need to reside in London while his
(2)constituents were many weeks travelling-time away in North America), 
there was the political problem of determining what voting rules would 
apply on any legislation that may have affected the colonies. Clearly, 
if a majority rule was to apply, and the number of representatives for 
the American colonists, voting as a block, could not ensure them a 
majority on legislation important to the colonists, they were in a weak 
position to prevent taxes being imposed upon the colonists. Rather than 
accept such a set of political rules, the colonists were probably better 
off without representation in Parliament (unless, in the unlikely event 
that the colonists were given a relatively large number of parliamentary 
seats to make majorities for them reasonably certain on important pieces 
of colonial legislation). At least in this situation the colonists 
could protest about taxes being imposed without their consent, whereas 
if they were represented in Parliament this argument was less convincing.
(1) L.H. Gipson, "The American Revolution as an Aftermath", op. cit., 
p. 99. Also see P.D.G. Thomas, British Politics, op. ait., p. 366.
(2) This general issue is discussed in some detail by Gipson, The 
British Empire, op. cit., Vol. X, pp. 32-34.
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This is what some colonists vaguely realised for themselves; the 
House of Representatives of Massachusetts Bay in a circular letter 
stated the following:
"... That considering the utter Impracticability 
of their even being fully and equally represented 
in parliament, and the great Expence that must 
unavoidable attend even a partial representation 
there, this House think that a taxation of their 
Constituents, even without their Consent, grievous 
as it is, would be preferable to any Representation 
that could be admitted for them there.
Was there an alternative political solution to this coionial 
public finance problem? Some form of union of the colonies within the 
British Empire almost certainly was not one. The colonial political 
representatives had in the past rejected the Plan of Union, drawn up by 
the Albany Congress, which would have provided a political framework for 
achieving the desired end of the colonies providing, and financing, 
external land defence, and some other collectively consumed goods 
desired by the colonists. There did not appear to be any reason for 
believing that this plan would have been accepted by the colonists after 
1763, when there was a much reduced external threat to the colonies, a 
threat which might have induced the colonies to accept such a plan.
(1) Massachusetts Circular Letter, February 11, 1768, in J.P. Greene 
(ed.), Colonies to Nations, op. cit., pp. 134-136. Franklin's 
views on Parliamentary representation varied over time, but by at 
least 1770 he was firm in his opinion that he did not see any worth 
in the notion. See his marginalia to a pamphlet by Josiah Tucker, 
Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 op. cit.3 Vol. 17, pp. 361-362.
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Perhaps if reference is made to the political-economic 
institutional situation immediately after the American Revolution, and 
consideration is given to how the new independent American states were 
providing and financing their collectively consumed goods, a solution 
might be found to the policy problem, in public finance, which was 
facing the British government in its administration of the colonies in 
the 1760s and 1770s. What is found, however, is that the new states 
persisted in behaving uncooperatively in their voluntary contributions 
to the funds needed by the Confederacy to provide collectively consumed 
goods. In fact, the situation was so serious that James Madison was 
moved to write, in April 1787, the pamphlet entitled Vices of the 
Political System of the United States} which was basically concerned 
with discussing the following:
"Failure of the States to Comply with the 
Constitutional Requisitions. This evil has been so 
fully experienced both during the war and since the 
peace, results so naturally from the number and 
independent authority of the States and has been so 
uniformly exemplified in every similar Confederacy, 
that it may be considered as not less radically and 
permanently inherent in than it is fatal to the object 
of the present system.
... [In the past there was] a mistaken confidence that 
the justice, the good faith, the honor, the sound 
policy, of the several legislative assemblies would 
render surperfluous any appeal to the ordinary motives 
by which the laws secure the obedience of individuals:
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a confidence which does honor to the enthusiastic 
virtue of the compilers, as much as the experience 
of the crisis apologizes for their error ... It is 
no longer doubted that a unanimous and punctual 
obedience of 13 independent bodies to the acts of 
the federal Government ought not to be calculated
It would appear to be reasonable to conclude from this
observation by Madison, of the state of the government of the new
Confederacy, that the British government after 1763 had been quite
justified in believing that a system, whereby the colonies voluntarily
contributed to a central fund to finance the provision of collectively
(2)consumed goods, would not have achieved its objective.
To overcome the problem in financing the provision of these 
goods and services the British government had eventually resorted to 
various forms of coercion. Madison also came to the conclusion that 
what was lacking in the market for certain collectively consumed goods, 
which the central government of the Confederation was attempting to
(1) Vices of the Political System of the United States (April, 1787), 
as reproduced in J.P. Greene, Colonies to Nations, op. cit.> p. 514 
and 516.
(2) While, as was pointed out above, Grenville probably had rejected 
the idea of employing a quota system by at least 1764 this is not 
to say that all subsequent British governments were opposed to this 
idea. As will be pointed out in Chapter VI below Lord North 
subsequently did publicly propose such a system in 1775 for raising 
revenue in the colonies.
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supply,
"Want of Sanction to the Laws and of Coercion in 
the Government of the Confederacy. A sanction is 
essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to 
that of Government. The federal government being 
destitute of both, wants the great vital
(2)principles of a Political Constitution."
While it is true that at this time the government of the 
Confederation did not have powers of coercion voted to it, the states 
did, to varying degrees, limit the freedom of an individual if this 
freedom clashed with the ability of the state to raise revenue. In the 
case of the state of New York, for example, Hamilton observed, taxes 
were collected with the individual not being given the right in most 
cases to the recourse of trial by jury. "The taxes are usually levied 
by the summary proceeding of distress and sale, as in cases of rent.
And it is acknowledged on all hands, that this is essential to the 
efficacy of the revenue law." Also in this state the admiralty courts 
did not use the institution of trial by jury, nor was trial by jury, 
according to Hamilton, universally applied in all legal cases, in the
(1) There are many passages in The Federalist, written to explain and 
defend the Constitution of the new nation, which state what the 
union of the states was meant to achieve. Hamilton, in letter 
twenty-three, possibly provides the briefest statement on this 
matter; namely "[to provide] the common defence of the members; 
the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal 
convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with 
other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our 
intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries." 
The Federalist, op. cit., p. 199. This list of objectives, if 
attained, would all provide collectively consumed goods to the 
members of the union.
(2) Vices of the Political System, op. cit., p. 516.
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other states:
"In Connecticut, ... , the trial by jury extends 
in practice further than in any other State yet 
mentioned [which are New York, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and 
Georgia.]"(1) 23
Thus the new states had come to the same conclusion, as had
the British administration responsible for the American colonies in the
1760s and 1770s, that trial by jury was not always the most practical
means of administering justice, especially in circumstances where there
(2)was a dispute over the amount of taxes imposed. Nor did the new
constitution of the United States hold out any hope of a change to a 
more liberal policy on this matter. The Congress of the central 
government was to "have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts,
(3)and Excises". But should an individual dispute the tax(es) imposed
by Congress, this individual could not have recourse to a trial by jury. 
According to Hamilton:
"It is evident that [trial by jury] can have no 
influence on the legislature in regard to the 
amount of taxes to be laid, the objects upon which 
they are to be imposed, or to the rule by which 
they are to be apportioned. If it can have any
(1) The Federalists op. cit.y p. 522, pp. 524-525. Emphasis in the 
original.
(2) A similar point is made by I.R. Christie, "The Historians' Quest", 
op. cit.y p. 199.
(3) The Constitution of the United Statesy Article 1, Section 8, as 
reproduced in J.P. Greene (ed.), Colonies to Nationsy op. cit.y 
p. 550.
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influence, therefore, it must be upon the mode 
of collection, and the conduct of the officers 
entrusted with the execution of the revenue 
laws.,,(1)
To police the revenue raising laws, which took the form of
imposed import duties, and thereby provide the government with revenue,
without which "a nation cannot long exist", Hamilton suggested that
"a few armed vessels judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports
(2)might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws".
Nor could an individual lawfully hope to pay the taxes 
imposed by Congress by printing his own money; the Constitution made 
Congress responsible for the nominal supply of money and it could 
"provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current
(3)Coin of the United States". Although the major reason why the
Congress was given control of the money supply, Madison argued, was to 
prevent a repetition of:
"The loss which America has sustained since the peace
[of Paris], from the pestilent effects of paper money
on the necessary confidence between man and man of
the necessary confidence in the public councils, or
the industry and morals of the people, and on the
(4)character of the republican government, ....
(1) The Federalist, op. oit., p. 522.
(2) The Federalist, op. oit., pp. 145 and 146.
(3) The Constitution, op. oit., Article 1, Section 8.
(4) The Federalist, op. oit., p. 318.
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The British government had come to very much the same
conclusions, for similar reasons, some two decades, or more, earlier,
about this general issue of the need to curb the freedom of an
individual, or group, in the community in order to be able to finance
the provision of collectively consumed goods, or just provide these
goods, as in the case of the controls on the money supply (for the
minimization of economic uncertainty by maintaining a semblance of
monetary stability^ was one of these collectively consumed goods).
The methods employed by the British government to curb individual
freedoms to achieve these ends were similar to those mentioned by the
Federalists, or in the Constitution (the removal of trial by jury in
(2)revenue cases, vessels to patrol the coast to prevent smuggling and 
the prohibition on the printing of paper money). But while the 
thirteen North American colonists were within the British Empire the 
individual colonists did not have eventual recourse to the ballot box 
to express an opinion which might have influenced the British 
government’s legislation, or proposed legislation, aimed, in part, at 
curbing his freedom of action. In the new union of the American states, 
on the other hand, the adult white male citizen did have such a right,
(1) This is not to say that the monetary policy embodied in the 
Currency Act of 1764, or the American Constitution of 1787, which 
was one of replacing paper money with specie, was the most 
appropriate; monetary stability could have been achieved without 
having to impose a specie (commodity) monetary system. More 
important, replacing paper money with specie did impose an 
unnecessary cost, as the price borne to achieve monetary stability. 
This point will be explained in more detail in the next chapter.
(2) For a discussion of the customs service in the colonies see
T.C. Barrow, Trade and the Empire: The British Customs Service
in Colonial America 1660-1775 (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University 
Press, 1967).
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if he owned enough property, to formally express an opinion through
his vote, about how he regarded, and so to some degree influence, the
constraints put on his freedom by the relevant laws passed by Lite
legislature; constraints that the Federalists, at least, had come to
believe were necessary to ensure the financing of the provision of
collectively consumed goods to be provided by the United States
(2)government.
(1) Exactly what proportion of the adult male population was 
disenfranchised by this property qualification imposed by the 
states is not certain, but it appears to have been in the range 
from five to twenty-five per cent of the adult white male 
population of the United States. See R.E. Brown, Middle Class 
Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts 1691-1780 (Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1955).
(2) This does not mean that this individual would have been satisfied 
with this situation. In particular, the rules, laid out in the 
Constitution of the United States, allowed for non-unanimous 
majorities as being adequate to ensure the approval of a proposal 
on public policy. This meant that if this individual was in the 
minority he would have had to accept the opinion of the non- 
unanimous majority, even though he almost certainly thought that
he would be worse off after, than before, the implementation of the 
approved proposal on public policy. Yet failure to comply with say 
an approved proposal on increased taxation, would have exposed this 
individual to the coercive power of the implemented provisions of 
the law, against which he could not defend himself with the help of 
trial by jury.
But to have used the rule of unanimity would have increased 
the cost, compared to a simple majority rule, of coming to an 
agreement about a proposal about public policy. In fact all the 
net benefits to be obtained from such a proposal may have been 
eliminated in the process of attempting to come to a unanimous 
decision. To lower the costs of coming to a decision the rule of 
unanimity needs to be relaxed, although this would increase the 
risk that an individual would suffer a net loss as a result of a 
decision made via a non-unanimous voting rule. Buchanan and 
Tullock have argued, however, that after comparing, at the margin, 
the potential costs of coming to a unanimous decision, with the 
possible costs that may be imposed on indivduals by this decision 
if arrived at instead by a majority voting rule, it may be 
perfectly rational for a community to use the majority rule to 
facilitate the decision-making process. See J. Buchanan and 
G. Tullock, The Calculus of Concent (Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press, 1962).
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Of the Federalists, Madison had reservations about the use of 
the majority rule (see the discussion of this point by B.F. Wright 
in the introduction of The Federalist3 op. oit.3) but he was not 
unaware of, and favoured, the line of argument, presented in the 
previous paragraph, in support of the use of the majority voting 
rule. He wrote as follows of the voting rules for the House of 
Representatives:
"It has been said that more than a majority 
ought to have been required for a quorum; and 
in particular cases, if not at all, more than a 
majority of a quorum for a decision. That some 
advantages might have resulted from such a 
precaution, cannot be denied. It might have 
been an additional shield to some particular 
interests, and another obstacle generally to 
hasty and partial measures. But these 
considerations are outweighed by the 
inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all 
cases where justice or the general good might 
require new laws to be passed, or active 
measures to be pursued, the fundamental 
principle of free government would be reversed.
... Were the defensive privilege limited to 
particular cases, an interested minority might 
take advantage of it to screen themselves from 
equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in 
particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable 
undulgences." {The Federalist3 op. oit.3 p. 393.)
While the use of majority rules may produce greater efficiency 
in decision making nevertheless this voting rule may still impose 
burdens on those always, or nearly always, finding themselves in 
the minority. Madison’s answer to this criticism of the majority 
rule is discussed below, in a slightly different context, in the 
footnote on page 443.
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It would appear from this brief discussion of the relevant 
political history of the new American states, in the immediate post- 
Revolution period, that the only insight to be gleaned from this history, 
to assist in solving the problem facing the British government in 
financing the provision of collectively consumed goods to the American 
colonies in the 1760s and 1770s, was that the British government should 
have provided some form of centralised representative government for the 
colonies. But this does not provide a solution, as has already been 
pointed out, for there is apparently no evidence to indicate that the 
colonists would have accepted any of the forms, discussed above, that 
such a political institution might have taken while still being regarded 
as being within the British Empire; a form of political union of the 
colonies, representation in the British Parliament (while the colonists 
were likely to be in the minority in that political institution) had 
both been rejected, implicitly or explicitly, by the colonial 
representatives. However, without such an institution what was the 
British government to do in order to solve its public finance problem?
To find a possible solution to this problem there is a need 
briefly to retrace the central argument concerning what is thought to 
have been the fundamental policy problem facing the British 
administration in the colonies after 1763. The British government 
could not exclude the colonists from consuming some of the collectively 
consumed goods it was providing and, therefore, the colonists had no 
incentive to reveal their true preferences for these goods, if these 
preferences were to be utilised to determine the tax-prices to be 
charged to finance, in part, the provision of these goods. In addition, 
even if their preferences were to some degree revealed, the tax-payer
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could always behave uncooperatively over the payment of tax-prices 
imposed. In other words, there was a failure in the price system. In 
the attempt to try and overcome this problem, the British government 
replaced the market mechanism with a political mechanism. The question 
is whether this was the appropriate means for overcoming this economic 
problem? If the problem was a weakness in the market mechanism, should 
not the solution rather lie in the direction of identifying this 
weakness, and then attempt to determine a method for improving the 
operation of this part of the market, rather than abandoning this faulty 
component of the mechanism, by replacing it with a political device?
This approach would appear to be preferable, especially since the 
political mechanism may appear to be arbitrary to those affected by 
its operation, and most likely will not provide a Pareto-efficient 
supply of the collectively consumed goods. Thus it may be preferable
(1) Since the unanimity voting rule is unlikely to bring the collective 
consumed good into existence, it could be argued that a majority 
voting rule should have applied, if the colonists had accepted some 
form of centralised representative government. But such a system 
of voting is not likely to provide a Pareto-efficient provision of 
the collectively consumed good, although under special conditions 
it will. If the tax per head is the same for every individual in 
the population, and the marginal benefits from this good are 
normally distributed, the majority rule will allow the community to 
converge to, and achieve, the Pareto-efficient level of 
expenditure on the collectively consumed good, at which point the 
mean and the median of the distribution of marginal benefits will 
coincide. See H.R. Bowen, "The Interpretation of Voting in the 
Association of Resources", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 58, 
(November, 1943), pp. 27-48.
Weaker assumptions may be used to show that majority voting 
may lead to Pareto-efficiency in the provision of these goods. If 
the tax rate is allowed to vary, and the difference between the 
marginal tax share and the marginal benefits share is zero at the 
median, then Pareto-efficiency will result from majority rule 
voting. See T.N. Tideman, "The Efficient Provision of Public Goods", 
in S. Mushkin (ed.), Public Prices for Public Products (Washington, 
The Urban Institute, 1972), pp. 111-123. Even in this case it is 
unlikely that this weaker assumption will hold in practice.
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to find a means of reducing the flaw in the market for collectively 
consumed goods by attempting to improve the operation of this market, if 
this improvement will reduce sources of political conflict^ and possibly 
increase the efficiency of this market, compared to the situation where 
the political means of handling the problem is employed.
Some economists have shown that, in theory, it is possible to
induce individuals to truthfully reveal their preferences for
collectively consumed goods. What is more, a community would be able to
provide for itself, out of its own resources, a Pareto-optimum supply of
these collectively consumed goods, via the methods suggested for
inducing the truthful revelation of preferences.^ Possibly of more
importance, empirical tests, employing controlled experiments, of some
proposed methods for inducing the revelation of preferences for
collectively consumed goods have indicated that it is possible to induce
individuals to reveal their apparently true maximum (not marginal)
preferences for these goods, even in the knowledge that this revelation
of preferences may be used to assess the tax-prices to be imposed on the
(2)consumer of the collectively consumed goods.
What appears to be central to the solution of the problem, of 
inducing the truthful revelation of preferences for collectively
(1) Cf. J. Dreze and D. de la Vallee Poussin, "A Tatonnement Process 
for Public Goods", Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1971), pp. 133- 
150; T.N. Tideman, "The Efficient provision of Public Goods",
op. cit.j and E. Malinvaud, "A Planning Approach", op. cit.
(2) Cf. P. Bohm, "Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment",
European Economic Review_, 3 (1972), pp. 111-130, and^ -^n Approach 
to the Problem of Estimating Demand for Public Goods", Swedish 
Journal of Economics, 73 (1971), pp. 55-66.
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consumed goods, is the clear recognition of the strategies that the 
consumers of this good have available to them when communicating their 
preferences for such a good. It follows that, to induce this truthful 
revelation of preferences, there is the need to reduce the net benefits 
that can be received by misrepresenting these preferences, as a result 
of this process of communication. To do this the net benefits to be 
received from misrepresenting preferences need to be made so uncertain 
that there does not appear to be any advantage in behaving in this 
manner, compared to the strategy of truthfully revealing preferences.
In other words, the consumers of the collectively consumed good should 
be encouraged to adopt the safe strategy (that will bring more certain 
net benefits), which is for the consumers to reveal their true 
preferences, rather than the unsafe strategy of misrepresenting 
preferences (which will provide relatively uncertain net benefits).
In the experiments carried out by Bohm, individuals were faced 
with an uncertain prospect. For example, in being asked to reveal, in 
advance> their maximum willingness to pay for a given quantity of a 
collectively consumed good, with known characteristics, which the 
authorities were contemplating providing, these individuals were informed 
that if the sum of their willingness to pay was less than the costs of 
producing this good the good would not be provided. These individuals 
were also told that it had not been decided how these revealed 
preferences would be used to determine the tax-price to be charged to 
each individual, to finance the production of the collectively consumed 
good; for example, the tax-price may be charged in proportion to the 
revealed preferences (in which case the individual would have had the 
incentive to understate his preferences), or the tax-price may be zero
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(in which case the individual, who would consume the good at a unit 
price of zero, had the incentive to overstate his preferences in an 
attempt to ensure the provision of the collectively consumed good).^^ 
Thus the individual, potential, consumer of the collectively consumed 
good is faced with two uncertainties: first, the good may not be
provided if he (she) and his (her) fellow consumers do not, in advance, 
show enough of a willingness to pay for this good, and, second, the 
uncertainty of the method to be employed to determine the tax-prices to 
be charged to finance the provision of the good.
What the first uncertainty implies is that the individual was
implicitly informed that there was to be no bargaining, between the
consumers and the supplier of the collectively consumed good, over the
quantity of the good supplied; it was to be the quantity initially
stated, or nothing, and there was to be no negotiating over supplying a
(2)quantity between these two extremes. This uncompromising bargaining
situation directs a threat at the potential consumer which, if 
implemented, acts as an excluding device for the good is then not 
provided and, therefore, the individual is excluded from consuming the
(1) Other methods for determining the tax-price to be charged are 
clearly also possible. See P. Bohm, "Estimating Demand , op. oit.
(2) This system of implicit bargaining does exclude the possibility of 
determining the marginal preferences of consumers for the good.
A procedure for determining marginal preferences is outlined, for 
example, in Tideman, "Efficient Provision", op. oit. However, the 
amount of information required by this method tends to make it 
difficult to put into practice.
Also, the historical problem at hand was one of just 
attempting to induce consumers to reveal their preferences for a 
given quantity of a collectively consumed good. For this reason, 
the issue of determining marginal preferences can be ignored here.
343
benefits which the good could provide. The expectation is that this 
directed threat will induce individuals not to understate, at least, 
their preferences for the collectively consumed good, in an attempt to 
ensure the provision of the good, if they would consume the good If its 
price was zero. Knowledge that these revealed preferences may be used 
to determine the tax-prices to be charged, on the other hand, should 
induce individuals not to overstate their preferences.
This bargaining procedure for solving the problem, of inducing
consumers of collectively consumed goods not to misrepresent their
preferences for these goods,^ was a concept that was vaguely
understood by at least some individuals in Britain after 1763, but
apparently not before this date. In their attempt to find a method for
excluding the colonists from consuming the external defence the British
government was providing, some had recommended the withholding of the
provision of external defence until the colonists had shown an adequate
level of willingness to contribute to the cost of providing this service
(2)In 1766 Viscount Barrington, Secretary of War, wrote the following:
"If we had no Forts, Garrisons or Settlements, 
in Indian Country, it is probable we would never 
be in a State of National Hostility with those 
People, should any of our Colonies by Misconduct 
get themselves into War with the Indians let
(1) It should be noted that this solution does not solve the problem 
of determining whether or not the tax-prices, if imposed on each 
individual, are equitable.
(2) "Ld Barrington's Plan relative to the Out Posts, Indian Trade etc." 
dated May 10, 1766. Found in J. Fortescue (ed.), Correspondence 
of King George III, 1760-178Z (London, Frank Cass, 1967), Six 
Volumes, Vol. 1, No. 454, p. 436.
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them get themselves out of it as they always 
used to do when they were not so strong; or 
else let them beg for Military Assistance; 
acknowledge their want of it, be thankful for 
it and pay its Expense."
The underlying idea in the last statement in this quotation is 
very similar to part of the economic theory outlined above for inducing 
individuals to reveal their true maximum preferences for a given supply 
of a collectively consumed good; the colonists were to reveal their 
preferences for land defence before it was decided by the British 
whether or not to provide, at least, some of this service. These 
preferences were then to be utilised for determining the tax-prices to 
be charged. Implicit in Barrington's recommendation seems to be the 
idea that if the size of the sum of these revealed preferences for land 
defence were not large enough, relative to the costs to Great Britain of 
providing this service, land defence would not be provided by the 
British government for the colonists' benefit.
In the same year as Barrington wrote his recommendation,
Josiah Tucker, the Dean of Gloucester, had come to a similar conclusion, 
although his argument bore on all the collectively consumed goods 
provided by the British government, and from which the colonists 
benefited. Tucker reasoned via a process of eliminating all but one of 
the policy options available to the British government in its attempt 
to find an efficient means of administering the North American
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c o l o n i e s . T h e  use of physical force to compel the colonists to pay
the stamp duties, or for the British to administer the colonies as they
had been doing in recent years, were both unacceptable courses of
(2)action. Instead he suggested that "we [the British] give [the North
American colonies] entirely up, unless [the colonists] will submit to be
governed by the same Laws as we are, and pay something towards
(3)maintaining the colonies."
By 1774 Tucker’s recommendation had taken on a more emphatic
form. Via a similar logical process of eliminating policy options which
he considered to be unacceptable, he came to the conclusion that for the
British government to solve its problems in administering the North
American colonies the British should "separate entirely from the North
American Colonies, by declaring them to be a free and independent People,
over whom we lay no Claim; and then by offering to guarantee this
(4)Freedom and Independence against all foreign Invaders whatever".
Here there is no mention of the British government waiting to establish 
whether the colonists would reveal a greater willingness to pay for the
(1) Josiah Tucker, A Letter from a Merchant in London to His Nephew in 
America (1766). Reproduced in Josiah Tücher, A Selection from His 
Economic and Political Writings, R.L. Schuyler (ed.), op. cit., 
pp. 303-330.
(2) Josiah Tucker, A Letter from a Merchant, op. cit., pp. 324-326. 
Tucker also seems to have implicitly rejected the option of 
providing parliamentary representation to the colonists on the 
grounds that it was unworkable, and unnecessary (because the 
colonists were already represented by the then current members of 
Parliament). A Letter, op. cit., pp. 312-313.
(3) Josiah Tucker, A Letter from a Merchant, op. cit., pp. 326-329.
(4) Josiah Tucker, The True Interest of Great Britain set forth in 
Regard to the Colonies", And the Only Means of Living in Peace and 
Harmony with them (1774). Reproduced in Josiah Tücher, op. cit., 
p. 358.
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services provided by the British government, when faced with the 
determined threat of the British intention to withdraw these services 
from the colonies, whereas in 1766 he was recommending that this should 
be done.
A reservation that may be voiced about Tucker's 1774 policy 
proposal, is the allusion to the need for the British government to form 
a defence alliance with the independent colonies, an alliance which only 
provided protection for the former colonies, and apparently no 
protection for Great Britain, other than that protection which the 
British provided for themselves. Such an alliance very well could have 
embroiled Great Britain in a military conflict which created an 
economic net burden for the British. This is what the British should 
have been wanting to avoid, if they were rational, in the economic sense 
of wanting to maximize the economic net benefits accruing to themselves. 
It follows that a superior policy proposal would have been for the 
British government to have granted the colonies their independence, and 
to have left it at that. It does seem possible, however, that Tucker 
did not regard the formation of a military alliance, between Great 
Britain and the colonies, as an important part of his proposal, for at 
no stage in his quite lengthy discussion of this policy option (the 
fifth option) is further reference made to the formation of an alliance. 
Rather the discussion concentrates on the first part of the proposal; 
of granting the colonies their independence. Thus it is quite possible 
that the policy that Tucker really wished to see implemented was just 
that the colonies be given their independence, without necessarily 
providing any form of undertaking to supply external defence for the 
former colonists' benefit. But this is a surmise.
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Both Barrington (for a particular case) and Tucker (for the 
more general case)y at least in 1766, had realised that the British 
government should stop providing collectively consumed goods, from 
which the colonists benefited, unless the colonists had revealed a 
willingness to pay for the goods provided, and agreed to pay something 
towards their provision; in other words, they had both implicitly 
realised that the British government had to induce the colonists to 
bargain for the provision of external defence before this service was 
provided. What is more, the British were in a position to adopt this 
recommendation in 1766, for there was no pressing and serious threat 
which could have constrained the British government into having to make 
a hasty decision, about whether or not to provide external defence, from 
which the colonists would benefit, before the revealed preferences of 
the colonists for this service could be assessed and agreement reached on 
the tax-prices to be charged. This does not appear to have been the case, 
in the mid-1750s, however, when the British were deciding on the level of 
assistance to provide to help defend the colonists against the French.
In fact, this observation raises a doubt about the practicability of the 
theory outlined above for inducing individuals to reveal their true 
preferences for a collectively consumed good yet to be provided. The 
theory implicitly assumes that there is adequate time in which preferences 
for this good can be determined and assessed. If this is not the case 
(which may be so on rare, or perhaps not so rare, occasions) then the 
provider of the collectively consumed good may be hurried into employing 
less precise methods, than this theory recommends, for determining 
whether, or not, a given quantity of the collectively consumed good
348
should be provided. In these circumstances mistakes can be made.^^
But Tucker's recommendation was not acted upon in the inid- 
1760s. This is not to say that his views were not known and respected 
by some in London. According to one writer in the English press in 1774, 
"The soundest politicians are of opinion that Dean Tucker's advice ... 
is the wisest scheme ever yet proposed for accommodating the present
(1) Karl Deutch has implicitly made a similar point, although with 
regard to situations of conflict of interests in general, where 
decisions on strategy have to be made within a time constraint, and 
with little information. In these circumstances, Deutch notes, "it 
is often not the best move or strategy that is chosen by an actor 
but rather one which he finds cheapest to compute." Karl W. Deutch, 
"Quantitative Approaches to Political Analysis: Some Past Trends
and Future Prospects", in H.R. Alker, Jr, et al, (eds),
Mathematical Approaches to Politics (Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific 
Publishing Company, 1973), p. 46. This argument appears to explain, 
in part, Pitt's decision for Great Britain to increase the level of 
military assistance to the colonies from 1757 on; remember that 
the British were in a difficult military situation in North America 
in 1757, and apparently Pitt believed that a hurried decision had 
to be made as to whether, or not, to counter the French threat. 
Although, even if this decision was rushed, Pitt still possibly 
thought it tended in the correct direction, given his views about 
the economic virtues of controlling the British Empire.
(2) It should be noted in passing that a probable reason why in 1766
Franklin, with such assurance, could apparently understate his, and 
the colonists', preferences, for the assistance provided by the 
British in the war with the French in North America, was that the 
collectively consumed good, the defeat of the French, already had 
been provided when Franklin gave his evidence, and could not be 
withdrawn. The colonists revealed a different set of preferences 
for this good when it was still being decided by the British 
whether, or not, to assist in providing this military help to the 
colonies. To demonstrate this latter point, an example, of what 
was being stated publicly by the colonial representatives at the 
time the British authorities were providing military assistance to 
the colonies, is taken from a reply by the Pennsylvania Assembly 
to Governor Morris, written 20th March, 1755; a reply which 
Franklin was involved in drafting. This reply, which was in 
response to a request by Morris for the Assembly to vote supplies 
to assist Braddock,at one point thanked the governor "for giving 
us this Opportunity of continuing to demonstrate our Loyalty to 
our King, our Regard to the British Interest in America, and our 
Care of the People we represent". (Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply
to the Governor, March 20, 1755, Papers of Benjamin Franklin3 op. 
cit.y Vol. 5, p. 533.) These colonists, at least, were pleased 
with the British response to assist them in meeting the French 
threat.
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faced with pitfalls, will not be attempted yet.^^ Instead the 
discussion will now turn to a more detailed assessment of the net 
economic burdens which the American colonists might have had to bear 
after 1763, as a result of the operation of British policies in the 
colonies. The major purpose of this examination is to determine if 
these net economic burdens, to any degree, induced the colonists to take 
active and violent political action against the British administration 
in the mid-1770s.
(1) Perhaps an alternative approach, in the attempt to solve the public 
finance problem the British government faced in the colonies, could 
have been one of attempting to discover a means of raising revenue 
in the colonies which did not require that the colonists 
compulsorily pay a tax of some form. Such an idea is not fatuous 
since such a method for raising public revenue does exist; namely, 
a lottery. In this case an individual is under no duress to take 
part in the lottery (purchase lottery tickets), yet those who do 
are providing the organisers of the lottery (the government) with a 
revenue surplus with which to finance government expenditures.
This mechanism for raising revenue via lotteries was used in 
the colonies by local institutions (for example, the Academy of 
Philadelphia employed such a technique in 1755 to raise funds to 
finance the activities of this institution - see Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin> Vol. V, p. 505ff.). Indeed the British authorities 
became so concerned with this practice that a royal instruction was 
issued, on 30th June, 1769, insisting that in future the colonial 
governors ensured that the operation of these lotteries were to be 
more carefully scrutinised by the British authorities.
[L.W. Labaree (ed.), Royal Instructions to British Colonial 
Governors 1670-17763 op. cit.> Vol. 1, p. 200.]
If the British government itself had employed this technique 
for raising revenue in the North American colonies, the colonists 
had every opportunity to avoid contributing revenue to the British 
government’s finances, through the act of free choice, by not 
participating in the lottery. Clearly if too many colonists 
adopted this action the British government would not have been 
assisted with its colonial public finance problem. This may well 
have been the case if this government had adopted lotteries as a 
means of raising revenue. But it does not appear totally fanciful 
to believe that the British government would have been more 
successful in raising revenue in the American colonies via this 




DID ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS PARTLY INDUCE THE AMERICAN 
COLONISTS TO REVOLT?
To test the hypothesis that the political activity of an
individual, or group, in the colonies, in response to the British
government's colonial public finance policy, was a function of the
inequality between the benefits received from collectively consumed
goods and the tax-prices paid by these individuals, or groups, for these
goods, involves some reasoned propositions as to what groups bore the
burden of some of the taxes (direct and indirect, actual and potential)
imposed on the colonists, and what sections of the colonial community
benefited from British government expenditures, in North America, on
(2)collectively consumed goods. It should be noted that the discussion
will not be particularly concerned with determining the actual average 
size per head of the net economic burdens imposed on the colonists by 
British colonial public finance policies, for while the average size of 
these net burdens may, to some degree, have influenced the political 
behaviour of the colonists on the eve of the American Revolution, it is
(1) By "potential taxes" is meant taxes which were legislated for, or 
proposed, but which, for one reason or another, were not imposed 
for any length of time; the examples in mind are the stamp duties 
and the Townshend import duties.
(2) In this discussion there will be no references to the tax-prices 
charged which were directly related to benefits from which the 
colonists easily (or at relatively little cost) could be excluded; 
i.e. post-office charges.
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difficult to establish whether this was so, or not, because of the lack 
of relevant adequate time series data. By considering the probable 
incidence of the net burdens, however, it may be possible to determine 
variations in political behaviour between groups of colonists, on the 
eve of the Revolution, which may correlate with variations in the net 
burdens, imposed by the British government's colonial public finance 
policies, borne by various groups of colonists. As will become apparent 
below, no attempt will be made to establish the actual size of the net 
burdens imposed, if for no other reason that it is not possible to 
determine the size, as seen by the various groups of colonists, of the 
gross benefits created by British public finance policies.Interest 
will rather centre on determining whether gross burdens and benefits 
existed in the first place, and what groups of colonists were the 
probable recipients of these burdens and benefits.
Considering the incidence of the benefits derived first, it is
probable that the group benefiting most, as a proportion of per capita
income, from expenditures on land defence after 1763 were those living
(2)at, or near, the western frontier. That these individuals were
benefiting from this land defence has been argued above. What should be 
added to that discussion is that by 1774 the British government had 
virtually abandoned the idea of protecting the western frontier with
(1) The reason for this statement should be obvious from the earlier 
discussion of the misrepresentation of preferences for collectively 
consumed goods.
(2) For the reasons mentioned in Chapter II, the present analysis of 
the incidence of benefits and tax burdens will be concerned only 
with the likely total benefits received, or tax burdens incurred, 
by various groups, and not the marginal incidence of these benefits 
and tax burdens. See the discussion on pages 225-226.
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British troops, and was prepared to leave the colonies the task of
administering Indian affairs.^  Yet the frontiersmen may still have
expected, based on past experience, that the British would come to their
assistance should the Indians become too troublesome. This certainly
seems to be a reasonable implication to draw from some of the statements
(2)made by the frontiersmen on the eve of the Revolution.
But frontier defence might also have tended to create a 
negative benefit for some, in particular, for those individuals wealthy 
enough to speculate in land west of the Alleghenies; which almost 
certainly were those living in the eastern, and more commercialised, 
parts of the colonies. The land to the west of the Alleghenies had 
come as one of the gains from defeating the French. However, the 
British did not want this land settled for the reasons already 
explained above. To implement this policy troops were used in the 
attempt to exclude the colonists from benefiting from the collectively 
consumed good of the wilderness west of the Alleghenies (or near 
collectively consumed good, for there was a cost involved for the 
individual who wished to take advantage of this land). In this sense, 
the expenditure on frontier defence most probably tended to create a 
negative benefit for the land speculator in the colonies.
This situation possibly lasted up until about mid-1768 but as 
the British troops were withdrawn from the wilderness, and the western
(1) The reasons for this withdrawal are discussed by Shy in Towards
Lexington, op. oit., pp. 229-230 and in P. Marshall, "Colonial 
Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy 1764-1768",
Journal of American Studies, Vol. 5 (1971), pp. 1-17.
(2) This implication is drawn from the statements cited below on pages 
371 and 372.
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frontier was left to be administered by the colonists, the land dealers
were left unrestricted in their efforts to exploit the wilderness. But,
in response to complaints from the Indians, the British government
imposed new excluding devices in February 1774, in the hope that this
would prevent conflict between the Indians and the c o l o n i s t s . T h e
one device was that land was to be auctioned, with a reserve price of
not less than sixpence per acre to be set on each block of land
(2)auctioned. Also the size of the quit-rent was to be raised. An
economic implication of this attempt to use these devices, if successful, 
was to convert a collectively consumed good into a private good, by the 
means of using the price mechanism, along with the imposition of 
property law, as an excluding technique. If individuals did not show an 
adequate level of preference for the auctioned land they were supposed 
to be excluded from obtaining the property rights needed to use this 
land. In addition, the reserve price for land always could have been 
set high enough so that the colonists would have been effectively, and 
totally, excluded from gaining legal control over the frontier land. 
However, an important ingredient required to allow this excluding 
mechanism to operate is the ability to enforce the law of contracts.
This ingredient seems to have been missing from the frontier. Thus
(1) Fears were expressed in Great Britain after 1768 and before 1774 
that the expansion of the colonists into the wilderness areas would 
cause violent retaliation by the Indians. These fears were 
confirmed, despite the royal instruction on the sale of land, with 
the militia being used against the Shawnee in 1774. Cf. Shy, 
Towards Lexington, op. oit., pp. 325-326, pp. 400 and 403.
(2) The details of this royal instruction are to be found, for example, 
in St George L. Sioussat, "The Breakdown of the Royal Management of 
Lands in the Southern Provinces, 1773-1775", Agrioultureal History, 
Vol. 3-4 (1929). The original instruction, of 3rd February, is 
reproduced in L.W. Labaree, Royal Instructions, op. oit., Vol. II, 
pp. 533-537.
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there is little reason to believe that this attempt, by the British 
government, at excluding the colonists from the wilderness created much 
of a negative benefit, if any, for those colonists with economic 
interests in this land.^ But certainly the potential for excluding 
the colonists was there in the form of the royal instructions of the 
3rd February, 1774.
Another excluding device was contained in the Quebec Act,
passed on the 13th June, 1774. The major objective that this Act was
meant to attain was that of preventing the colonists from settling in
(2)territory north-west of the Ohio and Allegheny rivers. The Act gave 
the French in the province of Quebec full religious and legal rights, 
and also extended the boundaries of Quebec to areas north-west of the 
Ohio and Allegheny rivers, land which the British apparently had no 
intention of settling. The excluding device which the British seem to 
have been relying on, through the provisions of the Act, was the 
American colonists’ antipathy for the French in Quebec, and via this 
means discouraging the colonists from migrating into an area 
administered by French colonials (with guidance from the British 
government).
This excluding device, which harnessed religious and cultural 
prejudices so that it may be effective, probably lowered the potential
(1) The problem for the British was to be able to enforce, at 
reasonable cost, contracts concerning the sale of wilderness land. 
Gipson, for example, seems to imply that this was not possible. 
Gipson, The British Empire, Vol. XI, op. oit., pp. 496-497.
(2) Sosin, Whitehall and. the Wilderness, op. oit., Chapter X and 
B. Donoughue, British Politics and the American Revolution, 
op. cit., Chapter V.
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benefits, for some land speculators, to be gained from the wilderness. 
How important this potential loss of benefits, resulting from being a 
member of the British Empire, was as a cause of the Revolution, compared 
to losses imposed on the colonists by other actions of the British 
government, we probably will never know. What can be said, however, is 
that the Quebec Act raised important enough issues to be complained 
about in the Declaration of Independence. ^  ^
Little needs to be said about who benefited from the results 
of British government expenditures on naval defence. Those who gained 
from this collective good probably would have been those who employed 
international trade as a means of marketing their products, and/or as a
(1) "[The King has given his assent to legislation]: For abolishing
the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, 
establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its 
Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument 
for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies."
The Declaration of Independence, reproduced in J.P. Greene, Colonies 
to Nations, op. cit., p. 300.
While the substance of this complaint does not refer to the 
colonists' loss of access to the wilderness, as a result of the 
Quebec Act, this does not mean that this consideration was not in 
the back of the minds of those who drew up, and supported, this 
section of the Declaration. As was implied by parts of the 
discussion in the previous chapter, what, at least, some colonists 
stated about British colonial policies did not necessarily indicate 
what their real grievances were concerning these policies.
(2) The whole issue of the costs imposed by these exclusion devices is 
discussed in far more detail in the economic analysis provided 
below of the Declaration of Independence. Cf. the relevant 
sections on pages 403~408 and 414—415 in Appendix A and the 
associated analysis provided in Appendix B.
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means of satisfying their wants as final or intermediate consumers.
The exporters were those living mainly along the coastal belt - the rice
and tobacco growers of the southern colonies, and the fish, wheat and
(2)flour exporters of the central and northern colonies - while the
major groups benefiting from imports should have been those living in
the coastal regions; the relatively expensive land communications
probably caused the price of imported commodities to be too high for them
to be consumed to any great degree by the relatively poor communities
(3)living nearer to the western frontier. Thus it seems reasonable to 
assume that it was the communities residing nearer the eastern coastline 
which were the main beneficiaries of the British government expenditures 
on naval defence.
(1) There is no doubt that the colonists benefited from this British-
provided naval defence, a point implicitly recognised, a short time 
after the colonies became independent, in letter eleven of The 
Federalist, written, by Hamilton in 1787 and entitled, "The Value of 
Union to Commerce and the Advantages of a Navy", to be found in 
The Federalist, B.F. Wright (ed.) (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1961), pp. 136-142. Ten years later the United States 
government acted on Hamilton's initial recommendation and formed 
the nucleus of a navy by launching three frigates. Also see the 
discussion on this general point, in the previous chapter, on pages
(2) In 1770 tobacco and rice made up about thirty six per cent, and 
fish, wheat and flour about twenty nine per cent, of the value of 
the colonies’ exports. These estimates are derived from the
Historical Statistics of the United States, op. cit., table Z76, 
p. 761.
(3) There apparently are no statistics available of the average per
capita incomes of the colonists residing, just prior to the 
Revolution, in the western and eastern portions of the colonies 
respectively. Nevertheless one contemporary writer clearly 
indicates that at least in South Carolina those living in the 
western part of this colony had markedly lower per capita incomes 
than those in the eastern portion. See The Backcountry on the Eve 
of the Revolution: The Journal and Writings of Charles Woodmason,
Anglican Itinerant, Richard J. Hooker (ed.) (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1953), passim.
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Some provisions of the Navigation Acts bestowed benefits on 
certain sections of the colonial community, such as bounties on the 
production of certain commodities produced in the colonies (indigo, and 
naval stores), and preferences shown to Empire-owned shipping. Again it 
seems reasonable to assume that the incidence of these benefits in the 
colonies was concentrated along the eastern seaboard. But the relative 
sizes (as a proportion of per capita income) of these benefits were 
apparently so s m a l l t h a t  they are not taken into account in the 
subsequent discussion.
As for the other benefits, provided by the British government, 
they were possibly evenly spread throughout the colonial population, 
and/or were relatively small. The provision of internal law and order, 
general administration and foreign diplomatic representation for the 
colonies by the British government may have been of greater benefit for 
the more commercialised centres of the colonies, but it could be argued, 
with some justification, that these services were of a similar value, as 
a proportion of per capita income, to all regions in the colonies, or 
even if this was not the case these benefits were relatively small as a 
proportion of per capita income in the colonies. There does not appear 
to be any strong reason for rejecting either of these views. This 
implies that this set of benefits may be omitted from the rest of the 
analysis in this chapter.
The discussion now turns to considering the likely incidence 
of the burdens imposed by some of the taxes imposed on the colonial
(1) See R.P. Thomas, "A Quantitative Approach", op. ait.. Table 1, 
for an estimate of the size of these benefits in the 1760s and 
1770s.
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community. The first tax to be discussed is the implicit tax on
exports imposed by the various provisions of the Navigation Acts.^^
It has been pointed out by some economic historians that the incidence
of the implicit export taxes imposed by these Acts was concentrated in
the colonies exporting enumerated agricultural commodities; namely,
(2)Maryland, Virginia, and North and South Carolina. Actually it is 
possible to be far more specific about the incidence of this implicit 
export tax.
To more accurately identify the incidence of this tax it is 
preferable to think of the loss of producer's surplus, that colonial 
producers of enumerated exported commodities had to bear as a result of 
the imposition of the implicit tax, as being an economic rent foregone 
on the fixed factor of production. The two economic concepts are the 
same, in the case of a competitive industry, such as colonial 
agriculture, if in the long-run land (the fixed factor of production) 
was in fixed supply, and labour, capital and any other factor of 
production used to produce the enumerated exports had a fixed price, and 
there were no externalities, economies of scale, and/or technical
(1) On the form that this implicit tax took see, for example,
R.P. Thomas, "A Quantitative Approach", op. oit., pp. 615-638.
A more refined statement of the burdens imposed by this implicit 
tax is to be found in J.D. Reid, "On Navigating the Navigation 
Acts with P.D. McClelland: Comment", American Economic Review,
Vol. 60 (1970), pp. 949-955.
(2) Cf. R.L. Ransom, "British Policy and Colonial Growth, Some 
Implications of the Burden from the Navigation Acts", Journal of 
Economic History, XXVIII (September, 1968), pp. 431-432.
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change. (1)
This loss in economic rents, because of the imposition of the 
tax, would have been reflected as a reduced capitalised value of land 
used to produce the enumerated export product, and land that would have 
been used for this purpose had the Navigation Acts not been applied. 
Thus the removal of the implicit export tax would have provided a 
capital gain to the current owners of intramarginal, marginal and some 
extramarginal land used, or which could have been used, to produce the 
enumerated export commodities. However, the individuals who would have 
made a capital gain, as a result of the removal of the tax, might not 
have been the ones who bore the capital loss while the tax was imposed. 
If this land had been purchased while the tax was being imposed, and 
there was no likelihood of the size of this tax being altered in the 
future, then, under conditions of perfect competition and perfect 
knowledge, the purchase price of this land should have fully taken 
account of the loss of economic rents imposed by the tax. Thus the 
capital loss imposed by the tax is borne completely by the initial 
seller of the land, after the tax is imposed, and not by the purchaser
(1) In fact, if these assumptions do not hold the concept of producer's 
surplus, as measured by the area above the long-run marginal cost 
(supply) curve up to the competitive equilibrium price line, has no 
economic meaning. If, for example, the prices of other factors of 
production do vary, so will the position of the long-run marginal 
cost [LMC] curve, so that the observed supply curve is not the LMC 
curve, but the locus of points at the bottom of short-run average 
cost curve, each with different short—run marginal cost curves.
The area above this observed curve, and up to the equilibrium price 
line, therefore, does not measure the Ricardian rent to the fixed 
factor of production, and thus does not measure the producer s 
surplus. This point, plus the recommendation that producer's 
surplus should be thought of as an economic rent to the fixed 
factor of production, has been emphasised by E.J. Mishan, What is 
Producer's Surplus?", American Economic Review3 LVIII (5), 
(December, 1968), pp. 1269-1282.
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of the land.^^ It follows that at least some owners of the land that 
was used, or could have been used (had the Navigation Acts been 
repealed), to produce the enumerated agricultural commodities might have 
suffered no loss, because of the implicit export tax imposed on these 
products, if they purchased this land after the Navigation Acts were 
imposed.
A qualification that should be added to this conclusion is
that in the 1760s all owners of land used to produce enumerated
commodities possibly suffered a capital loss because of the manner in
which the Navigation Acts were implemented. Prior to this date evasion
of the provisions of these Acts had been prevalent, but during the 1760s
(2)attempts were made to more vigorously impose their provisions. The
economic effect of this action was to raise the size of the implicit 
export taxes. If this increased level of taxation could not have been 
avoided then all the current owners of the relevant land would have 
suffered a capital loss. Although there was this attempt to prevent 
evasion of the Acts it is not all that certain that the attempt was 
effective.
It follows from these observations that it is not definite
(1) Another way of considering this problem is to assume that this 
particular piece of land has a totally inelastic supply (which was 
assumed previously when pointing out the similarities between 
economic rent, to a fixed factor of production, and producer's 
surplus) in which case it is easily shown that the total burden of 
the tax is borne by the seller of the land.
(2) Cf. T.C. Barrow, Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in
Colonial America 1660-17753 op. cit.3 Chapter VIII. Also see 
"Reform of the Customs Service: Order in Council" (October 4,
1763), The Townshend Revenue Act (June 29, 1767) and the American 
Board of Customs Act (June 29, 1767), all reproduced in J.P. Greene, 
Colonies to Nations3 op. cit.3 pp. 14-15, 115-117.
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whether all the owners of intramarginal, marginal and some extramarginal 
land, used, or which could have been used, to produce enumerated 
commodities, for the period 1763 to 1775, suffered a capital loss 
because of the provisions of the Navigation Acts. All these land owners, 
however, did stand to make a capital gain if the implicit export tax 
was repealed. Perhaps this was the major reason why, after 1763, the 
Virginian and Maryland tobacco growers and the rice growers of South 
Carolina, and particularly the owners of relatively large and valuable 
tracts of land producing these crops, wished to have the Navigation Act 
repealed, although the threat of the potential loss, if not the actual 
loss, that could be imposed by the anti-evasion measures taken by the 
British government, from 1763 on, no doubt was an added reason for 
protesting over the operation of the Navigation Acts.
It might be noted in passing that it was not just the American 
colonists who bore these "burdens". Land producing these enumerated 
crops was also owned by individuals residing in Great Britain at the 
time. Also, the British government itself might have borne some of the 
capital loss imposed by the provisions of the Navigation Act if it had 
been a seller of land that was subsequently used, or potentially could 
have been used (if the implicit export tax had been removed) to produce 
the enumerated export commodities.
The welfare loss imposed on the colonists by taxes, direct or 
indirect, imposed after 1763 on imports into the colonies would have 
been borne by those who consumed these goods either as final consumers 
or producers. The colonists who seem most likely to have borne this 
welfare loss imposed by these taxes were the wealthier members of the 
colonial community living along the eastern seaboard; the cost of
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transporting imported commodities to the interior would have made the 
price of these commodities so high that, even without the excise tax 
being imposed, these commodities probably would have been consumed in 
relatively small quantities by the relatively poor, and thought-to-be 
self-sufficient, or near self-sufficient, communities in the interior.^
Another form of indirect taxation imposed upon the colonists 
was the operation of the provisions of the Currency Act of 1764. The 
implicit tax burden imposed by this legislation was that of replacing 
paper money, which had a zero cost of production, with specie money, 
which, for the colonists, had an opportunity user cost of the interest 
that could be earned on the resources required to purchase the specie
(1) The per capita size of this burden was about forty cents per annum 
between 1763 and 1772. This calculation is based upon the 
information provided in Thomas, "British Imperial Policy , op. oit.j 
Table 1.
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employed as legal t e n d e r . I n  this case the greatest size of this 
tax burden would have been borne by the individuals who held the largest 
stocks of money balances. Since it is generally accepted by monetary 
theorists that the size of an individual's real cash balances increase 
with his, or her, real income, other things remaining the same, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the regional group of colonists who held the 
largest stocks of real cash balances were to be found among those 
relatively involved with the monetised market system; namely, those who 
tended to live along the eastern seaboard.
A similar general observation could be made about the likely 
potential incidence of the Stamp Act. While the actual amount of
(1) Cf. S.S. Finklestein, "The Currency Act of 1764: A Quantitative 
Reappraisal", The American Economist3 Vol. 12 (1968), pp. 38-47.
The maximum burden imposed by this Act, as calculated by 
Finklestein, using an eight per cent rate of interest, was twenty- 
eight cents per capita per annum.
As Finklestein is aware, his calculations of these costs tend 
to overstate the burden, imposed by the Currency Act, because of 
the assumption that all paper money was replaced immediately by 
specie. Actually paper money was to be withdrawn from circulation 
as it came due for redemption, which was, in some cases, some years 
after 1764. Also, as was pointed out earlier, the provisions of 
the Act were relaxed after 1770, to allow an increased supply of 
paper money. Finally, Finklestein assumes that the same value of 
specie replaced the value of paper money in circulation. This need 
not have been the case; the increased cost of holding specie money 
might have induced individuals to reduce their level of demand for 
money. The reduced quantity (value) of specie money needed to meet 
this demand would have lowered the burden of the operation of the 
Currency Act, relative to the size of this burden calculated by 
Finklestein.
The objective of the Currency Act was to stabilize the growth 
rate of the money supply. As is implied by this identification of 
the burden imposed by the Currency Act, this legislation was not the 
most appropriate (least costly) way of achieving this objective. A 
less costly way of implementing this policy was to put more rigorous 
controls on the rate of growth of the supply of paper money.
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revenue raised by this tax may not have been relatively large, because
of the short time the tax was in operation, this fact is of little
relevance in helping to understand the political behaviour of the
colonists with respect to this tax; what mattered was the potential
size of this tax had it been fully imposed, although, even if this had
occurred, the tax still would have been small in absolute terms
according to Thomas Whately's calculations - about forty cents per
capita per a n n u m ^  - compared to an assumed annual per capita income,
(2)at current prices, for the colonists in 1770 of between $75 and $80.
But the stamp duties were not in operation on the eve of the American 
Revolution and, therefore, perhaps this tax should be ignored in the 
considerations of the economic burdens imposed by the British government 
on the colonists.
However, the repeal of the Stamp Act did not mean that there 
was no further threat of another tax being imposed, as a substitute for 
the stamp duties, to raise revenue. Even on the eve of the outbreak of 
the American Revolution, Lord North presented a resolution to Parliament, 
on the 20th February, 1775, in which it was stated that Parliament 
would tax a colony, unless this colony contributed its proportion "to 
the common defence ... and shall engage to make provision also for the 
support of the civil government, and the administration of justice".
(1) Thomas Whately, Considerations on the Trade and Finances, op. cit.,
p. 72.
(2) See the discussion on the conjectured size of the average per 
capita income in the colonies in 1770 in R.L. Ransom, "British 
Policy", op. cit., pp. 432-433.
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This proportion, and the absolute amount, the colonies were to contribute
was to be set by Parliament. The resolution was passed by 274 votes to
88.^^ Jefferson, in answer to this resolution, concentrated, in part,
on the proposition that, in one way or another, the British government
wished to impose greater tax burdens on the colonies. The technique
for raising revenue whereby the colonial assemblies taxed the colonists,
in order to raise enough revenue to meet a quota set by Parliament, was
unacceptable because, "we must saddle ourselves with a perpetual tax
adequate to the expectations and subject to the disposal of Parliament
alone". So the threat of taxation, albeit an indirect threat, by
Parliament was still in the North resolution, for while the colonists
did not control how the tax revenue raised by the colonies was to be
spent, the colonists might just as well be taxed by Parliament; this
system of raising tax revenue proposed by North, "only changes the form
(2)of the oppression, without lightening the burthen".
Thus the threat (direct or indirect) of taxation by Parliament 
was still seen as an issue by some colonists on the eve of the 
Revolution, and this threat of being taxed might have been enough to 
induce a political response from the colonists, as it did from
(1) R.W. Van Alstyne, "Parliamentary Supremacy versus Independence: 
Notes and Documents", The Huntington Library Quarterly3 Vol. XXVI 
(May, 1963), p. 205. The North resolution is reproduced in full 
on this page of Van Alstyne’s article.
(2) Virginia Resolutions on Lord North's Conciliatory Proposal, 10th 
June, 1775, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson3 Julian P. Boyd 
(ed.) (15 Vols, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950-58), 
Vol. 1, pp. 170-174, especially p. 171.
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J e f f e r s o n . N o r  does it seem unreasonable to assert that the group 
of colonists which were most likely to be relatively heavily taxed, if 
the threat to tax in one form or another was implemented, were those 
most involved with the monetised economy, and not those living in the 
more remote parts of the colonies.
Finally, as for the incidence of the implicit tax imposed by 
the provisions of the Quartering Act, the economic burden of this tax 
probably was concentrated in the eastern sectors of the colonies of 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and South Carolina 
- the colonies responsible for the costs of quartering the British 
troops stationed in the colonies.
Piecing together these observations about the likely 
geographic incidence, in the American colonies, of the total economic 
burdens imposed, or threatened to be imposed, by the British 
government's colonial revenue raising policies, and the benefits of 
British expenditures on land defence, it would appear that the size of 
the total benefits received by the group of colonists residing at, or 
near, the western frontier were greater than the total economic burdens, 
actual or threatened, borne by this group of colonists. In fact, it is 
difficult to establish if this group of colonists bore any economic
(1) Van Alstyne has argued that North implied in the parliamentary 
debate on the resolution that the British Parliament would not 
exercise its right to impose taxes, in one form or another, on the 
colonists. This view will be assessed in detail in the next 
chapter, but for the time being it need only be pointed out that 
what was important for determining the colonists' political 
behaviour is what they, the colonists, thought North meant by his 
resolution, not what North meant to imply. See Van Alstyne,
Empire and Independence> op. cit.> pp. 61-62, and 'Parliamentary 
Supremacy", ibid.
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burdens on the eve of the Revolution, as a result of the British 
government colonial policies mentioned here, whereas they certainly 
benefited from the maintenance, and defence, of the peace with the 
Indians. As for the colonists living along, or relatively near, the 
eastern seaboard, they certainly bore economic burdens imposed by the 
British government, and there was always the threat of further economic 
burdens being imposed. However, if the incidence of the total benefits 
of sea defence, and any benefits of land defence, to this general group 
of colonists are taken into account, it is quite possible that the size 
of the actual total benefits to this group, of British government 
expenditures on collectively consumed goods, could have exceeded the 
size of the total economic burdens imposed, or threatened to be imposed, 
on this section of the colonial community. There were no doubt 
exceptions to this general statement, but when applied to this section 
of colonial society as a whole the previous statement may well be a 
valid proposition. But if there really was a considerable 
understatement of preference, by this group of colonists, for the 
collectively consumed goods provided by the British goverment in the 
period from 1763 to 1775, then it is probable that the size of the 
total tax burdens imposed, or threatened to be imposed, on this group 
of colonists along the eastern seaboard, was greater than the revealed 
total benefits received by this group from British government 
expenditures on collectively consumed goods.
If this was indeed the case, with colonists most likely to be 
taxed understating their preferences for collectively consumed goods, 
one would expect to find some evidence of the colonists along, or near, 
the eastern seaboard, who were relatively dependent on international 
trade, the monetised market system, and possibly land speculation, for
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their economic well-being, to be relatively hostile to the tax- 
expenditure system imposed, or threatened to be imposed, by the British 
government in the North American colonies. On the other hand, those 
benefiting from the British-provided sea and/or land defence, and little 
burdened by the taxes imposed by the British government, and therefore 
had little, or no, incentive to understate their preferences for 
collectively consumed goods provided, would tend to support this public 
finance policy in North America. This group should have tended to be 
the colonists along the western frontier, and any colonists dependent on 
sea defence, but little influenced by the tax system, which was likely 
to have been some groups living along the eastern coastline.
What these observations imply is a means of testing the 
hypothesis that the economic benefits provided, and the economic burdens 
imposed, by the British government's colonial public finance policy did 
induce, to some degree, some colonists to adopt the political behaviour 
which assisted in bringing about the American Revolution. The test is 
to focus attention on comparing the hypothesised geographic location of 
certain types of political behaviour, as generally outlined in the 
previous paragraph, with the actual political behaviour of various 
geographic groups in the colonies on the eve of the Revolution. In 
order to test this hypothesis on this matter, it is hoped that any other 
major factors that may have been influencing the political behaviour of 
the colonists as well, on the eve of the Revolution, can be accounted 
for so that the hypothesis may be adequately tested. Such a test may 
also be an indirect, but weak, test of the proposition that at least 
some colonists understated their preferences for the collectively 
consumed goods provided by the British government, and from which they
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benefited; the test being to observe if certain identified groups of 
colonists, who clearly gained substantially from British government 
expenditures on collectively consumed goods, also protested at the 
relatively small tax-price imposed on them by this government.
A major problem in testing the hypothesis is that there is no 
detailed, and/or accurate, information on the political behaviour of 
groups of colonists in different geographic locations on the eve of, or 
during, the Revolution. There are pieces of relevant information 
available, however. The first set of observations is rather slim. It 
has been observed by one historian that the Loyalists were concentrated 
on the western frontier, particularly in Georgia, and the maritime 
region of the middle c o l o n i e s . W h i l e  no statistical evidence is 
provided to support this contention, it is one which complies with what 
one could reasonably expect if the analysis presented above is correct.
Nelson is of the opinion, however, that the Loyalist support 
in the frontier region was only due to the fact that the British 
government’s land policy was checking the advance of agricultural 
settlement and, therefore, was providing a service to those trading with 
the Indians, by removing a possible source of conflict with the Indians. 
This does not seem to be the only reason for this Loyalist support at 
the western frontier, however.
An individual wrote in the Georgia Gazette on the 10th August, 
1774 as follows:
(1) W.H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961), 
p. 87 ff.
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"We have an enemy at our backs, who but very 
lately put us into consternation. We fled at 
their approach; we left our property at their 
mercy; and we have implored the assistance of 
Great Britain to humble these haughty Creeks.
And yet, no sooner is our panic a little 
subsided, but we insult our best and only friend 
from whom alone we can expect protection.
Carolina it is certain, will give us none."^^
This was not the only individual who saw value in having the 
British government provide frontier protection, presumably as long as he 
did not need to pay "too much" for this protection. The petitioners 
from Anson County, North Carolina, made it clear to the governor of that 
colony in 1775 that they were reliant on the British government for 
their protection, and that they did not want the then current political 
relationship between the colonies and the British Parliament altered.
"We consider that, under Divine Providence, 
it is solely upon the wisdom and virtue of 
that superior legislative might that the 
safety of our lives and fortunes, and the 
honour and welfare of this country, do most 
principally depend.
Give us leave, therefore, Sir, to express our 
utter detestation and abhorrence of the late
(1) Cited by P. Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1941), pp. 288- 
289.
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unjustifiable violation of publick commercial 
credit in the Massachusetts Government.
We protest against it with the utmost disdain, 
as the wicked experiment of a most profligate 
and abandoned Republican faction, whereby the 
general repose and tranquility of His Majesty's 
good subjects on this Continent are very much 
endangered and impaired.
Possibly had the frontiersmen been less isolated, and more 
articulate, there would have been much more documented evidence of their 
loyalty, and the reasons for their loyalty, to the British government on 
the eve of the Revolution.
As was stated earlier, this evidence to test the hypothesis 
outlined above is slim. What would provide ideal statistical 
information to test the hypothesis is data from an opinion poll, taken 
just on the eve of the American Revolution, which allowed anonymity for 
those providing information about the degree of their preferences for 
the British government's public finance policies, or a similar piece of 
information, and also provided information about the general geographic 
location of those interviewed, along with their level of revealed 
preferences. The nearest, but very distant, known statistical source to 
such an opinion poll are the records of the British government's claims
(1) "Address of Inhabitants of Anson County North Carolina, to 
Governor Josiah Martin", [March 10] 1775, as reproduced in 
R.B. Morris (ed.), The American Revolution (New York, Harper Row,
1970), p. 214.
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Commission. This commission was established after the Revolution to
hear the claims, on the British government, for compensation by those
Loyalists who had lost property in, and left, the American colonies
during and after the Revolution. The records of these hearings provide
quite detailed information about these claimants, such as their previous
colony and town and/or county of residence in the colonies, occupation,
country of birth, approximate length of residence in the colonies and
(2)the size of the claim made. With this information of the general 
location of those Loyalists who saw fit, and were in a position, to 
leave the American colonies, or states, together with information about 
the size of the total white population of each county, it is possible to 
roughly determine the proportionate strength of Loyalist support for
(3)nearly each county in the colonies. This information should,
therefore, provide some evidence of the extent of pro-British sentiments 
in various geographic areas of the colonies, and by implication the 
relative extent of anti-British feeling in these regions.
There are a number of reservations that need to be raised 
about the use of these statistics to test hypotheses concerning 
political behaviour on the eve of the Revolution. The obvious point to
(1) The sort of statistical test attempted here of an economic 
explanation of part of the colonists' political behaviour, just 
prior to, and during the American Revolution, was previously 
suggested, in brief outline, by R.L. Thomas, "British Imperial 
Policy and the Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution", 
Journal of Eoonomio History> XXVIII (1968), p. 440.
(2) This information, and more, is set out in tables for each colony in 
Wallace Brown, The King's Friends (Providence, Brown University, 
1965), pp. 289-344.
(3) The data on the total white population, by county, for about 1775 
is to be found in Stella H. Sutherland, Population Distribution in 
Colonial America (New York, Columbia University Press, 1936), 
passim.
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make is that this data refers to a situation late in the Revolution, or 
after the Revolution, and not to the state of Loyalist support just 
prior to the Revolution, which is the type of data required to test the 
hypotheses of interest here. Now for a number of reasons the relative 
level of this Loyalist support - proportionate Loyalist support in a 
county relative to that found in other counties - as indicated by the 
data from the claims commission, could vary from what it really was just 
before the outbreak of military conflict.
On the eve of the Revolution the colonists may have been 
willing to understate their preferences for the collectively consumed 
goods provided by Great Britain, given that these goods would still be 
provided, or were likely to be provided, if the need arose. However, 
the threat, and application, of punishment by the British, for the 
colonists not behaving cooperatively, may have induced the colonists to 
reveal their preferences more truthfully, and thus any net burden of 
British public finance policies, as seen by a colonist, may have turned 
into a net benefit. This possibility might be reflected in the colonist 
turning from being anti-, to being pro-British. On the other hand, the 
use of physical force by the British government may have caused the 
opposite to happen; the burdens of remaining in the British Empire 
became even greater after the outbreak of the American Revolution, or 
any net benefits of remaining in the Empire were turned into net burdens.
What is known is that, during the Revolution, allegiance did 
change. Colonists changed sides, and those who were neutral were forced 
to take sides; the British army elicited behaviour which possibly would 
have been different had British military intervention in the colonies 
not taken place, whereas the rebel militia helped to induce wavering
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colonists to commit themselves, and take a more active part in the 
conflict.^
If these influences had an even impact throughout the colonies 
there would be no cause for concern, from the point of view of the 
statistics measuring the relative level of Loyalist support through the 
American colonies. That this happened, even approximately, is not at 
all certain. For example, where the British were entrenched for 
relatively long periods, the Loyalists, as a percentage of the total 
population of the area, tended to be more numerous than in other areas, 
taking other possible relevant factors into account. In the town of New 
York, where the British troops were to be found throughout the whole of 
the Revolution, from late 1776 until the end of the fighting, claimants 
made up 0.737 per cent of the total white population for the town, 
whereas for the comparable town of Philadelphia, probably similarly 
affected by the British public finance policies, where British troops 
were stationed for less than nine months - between September 1777 and 
June 1778 - the percentage of claimants was 0.554. The difference in 
these percentages, given they are so small, may be a coincidence, but 
other explanations are possible. The close proximity of British troops 
might have tended to induce the local population to reveal their pro- 
British sentiments, more than would have been the case had these troops 
not been present, the extent of these revelations being greater the 
longer the British troops were at hand. When the British troops 
withdrew, these Loyalists were likely to bear the wrath of the patriots,
(1) Cf. J. Shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict
Considered as a Revolutionary War", in S.G. Kurtz and J.H. Hutson 
(eds), Essays on the American Revolution3 op. cit.3 p. 146 ff, and 
W. Brown, The King's Friends, op. cit.3 pp. 111-112, 89-90, 251.
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and as a result saw fit to leave the American states. An attempt will 
be made to take into account the consideration discussed here in the 
statistical analysis which follows.
Another reason which might have caused the relative numbers of
Loyalists to vary as between geographic areas, compared to what they
might have been before the Revolution, was that the treatment of known
Loyalists by the patriots, after the British troops had left, varied
from region to region, thus possibly causing relatively more Loyalists
to flee from some regions than from others, other things remaining the
same. In New York and South Carolina, for example, the legislative
action taken against the Loyalists was relatively h a r s h . A l s o
coercive action against the Loyalists by the Patriots probably was more
likely to have taken place in the towns, where less energy (cost) was
involved with organising and carrying out reprisals against thought-to-
be Loyalists, than against those Loyalists who lived in relatively
remote parts of the colonies. Also one might suspect that this action
would tend to be directed against the wealthier Loyalists, who possessed
relatively large amounts of property that could be confiscated and
redistributed, than against the poorer Loyalists; at least this is how
(2)the Loyalists might have perceived the situation. Both these latter
points, if correct, indicate that Loyalists would have tended to come 
from the seaboard towns in relatively larger numbers, compared to a case
(1) Cf. W. Brown, The King's Friends, op. oit., pp. 78 and 214.
(2) This may be part of the reason why 14.2 per cent of the Loyalist 
claimants made claims of £5,000, or more, each (see W. Brown, The 
King's Friends, op. oit., p. 267), even though probably a much 
smaller percentage of the colonial population was individually 
worth this amount. Of course this may not be the only possible 
explanation of this observation, but the speculation made in the 
main text does not conflict with this fact.
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where these factors were not operating.
The information from the claims commission may also not 
accurately reflect the relative distribution of Loyalist support in the 
colonies on the eve of the Revolution because it reflects the information 
on Loyalists who actually left the colonies, and bothered to submit a 
claim for compensation, and not on those Loyalists who could, or would, 
not leave the colonies, or if they did leave they did not submit a claim. 
Many relatively poor Loyalists, who may have felt as pro-British as the 
colonists who did become refugees, may not have controlled enough 
resources to enable them to migrate to Canada, Great Britain or 
elsewhere. The poor in the western areas of Virginia and Pennsylvania, 
for example, had to travel relatively long distances either to the coast, 
or Canada. Possibly for this reason, amongst others, relatively few of 
these poor, and Loyalist, colonists did migrate. On the other hand, 
those close to escape routes, such as the colonists in the back country 
of the colony of New York, migrated in relatively large numbers.^
Other groups of Loyalists, however, might not have left the colonies 
because they were strong enough to resist pressure to induce them to 
leave; this was more likely the case where they were numerous enough 
to repel any harassment by the patriots. Some of the poor who did
become refugees may not have thought it worth their while to claim 
compensation. Although Brown does not think this happened, a contrary
(1) The facts to support these statements will be discussed in more 
detail below. The general point being made here is also made by 
E.R. Fingerhut, "Use and Abuses of the American Loyalists' Claims: 
A Critique of Quantitative Analysis", William and Mary Quarterly, 
Vol. 25 (1968), pp. 248-249.
(2) Cf. W. Brown, The King’s Friends, op. oit., pp. 288-289.
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view has been put by Fingerhut.^  If indeed the poor tended not to 
make claims, and also those Loyalists who did come from the back-country 
tended to be poor, then the claims commission reports would understate 
the relative strength of the Loyalist support in the frontier areas.
For these reasons it seems reasonable to conclude that the
American Revolution did cause the geographic location of relatively
strong Loyalist support, as reflected in the post-revolution claims
commission statistics, to vary compared to that which probably existed
just prior to the Revolution. In particular, it seems probable that the
claims commission data would tend to overstate the relative strength of
Loyalist support in the seaboard urban areas, and understate the
relative strength of this support in the rural, and particularly some
(2)western rural, areas. Nevertheless, despite these reservations about
this data, it does seem worthwhile considering this information, as a 
means of testing the hypothesis outlined above, concerning the location 
of differing political behaviour in the colonies, as an indirect test 
for the proposition that the British government's public finance 
policies, in the 1760s and 1770s, contributed, to some degree, in 
bringing about the American Revolution.
(1) E.R. Fingerhut, "Uses and Abuses", op. ait., pp. 247 and 250-251.
He points out that the commission was very strict in its 
requirement that documented evidence had to be produced, to show 
that a Loyalist had owned the property lost to the American 
patriots, before it would pay compensation to the individual making 
the claim. The people most likely to lack this evidence were the 
poor.
(2) Wallace Brown probably would disagree with this view. He has 
stated the following: "New York is the only colony where in certain 
areas the distribution of claimants may not be an accurate 
reflection of over-all loyalty strength". While he provides 
arguments to support this statement as far as New York is concerned 
he provides no evidence to show that this statement is true for the 
other colonies as well. Cf. W. Brown, The King's Friends3 op. ait., 
p. 83n.
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To begin with the aggregate statistics for each colony will be 
considered. In table 4 are presented estimates of the percentages of 
the total white population for each colony who were claimants.
TABLE 4
(3)Percentage of Total White Population Who Were Claimants.
(4)New Yorkv 0.567 Connecticut 0.077
Georgia^ 0.572 Pennsylvania 0.074
South Carolina 0.485 New Hampshire 0.056
New Jersey 0.201 Maryland 0.054
Massachusetts ^ 0.109 Virginia^ 0.041
Rhode Island 0.103 Delaware 0.026
North Carolina 0.100
) The estimates are not identically the same as those estimated by
Brown; cf. W. Brown, The King's Friends, op. cit., p. 253. This
is particularly so in the case of the percentages estimated for 
Georgia and Virginia. Since Brown does not provide any sources for 
the statistics of the total white population for each colony used 
in his calculation, it is a little difficult to explain the 
differences between his estimates and those shown in table 4. 
Apparently Brown used the population statistics in the Historical 
Statistics, op. cit., but this does not explain the discrepancy 
in the case of Virginia, unless one assumes Brown did not include 
the population of Kentucky in his calculations. The discrepancy 
in the case of Georgia, however, defies explanation, even if the 
population statistics in the Historical Statistics are used to 
calculate the percentage of claimants for Georgia in table 4, which 
they were not, as is explained in note 5 to table 4.
(2) Since the claimants were most probably only family heads, the 
percentages may be multiplied by the average size of the claimant 
families, say five or six, to give a more accurate idea of the 
order of magnitude of the relative strength of the active Loyalists, 
as a percentage of the total white population of each colony.
(3) The number of claimants by colony is to be found in W. Brown, The 
King's Friends, op. cit., pp. 290-344. The total white population 
for 1775 is calculated from the Historical Statistics of the United 
States (Washington, 1960), Series Zl-19, p. 256. The 1775 estimate 
was found by simple interpolation.
(4) Total white population includes that for Vermont.
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(3) Because the population of Georgia was growing relatively rapidly 
during this period the estimate of the white population in 1775 
provided by Stella Sutherland was employed, instead of an estimate 
found by interpolation using the population data from the 
Historical Statistics, op. cit. See Stella H. Sutherland, 
Population Distribution in Colonial America (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1936), pp. 259-260.
(6) Total white population includes that for Maine.
(7) Total white population includes that for Kentucky.
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This table does comply to some degree with what was hypothesised in the 
analysis outlined above. Colonies in which the incidence of implicit, 
or explicit, taxes imposed by the British government were thought to be 
relatively heavy, or potentially relatively heavy, compared to the 
revealed benefits received - as in the colonies of Maryland, Virginia 
and Delaware - the Loyalists were weakest; in fact quite decidedly 
weaker than in the colonies where the Loyalists were strongest. In 
colonies with relatively exposed wilderness frontiers - Georgia and 
South Carolina - or possibly benefiting particularly from sea defence 
- Georgia, South Carolina and possibly New Jersey - the Loyalists were 
relatively numerous; at least, as indicated by the statistics in table 
A. As for the colony of New York, besides being particularly exposed 
to the presence of British troops during the Revolution, it also had a 
wilderness frontier which, in addition, was close to the Canadian 
border and, therefore, an area from which it would have been relatively 
easy for the Loyalists to reach the safety of a British controlled area.
It might be thought that the positions of North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia should have been higher in the ordering shown 
in table A given that all these colonies had western frontiers.
However, in order to determine whether the presence of the western 
frontier did have any impact on the geographic distribution of the 
Loyalists in these colonies, the data needs to be disaggregated down to 
the county level.
One problem with attempting to perform any statistical tests 
on this disaggregated data is that the information on the total white 
population, for each colony by county, needed to calculate the 
proportion of claimants for each county, is not always available for
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the same year close to 1773. To overcome this problem, colonies are 
grouped together which have population data for about the same year.
The colonies of New Hampshire, South Carolina, Georgia and North 
Carolina^ have population estimates for 1775, Massachusetts for 1776, 
and Rhode Island and Connecticut for 1774. The population statistics 
for the counties of these colonies will be used to form a sample of 
seventy-two observations. There are total white population statistics, 
by county, available for the colony of New York for the year 1771, and 
for New Jersey for 1772. These statistics provide a separate data 
source of twenty-seven observations. For the colonies of Pennsylvania 
and Virginia there is population data by county for the years 1779 and 
1782-87 respectively, but none closer to 1775. To include the 
calculations of the proportionate Loyalist strength, using this data, 
with that for the other colonies, would only tend to bias any 
regression coefficients that might be estimated using this grouped data. 
Thus the geographic distribution of Loyalist strength in these two 
colonies, as indicated by the proportion of claimants by county, will 
need to be discussed separately.
For each of the counties, in each of the colonies mentioned 
above, the percentage of claimants for that county, of the total white 
population for that county, was calculated. To determine whether the
(1) For this colony there were no statistics available on the size of 
the total white population for each county in 1775. However, it 
is possible to estimate this data from the estimates of the total 
population for each county, and the estimates of the percentage of 
slaves found in each county for years other than 1775, but within 
ten years of this date. Assuming that these percentages did not 
change very much during the intervening period, then the estimates 
of the total white population for each county in North Carolina in 
1775 should be reasonably accurate. See Stella H. Sutherland, 
Population Distribution, op. o i t p. 212, for the population 
statistics, and p. 216n for the proportion of slaves in each county.
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frontier was a statistically significant variable, in determining the 
size of the proportion of claimants in a county, a dummy variable was 
employed (Di) as an independent variable in a regression equation; the 
value one was given if the county was at, or near, the western frontier, 
and zero otherwise.
But other variables may also influence the relative size of 
the percentage of claimants calculated for a county, and these variables 
need to be taken into account. If a county had a large town within its 
borders, and/or a town which was the British administrative centre for 
the colony, the value of one was given to that county, and zero 
otherwise (D2). The reasons for including this variable are fairly 
obvious; first, given the comments above about the greater likelihood 
that the Loyalists in the towns would be victimised by the Patriots, 
compared to those in rural areas, and, second, that it seems reasonable 
to suppose that employees of the British government were more likely to 
be loyal to this government, and possibly also more likely to receive 
the coercive attention of the Patriots. One might also add that recent 
immigrants to the colonies, who possibly would have had a tendency to be 
more loyal to the British government, than those b o m  in the colonies, 
may also have tended to congregate in the coastal towns. This statement 
is not made with any conviction, and, as will be seen below, is 
qualified to a large extent.
In the hope of determining whether British sea defence had any 
impact on the proportionate strength of the Loyalists the value one was 
given to counties on the coast, and all other counties zero (D3) .  
Finally, if the British troops had been in, or near, a county for any 
length of time during the American Revolution the value one was given to
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that county, and zero otherwise (D4) . The reason for including this 
dummy variable was explained above.
Thus four dummy variables are employed, separately, or in 
various combinations, in an attempt to explain the relative values of 
the proportions of claimants in each county included in the two data 
samples. The general form of the regression equation to be estimated is
A A
- a + 3i Di + 32 02.^  + 33 D3i + 34 D4i + e^,
here Di is the dummy variable for counties at, or near, the western 
frontier, D2 is the dummy variable for counties with relatively large 
towns, or British administrative centres, within their borders, D3 is 
the dummy variable for coastal counties, and, D4 is the dummy variable 
for counties with British troops in, or near, them for any length of 
time during the American Revolution. is the percentage of Loyalists
of the total white population in a county and e^ is the residual. The 
constant term a, and 3j's, are the parameters to be estimated, and, in 
particular, determine whether they are statistically significantly 
different from zero.
In the case of the most of the dummy variables there was no 
difficulty in determining whether a county should take the value of one 
or zero. This was certainly the case of the dummy variable concerning 
whether a county was on the coast or not, and that used to account for 
large towns and concentration of British government officials.
In the case of the dummy variables Di and D4 a certain amount
(1) Maps showing the location of each county are to be found in 
Wallace Brown, The King’s Friends 3 op. cit.3 passim.
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of judgement was required in determining what counties were, or were not, 
on, or near, the western frontier, and in which troops were stationed 
for any extended period of time. The assumptions made to compose these 
variables, however, do seem to be reasonable,^  although possibly some 
errors of judgement did creep into nominating the values of these 
variables.
A number of regressions were run, using different combinations 
of variables, employing the first data sample. The first regression 
used all the dummy variables and a constant term, the results of which 
are shown in table 5. R1 2 stands for the multiple correlation 
coefficient adjusted for degrees of freedom, and D.W. the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. All the coefficient estimates are significant at the five 
per cent level, according to the two tail test, except for the estimate 
of the constant term and the coefficient for D 3. The constant term is 
dropped from this regression and the reestimated results are shown as 
regression number two. All the coefficient estimates are significant at
A
the five per cent level except the estimate for $3> which is
(1) In the first data sample, the counties nominated as being on, or
near, the western frontier were Camden, Ninety Six and Orangeburg 
in South Carolina, the whole of Georgia, and the counties of Anson, 
Bladen, Cumberland, Mecklenburg, Rowan and Tryon in North Carolina. 
The counties considered to be ones where British troops were 
stationed in, or near, for any length of time were Newport in Rhode 
Island, Fairfield and Litchfield in Connecticutt, and Charleston in 
South Carolina. In the second data sample, the counties of Albany, 
Charlotte and Tryon in the colony of New York were considered as 
being frontier counties. Counties which were assumed to have had 
British troops stationed in, or near, them during the American 
Revolution were Kings, Queens, Suffolk, New York, Orange and 
Richmond in the colony of New York, and Essex, Middlesex, Somerset, 
Bergen and Sussex in New Jersey. In order to distinguish the 
extended length of time that the British troops stayed in New York, 
the value of two was given to this county, instead of one.
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significant only at the twenty per cent level, according to the two tail 
test. The value of the R2 has also increased in value compared to that 




Number ol 01 §2 e 3 §4 R2 F- D.W.
statistic
1 . 0.1245 0.2207 0.5790 0.0633 0.3075 0.4075 13.51 2.08
(0.2717) (2.8410) (4.6749) (0.9906) (2.0898)
2 . 0.2206 0.5782 0.0739 0.3124 0.4218 13.70 1.99
(3.2299) (4.7031) (1.4720) (2.1543)
3. 0.2530 0.6203 0.3468 0.4050 17.75 2.18
(3.6576) (5.1780) (2.4177)
Cl) Numbers appearing in brackets are the t-statistics for the
coefficient estimates appearing above the bracketed numbers.
* Significant at the one per cent level of significance according to 
the two tail test.
** Significant at the two per cent level of significance according to 
the two tail test.
*** Significant at the five per cent level of significance according to 
the two tail test.
**** Significant at the twenty per cent level of significance according 
to the two tail test.
Dropping D 3 from the equation provides the results shown as 
regression number 3. The coefficient estimates are all significant at 
the two per cent level but the value of the R2 has fallen slightly in 
value. Apparently, therefore, the proximity of colonists to the 
frontier was a factor determining their political behaviour with respect 
to the British government. However, if colonists were located at the 
seaboard they apparently tended not to be more loyal to the British
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government than those further from the coast. Before discussing these 
findings any further the regression results obtained by employing the 
second sample of data should be consulted first. These results are 
shown in table 6.
Table 6
Regress-
ion ANumber (X AS i































5. 3.1123 ***0.6770 0.6709 27.0009 2.4126
(8.3770) (1.4878)
(1) Numbers appearing in brackets are the t-statistics for the
coefficient estimates appearing above the bracketed numbers.
* Significant at the one per cent level of significance according to 
the two tail test.
** Significant at the ten per cent level of significance according to 
the two tail test.
*** Significant at the twenty per cent level of significance according 
to the two tail test.
The constant term in regression number one is not 
significantly different from zero at the normal levels of significance, 
and is therefore dropped from the regression equation. In regression 
number two 33 is still not significantly different from zero, thus D3 is 
dropped from the regression equation. The coefficient estimate for Di
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is still the only one to be statistically significant. By alternately 
dropping D2 and D4 from the regression equation it is found that D4 is 
more significantly different from zero, although the adjusted multiple 
correlation coefficient for the regression equation using only variable 
Di and D4 (see regression number 4) is slightly less than that for the 
regression where D2 replaces D4 as an explanatory variable (see 
regression 5).
Thus in the case of this second data sample, covering just the 
colonies of New York and New Jersey, the location of the colonists with 
respect to the western frontier also appears to be a statistically 
significant variable in determining some colonists' political vehaviour, 
whereas the location of the colonists to the seaboard does not appear to 
be a statistically significant variable in determining this behaviour.
Despite the apparent statistical significance of the proximity 
of the colonists to the western frontier in determining their loyalty to 
the British government, the results obtained by employing the second 
data sample should not be overemphasised. The reason is that the 
dummy variable, Di, no doubt is also picking up the influence of the 
fact that it was relatively easy for the colonists in the frontier 
regions to leave the colonies by way of crossing the Canadian border. 
Also, despite the statistical significance of the coefficients for Di 
in the regression equations using the two data samples, this does not 
appear to be the case in the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania, 
both colonies with a frontier abutting onto the wilderness. Simple 
observation of the geographic distribution of the proportion of 
claimants by county in these colonies indicates that the Loyalists in
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the frontier counties were relatively weak. (1)
Despite the apparent weakness of the Loyalists in these areas
it is thought that they were stronger in number in the frontier regions
of these colonies than the data on the number of claimants would suggest.
For example, it is known that there were a number of Loyalists in
Pittsburgh (Westmoreland county, Pennsylvania) yet there were only four
(2)claimants from this area. In Virginia it is also thought by some
historians that there was a relatively strong Loyalist group in the
interior, but the failure of the British government to give support to
them prevented this Loyalist element from revealing istelf - at least
(3)revealing itself in the records of the claims commission. Other
partial explanations for the relatively small number of claimants from 
these frontier areas could be associated with the difficulties involved
(1) The percentage of claimants in Pennsylvania was about 0.064 per 
cent (using an estimate of the total white population for 1780) 
whereas in the frontier counties of Bedford and Westmoreland these 
percentages were 0.013 and 0.045 respectively (using estimates of 
the total white population of these counties in 1779). The only 
frontier county which shows a relatively large number of claimants 
is Northumberland with a percentage of claimants of 0.373. A 
possible reason why this county was above the average for 
Pennsylvania was that it was relatively easy for the Loyalists to 
leave the county of Northumberland by going down the Susquehanna 
River. In Virginia the frontier counties all had relatively few 
claimants - Augusta 0.015 per cent, Bedford 0.018 per cent, Fort 
Pitt 0.019 per cent, Kashaskia 0.000 per cent and Rockinghan 0.034 
per cent, - compared to the colony average of 0.037 per cent. 
(Estimates of the total white population for the period 1782-87 
were used to calculate these percentages for the counties, and an 
estimate of the total white population in 1780 to calculate the 
average percentage for the colony.)
(2) Cf. Wallace Brown, The King’s Friends, op. oit., pp. 139-140 and 
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with travelling to areas of British control, especially for the poor 
from these areas, and that the Loyalists in these areas may have been 
relatively unmolested by the Patriots, for the reasons speculated about 
above.
In the regression results for the first data sample, the dummy 
variable Di may also be picking up the influence of the relatively large 
number of those who were foreign born, and who were also claimants from 
the colonies of North Carolina, South Carolina and G e o r g i a . T h e  
implication is that the place of a claimant's birth would influence his 
loyalties to the British government. But not too much should be made of 
this point for a large proportion of the populations of these three 
southern colonies were probably immigrants anyway and, therefore, if the 
country of birth had little, or no, influence on an individuals' loyalty 
to the British government, one would still expect to find a relatively 
large proportion of immigrants amongst those who were claimants.
Estimates of the proportion of immigrants of the total white
population for the southern colonies are not available, but it is
possible to piece together some reasonable conjectures as the order of
magnitude of these proportions. Assume that the total white population
(2)for Georgia, for example, in 1750, of 4,200, was all American born. 
Also assume that the natural population growth rate for this colony was 
2.0 per cent per annum. The calculated native born population in 1780,
(1) In these three colonies the foreign born claimants made up about
78 per cent of all claimants from each of these colonies. W. Brown, 
The King's Friends3 op. cit.} pp. 333, 337 and 341.
(2) This figure is obtained from the Historical Statistics, op. cit.3 
table Zl-19, p. 756.
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derived from the initial population was, therefore, 7,540; which is 
24.45 per cent of the estimated population for this year. If none of 
the rest of the population came from other colonies, and those who 
immigrated to Georgia after 1750 produced no offspring, then those who 
were foreign born made up 75.5 per cent of the population of Georgia in 
1780. Clearly this latter assumption is incorrect but to offset the 
upward bias it creates in the calculations of the proportion of foreign 
born the assumption, concerning the natural rate of the population 
increase, possibly tends to be on the high side. (This statement is 
amplified in the next paragraph.) Also after 1770 there seems to have 
been a sharp increase in the rate of immigration, compared to that for 
the period 1750 to 1770; between 1770 and 1780 the white population 
grew at a rate of 14.3 per cent per annum, and at 7.2 per cent per 
annum for the previous two decades; which means that these immigrants 
had less opportunity to produce American born offspring before 1780.
Thus the figure of 75.6 per cent of the population of Georgia in 1780 
being foreign born does not appear to be too unreasonable.
Applying the same assumptions to the population data for North 
and South Carolina indicates that 42 per cent, and 46 per cent, of the 
white population in these respective colonies were foreign born in 1780. 
For comparison, if the same assumptions are applied to the population 
statistics for Massachusetts, for example, the hypothesised native born 
population in 1780 is larger than the actual estimated population by 
25.5 per cent. This indicates, assuming that there was no rapid 
emigration from Massachusetts, that the assumption of a natural 
population growth rate of two per cent per annum, and/or the assumption 
that a colony's population in 1750 was all American born, tends to bias
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up the proportion of a colony's population calculated to be American 
born in 1780.
Finally, on this question of the influence of the country of 
birth of a colonist on this individual's political behaviour, there is 
no strong a priori reason why, the fact that a colonist if foreign born, 
should induce this individual to become a refugee Loyalist. It could 
well be argued that a foreign born colonist had made, for various 
reasons, a relatively recent, positive, decision to leave Europe. For 
this individual to become a refugee Loyalist meant that the colonist was 
possibly going back to the circumstances which he had been wanting to 
change by migrating to North America.
Based on these observations, the dummy variable Di, in the 
regression equations employing the first data sample, does appear to be 
identifying the influence of the frontier on political behaviour, 
although a minor part of its statistical significance probably should be 
assigned to the possibility that the claimant's place of birth 
influenced his loyalty to the British government. It does not seem 
possible to be more definite about this point than this, without having 
more detailed information about the geographic distribution of the 
proportions of the colonial population who were foreign born.
(1) One factor which does not appear to have had a positive influence 
on the size of the number of Loyalists in the frontier areas of 
North and South Carolina was the Regulator movement. The evidence 
available to support this statement is to be found in H.T. Lefler 
and A.R. Newcombe, North Carolina: the History of a Southern State
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1954), p. 178, 
and R.M. Brown, The South Carolina Regulators (Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 123-124.
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Of the other regression results shown in tables 5 and 6, the 
one which is of interest concerns the variable D3 - the variable 
supposed to be capturing the influence of the location of the colonists 
to the seaboard on the colonists' political behaviour. While the 
coefficient estimates for D3 in table 5 are not particularly 
statistically significant, and much less so in table 6, this does not 
necessarily mean that the location of the colonists to the seaboard was 
not a significant variable in explaining, at the first level of 
explanation, the loyalty of some colonists to the British government.
A possible reason why this variable was not shown to be of importance in 
explaining the relevant political behaviour of some colonists is that 
the influence it may have had was concentrated in the larger coastal 
towns - geographic areas which benefited particularly from international 
trade - and/or where British troops were stationed for any length of 
time.^ But it is not possible to test this speculation without some 
more relevant information. Such a piece of information, for example, is 
that it has been noted that the strength of the Loyalists in, and around, 
the town of New York was probably greater than the data from the claims 
commission would suggest. If this was indeed the case, then it is no
(1) This inability to distinguish between these effects does not show 
itself as there being a strong linear dependence between the column 
vectors of dummy variables, which implies that there is not a 
problem of multi-collinearity in these regressions. In the case of 
the first data sample, the multiple correlation coefficient for the 
regression D3 on Dj, D2 nnd D4 is -0.094. The multiple correlation 
coefficient for this regression employing the second data sample is 
0.183. Nor are the relevant simple correlation coefficients high.
(2) W. Brown, The King's Friends3 op. oit.3 p. 82. The reason for this, 
it is thought, is that the number of Loyalists in these areas was
so large that they could resist any attempt by the Patriots to use 
force in the attempt to induce these Loyalists to leave the state 
of New York.
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wonder that the coefficient estimates for the variables D2 , D3 and D4 in 
table 6 are not statistically significant.
Perhaps still the most significant fact to be noted in these 
results, in support of the hypothesis outlined above, is that to be 
observed back in table 4, and that is the decidedly relative weak 
strength of the Loyalists, in other words, the relative strength of the 
opposition to the British administration, in the colonies of Delaware, 
Maryland and Virginia. There is no need to comment on the claimants 
from Delaware as there were only ten of them.' As for the other two 
colonies, the major source of Loyalists seems to have come from the 
merchants, and/or office bearers, who came from the major towns in 
Maryland (fifty-one per cent of the claimants from Maryland came from 
Annapolis and Baltimore) and Virginia (forty-six per cent of the 
claimants came from Williamsberg, Norfolk and Portsmouth). Particularly 
in the case of Virginia it was the merchants, to whom (or their 
principles) the plantation owners were so financially indebted, who saw 
fit to leave the colonies. Outside the urban areas in these colonies 
there were relatively few claimants - about 0.026 per cent (of the 1775 
population) in Maryland and 0.02 per cent in Virginia, which are 
percentages of about the same size as that calculated for Delaware.
(See table 4.)
It seems reasonable to conclude from these statistical results 
that they comply to some degree with what was hypothesised above about 
the geographic distribution of the relative strength of the support for, 
and opposition to, the British government prior to the American 
Revolution, after taking into account other relevant considerations.
The dummy variable D^ does indicate the statistical significance of the
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proximity of colonists to the western frontier in determining their 
relatively strong pro-British political behaviour. It is another matter 
interpreting these results to mean that increased loyalty to the British 
government was due to the fact that colonists near to the frontier were 
relatively lightly taxed by the British, and were more inclined to value 
relatively highly, compared to other colonists, the benefits that 
external defence produced. Certainly there were some colonists living 
near the frontier who did value this assistance - the statements, from 
the Georgia Gazette and the petitioners from Anson county cited above is 
evidence to support this statement - but whether the influence of the 
relatively large size of the net benefits received from the British 
government's colonial public finance policies, by colonists at the 
frontier, was strong enough to induce them to reveal their pro-British 
feelings, (encouraged by this public finance policy) by becoming refugees, 
cannot be stated with any certainty just by consulting the regression 
results presented above. But the regression results obtained are not at 
variance with this interpretation.
The statistical significance of the dummy variable D3 in 
determining the colonists' political behaviour is not well established 
by the regression results. As was pointed out above, the reason for 
this might be because the other factors, which were operating at the 
same time, tended to cloud the influence of this variable, and also 
because the data on the number of claimants was not always an accurate 
guide to the strength of the Loyalists in coastal areas. But if D 3 was 
of some importance in determining political behaviour, it does not 
necessarily follow that the relative valuation of sea defence by some 
colonists, compared to the tax burdens they bore, as a result of British 
government revenue policies (or any British policy which created an
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economic burden for the colonists), was the underlying factor which was 
inducing some colonists to leave the colonies, although such an 
interpretation is reasonable.
If the valuation of the benefits of sea defence was indeed one 
variable determining the political behaviour of the colonists, it might 
go some of the way in explaining an apparent anomaly which appears in 
the statistical results presented above. It was hypothesised above that 
the incidence of the net economic burdens imposed by the British 
government, via its various public finance policies, were relatively 
heavy in the colonies of Delaware, Maryland and the eastern parts of 
Virginia, especially if the colonists in these colonies considerably 
understated their preferences for the benefits derived from sea defence. 
As a result the expectation was that anti-British sentiments would be 
relatively strong in this region of the colonies. The statistical 
evidence presented above tends to support this expectation. However the 
incidence of the gross economic burdens was also considered to be 
relatively heavy in the eastern areas of South Carolina, and if 
preferences for sea defence were similarly understated in this colony, 
the net burdens imposed on this colony were also relatively heavy. It 
seems reasonable to conclude from this, that if the incidence of the net 
burdens of British public finance policies did induce opposition to the 
British government, and other things remained the same, that the 
proportion of claimants in all these colonies, including South Carolina, 
would have been of the same order of magnitude. They were not; the 
percentage for South Carolina was distinctly higher than that for the
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other three c o l o n i e s . A  possible partial explanation of this 
difference may be that South Carolina was more exposed to being attacked 
from the sea, compared to the other three colonies, because its 
coastline was relatively open (a fact demonstrated by the British army's 
occupation of Charleston between 1781 and 1782), and it was closer to 
areas controlled by potential enemies who could invade from the sea.
As a result of these considerations, revealed preferences for sea defence 
in this colony, even during the Revolution, may have been higher, 
relative to the tax burdens imposed, than that to be found in Delaware, 
Maryland and Virginia, and thus proportionately more Loyalists tended to 
come from South Carolina. Of course, other factors may also help to 
explain this difference; such as the fact that British troops were 
stationed in South Carolina for a relatively long period of time; but 
the relative importance of sea defence to South Carolina, provided by 
the British government, possibly was also a consideration influencing 
political behaviour in this colony.
To conclude this chapter it must be emphasised that no great 
weight should be put on the statistical results obtained, by employing 
the information from the claims commission. Nevertheless these results 
are not totally at variance with the hypothesis that, because of the 
British government's public finance policies in the American colonies in 
the 1760s and 1770s, the colonists along the western frontier would have 
tended to be more loyal to the British government, and those groups of 
colonists, in the eastern parts of the colonies, who were relatively
(1) In table 4 the percentage for South Carolina is 0.488, whereas for 
Maryland it is 0.054, and even lower for Virginia and Delaware.
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dependent on international trade, and the monetised market system, would 
have tended to be relatively strong opponents of the British government. 
It should be emphasised, that the exercise in regression analysis 
attempted here has only been concerned with trying to identify 
statistically significant variables. This does not mean that anything 
definite can be stated about the relative importance of a statistically 
significant independent variable in explaining the variation in the 
proportion of claimants between regions, just by consulting the size of 
the regression coefficient for the significant independent variable.^ 
What is more important, even if the hypothesis is not disproved by the 
statistical evidence, nothing can be said, based on this result, about 
the relative importance of British colonial public finance policies in 
causing the American Revolution; all that can be said is that the 
statistical evidence does not disprove (or, at least, totally disprove)
(1) This political behaviour of the colonists in the eastern sector of 
the colonies also provides some weak evidence to show that the 
colonists tended to understate their preferences for sea defence. 
This group no doubt gained from sea defence, and possibly (some 
might say probably) to an extent in excess of the economic burdens 
imposed by the British government's revenue raising policies, or 
such intended policies to raise revenue. Yet these colonists 
strongly opposed this government over these policies.
A more substantial test, in addition to the ones already 
provided above, of the hypothesis that the average colonist, prior 
to the Revolution, tended to misrepresent his preferences for the 
collectively consumed goods in general provided by the British 
government, will be provided in the next chapter.
(2) The variance of the independent variables has to be known, and the 
covariance matrix should be orthogonal (there is no correlation 
between the independent variables), before anything definite can be 
stated about the relative importance of an independent variable, in 
explaining the variation of the dependent variable. See
A.S. Goldberger, Econometric Theory (New York, John Wiley, 1964), 
pp. 197-201.
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the hypothesis that it was of some importance.
As an alternative test of the proposition that economic 
considerations influenced the political behaviour of the colonists on 
the eve of the Revolution, an economic analysis is provided in appendix 




THE ECONOMIC CONTENT OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
The statistical test performed in chapter V to determine 
whether economic factors induced the colonists to revolt is not the 
only method that can be employed to test such a proposition. Another 
obvious method would be to assess the economic content of the list of 
grievances, against the British administration and its colonial 
policies, drawn up by the colonists at the beginning of the American 
Revolution; in other words, to assess the economic content of The 
Declaration of Independence of the 4th July, 1776.
Before embarking on such an exercise it would be well to
point out that in the past it has been argued that the economic content
of the Declaration was minimal. For example, C.M. Andrews expressed
the view that this document "contains only one item out of twenty-seven
constituting an economic grievance", and this grievance was an indirect
complaint arising out of the operation of the "English Mercantile
S y s t e m " ; viz. the Navigation Acts. One economic historian does not
(2)even believe that the Declaration made reference to these Acts.
While this is true, the Declaration, however, did make very clear
(1) C.M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History (4 Vols,
New Haven, Conn., 1934-38), Vol. IV, p. 427.
(2) P.M. McClelland, "The Cost to America of British Imperial Policy", 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 59 (May, 
1969), p. 376.
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implicit references to the Navigation Acts, and their implementation;
this will become apparent below. Nevertheless, even allowing for the
possible reference to the Navigation Acts, the view of some historians
still appears to be that the Declaration has no other economic content
and, what is more, this fact is utilised to support the view that
economic considerations did not contribute to any great degree in
inducing the colonists to revolt against the British administration.^
Clearly, as the discussion in chapter V indicates, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to determine the extent to which economic factors
goaded the colonists into revolt, but what will become obvious from the
discussion which follows (if this point is not already obvious to those
familiar with the contents of the Declaration, and the analysis in
chapters IV and V above) is that the Declaration alluded to a good deal
many more distinct economic burdens than just the indirect reference to
the economic costs imposed by the Navigation Acts. This point has been
(2)realised by others, but there does not appear to be an extended 
discussion in the literature of the economic content of the complaints 
listed in the Declaration. A possible repercussion of this omission is 
that some historians have tended to give too little weight to economic 
elements which contributed to the Revolution.
The discussion which follows will not be an extended one.
The reasons are that the relevant historical interpretation of the 
Declaration has been provided by others, as, for example, by E. Dumbauld
(1) This appears to be an implication of I.R. Christie's survey of the 
historical literature on the American Revolution in "The 
Historians' Quest", op. o i t particularly p. 190.
(2) See, for example, J.R.T. Hughes, "Discussion", American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings} Vol. 59 (May, 1969), p. 383.
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in The Declaration of Independence and What It Means Today and most 
of the relevant economic analysis required for such a discussion is to 
be found in an explicit, or implicit, form in chapters II through to V 
above. Nevertheless the analysis which follows will help, to some 
degree, to high-light the extent to which economic considerations were 
involved in the colonists' grievances, against the British 
administration, in 1776.
Each grievance which has some obvious economic content will 
be discussed in the order in which it appears in the Declaration; 
those grievances which are thought not to contain any definite economic 
content will be ignored. The first group of grievances was directed 
against the king, of which the initial one stated:
"He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most 
wholesome and necessary for the public good".
This complaint obviously is general in nature, and refers to 
a number of grievances, some of which are identified in subsequent 
parts of the Declaration. A discussion of these relevant, specifically 
mentioned, complaints, which have some clear economic content, will 
take place below. For the present attention will concentrate on a 
complaint not referred to elsewhere in the Declaration, but which is 
implied by the initial grievance stated above; namely, the operation of 
the Currency Act. The operation of this Act prohibited the colonies
(2)implementing legislation which would allow them to print paper money.
(1) (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1950). The discussion 
which follows will draw heavily on Dumbauld's historical 
interpretation of the Declaration.
(2) Dumbauld, The Declaration, op. cit.3 p. 89.
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The actual form that the economic burdens took, resulting from the
implementation of this Act, have been outlined in chapters IV and
What should be mentioned here is that a possible reason why the Currency
Act of 1764 was not identified for more specific attention in the
Declaration is that, from 1770 on, the provisions of this Act were
(2)relaxed to allow more flexibility in the supply of legal tender.
The next five complaints stated in the Declaration can be 
ignored for the purposes of the present discussion, as they do not 
contain any obvious economic overtones. This is not the case in the 
grievance which follows:
"He has endeavored to prevent the Population of 
these States; for that Purpose obstructing the 
Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing 
to pass others to encourage their Migrations 
hither, and raising the Conditions of new 
Appropriations of Lands".
The refusal to allow the implementation of naturalization
laws, passed by the colonial assemblies, had begun, in part, from the
time of the proclamation of the 7th October, 1763, but the Declaration
implicitly refers in particular to the royal instruction of the 24th
(3)November, 1773, which denied assent to the naturalization acts. The
economic cost created, for some of the colonists, by such an action, 
was that it tended to reduce the rate of increase in the labour/land
(1) See pages 312-313 and pages 362-364 above.
(2) See J.A. Earnst, Money and Politics, op. cit., p. 245ff.
(3) Dumbauld, The Declaration, op. cit., p. 105.
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ratio in the colonies and, thereby, the rate of increase of Ricardian 
rents to be earned on land, other things remaining the same. As a 
result, the rate of increase in the capitalised value of land in the 
colonies would have tended to be slowed down by the constraints on 
immigration.^^ This was certainly against the interests of colonial 
land owners and land speculators. Another economic aspect of the slow­
down in the rate of immigration, but a consideration which perhaps was
not in the minds of those who signed the Declaration, although it
(2)certainly was thought of by some in Great Britain, was that it would 
have tended to reduce the rate of entry of modern techniques of 
industrial production into the colonies, as introduced by immigrants
(1) If other things did not remain the same, however, increased
immigration need not have caused the value of land to rise more 
rapidly. For example, the increased agricultural production, 
made possible from the increased supply of labour, may have caused 
the prices of this agricultural output to fall so low as to bring 
about a fall in land real values in the colonies; in other words, 
the rising marginal physical product of land, resulting from the 
rising labour/land ratio, was more than offset by the falling price 
of agricultural output, thereby causing the marginal revenue 
product of land to fall. Whether this would have happened as a 
result of the increased immigration into the colonies, had it been 
allowed, would have depended on the values of the price elasticity 
of demand for the output of colonial agriculture, and the values of 
the elasticity of factor substitution between labour and land in 
agriculture. This point is demonstrated in note one,in appendix 
B, below.
(2) Dumbauld, The Declaration, op. cit., p. 105. Also see Josiah
Tucker, "Great Britain and the Colonies", op. cit., pp. 364-365. 
Even with these constraints on immigration Tucker was still 
apparently worried by the loss of "Artificers and Mechanics to 
the colonies as a result of emigration from Great Britain. The 
believed economic loss to Great Britain of the "brain drain' , 
therefore, is not a notion of recent vintage, although at this 
time it was not just the loss created by the emigration of skilled 
labour as such that was the only concern, but also the 
realisation that there was a need to limit the uncompensated 
international externalities created by the emigration of labour 
possessing detailed knowledge of the latest techniques of 
industrial production in Great Britain.
405
skilled in the methods of the new bourgeoning industrial technology 
found in Great Britain.
The British government also disallowed laws passed in the
colonies providing financial encouragement to immigrants to settle in
the colonies (in the form of tax concessions to new immigrants to North
Carolina).^  At the same time the settlement of immigrants in the
colonies was positively discouraged by the British government insisting,
via the royal instruction of February, 1774, that vacant land in the
colonies in future had to be sold by auction at a price at, or above,
a reserve price that the colonists apparently thought was above the
market price then ruling. In addition, the level of the quit rent was
raised. These administrative devices, if implemented, implicitly, or
(2)explicitly, excluded the colonists from exploiting the wilderness.
Actually there is a certain element of contradiction in this 
particular grievance as the various controls placed on immigration and 
the expansion of land available for settlement and, therefore, 
presumably land for agricultural production, created potential economic 
losses and benefits for various economic groups residing in the colonies. 
While, as pointed out above, the controls on immigration tended to 
reduce (or potentially to reduce) the rate of increase in rents on land, 
on the other hand, these controls also tended potentially to increase
(3)the rate of increase of real wages. However, the controls on the
(1) Dumbauld, The Declaration, ibid.
(2) The discussion on pages 354-355 above extends the discussion of 
this point with respect to the use of an auction system for the 
sale of land, and the increase in the size of quit rents, as 
excluding instruments.
(3) This is easily shown by extending the analysis in appendix B; see 
note two in this appendix.
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expansion of the land area available for agriculture^^ potentially
would have tended to maintain the rate of increase in rents in the
eastern parts of the colonies; removal of these controls, if they had
been effective, would have reduced the rate of increase of rents earned
(2)on land in this region of the colonies, and since the supply of this
land was effectively fixed, the rate of increase of rental incomes on
this land would have fallen. Certainly John Dickinson was aware of this
particular sequences of repercussions, for he complained in letter eight
of his Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania that the westward expansion
of the colonies would only tend to reduce the rate of growth of land
(3)values in the more settled parts. As for the rental incomes earned
(1) When considering the controls on the expansion of the land area the 
controls implicitly imposed by the Quebec Act should also be 
included. These controls are discussed below on pages 414 and 415.
(2) This point is easily shown in equation 5, in appendix B, under the 
appropriate assumptions.
(3) The contexts of Dickinson's argument was his complaint that the 
last war, fought against the French, had produced results against 
the interests of the land owners in the longer settled parts of the 
colonies; the acquisition of the western lands tended to reduce 
the rate of increase of land values in the eastern sector of the 
colonies as the size of the population in the colonies increased. 
This argument is probably correct, but the subsequent assertion 
made by Dickinson in this context is not, for he went on to accuse 
the British government of fighting this war "solely for her own 
benefit. The objects of it were, the securing to herself the rich 
tracts of land on the back of these colonies, with Indian trade, 
and Nova-Scotia with the fishery". [John Dickinson, Letters from a 
Farmer in Pennsylvania (1767-1768), Letter VIII, (New York, The 
Outlook Company, 1903), pp. 81-82.]
Also what Dickinson failed to take into account, or 
acknowledge, was that the payment of taxes after 1763 to be 
employed in financing frontier defence was, in addition, for the 
purpose of reducing the rate of expansion of the land area of the 
colonies, and, therefore, this tax revenue was indirectly assisting 
in maintaining the rate of growth of land values in the eastern 
sector of the colonies; the growth rate of the very economic 
variable which Dickinson wanted maintained.
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on land in the west, however, these possibly would have tended to rise
when these controls on land acquisition were r e m o v e d . O n  the other
hand, these controls on the expansion of land for settlement would have
(2)tended to reduce the rate of growth of the real wage paid to labour.
Thus there were a number of conflicting potential advantages 
and potential disadvantages for various economic groups in the colonies 
that could have resulted from some of the controls introduced by the 
British authorities if they had been effectively applied. The controls 
on immigration potentially were to the advantage of wage earners and to 
the disadvantage of land owners. The controls on the expansion of land 
available for agricultural purposes potentially were to the disadvantage 
of wage earners, and probably to the disadvantage of speculators in 
wilderness land and any other colonial dealers in this land, but to the 
potential advantage of owners of land in the eastern part of the colonies. 
Obviously, it follows that not all the controls, with economic 
ramifications, imposed by the British government, and complained of in 
the Declaration, potentially imposed economic costs on some sections of 
the colonial community; there were some potential benefits in these 
controls for some quite sizable economic groups in the colonies.
However, the group that did most probably unambiguously suffer from the 
British government's policies discussed here were the dealers in 
frontier land, for they probably would have gained from the land 
expansion no matter what happened to the rate of immigration (as long as
(1) This possibility is discussed in more detail in note three in 
appendix B.
(2) This point is easily shown in terms of equation 6 in appendix B.
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there was not a net emigration). As for the other groups in the 
colonial society, the potential economic burdens and gains of the 
relevant British policies for these groups is more ambiguous.
Perhaps for this reason, at least in part, the British government1s 
colonial land policies are more frequently complained about, directly 
and indirectly, in the Declaration than the controls on immigration.
The next grievance of interest is:
"He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, 
for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount 
and Payment of their Salaries".
Judges in the colonies were appointed by the king, and their 
length of tenure was also dependent upon the king's directive. In 
addition, the salaries of the judges in the colonies were to be paid by 
the crown.
The fact that the British authorities possessed this control 
over the courts of law, instead of the colonists, obviously tended to 
increase the likelihood of the British government being able to impose 
its policies - public finance, or any other, policy - on the colonists. 
If this control was possessed by the colonists they, for example, could 
have always threatened to terminate the salary, and tenure, of those 
judges who ruled against those colonists who found themselves before the 
bench for violating provisions of those acts imposed by the British 
government to raise revenue in the colonies, and/or ignored the rule of
(1) These conflicting advantages and disadvantages of British colonial 
policies are demonstrated diagramatically in note four in appendix 
B.
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law in their protests against the British administration for imposing 
these acts. Thus the British government needed to possess control over 
the courts if it wished to implement its policies in the colonies; if 
the judges refused to prosecute, in cases where colonists had clearly 
broken the law as seen by the British government, the British 
authorities obviously needed to be able to remove these judges from 
office.
No doubt not all colonists saw this dispute, even in part, 
over this particular controversy, from this point of view. Nevertheless, 
the economic implications of this issue are quite clear; if the British 
government could not impose its laws through the courts - which was a 
real possibility if the colonists had been responsible for paying the 
salaries of the judges in the colonies, and were responsible for their 
appointment and removal from office - the British government had little, 
if any, chance of raising revenue in the American colonies via any 
revenue act imposed by Parliament. Thus, by the colonists not 
possessing this authority over the courts, the probability of the 
British government raising revenue in the colonies was no doubt raised, 
other things remaining the same, compared to what it would have been had 
the colonists possessed this control. How much this probability was 
raised is another matter. If the British government did not possess the 
coercive force required to bring colonists before the courts for 
refusing to comply with the rules of British laws, which in turn 
depended on the extent to which the colonists were prepared to oppose 
these laws, then the control over the courts by the British government 
would have had little, or no, effect on this government's ability to
raise revenue in the colonies.
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"He has erected a Multitude of new Offices, 
and sent hither Swarms of Officers to harrass 
our People, and eat out their substance."
This complaint is a clear reference to the additional 
commissioners of customs, and the courts of admiralty, established to 
police, and enforce, aspects of the Navigation Acts, and any other act 
constraining international trade with the colonies {viz. Townshend Act). 
The economic repercussions of this administrative action are also 
obvious - if this action was effective in reducing the evasion of these 
trade regulations it raised the implicit, or explicit, import, and 
export, duties imposed by these Acts constraining the international 
trade of the colonies, and obviously, thereby, raised the economic 
burdens, borne by the colonists, that were imposed by these A c t s . ^
"He has kept among us, in Times of Peace,
Standing Armies, without consent of our 
Legislatures."
The troops stationed in the coastal towns in the colonies
were so deployed to enforce law and order after the disturbances over
the Stamp Act in 1765. In other words, these troops were an instrument
for imposing the legislative authority of the British Parliament in the
colonies, as were the judges appointed by the British government. In
addition, these troops imposed an indirect tax on those colonies made
responsible for quartering them at their own expense, under the
(2)provisions of the Quartering Act of 15th May, 1765. Obviously if
(1) Also see the relevant discussions in chapter V, page 361 above.
(2) See "The Quartering Act" as reproduced in J.P. Greene, Colonies 
to Nations3 op. cit.3 pp. 43-44.
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these troops had not been so deployed the potential, if not the actual, 
economic burden imposed on the colonies, by British government 
legislation, would have been lighter.
The final charge specifically directed against the king can 
be ignored here. Thus of the twelve complaints levelled against the 
king, five had some economic content. The next set of grievances is 
directed against the king and his Parliament.
"He has combined with others to subject us 
to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, 
and-unacknowledged by our laws; giving his 
Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation."
This general statement begins the listing of the acts of 
Parliament which the framers of the Declaration regarded as being 
outside the bounds set for the authority of the British Parliament to 
legislate for the colonies, authority given to Parliament, by the 
consent of the American colonists, via "our Constitution". As Dumbauld 
has noted, this particular general charge against the king and his 
Parliament raised a crucial issue, leading to the Revolution, and that 
was: what exactly were the limits of the constitutional authority which
Parliament possessed to administer the American colonies?^ The 
colonists denied Parliament the authority to legislate for the colonies, 
other than with that authority specifically granted by the colonies.
What this clearly implied is that the colonists denied the British 
government its solution for financing, or excluding the colonists from 
consuming, the collectively consumed goods it provided, and from which
(1) Dumbauld, The Declaration3 op. cit.3 p. 120.
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the colonists benefited. This assertion is clearly supported by the 
grievances, listed in the Declaration, against the actions by the king 
and his Parliament, which attempted to solve the public finance problem 
the British government faced in its administration of the colonies.
Some of these grievances have already been touched on, but there were 
others yet to be considered.
This is not to say that all the grievances discussed here bore 
reasonably directly on the question of the British government's 
attempted solution of the economic problems posed by the collectively 
consumed goods it provided, and from which the colonists benefited.
This is not the case, for example, in the following charge, which was 
partly concerned with the issue of indirect taxation as such:
"For quartering large Bodies of Armed Troops 
among us".
The form of the implicit tax imposed on the colonists via the 
operation of the provisions of the Quartering Act of 1765 has already 
been dealt with above.
The grievance which follows in the Declaration is ignored 
here, but not that stating:
"For cutting off our Trade with all Parts of the 
World".
While there is no doubt that this complaint refers to the acts 
of Parliament of 1774 and 1775, which prohibited all trade with the 
colonies, it is thought by Dumbauld that it also refers to the operation
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of the Navigation Acts. This view is most probably correct for parts
of these Acts did indeed prohibit direct international trade between the 
colonies and some parts of the world. The economic repercussions of 
this constraint was to impose an implicit tax on those colonists 
affected by the operation of the Acts, or at least prevented these 
colonists in the 1760s and 1770s from making a capital gain (as was 
discussed in chapter V).
"For Imposing Taxes on us without our Consent."
There is no need to expand on what was said in chapter IV 
about the economic content of this complaint.
"For depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits 
of Trial by Jury."
Trial by jury was never available in the admiralty courts in
Great Britain, or the colonies, which tried individuals on charges of 
(2 )smuggling. Such an institutional arrangement, with these courts
presided over by judges appointed, and whose salaries were paid, by the 
British government, no doubt increased the probability of finding an 
individual colonist, brought before this court, guilty, compared to a 
situation where this individual was tried in the colonies by a jury 
composed of colonists who almost certainly would have been sympathetic 
to the defendant/1 23  ^ What this implies, in terms of the economic 
repercussions of this particular administrative constraint on the use of
(1) Dumbauld, The Declaration^ op. cit.3 p. 129.
(2) Dumbauld, The Declaration3 op. cit.3 p. 132.
(3) This point is taken up, in a little more detail, below. Also see 
the discussion above concerning the appointment, and payment, of 
judges in the American colonies.
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juries, is that the relatively more effective imposition of penalties 
for smuggling should have tended to discourage this practice, and, 
thereby, implicitly raised in size the implicit, or explicit, import 
duties imposed on the colonists. Such an increase was clearly against 
the colonists' economic interests.
"For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried 
for pretended Offences."
Individual American colonists, believed to be guilty by the 
British authorities of breaking the law - for example, for refusing to 
comply with the revenue laws, or for riotous behaviour against these 
laws - were liable to be transported to face trial in other parts of 
the British Empire, where it, no doubt, was thought that the outcome of 
this trial could not be influenced by pressure, moral or otherwise, 
brought to bear by the American colonial population. This policy 
clearly was implemented by the British for the purpose of enforcing its 
colonial policies via the courts, and was against the economic interests 
of the colonists, if successfully executed, in the instance of legal 
cases related, directly or indirectly, to revenue acts.
"For abolishing the Free System of English Laws 
in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein 
an arbitrary Government, and enlarging its 
Boundaries, so as to render it at once an Example 
and fit instrument for introducing the same 
absolute Rule in these Colonies."
This complaint refers to the provisions of the Quebec Act.
As was pointed out in chapter V, the economic repercussion of enlarging 
the boundaries of the colony of Quebec, to incorporate the land north-
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west of the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers, was that this action acted as 
an excluding device against those colonists who wished to exploit the 
collectively consumed good properties that this wilderness land 
possessed; certainly not a policy action to the economic advantage of 
some colonial interest groups.
"For taking away our Charters, abolishing our 
most valuable Laws; and altering fundamentally 
the Forms of our Governments."
The predominant case of the British Parliament altering the
charter of a colony was that to be found in the provisions of the
(2)Massachusetts Government Act of 20th May, 1774. The important
changes introduced by this Act were that the members of the Council were 
to be appointed by the crown, whereas previously the House of Assembly 
elected this body, and juries were to be chosen by sheriffs instead of 
being elected by the colonists, as was the case before this Act was 
implemented. It was also made clear in this Act that the crown- 
appointed governor was given sole power to appoint, or remove, judges, 
any other officer of the courts of law, and sheriffs.
There is no reason to speculate as to the reasons why these 
changes were made; they are provided in the Act. On the system
(3)whereby the Council was elected by the Assembly, the Act stated:
(1) See the discussion on page 407 above which expands on this point.
(2) Excerpts of this Act are reproduced in J.P. Greene, Colonies to 
Nations3 op. eit.3 pp. 204-207.
(3) J.P. Greene, Colonies to Nations, ibid.
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"... [It] hath, by repeated experience, been 
found to be extremely ill adopted to the plan 
of government established in the province of 
the Massachusetts Bay, ... and hath been so 
far from contributing to the attainment of the 
good ends and purposes thereby intended, ... 
and conformity with, the laws of Great Britain, 
that the manner of exercising the powers, 
authorities, and privileges aforesaid, by the 
persons so annually elected, hath, for some time 
past, been such as had the most manifest 
tendency to obstruct, and, in great measure, 
defeat, the execution of the laws".
This obstruction had to be by-passed by the crown becoming 
responsible for the appointments to, and removal from, the Council.
As for the previous method of the electing juries, this 
"affords occasion for many evil practices, and tends to pervert the free 
and impartial administration of justice".
The economic implications of these changes for the colonists 
should be quite obvious, given the discussion above of some of the other 
charges against the king, or the king and his Parliament.
The final complaint against an act passed by the British 
Parliament is ignored. Thus in this section of the Declaration, of the 
ten complaints about acts of Parliament eight had some clear economic
(1) J.P. Greene, Colonies to Nations, ibid.
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content.
In the last section of the listed grievances there are five 
complaints, all of which are directed against the king. But these 
charges are ignored here because they refer to a situation where the 
Revolution had begun, with the British government attempting to quell 
the colonists' violent opposition with military repression in one form 
or another; the present analysis is only concerned with the causes 
leading up to the Revolution, not the complaints resulting directly from 
a violent revolution already in progress.
In total, therefore, thirteen of the twenty-seven complaints 
presented in the Declaration may be interpreted to have had some 
economic content. If the last five of the listed grievances are ignored, 
and only those complaints which referred to events which preceded the 
Revolution are taken into account, then thirteen of the twenty-two 
complaints listed could clearly be related, in part, to economic gross 
burdens, or potential burdens, the colonists bore, or possibly could 
have borne, in one form or another, as a result of British government 
colonial policies.
It should be emphasised that just to determine the proportion 
of the grievances which had some economic elements to them, compared to 
the total number presented in the Declaration, does not give a clear 
idea of the relative importance of these economic complaints, compared 
to the total stock of complaints. First of all, some of the grievances 
are repeated to some degree through the Declaration. As a result there 
is an element of double counting if this repetition is not allowed for 
when counting up the complaints. More important is the fact that the 
framers of the Declaration did not provide any reasonably precise
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information about the relative importance of each of the grievances, let 
alone this sort of information on each of the separate complaints 
implied by a single statement of a grievance in the Declaration. As a 
result it is left to others to speculate about the relative importance, 
as seen by the colonists, of each of the grievances listed. It follows 
that it is not possible to state, with any certainty, how relatively 
important economic factors were in determining the political behaviour 
of the colonists, based on an analysis of the Declaration.
Despite this inconclusive result, what can be said is that, 
according to the interpretation given above of the Declaration, this 
document implicitly referred to a good many more economic complaints, 
and issues, than some have inferred from the grievances listed in the
Declaration of Independence.
To conclude this discussion of the Declaration it is of 
interest to note that this document also contains an indirect attempt 
to understate the benefits received by the colonists from the British 
government expenditures on external defence, and disputes the tax-prices 
charged to pay for this service. In the final paragraph of the 
Declaration it is stated:
"We have reminded them [the British] of the 
circumstances of our emigration and settlement 
here".
This subject is expanded upon by Jefferson in his Summary
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View (1) where he states:
"Not a shilling was ever issued from the public 
treasures of his Majesty, or his ancestors, for 
their [the colonies] assistance, till of very 
late time, after the colonies had become 
established on a firm and permanent footing.
That then, indeed, having become valuable to 
Great Britain for her commercial purposes, his 
Parliament was pleased to lend them assistance 
against an enemy. ... Yet these states never 
supposed, that by calling in her aid, they 
thereby submitted themselves to her sovereignty. 
Had such terms been proposed, they would have 
rejected them with disdain, and trusted for 
better to the moderation of their enemies, or to 
a vigorous exertion of their own forces. We do 
not, however, mean to under-rate those aids, 
which to us were doubtless valuable, on whatever 
principle granted; ... they amply may be repaid 
by our giving to the inhabitants of Great Britain
such exclusive privileges in trade as may be 
advantageous to them, and at the same time not too
restrictive to ourselves".
(1) Dumbauld discusses the fact that this sentence from the Declaration 
is an implicit reference to some ideas expressed in the Summary 
View. See The Declaration, op. cit.y p. 151.
(2) Thomas Jefferson, "A Summary View of the Rights of British America , 
MS Text to be found in The Papers of Thomas Jeffersony Vol. 1,
op. cit.y p. 122
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Contrary to Jefferson's assertion, the British had spent 
resources prior to 1754 on providing external defence from which the 
colonists b e n e f i t e d . A n d  the British government had not demanded 
repayment for the cost of the military assistance given to the colonies 
during the Great War for the Empire, but only demanded a partial 
repayment for the costs of providing relevant collectively consumed goods 
after 1763. Yet assuming that the British government had demanded 
repayment of the war expenditures, Jefferson disputed the tax-price 
charged to allow this repayment.
Perhaps Jefferson did not mean to be misleading in his 
presentation of colonial history, remembering that he was only thirty- 
one years of age at the time of writing the Summary View, and, therefore, 
possibly was too young to be properly informed of the relevant 
historical facts. In addition, one could not dispute the tax-price 
Jefferson thought was adequate to repay the British for their military 
assistance supplied to the colonies, unless one was prepared to make a 
value judgement.
(1) The evidence to support this statement was presented at the
beginning of chapter III above. To emphasise the point made in the 
main text even further it may be well to cite a statement made by 
the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1741, at the time Great Britain was 
involved in a maritime war with Spaint
"Among the many Advantages this Colony, with others enjoy, 
under our gravious King, that of being protected ... is One. To 
this End, there are generally Ships of War stationed at Boston,
New York, and Virginia, as Places the most commodiously situated, 
that whenever Enemies approach, they might, on Notice given them, 
be in Readiness to scour the Coasts ...'.
Clearly the colonists of Pennsylvania, in 1741, would not have 
agreed with Jefferson's later assertion that the British government 
had not spent any funds on protecting the North American colonies 
prior to 1754.
The passage cited is from the Pennsylvania Archives, eight series,




Assume that there are two factors of production, labour (L) 
and land (T), combined in production to produce the agricultural output 
(X). The rent (r) received on land, in a perfectly competitive industry 
with constant returns to scale, is the marginal physical product of land 
multiplied by the price of agricultural output (P ); alternativelycl
where the starred variables are the rates of growth of these variables,
a is the relative share of output going to labour and o is the
ctelasticity of factor substitution. The ratio —  is obviously positive.
in other words, all the agricultural output is consumed, and the level of
[1 ]
On expanding equation 1, to find the rate of increase of 
land rents, it can be shown that^^
[2]
Introducing the demand conditions for agricultural output,
X = D
and D = D(P , P, Y)cl [3]
(1) Cf. J. Pitchford, "Wage Policy and Distribution Theory", 
Eoonomiaa, Vol.34 (1967), pp.178-179.
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demand is a function of the price of this output, the prices of other 
commodities in general (P), and income (Y). Totally differentiating
equation 3, and dividing by X, it can be shown that
* k k k
X = £ P + £ P  + £ Y  ,a a y
* £
or
*P X £ * v *_ —— - ■ -- p _ — L. ya £ £ £ a a a
The £^'s are the respective price and income elasticities, with their 
assumed qualitative values being £^<0, £ > 0  and £^>0. Substituting 
equation 4 into equation 2
* £n k k X £ *  v*-  (L - T) + — --- —  P - —^ YQ £ £ £a a a
[5]
k k k k
If P and Y are so small that they can be ignored, and (L - T) is positive,
k
then r will only be positive if £ (which is negative) is large enough
* a
X O L * *not to cause the value of —  to offset the value of —  (L - T).£ oa
Note two
Via a similar procedure to that shown in the previous note, 
it can be shown that
£*
w =
*(1 - a) * * x £ *  v * ^  ^ (T-L) + —  P - t^ Y  ,
where (1-a) is the relative share of output going to land. With £3.
* * * * 
relatively large, w will increase if L falls with T constant. L will
almost certainly fall if immigration into the colonies is curtailed. 
Note three
On the horizontal axis in diagram 1 is represented the
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available supply of l a b o u r . T h e  marginal physical product of labour
(MPP) in the eastern areas of the colonies is measured on the right-hand
vertical axis, and the same variable for the western frontier areas of
the colonies is measured on the left-hand vertical axis. The effect of
increased agricultural output on the price of this output and, therefore,
on the marginal revenue product of labour is ignored in this diagram.
The MPP schedule, indicating the MPP with increased supplies of labour
being applied to a fixed amount of land, is assumed to be downward
sloping in both sectors. The initial MPP schedule for the frontier
region is AB, and CD for the east. Where the schedules cut indicates
the distribution of labour between the sectors (OF in the west and O^F
(2)in the east) and the equilibrium wage for both sectors.
The British authorities remove the controls on westward 
expansion. The greater availability of land, of the assumed same quality 
as that already in use in the region, thereby causes the MPP in the 
western frontier region to rise for all positive amounts of labour in 
this region. The MPP curve AB pivots upwards from its origin to the 
position AG. The wage rate will increase in both sectors as the increased 
wage rate in the west will induce labour to leave the eastern sector, 
thereby forcing up the wage rate in this region of the colonies.
(1) This diagram is employed by R.W. Fogel and J.L. Rutner to analyse 
a similar general type of problem as that discussed here.
Cf. R.W. Fogel and J.L. Rutner, "The Efficiency Effects of Federal 
Land Policy, 1850-1900: A Report of Some Provisional Findings",
in W.O. Aydelotte, The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History 
(London, Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.390-418, esp. pp.404-411.
(2) Transport costs and the risks involved with living at, or near, the 
frontier (risks of being attacked by Indians) are abstracted from. 
Allowing for these considerations would introduce a wage differential 
into the model, but basically this would not alter the conclusions







The rental income initially earned in the East is represented 
by the area CEJ in diagram 1. After the release of land this rental 
income falls to area CHK. In the western frontier region the initial 
rental income is represented by the area AEL, and after the change 
it is represented by the area AMH. As represented in diagram 1, this 
implies a rise in rental income in the frontier region as area AEL is 
less than area AMH. But this need not be the case as wages may rise 
so sharply as to more than absorb any increase in regional income 
allowed by the increased supply of land. This would be the case, for 
example, if the schedule DC were highly inelastic, then it may have 
turned out that the rental income in the western frontier region fell 
with an increased supply of land.
This possibility may be more precisely demonstrated with a 
little mathematics. It is known that the wage rate in both sectors 
must increase by the same rate; in other words,
* [7]
where the subscripts F and E stand for the frontier sector and the
eastern areas of the colonies respectively. Utilising equation 6 above,
* *and assuming that e has a minus infinite value, and P = Y  = 0, equation
Si
7 may be written as
u - ° o F (1 ot)£
[8]
Now equals zero, as the supply of land in the east is fixed.
Rearranging equation 8, the following is obtained,
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* * ^  a) E ÖF
<LF " TF> = (1 -a)F LE [9 J
Now the rental income in the frontier region (Rp) is determined 
by the following obvious relationship:
^  rF TF [10]
The rate of growth of this rental income is
* * * 
RF - rF + TF [11]
Substituting equation 5 into equation 11, on the assumption that £ has
Si
* ;ka minus infinite value, and P = Y  = 0, this equation becomes, on applying 
appropriate subscripts, 
a.v * * *
*F = ÖI (LF " TF* + TF F
[12]
Now on substituting equation 9 into equation 12, the following is obtained;
*
*F
Olp(l 0(.)g p * *
(l-a)F aE LE + lF [13]
Since all the parameters in equation 13 take positive values, but takes
a negative value with an expansion of the land supply in the western 
*frontier region, R„ will only be positive ifr
0lp(l Ct ) g p *
(1-“)F 0^ Le
*< T,
This may not be the case if, for example, Op takes a small enough value. (1)
(1) These expressions would be more complicated if the assumption 
that £fl had a value of infinity did not hold approximately. 
Introducing this complication would not clarify the issues of 
interest here, however, and because of this this consideration is 
ignored.
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It is easily shown that the rental income in the east must 
fall on the expansion of the land supply in the west. By a similar 






* *- V *+ T, [14]
•k k k kBut T£ is zero, and (Lp - Tp) is negative, so that Rp is negative,
If the rental income in the western region did rise, and 
probably it did rise,^^ exactly who in the colonial society gained from 
this increased rental income would be those who managed to obtain legal 
possession from the Indians of the newly released frontier land, 
assuming that the Indians sold this land to the European colonial 
purchasers at a price below its true value when this land was used for 
agricultural purposes. This possibly was not the only economic group who 
gained. If this land in turn was sold to other individuals at a price 
below its true value, when employed as agricultural land, then these 
subsequent purchasers in turn would have gained from this increased 
rental income in the western frontier region.
Note 4
The previous analysis, based on diagram 1, may be enlarged 
upon by introducing the possible economic repercussions of immigration.
otp (1 °0 p
(1) The value of Op was possibly close to one, and the ratio - ■ ^  --
"k fwas probably less than one, thus R_ in equation 13 *
was probably positive if ^p^was positive, even though |Lp| 
may have been greater than T .
r
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Immigration would increase the rate of population growth above what it 
otherwise would have been. This may be represented, as in diagram 1, 
by extending the horizontal axis from 00^ to OX. Given the supply of 
land, the slopes of the MPP schedules in both regions are unafLected by 
the increase in the supply of labour. With the controls on the supply 
of land being effectively applied, the real wage is forced down from 
OL to ON. Removing these controls on land raises the wage rate, but in 
the case shown in diagram 1, the wage rate is below what it would have 
been if the controls on immigration and land expansion had been 
effectively imposed. On the other hand, the land developers and land 
owners in both regions are shown in diagram 1 to have gained from the 
combined immigration/land policy. Of course, other outcomes were 
possible, and are easily demonstrated with the aid of diagram 1.
If colonial society were classified into two basic economic 
groups; land owners and labour; it is clear from the previous analysis 
that it is not possible to determine which of these two groups 
potentially would have gained, and who would have lost, from the 
combined impact of the British government's colonial land and immigration 
policies of the 1760s and 1770s. The only specific economic group about 
which something more definite can be said are the dealers in frontier 
land; they probably were potential losers from the controls on the 
expansion of frontier land, and the enforcement of the controls on 
immigration would not influence this conclusion. This statement can 




AN ANALYSIS OF THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION GAME
While the economic burdens, and any other social and/or 
political burden, that the British government may have imposed, or 
attempted to impose, on the American colonists, induced the colonists to 
protest about these burdens, these burdens, and the protests they 
induced, could not, of themselves, have caused the American Revolution. 
The decision whether, or not, there was to be an armed conflict between 
the British and the American colonists, over the issue of the burdens 
placed, or attempted to be placed, upon the colonists by the British 
government's actions, was always the British government's to make, once 
the colonists had decided to behave uncooperatively with respect to the 
methods employed, or proposed to be employed, in the 1760s and 1770s for 
the purpose of partially financing some of the collectively consumed 
goods provided by Great Britain. If the British government had decided 
against employing the strategy of using armed forces against the 
colonists, to coerce them into some form of agreement to help finance 
the administration and protection of the American colonies, there would 
have been no military conflict in 1775, other things remaining the same.
It is true that if the colonists had cultivated the social 
tradition, or custom, of contributing resources to meet taxes imposed 
by the British Parliament, needed to finance collectively consumed goods, 
without the need to use relatively large amounts of paramilitary, or
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military, force to coerce the colonists into making these 
contributions,^^ and they cooperated in the task of limiting the 
conflict over land between the Indians and themselves, thereby reducing 
the costs of providing frontier defence, there is a high probability 
that the conflict of interests between the British administration and 
the colonists over the satisfying of collective colonial needs after 
1763 (or before for that matter) would not have arisen, other things 
remaining the same. But this bias in the social conventions of those 
white colonists residing in the thirteen North American colonies was not 
present prior to 1773; this fact was clearly demonstrated by the events 
of the Stamp Act crisis, and subsequent political actions by the 
colonists in response to British public finance policies as they 
affected the colonists.
A question which follows naturally from this last observation 
is why did the colonists adopt the social standard of being apparently 
relatively sensitive to any attempt by the British government to charge 
the colonists for the collective wants satisfied by the British 
government expenditures. An answer may possibly be provided by the 
well-known school of interpretation of the political behaviour of the 
American colonists, in the decade or so before the Revolution, which 
argues that the colonists were highly suspicious of the motives behind 
the British government's policies with respect to the colonies; it was 
thought by the colonists that for them to accept the use of just a
(1) This is assuming that the British government had not discovered, or 
did not wish to use, the bargaining mechanism, as outlined earlier 
at the end of chapter IV, for inducing individuals to reveal their 
true preferences for collectively consumed goods, in the knowledge 
that these preferences may be employed to assess the tax-price to 
be charged to the individual.
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minimal amount of arbitrary political power by the British government 
against themselves would lead to the complete erosion of the poiitical- 
economic freedoms which they enjoyed. While these fears may have been 
exaggerated, they were believed by the colonists.
At this point in the discussion it may be well to digress 
somewhat and assess this explanation, or hypothesis, presented by 
Bailyn, of colonial political behaviour in the 1760s and 1770s, in order 
to prepare the ground for the next step in the analysis of the nature of 
the conflict of interests between the colonists and the British 
government in 1775. A weakness of this explanation is that while the 
colonists may have believed the rhetoric of the colonial leaders and 
pamphleteers, at least on the question of the British government taxing 
the colonies and what this implied politically, this interpretation is 
really at a very imprecise level of explanation; deeper levels of 
analysis, which consider more fundamental motives for individual, or 
group, political behaviour in the colonies, should be possible. The 
fears that the colonists may have had of direct taxation, for example, 
do not appear to have been based on the fact that it was the British 
government which was imposing these taxes. After the colonists became 
independent Hamilton made the following observation of the society of 
the new American states:
(1) This view has been put many times by Bailyn. Cf. B. Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1967), The Origins of American Politics 
(New York, Knopf, 1969), and "The Central Themes of the American 
Revolution, An Interpretation", in Essays on the American 
Revolution, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
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"It is evident from the state of the country,
from the habits of the people, from the experience
we have had on the point itself, that it is
impossible to raise any very considerable sums
by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been
multiplied; new methods to enforce the
collection have in vain been tried; the public
expectation has been uniformly disappointing, and
the treasuries of the States have remained empty".
To overcome this absence of the accepted social standard, in American
society of the 1780s, to pay direct taxes for the purpose of financing
the functions of the central government of the union, the process of
imposing taxes had to be made less overt, via the method of using
(2)indirect taxes; viz. import duties.
The inference that can be drawn from this observation by 
Hamilton is that the fears the colonists may have had with respect to 
paying direct taxes were over paying them at all, to any relatively 
centralised political institution, even if they were politically 
represented in this institution which was responsible for imposing these 
taxes, and not over the issue of paying direct taxes to the British 
government as such. This conclusion is at variance with what a strict 
interpretation of Bailyn's thesis would indicate; that the fears the 
colonists had of being taxed by direct taxes were based on the fact that 
the British government was doing the taxing, and probably also because
(1) The Federalist3 op. oit., pp. 143-144
(2) The Federalist3 ibid.
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the colonists were not represented in Parliament.
The apparent weakness of the Bailyn hypothesis becomes more 
obvious when one considers the inability of this hypothesis to forecast 
reasonably accurately the political behaviour of the former colonists; 
remembering that one technique for testing an hypothesis in the social 
sciences is to compare the predictions, that can be inferred from the 
hypothesis, with the actual facts as they become available (although the 
predictions possibly need to be restricted to the fairly short-run, in 
order to reduce the likelihood of relevant variables changing, which in 
the hypothesis are assumed to remain unchanged). A forecast that it 
seems reasonable to imply from Bailyn's hypothesis is that the colonists 
would replace the methods employed by the British government, to 
implement its public finance policies in the colonies, with less 
coercive techniques for raising revenue. Other than the fact that the 
citizens of the New American states had their interests to some degree 
safeguarded, via a process of elected representatives,^^ who voted on
(1) This was no safeguard if an individual was always in the minority. 
This probably would have been the case for the colonists, in the 
instance of parliamentary legislation to raise revenue in the 
colonies, if, for example, the colonists had accepted proportional 
representation in the British Parliament. This is probably one of 
the reasons why the colonists rejected representation in this 
political institution. (See the discussion on this latter point in 
chapter IV above on page 336n.) Madison, however, in his famous 
letter ten in The Federalist, stated that an individual in the 
minority had little to fear from the majority which passed 
legislation in the new central government of the United States.
The diversity of the factions in the new union would make it less 
likely, compared to a small community with fewer factions, that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists it 
will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own 
strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other 
impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a 
consciousness of unjust or dishonourable purposes, communication is 
always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose
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concurrence is necessary". The Federalist, op. eit., p. 135.
However, beside this apparent difficulty of forming a coalition 
from various diverse factions to create a majority to pass 
legislation which might hurt the minority, it should be pointed out 
that a minority faction may sometimes find itself in, and sometimes 
out, of the majority coalition needed to pass different pieces of 
legislation. Thus a minority faction may not always be in the 
minority coalition. In addition, even if a minority did suffer an 
economic loss as a result of legislation passed by the majority, 
this need not be the end of this process of collective action. It 
may well be that the votes of a minority are required to pass this 
particular piece of legislation. But in providing this support, in 
order to allow the formation of this majority coalition, the 
minority stipulates that the rest of the coalition supports it in 
passing legislation which is to the benefit of the minority. Thus, 
for example, the Southern states may support tariff legislation, 
passed to protect manufacturing industry in the north-east, if the 
Northern states would support legislation beneficial to the South. 
This possibility of trading votes in order to form majority 
coalitions, plus the other apparent safeguards discussed above for 
minorities in the political system proposed for the United States, 
may induce an individual to be willing to accept, and abide by, the 
rules of the political game laid down by the United States 
constitution.
The anti-Federalists, however, did not accept that minorities 
would not be harmed by the aggregation of political power into a 
central government, empowered with the proposed constitution. In 
fact at least one anti-Federalist believed that the proposed 
changes to the political system in the new states smacked too much 
of the past when the colonies were offered the opportunity to be 
represented in Parliament; James Winthrop (?) had the following 
to say: "This new system ... is a consolidation of all the states
into one large mass, however diverse the parts may be of which it 
is to be composed. ... The attempt made by Great Britain to 
introduce such a system, struck us with horrour, and when it was 
proposed by some theorist that we should be represented in 
parliament, we uniformly declared that one legilature could not 
represent so many different interests for the purposes of 
legislation and taxation. This was a leading principle of the 
revolution, and makes an essential article in our creed". "The 
Agrippa Letters", Letter IV, December 3, 1787, reproduced in 
C.M. Kenyon (ed.), The Antifederalists (New York, Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, 1966), p. 134. (There is some doubt as to whether 
Winthrop was the author of the "Agrippa Letters". See Kenyon (ed.), 
The Anti federalists, op. eit., p. 131.)
Winthrop's expectation, based on his interpretation of the 
anti-British rhetoric of the late colonial era, for the future 
political developments in the new American states were to be 
disappointed; the battle to pass the constitution for the union 
was narrowly won. This outcome is not surprising, in terms of the 
analysis presented in the main text, despite the apparent 
contradiction of the pre—Revolution political values emphasised by 
Winthrop; if the former colonists desired the collectively
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consumed goods ,  w hich  th e  B r i t i s h  governm ent p r e v i o u s ly  p r o v id e d ,  
th e n  th e y  needed  to  f i n d  a p o l i t i c a l  m echanism , assum ing  no m arket 
mechanism was known o f ,  to  p r o v id e  t h e s e  goods ,  and i f  t h e  B r i t i s h  
governm ent was as  r e a s o n a b le  i n  i t s  p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c  demands and 
s u g g e s t i o n s  to  th e  c o l o n i s t s  a s  th e  p r e v io u s  a n a l y s i s  would 
i n d i c a t e ,  th e n  i t  i s  q u i t e  p r o b a b le  t h a t  t h e r e  would be 
s i m i l a r i t i e s  be tw een  th e  B r i t i s h - s u g g e s t e d  g e n e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  
s o l u t i o n  to  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  p rob lem  ( o f  g r a n t i n g  th e  c o lo n i e s  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  P a r l i a m e n t ) , and th e  s o l u t i o n  d e v is e d  by th e  new 
A m erican s t a t e s  ( o f  p r o v id i n g  a c e n t r a l i s e d  governm ent e c o n o m ic a l ly ,  
and p o l i t i c a l l y ,  p o w e r fu l  enough to  p r o v id e  th e  c o l l e c t i v e l y  
consumed goods d e s i r e d  by th e  e l e c t o r a t e ) .
T h is  i s  n o t  to  sa y  t h a t  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  s o l u t i o n  d e v is e d  by 
th e  Founding  F a t h e r s ,  and a c c e p te d  by th e  American S t a t e s ,  f o r  
p r o v id i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y  consumed go o d s ,  a lw ays p r o t e c t e d  th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  m i n o r i t i e s .  Vote t r a d i n g  c e r t a i n l y  d id  t a k e  p l a c e  
(even  b e f o r e  t h i s ,  d u r in g  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e v i s i n g  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  a t  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o n v e n t io n ,  b a r g a i n s  w ere  s t r u c k  
be tw een  m i n o r i t i e s ,  i n  o r d e r  to  come to  m a j o r i t y  a g re e m e n ts  o v e r  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  v a r i o u s  powers f o r  th e  p ro p o se d  f e d e r a l  governm ent)  
and th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  m i n o r i t i e s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  th o s e  o f  th e  
S o u t h e r n e r s ,  w ere  to  some d e g re e  p r o t e c t e d  i n  t h i s  manner up to  th e  
1850s ( a l t h o u g h  n o t  a lw a y s ,  as th e  S o u th e rn  p r o t e s t s  i n  t h e  1820s 
and 1830s o v e r  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n  i n d i c a t e ) . But by 1860 th e  
S o u th e r n e r s  had  come t o  r e a l i s e  t h a t  th e  r a t e  o f  grow th  o f  
p o p u l a t i o n  i n  th e  N orth  would e v e n t u a l l y  e n a b le  t h i s  e l e c t o r a l  a r e a  
to  p a s s  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  w i t h o u t  t h e  need  to  form a c o a l i t i o n  
w i th  th e  S o u th .  I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  t h e  S ou th  had come to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  
e v e n t u a l l y  th ey  would f i n d  th e m s e lv e s  i n  a m in o r i t y  u n a b le  to  t r a d e  
v o t e s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  N o r th e r n  m a j o r i t y  would have no need  to  b a r t e r  
i n  o r d e r  to  p a s s  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n .  In  such  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  i t  may 
be p r e f e r a b l e  f o r  th e  m i n o r i t y  e i t h e r  to  a t t e m p t  to  have th e  r u l e s  
o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  game changed  ( th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  am ended) , o r  e l s e  
c e a s e  to  p la y  by th e  r u l e s  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  game and l e a v e  th e  game 
a l t o g e t h e r .  S in c e  t h e r e  was no chance  o f  th e  f i r s t  s t r a t e g y  
w o rk in g ,  th e  Sou th  a t t e m p te d  to  l e a v e  th e  game. Thus th e  S ou th  
came to  a c c e p t  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  r a i s e d  by W inthrop  ( ? ) ,  some s e v e n ty  
y e a r s  b e f o r e ,  to  t h e  p ro p o se d  U n i te d  S t a t e s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ;  nam ely , 
t h a t  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l - i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n s t r u m e n t  would n o t  p r o t e c t  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  m i n o r i t i e s ,  even  s i z a b l e  m i n o r i t i e s ;  w he reas  
M ad ison ’ s p r e d i c t i o n ,  t h a t  m a j o r i t i e s  would be u n a b le  to  c o a le s c e  
i n  o r d e r  to  p a s s  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  would harm th e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  m i n o r i t i e s ,  was r e j e c t e d  by th e  S o u th .  The r e p e r c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  
a t t e m p t  to  b r e a k  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  game was th e  A m erican 
C i v i l  War, w i th  t h e  N o r th  a t t e m p t in g  to  f o r c e  t h e  S ou th  b ack  i n t o  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  game.
On th e  b a r g a i n i n g  t h a t  to o k  p l a c e  i n  d e v e lo p in g  th e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  s e e  J . P .  Roche, "The Founding  F a t h e r s :  A
Reform Causus i n  A c t io n " ;  American P o litic a l Science Review3 V ol. 
55 (1 9 6 1 ) ,  pp . 799 -8 1 6 .  The i s s u e  o f  v o te  t r a d i n g  i n  th e  1840s 
and 1850s ,  and t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  by th e  Sou th  t h a t  i t  was l o s i n g  t h i s  
a b i l i t y  to  t r a d e  v o t e s ,  s e e  D. Yarwood, "A F a i l u r e  i n  C o a l i t i o n  
M a in te n an c e :  The D e f e c t i o n  o f  th e  Sou th  P r i o r  to  t h e  C i v i l  W ar",
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in S. Groennings, et al. (eds), The Study of Coalition Behaviour: 
Theoretrical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents (New York, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 226-234. The Southerners' 
dissatisfaction, in the 1820s and 1830s, with the tariff acts is 
discussed in C. Pope, "The Impact of the Ante-Bellum Tariff on 
Income Distribution", Explorations in Economic History3 Series Two, 
Vol. 9, pp. 376-382.
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issues which could affect the individual voter, the methods used to 
raise revenue in the New American states were apparently similar to 
those employed by the British. Within four years of the Peace of Paris 
being signed, a time period which will be considered here to be the 
short-run, the governments of the new American states were employing 
identical coercive devices as the British employed in the 1760s and 
1770s to raise revenue. That this was so rather contradicts the 
rhetoric of the leaders of colonial opinion on issues such as trial 
without jury in cases concerning breaches of tax legislation, the 
judicious stationing of customs officials to impose external taxes, and 
the controls on the rate of growth of the money supply.
Some individuals may imply predictions, based on Bailyn’s
thesis, referring to wider topics than just the issue of raising
government revenue. It may seem reasonable to expect, for example,
that, if the pre-Revolution anti-British rhetoric really was believed,
the distribution of wealth should have become more equal, at least over
the longer term, and with other things remaining the same. This does
not appear to have occurred. In fact the evidence points to the
possibility that the distribution of wealth tended to become more
(2)unequal after the Revolution up to 1825. The only redistribution of
wealth that certainly did take place was that wealth confiscated from 
the Loyalists, and taken over by the Patriots.
(1) See the relevant discussions, in chapters IV and V above, on the 
similarities between British colonial policies in the 1760s, and 
what the policies of the new states were, or what the Federalists 
thought would be desirable public finance policies in the late 
1780s.
(2) The relevant literature on this topic is surveyed in B. Berthoff 
and J.M. Murrin, "Feudalism, Communalism and the Yeoman Freeholder, 
The Social Revolution Considered as a Social Accident", in Essays 
on the American Revolution3 op. cit.3 pp. 279-281.
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Perhaps a more contentious prediction to imply, from the 
stated anti-British ideology of pre-Revolution colonial society, is 
that the legal status of slaves in the former thirteen American colonies 
should have changed to make all these individuals free, not just some as 
was the case, to participate in American society on a more equal footing 
with the whites. It could be argued, on the other hand, that such a 
prediction is invalid because it is derived from the moral values of a 
later age, not the age of the late eighteenth century where, in the 
British milieu, brutality in social relations was an accepted fact of 
every-day life. Rather, Bailyn argues "What is significant in the
historical context of the time is not that the liberty-loving 
Revolutionaries allowed slavery to survive, but that they - even those 
who profited directly from the institution - went so far in condemning 
it, confining it, and setting in motion the forces that would ultimately 
destroy it".
Some may accept such an argument, others may not. But there 
is no reason to become involved with this issue, concerning the expected 
social and legal status of slaves in immediate post-Revolution America, 
in order to feel reasonably safe in making the general point, based on 
alternative observations, that it does appear that the ideology, the 
supposedly believed rhetoric, of pre-Revolution American society leads 
one to derive reasonable expectations, about the likely changes in the 
nature of this society in the early years of its independence from 
British political control, which do not fit too well with the facts for 
this later period. Nor does it seem particularly satisfactory for
(1) B. Bailyn, "Central Themes of the Revolution", op. oit.3 p. 29.
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Bailyn to argue, in order to avoid this problem of the apparent 
contradictions between the expected components of post-Revolution 
American society, derived from his hypothesis, compared with the 
actualities, that one just needs to use different sociological models to 
explain important events in pre- and post-Revolution American society; 
in Bailyn’s w o r d s , " t h e  approach that allowed one to understand the 
main events of the earlier years [pre-Revolution years] no longer serves 
for the later [immediate post-Revolution years]: a different kind of
analysis and a different focus of attention are required".
To employ such ad hoc theorising to assist in understanding 
the political behaviour of the colonists, and former colonists, for 
periods so relatively close together - the decade through to 1775 and 
into the revolution period, and the period from 1783 up to at least 
1788, when The Federalist was completed - raises considerable doubts as 
to whether the Bailyn hypothesis really does identify the core of 
underlying variables which actually motivated the colonists to oppose 
the British government so resolutely. It would appear to be far more 
satisfactory to derive a theory, to assist in understanding the 
political—economic behaviour of the major contenstants just prior to 
the Revolution, from which more accurate predictions could be drawn of 
the political-economic behaviour of the former colonists for the short­
term immediately after the peace was formally recognised. This implies, 
of course, that the portion of public finance theory which has been 
exploited above, to analyse the conflict of interests between the 
British government and the colonists, should be subjected to the same
(1) B. Bailyn, "Central Themes of the Revolution", op. cit.3 p. 18.
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test, as the Bailyn thesis, to determine whether, or not, it predicts 
reasonably accurately. While an analysis, employing these analytical 
tools, of political behaviour in the immediate period leading to the 
military conflict from 1775 on, has not yet been attempted here, it may 
be well first to test the present analysis as far as it has gone, by 
means of determining its predictive ability. If the predictions prove 
reasonably accurate, it will provide some confidence when employing 
these tools of analysis in the attempt to unravel the nature of the 
conflict of interests, between the British government and the colonists, 
in the mid-1770s and beyond. If the predictions are contradicted by the 
facts then these tools should be abandoned, or at least refined, and a 
new, more satisfactory, analytical approach searched for.
Before deriving any relevant and implied predictions from 
this application of public finance theory, first a brief summary needs 
to be given of where this theory has been employed to help analyse 
Anglo-Colonial political-economic relations, and the relevant general 
conclusions reached so far. From this resume it should be possible to 
infer reasonable predictions concerning the likely political-economic 
behaviour of the former colonists in the immediate post-Revolution 
period. The central problem analysed was the conflict of interests over 
the provision, and payment for, collectively consumed goods. From this 
analysis it would appear reasonable to conclude that a fundamental 
conflict of interests between these two parties arose over this issue. 
The previous analysis also allows the conclusion that the British 
government was faced with a difficult (or at least not simple) public 
finance problem, which the colonists do not appear to have realized 
could have been solved if a mechanism could be found for inducing
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individuals explicitly to reveal their true preferences for collectively 
consumed goods, in the knowledge that these revealed preferences might 
be employed in the process of determining, and imposing, taxes to 
finance the provision of these goods. In other words, a solution which 
would not have required the application of the usual institutional tools 
for coercing individuals into paying taxes to finance the provision of 
these goods. Finally, and underlying the conclusions just stated, the 
theory employed above indicates the hypothesis, and the analysis above 
of the historical facts tends not to disprove this hypothesis, that the 
colonists would have tended to misrepresent their preferences for the 
collectively consumed goods provided by the British government, or less 
specifically, that they would have tended to behave uncooperatively, 
when the British government called upon the colonists to help to finance
the provision of these goods after 1754 and on past 1763.
From these brief conclusions, taken singly, or in combination, 
one may draw a number of apparently reasonable predictions as to how the 
American society would have responded, in the short-term after the 
American Revolution, to the fundamental change that the British 
government now no longer held any political control over the former
colonies. The first prediction is that the major change that did take
place in American society, now that the British government no longer 
intentionally provided collectively consumed goods from which the former 
colonists could benefit, was essentially concerned with solving the 
public finance problem that faced the British colonial administration; 
namely, with establishing institutions to provide collectively consumed 
goods, and devising the political rules to apply for determining the 
collective wants to be satisfied, and how the revenue was to be raised
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t h a t  was r e q u i r e d  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  s a t i s f y i n g  o f  t h e s e  w a n t s .  Th is  
p r e d i c t i o n  f o l l o w s  n a t u r a l l y  f rom th e  f i r s t  and second  c o n c l u s i o n s  
r e a c h e d  i n  t h e  p a r a g r a p h  above .  The p r e d i c t i o n  seems to  comply w i th  
t h e  r e a l i t y  f o r  i t  does  n o t  a p p e a r  u n r e a s o n a b l e  t o  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  major  
p o l i t i c a l  change to  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  immedia te  p o s t - R e v o l u t i o n  American 
s o c i e t y  was t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a c e n t r a l  gove rnm en t ,  a u t h o r i s e d  w i t h  the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  which  was l a i d  o u t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
r u l e s  t o  a p p ly  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  c o l l e c t i v e l y  
consumed goods ,  o r i g i n a l l y  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h a t  
t h i s  f e d e r a l  government  deemed w o r th  p r o v i d i n g .  T h i s  p o i n t  was 
i m p l i c i t l y  d i s c u s s e d  i n  more d e t a i l  i n  The F e d e ra l i s t .  ^
T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e r e  were  n o t  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  changes  
a f t e r  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  For  
exam ple ,  t h e  power to  a p p o i n t  j u d g e s ,  a p p o i n t  and remove g o v e r n o r s  and 
o t h e r  p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s ,  wh ich  was p r e v i o u s l y  i n v e s t e d  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  was a f u n c t i o n  now a d m i n i s t e r e d  by t h e  new i n d e p e n d e n t  
s t a t e s  t h e m s e l v e s .  Also  s t a t e  g o v e r n o r s  became more r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  
e l e c t e d  c o l o n i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and t h e  e l e c t r o a t e  i n  g e n e r a l .  But
(1)  See t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  c h a p t e r  IV above on pages  335-336 and t h e  
f o o t n o t e  on page 336.
(2) I t  m igh t  be n o t e d  i n  p a s s i n g  t h a t  by c o n t r a s t  t h i s  p r e d i c t i o n  does 
n o t  a p p e a r  to  f o l l o w  from B a i l y n ’s t h e s i s .  I f  t h e  c o l o n i s t s  r e a l l y  
d i d ,  on a v e r a g e ,  b e l i e v e  t h e i r  own r h e t o r i c  t h e y  would n o t  have 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  
government  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a s  s k e t c h e d  ou t  by t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ;  o r  a t  l e a s t  W in throp  ( ? ) ,  and 
o t h e r  a n t i f e d e r a l i s t s ,  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  
s h o u ld  n o t  have be e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h  the  powers  i t  had v e s t e d  i n  
i t  (an o p i n i o n  b a s e d  on t h e  r h e t o r i c  e s p o u se d  b e f o r e  t h e  American 
R e v o l u t i o n ) .  But t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  i n  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  W i n t h r o p ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e - R e v o l u t i o n  
r h e t o r i c .  See t h e  f o o t n o t e  on page 433 above f o r  an e x p a n s i o n  o f  
t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n .
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such changes appear to have been brought about more as a result of the 
administrative vacuum left by the sudden departure of the British 
authorities from the colonies, in response to the colonies act of 
independence, than as the result of changes induced by political 
ideological developments in the colonies, in the decade or so before the 
Revolution, concerned with determining how political institutions should 
be organised (other than that the British government should not have 
political power within such colonial institutions).
A prediction which also follows immediately from the first and 
second conclusion reached above, is that the governments of the former 
colonies would need to employ many of the same coercive devices, 
employed in the colonies by the British administration, to raise revenue 
to meet the costs of maintaining these governments. This prediction 
appears to fit the facts reasonably well.
The final prediction is that there were not likely to be any 
major changes in other economic and/or social institutions in the 
immediate post-Revolutionary American society; American society would 
stay very much as it was, except perhaps for those in colonial society 
who had overtly opposed the break with Great Britain. This conclusion 
follows from all three of the conclusions reached above, but in 
particular from the proposition that the colonists would have tended to 
overstate their abhorrence of British taxation policies, or any British 
policy which implicitly placed an economic burden on the colonists, and 
would have tended to understate their preferences for the British 
expenditures on collectively consumed goods from which the colonists
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b e n e f i t e d . T h e  emotive language in the colonial rhetoric of "natural 
rights", "freedom", "liberty" and "slavery" did not imply a wide 
interpretation of these concepts describing the human condition. These 
concepts were to be interpreted basically in terms of colonial public 
finance policy issues - the "freedom" to determine what taxes were to be 
imposed, and how the tax revenue raised was to be spent, was a "natural 
right"; the "liberty" from the "slavery" of being taxed by a political 
institution in which the colonists' views were not represented. This 
emotive language essentially did not relate to questions of the freeing 
of slaves, or the provision of more equal opportunities to all members 
in the community, in order to reduce the economic inequalities that may 
have existed in the colonial society; although there were some minor
(1) Care should be taken here not to generalise too much. Possibly the 
great majority of the colonists were basically indifferent to the 
conflict of interests between Great Britain and the colonies prior 
to about 1774, for they were probably untouched, or unlikely to be 
touched, by the economic burdens imposed, or proposed to be imposed, 
by the British government. For this reason probably the costs to 
these colonists of obtaining the correct, and relevant, information 
concerning British colonial public finance policies possibly 
outweighed the gross benefits to these individuals that this 
knowledge produced; in other words, there was little incentive for 
these individuals to be properly informed on these matters.
Instead they would, most likely, tend to accept, to a lesser or 
greater degree, the information and opinions readily provided by 
the more vociferous colonial leaders, and pamphleteers, and/or have 
their ideas on these issues formed by the military repression 
imposed by the British army from 1774 on. But when attention is 
focused on the colonial political entrepreneurs who opposed the 
British policies; the individuals whose objective should have been 
to be well informed on the underlying reasons for British colonial 
public finance policies; the argument that the political behaviour 
of these individuals was determined by their lack of knowledge of 
the correct facts is not convincing, at least not in the case of 
men such as Franklin. For these individuals, at least for the more 
informed ones amongst them, it seems reasonable to assert that they 
misrepresented their preferences for the relevant collectively 
consumed goods, and overstated their abhorrence of the taxes 
imposed to pay for these goods. As for the rest of the colonial 
community, its political behaviour in this regard was probably, to 
varying degrees, less deliberately, and more unintentionally, a 
case of behaving uncooperatively.
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changes in these directions. The prediction fits the facts, at least 
for the short t e r m . I n  the longer-term, when other important 
variables did change, these predictions do not hold, but this
(1) It is fully realised that the terms "minor changes" and "major 
changes", employed in the main text, are terms open to widely 
differing definitions. Some may argue that the changes that took 
place were major changes; that the alterations in the laws 
concerning inheritance and the outlawing of slavery in certain 
states could be considered to be "major changes". Others would 
take a contrary view. But there does not appear to be a generally 
acceptable means of settling this issue of how one defines these 
terms; value judgements (which will vary between individuals) of 
necessity have to enter the definitions of what constitute relevant 
major and minor short-term changes in American society after the 
Revolution. Despite this observation, the value judgements 
implicitly imposed on the definition of "major changes" employed in 
the main text appears to be a reasonable one; the definition being 
that income distribution became less unequal, that all slaves were 
to be set free (at least within some reasonable space of time, and 
without the use of a great deal of force), and that the methods 
employed for raising revenue in the new states were potentially far 
less coercive than those used by the British colonial administration.
This problem of having to employ value judgements, in the 
process of devising these definitions, is essentially a particular 
instance of the basic methodological issue at stake when assessing 
the degree of accuracy of a prediction, or forecast. In the case 
of an economic forecast, for example, (or any forecast in the 
social and natural sciences for that matter) a value judgement is 
involved in determining what constitutes an "accurate" forecast, 
for in the process of setting confidence limits for the forecast a 
value judgement requires to be made in order to establish how wide, 
or how narrow, these limits should be set. In the case of 
forecasts based on econometric evidence it is usual to impose x 
number of standard deviations from forecast to establish the 
confidence limits; or where the information required to calculate 
standard deviations is not available, confidence limits are set by 
imposing that they are + y percent of forecast. But clearly an 
arbitrary value judgement is involved in determining what x, or y, 
should be.
It follows that while value judgements are implicitly imposed 
in the main text for the purpose of assessing the accuracy of the 
predictions made (based on the public finance model), this 
methodological weakness of having to employ these judgements would 
still have to be faced even if more exact, and rigorous, measures 
of social change could be devised and employed, instead of those 
utilised in the main text.
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contradiction, for obvious reasons, does not mean that the public 
finance theory that has been exploited here, to analyse the fundamental 
conflict of interests between the colonists and the British government, 
is inappropriate for the task.
Thus the theoretical framework which has provided the core of 
the present analysis of this era of American history appears to stand up 
to the tests applied here to determine its ability to predict short-term 
changes in post-Revolution American society. In turn this implies that 
the hypothesis, that the colonists tended to misrepresent their 
preferences for the collectively consumed goods provided by the British 
government, is not refuted by the predictive test applied above. This 
still leaves unanswered the question of why the American colonists 
adopted the social tradition of being strongly opposed to paying taxes 
to the British government, to partly assist in financing the provision 
of collectively consumed goods which this government was providing. 
Obviously the colonists thought it was in some way to their advantage 
to behave in such a manner while they could not be excluded from 
benefiting from the collectively consumed goods the British government 
was providing. For the present analysis nothing more really needs to be 
said than this, although it would be more satisfying to possess a deeper 
understanding of this aspect of the political-economic behaviour of the 
colonists. (This topic is returned to below on pp. 494-498.)
A peripheral, but interesting, issue is that if the colonists 
found it to their advantage to behave uncooperatively on the issue of 
financing the production of collectively consumed goods, why did not the 
British tax-payer, in the decade or so before the American Revolution, 
also refuse to pay taxes, no matter how small, to the British
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g o v e r n m e n t ? A  possible explanation of this difference in political- 
economic behaviour, that the colonists were not represented in Parliament, 
whereas the British tax-payer was, is not convincing, for the colonists 
had rejected the proposal to be so represented. It might also be argued 
that the true marginal benefits received by the average colonists from
(1) It was of some annoyance to the British political leaders that the 
colonists were so relatively uncooperative in paying taxes, 
compared to the British, despite the apparent lower average level 
of taxation in Great Britain. North, for example, on the 2nd 
February, 1775 pointed out to the members of the House of Commons 
that the per capita tax rate in Great Britain was twenty-five 
shillings sterling, whereas it was sixpence in the colonies. 
(Cobbett ’s Parliamentary History> Vol. XVIII, column 222.) There 
are, of course, a good many things wrong with this comparison.
First of all these calculations almost certainly do not allow for 
local taxes and levies. In North Carolina, for example, it has 
been calculated that local taxes amounted to about five shillings 
sterling per capita. (Cf. M.L.M. Kay, "The Payment of Provincial 
and Local Taxes in North Carolina 1748-1771", William and Mary 
Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 26 (1969), pp. 218-240. On this 
topic of local taxation also see R.A. Becker, "Revolution and 
Reform: An Interpretation of Southern Taxation 1763 to 1783",
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 32 (1975), pp. 416- 
442.) Assuming that this level of local tax rates was 
approximately the same in all the colonies, and that North's 
calculation only omits these taxes in the case of the American 
colonies, but includes them in the case of Great Britain, then the 
disparity in per capita tax levels is narrowed from a ratio of 50:1 
to 4.5:1.
This is not all that is wrong with North's calculations. They 
do not allow for the distortionary economic costs created by the 
imposition of the British rules and regulations, and taxes.
However, these costs may have been of approximately the same 
proportionate size for both groups of tax-payers. Thus the 
previous ratios of per capita tax rates may remain virtually 
unaltered after allowing for this consideration.
A far more important point, and one which has been emphasised 
throughout this essay, is that it is net tax rates which are of 
relevance (not gross tax rates) in influencing political-economic 
behaviour. The North calculations, obviously, make no allowance 
for the benefits received by both groups of tax-payers from the 
British government expenditures on collectively consumed goods.
The issue of comparing benefits received with taxes paid is taken 
up in the main text below.
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British-provided collectively consumed goods were absolutely lower, 
relative to the marginal economic burdens imposed by direct and indirect 
taxes imposed by the British government, than for the average tax-payer 
in Great Britain. Obviously such an explanation is not easily refuted 
because of the problem of measuring the true marginal benefits received 
from a collectively consumed good, and the marginal economic burden 
imposed by the process of taxation. In addition, even if these 
variables could be measured, for the period under consideration, it 
still needs to be shown that varying differentials between these 
marginal variables did influence the sort of political-economic 
behaviour observed, and not, for example, the differentials between 
total benefits and total economic burdens created by imposing taxes.
There are other possible partial explanations of this 
difference in political-economic behaviour. One is that tax-payers 
realised that the British government was in a stronger position to 
successfully implement threats of coercion against uncooperative 
individuals, or groups, in Great Britain than against similarly 
uncooperative individuals, or groups, in the American colonies. But 
probably at least part of the possible total explanation of this 
difference in behaviour needs to be phrased in terms of differences in 
the cultural traditions of the two geographic groups being taxed. In 
other words, it is readily conceded that there might have been 
differences in the cultural traditions during the time period under 
consideration which caused the colonial tax-payer to behave more 
uncooperatively, compared to the average tax-payer in Great Britain.
In support of this view reference is made to the limited, but 
objectively measured, recent evidence which does indicate that possibly 
individuals of one geographic area, and one set of cultural traditions,
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in general, may behave more cooperatively, than those of another, in 
situations where there is a conflict of interests. This evidence is 
provided by the results obtained from a controlled game theoretic 
experiment carried out by Rapaport, Guyer and Gordon^^ on respective 
groups of Danish and American students of university level. The former 
group tended to behave more cooperatively to a statistically significant 
degree. There is one weakness with this experimental result, and that 
is that the two samples of students were not quite matched; the Danish 
students were enrolled at an engineering college whereas the American 
students came from all faculties of a university. Nevertheless the 
statistical results obtained are suggestive, and if correctly 
representative of the true situation, is a fact which requires an 
explanation; an explanation which would need to draw on such 
sociological notions as differences in cultural traditions, the process 
of cultural development, and so on.
If part of the explanation of the difference in the political- 
economic behaviour of the colonial American, and British, tax-payers 
draws on these sociological theories it does not follow, however, that 
these theories (if valid) provide the necessary, and sufficient, 
conditions required to explain the relative behaviour of the American 
colonists on the taxation issue; they only provide necessary 
conditions. Obviously what is also required is at least another 
necessary condition, in the form of the potential conflict of interests, 
between the British government and tax-payers, over the attempt to
(1) "Threat Games: A Comparison of Performance of Danish and
American Subjects", in H.R. Alker, et al. (eds), Mathematical 
Approaches to Politics, op. c i t pp. 171-193.
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finance the provision of the collectively consumed goods provided via a 
non-market political mechanism. Together these conditions could 
provide the minimum number of necessary and sufficient conditions 
required to explain the relevant political-economic behaviour of the 
American colonists, compared to that of the average British citizen.
Returning to considering the political-economic behaviour of 
the colonists alone, what is of interest is that even after the British 
government had ceased to provide goods and services to meet colonial 
collective wants the former colonists, if Hamilton's previously cited 
observation about post-Revolution American society is correct, 
continued not to be socially attuned to accepting the custom of paying 
direct taxes. Actually, to be more precise, they were still not imbued 
with the social tradition of paying direct taxes to finance the 
provision of collectively consumed goods (they had been quite prepared 
to pay direct taxes peacefully to finance the government-provided 
private good of post-office services) even though these taxes were 
imposed by a system of representative government. In other words, 
these former colonists had not accepted the reality that in order to 
satisfy the collective wants, of the type that the British government 
had been attempting to satisfy to some degree, individual freedoms 
needed to be constrained to some extent by a political-social mechanism; 
assuming that these individuals had not discovered a bargaining device 
(of the type discussed at the end of chapter IV) for overcoming the 
failure of the market created by the non-exclusion property of 
collectively consumed goods. This interpretation of the behaviour of 
the former colonists is also consistent with the view that one of the 
implicit objectives for the authors of The Federalist3 in writing their
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letters, had been to persuade the rest of the American community of 
the need to provide the central government of the Confederation with a 
constitution, in which was set out a list of agreed on political rules, 
which, if enforced, constrained individual freedoms for the purpose of 
allowing, amongst other things, the provision of goods and services to 
satisfy some of this community's collective wants, which had previously 
been provided by the British government. In other words, it was the 
task of the authors of The Federalist to persuade the citizens of the 
new states to alter their social tradition of not being willing to 
finance collectively consumed goods of the sort the Federalists (as the 
British government had) thought the central American government 
(British colonial administration) should provide.
The persistent of this uncooperative behaviour after the 
Revolution may simply be explained by a distributed lagged adjustment 
hypothesis; namely, that past experience had shown that, while the 
British government provided the collectively consumed goods, the 
optimum strategy to adopt, with respect to providing tax revenue to 
finance these goods, was that of behaving uncooperatively, and that 
this past experience determined current behaviour. Thus when the 
British government ceased providing these goods the former colonists 
continued to adopt this uncooperative strategy, possibly in the belief 
that these goods would be provided by others, and/or that these goods 
provided few benefits. It soon came to be realised that these goods 
were of some value, if this had not been fully realised before, and, if 
valued, that these goods had to be provided by the collective actions 
of the former colonists themselves; the traditional norm of behaving 
uncooperatively on issues involving the financing of collectively
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consumed goods was slowly modified in response to changing, and more 
recent, past experience. To hurry this process of political behaviour 
modification along the Federalists exploited their persuasive powers.
It is not particularly important for the main analysis 
whether this particular argument Is correct or not; this discussion is 
inserted purely for completeness. The observation that is important is 
that the social convention in late American colonial society was that 
of not being willing to peacefully submit to paying taxes to the level 
imposed by the political mechanism utilised, or proposed, by the 
British government, for the purpose of raising revenue to partly finance 
the production of collectively consumed goods provided in the past, or 
currently, by the British, and from which the colonists benefited.
(1) This is not to say that the colonists did not make an offer to
contribute resources to the administration and protection of the 
British Empire. In fact the colonial representatives at the 
Continental Congress did make such an offer in the reply, on 31st 
July, 1775, to the North resolution (passed by the House of Commons 
on the 27th February, 1775); namely, the colonies would submit to 
the regulation of trade in exchange for the undertaking that Great 
Britain would not tax the colonies, or alternatively for a British 
colonial policy of free trade the colonists would contract to raise 
their fair share of revenue contributions. The form of this offer 
was implicit in the following objection to the North resolution:
"To demand ... additional aids [to those already provided by 
the British monopoly on trade] in the form of a tax, is to demand 
the double of their equal proportion, if we are to contribute 
equally with the other parts of the empire, let us equally with 
them enjoy free commerce with the whole world. But while 
restrictions on our trade shut to us the resources of wealth, is it 
just we should bear all other burthens equally with those to whom 
every resource is open [?]". (The Papers of Thomas Jefferson^ op. 
oit.3 Vol. 1, p. 232.)
This implicit offer to contribute resources to the 
administration of the Empire was far more explicit in its details 
than the offer of reconciliation made earlier in the month (8th 
July), in the second petition from the Continental Congress to 
George III (The "Olive Branch" petition), in which it was suggested 
"that your Majesty be pleased to direct some mode by which the
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united applications of your faithful colonists to the throne, 
in persuance of their common councils, may be improved into a 
happy and permanent reconciliation". (The Papers of Thomas 
Jeffersony op. oit.y Vol. 1, p. 222.)
The British ministry rejected the implicit offer embodied in 
the reply to the North resolution, if for no other reason than the 
British government wished to control both colonial international 
trade, and the indirect mechanism for raising tax revenue in the 
colonies (the quota system) to be contributed to meeting the 
expenses of the Empire. Only in this way, according to the North 
ministry, would the British government raise an adequate amount 
of revenue in the colonies to compensate it for the cost of 
providing the benefits obtained by the colonies, as a result of 
their being part of the British Empire.
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This was given cultural, and therefore political, constraint within 
which the British government's taxation policies in the colonies needed 
to operate, in order to avoid conflict with the colonists. It was for 
the British government to discover methods of operating within this 
constraint. If the British government violated this constraint by 
employing military force in an attempt to coerce the colonists into 
paying the taxes it imposed, or into accepting the proposed taxes, 
there was the strong likelihood of violent conflict erupting. If this 
constraint was not violated, by the British government policies 
relating to public finance issues, there would not have been any 
violence, other things remaining the same. (Such should have been the 
case if the British government could have discovered methods for 
inducing the colonists peacefully, and reasonably truthfully, to reveal 
their preference for the collectively consumed goods it was providing, 
in the knowledge that these preferences would be used to assess the 
tax-prices to be charged to the colonists.) The decision to violate, 
or not to violate, this constraint was the British government's to make. 
In this sense, whether, or not, there was to be an American Revolution 
was only for the British government to decide in 1775. These comments 
bring the discussion back to the issue raised in the initial paragraph 
of this chapter.
In 1766, violation of this constraint was avoided by the 
British Parliament repealing the Stamp Act. By 1775, however, the 
majority of the members of the British Parliament had concluded that 
the American colonists needed to be confronted with the proposition 
that they had to bear some "reasonable" degree of responsibility for 
meeting the costs of administering and protecting the colonies; the
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form that this financial contribution could take, as suggested by the 
British government just before the outbreak of the Revolution, was to 
be found in North's resolution of the 20th February, 1775 (which was 
passed by the House of Commons on the 27th of the same month). If the 
colonists rejected this assertion of Parliamentary supremacy, then the 
colonies needed to be pressed into recognising Parliament's authority 
to legislate on colonial matters.
At this point it is well to clearly establish what was the 
real intention of the North ministry in presenting this resolution, for 
one historian has argued that the British government in 1775 had no 
intention of raising revenue in the colonies, even in the form of the 
colonies meeting any quotas set by Parliament, as suggested by the 
North Resolution. Based on an assessment of North's speech in support 
of his own resolution, Van Alstyne interpreted North as saying that 
"he was for leaving the colonies at liberty to contribute voluntarily 
to imperial defence. Parliament would retain the legal right to 
reject or increase these voluntary aids; but it is plain from the 
context that the government did not intend to exercise its right".
In short, Van Alstyne concludes; "It seems clear that the ministry did 
not even intend to hold out on its demand that the colonies share in 
the cost of imperial defence. 'Submission' was all that was 
e x p e c t e d " . T h i s  interpretation of the intentions of the North 
ministry is open to question. Rather what appears to have motivated 
this ministry to introduce this resolution, as will be argued below, 
is that in early 1775 the North government was still intent on coercing
(1) R.W. Van Alstyne, "Parliamentary Supremacy", op. oit.3 pp. 205n 
and 209. Emphasis added.
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revenue out of the colonies, in addition to the controls on 
international trade, although the technique for doing so had changed 
from that of imposing taxes set by Parliament to a system of imposed 
quotas; the proposed revenue raising system was certainly not to be 
one based on voluntary contributions.
To clarify this issue it is well to quote at length relevant
passages from the debate, and statements in committee, on the
resolution. North in his initial speech on the resolution in the
(2)debate on the 20th February is reported as stating:
"... The parliament of Great Britain ... 
must always maintain the doctrine that every 
part of the empire was bound to bear its 
share of service and burthen in the common 
defence; yet as to the matter of that right, 
and with respect to the mode of contribution, 
if the end could be obtained, and if the 
Americans would propose any means and give 
assurance of the prosecution of those means 
by which they should contribute their share 
to the common defence - he had said, he did not 
apprehend parliament would hesitate a moment to 
suspend the exercise of that right [to tax the 
colonies]; but would concede to the Americans, 
raising their share of the contributions by 
themselves. This was the direct and avowed
(1) Cohhett's Parliamentary History, Vol. XVIII, columns 319-320.
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sense, in which the resolution for the Address 
was moved. ... If the Americans would propose 
to parliament, any mode by which they would 
engage themselves to raise, in their own way, 
and by their own grants, their share of 
contribution to their common defence, the 
quarrel on the subject of taxation was at an 
end".
The resolution is then stated by North. He goes on:
"[The resolution] points out the end and purpose 
for which the contributions are to be given, and 
the persons from whom the grant of them is to 
originate. It takes away every ground of 
suspicion as to the appropriation of the 
revenue when raised, to purposes to which the 
Americans never would grant it".
Despite North's assertion concerning the precision of the 
meaning of the resolution he was asked in committee, on the 27th 
February, to clarify how the resolution was to be implemented. In 
reply he is reported as stating:
"He was for leaving the colonies at liberty to 
contribute voluntarily to the alleviating the 
public burdens, and for preserving to parliament, 
a right of rejecting or increasing those 
voluntary aids at pleasure. Among other things, 
he said, if the colonies reject just conditions, 
they must be reduced to unconditional obedience;
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that suoh of the colonies as did not comply 
with the Resolution, would have the Acts 
r-igidly enforced against them; that he did 
not nor could, at present, pretend to specify 
the exact sum they ought to raise, as it would 
probably fluctuate by leaving a certain 
proportion to the sums raised in Great Britain".
There is nothing in these reported statements by North which 
would indicate that the North ministry was not intent on forcing the 
colonies to accept some system of revenue raising which would have the 
result of the colonies contributing resources, up to an amount set by 
Parliament, to the partial meeting of costs of administering and 
protecting the colonies. What is worse, these resources apparently 
could be allocated "to purposes to which the Americans never would 
grant it". A severe interpretation of this statement could be that the 
revenue raised in the colonies could be used to finance the production 
of goods the colonists did not want, which implies that the tax burden 
was greater than if there was a system of benefit taxes. An alternative, 
and probably more accurate, interpretation is rather that this revenue 
could be employed to meet collective wants, for which the colonists 
understated their true preferences, if these revealed preferences were 
likely to be used to assess the tax-prices to be imposed on them. Thus 
the implicit net tax burden indicated by North's statement probably was 
not as great as implied by the previous interpretation of this statement.
What is rather surprising about North's approach in 1775 are
(1) Parliamentary History, Vol. XVIII, Columns 352-353. Emphasis added.
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the similarities it had with Grenville's attack, just over a decade 
before, on the problem of raising revenue in the colonies, for the 
purpose of financing the production of goods to satisfy collective 
wants. Just as Grenville had tried to assign the tax revenue to be 
raised in the colonies to an expenditure project which would produce 
collective benefits for the colonists, so North had the same objective 
in mind; just as Grenville had thought that this implicitly 
acknowledged notion of benefit taxation was a reasonable approach to 
the problem at hand, and would meet any reasonable objections from the 
colonists, so apparently had N o r t h . B o t h  believed that the 
authority of Parliament must be maintained on the question of its power 
to raise revenue in the colonies, no matter how indirectly, to finance 
the production of collectively consumed goods. The only difference in 
approach is that whereas Grenville had rejected the use of quotas, or 
requisitions, North wished to use this method of raising revenue, and 
was intent on enforcing this system.
The similarities between the approach taken by North, and 
that taken by Grenville, were not lost on one member of Parliament.
(2)Charles Jenkinson pointed out in the debate on the North resolution: 
"[The resolution] lays down as a rule at the 
foundation that every part of the empire must 
bear its share to the common defence; and as 
to the mode by which the provinces and colonies 
may contribute their share ... But it does it,
(1) This is implied in the statement by North, reported above, 
beginning "[The resolution] points out, ..." etc.
(2) Parliamentary History, Vol. XVIII, column 330.
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Sir, in a way that maintains and supports the 
supremacy of parliament. The terms on which 
this agreement is to be established, must have 
the sanction of parliament, the revenue raised 
must be at the disposal of parliament. Sir, 
this is so far from being a proposition new at 
this day, that it is the very proposition which 
Mr. Grenville made to the colonies the year 
before he brought forward the measure of the 
Stamp Act. ... If there be anything new in this 
proposition, it is that it speaks out explicitly 
and definitely".
Nor was the strong element of compulsion in the North 
resolution ignored by the members of Parliament. While in committee 
David Hartley for example noted:
"The present motion is not free but compulsory; 
it is attended with menaces and threats, ... To 
say, Give me as much money as I wish, till I 
say enough, or I will take it from you, and then 
call such a proposition conciliatory for peace, 
is insult added to oppression. ... What is this 
if it be not extorting a revenue by threats of 
taxing?".^
(1) Parliamentary History_, Vol. XVIII, column 350. This is not to say 
that every statement Hartley made in this debate was correct. In 
the same speech he asserted, echoing Franklin, that the colonies 
had behaved cooperatively when providing contributions to the last 




One will search in vain to find a rebuttal by North of this 
criticism by Hartley of the resolution before the House. Indeed North 
only confirmed Hartley’s view of the resolution, for the statement made 
by North on the 27th February, as cited above, in which he made it clear 
that the British government would use force to impose the colonial 
public finance policy implied in his resolution, was made after 
Hartley's statement to the Commons. If North meant to be conciliatory 
it seems reasonable to expect to find Hartley criticising the just cited 
statement by North after it had been made, and then possibly for North 
subsequently to make some qualifying and conciliatory remarks. This did 
not occur.
The strong suspicion remains, therefore, that the North 
ministry in 1775 had no intention of establishing a voluntary system of 
colonial contributions to the defence of the colonies; if a colony did 
not contribute according to the dictates of Parliament it would be 
forced into compliance. This view is also not refuted by what North was 
stating outside Parliament. In late October, 1775, North wrote the 
following:
"... His Majesty's other counsellors still 
remain ready to agree with any province in 
American upon the footing of the resolution 
of H. of Commons of the 27 of February last, 
but the leaders of the Rebellion in the 
Colonies plainly declare themselves not 
satisfied with those conditions, and 
manifestly aim at a total independence.
Against this we propose to exert ourselves,
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using every species of force to reduce them, 
but authorizing, at the same time, either the 
Commander in Chief or some other Commissioner, 
to proclaim immediate peace and pardon, and to 
restore all the privileges of trade to any 
Colony upon its submission. Authority will 
likewise be given to settle the question of 
taxation for the future upon the plan held 
forth last year3 and to put every other matter 
now in dispute between them and this country 
in a course of accommodation".^^
It is not clear what taxation plan "held forth last year"
North is referring to, but it seems reasonable to presume from the
context of the letter, that this plan could not have been any more
liberal than that incorporated in the North resolution. If this
presumption is correct then the march of events had not altered the
North ministry's basic position, publicly set out in February, that the
basis for the British negotiating with the colonists had to be on the
propositions presented in the resolution, although by October, judging
by North's letter to Grafton, the issue of forcing an agreement on this
resolution had now merged with the task of preventing, with the use of
(2)military force, the colonists' attempts to become independent. What
(1) Lord North to the Duke of Grafton, October 20, 1775. This letter 
is reproduced in full in Van Alstyne, "Parliamentary Supremacy", 
op. oit.3 pp. 221-222. Emphasis added.
(2) While the colonists had not yet declared their independence of 
Great Britain, the British government had presumed that it was just 
a matter of time before they did.
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is clear from this letter is that there is no indication that the 
British government in 1775 was not intending to raise revenue in the 
colonies, and use force if necessary to achieve this end. This is not 
to say that later the North government did not change its objective, 
from wishing to impose some revenue raising device on the colonists, to 
just preventing the colonies from becoming independent, and waiving all 
pretentions of attempting to raise revenue in the colonies. But this 
does not appear to have been the case in 1775.
It follows from this interpretation of these pieces of 
evidence that Van Alstyne's contention that the North ministry in 1775 
was not intent on raising revenue in the American colonies is not 
substantiated.^^ If this conclusion is correct then this raises 
another subject for consideration, and that is (given that the American 
colonists had been communicating the information to the British for 
over a decade, albeit in a disguised form, that they would not 
contribute resources, to the level expected by the British government, 
to assist in providing collectively consumed goods while the British 
government provided these goods) why was the North ministry still 
intent on trying to induce the colonists to contribute to the funds
(1) The conclusion that the British government in 1775 was intent on 
raising revenue, in addition to controlling international trade 
in the North American colonies is further substantiated by the 
view expressed in August of that year by another member of the 
North cabinet. Dartmouth wrote that if the colonies would "admit 
of duties for regulation to trade, and will add to that a 
revenue for the support of Civil Government, and such military 
force as they themselves shall desire to have among them, I think 
we may soon be agreed". Dartmouth to Knox, 6th August, 1775, as 
cited by Donoughue in British Politics, op. oit.3 p. 7n.
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needed to protect and administer the colonies? A possible partial 
answer is to be found in a statement by North, when addressing himself 
to his resolution:^
"If [the colonists'] outward pretentions be the 
real principles of the opposition which they 
have made, they must, consistently with these 
principles, agree to the resoution. If they do 
not meet us on this ground, it will evidence 
that they have other views, and are actuated by 
other motives".
What North appears to be alluding to is a literal interpretation which 
he apparently gave to the colonists' protests over being taxed 
(externally or internally) by Parliament without their consent, and chat 
he was aiming to circumvent this objection by imposing a requisition 
system, whereby Parliament was not responsible for the final act of 
imposing taxes on the colonists. Such a literal interpretation of these 
protests by the colonists lead North astray; these protests did allude 
to deeper motives for the colonists' political behaviour in response to 
their being taxes by Parliament, but the North ministry apparently had 
not made this observation.
If this government had correctly interpreted the motives for 
the colonists' political behaviour, however, it is still not certain 
that North would have adopted an alternative approach to the problem at 
hand; North was still intent on upholding "the doctrine that every part 
of the empire was bound to bear its share of service and burthen in the
(1) 20th February, 1775, Parliamentary History3 Vol. XVIII, pp. 321-322.
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common defence". To impose this doctrine, which appears to have taken 
precedence over all other considerations concerning colonial policy at 
the time, the British government in 1775 was prepared to resort to 
military force. The British government of the day, therefore, had 
resolved - as is fairly clearly implied by the doctrine enunciated by 
North - that for Great Britain to continue to play the game of 
administering imperial public finance policy, according to the rules 
that had applied from at least 1763 through to 1774, would add to the 
economic burden placed on British tax-payers. The rules of the game 
needed to be changed to Great Britain's advantage in order to reduce, 
or at least limit, this financial burden. At least this appears to 
have been the implied attitude of the North ministry in early 1775.
But the British politicians knew from Josiah Tucker's 
writings, if from no other source, that alternative policy options were 
available to the British government in 1774, and later, to solve the 
basic policy problem facing it in its administration of the North 
American colonies, other than the use of military force. The best of 
these options was for the British government to withdraw the services 
of the collectively consumed goods, from which the colonists benefited 
(unless the colonies agreed to contribute a certain sum to the 
financing of the costs of administering and protecting the colonies), 
an objective which could have been achieved by the British government 
granting the colonies their independence if the financial precondition 
was not met. Certainly the use of military force to coerce the 
colonists into compliance with the British government's wishes stood 
little chance of solving the fundamental political-economic policy 
problem it was confronted with in its administration of the North
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American colonies.
While the British government of about 1775 might not have
(2)considered the best policy option as stated above, they do appear,
as part of the subsequent discussion will indicate by implication, to
have considered the policy option of granting the colonies their
(3)independence of the British political system, which effectively meant
that Great Britain ceased to provide, or at least intentionally provide,
collectively consumed goods from which the colonists benefited. Other
than the qualification concerning the willingness of the colonists to
contribute to the financing of the collectively consumed goods, this
policy option which the British government of 1775, and after,
(4)considered, but rejected, was close to the best available. The
(1) See the discussion of these points at the end of chapter IV above.
(2) The use of the term "best" is meant to imply that it was not 
necessarily the optimum policy. The optimum policy solution is 
concerned with attaining certain optimum marginal conditions, 
whereas the best solution is not. But because of the practical 
problems involved with determining the marginal optimal situation, 
it is preferable to concentrate on what is attainable in practice; 
the best policy option is one which could have been implemented 
with relative ease, without the need to determine a good deal of 
information (which the implementation of the optimum policy 
entails), and yet be a more advantageous policy to adopt, compared 
to alternative, and apparently relatively easily attainable, policy 
options. On the subject of the difficulties involved with 
obtaining the correct information needed to implement the optimum 
solution see the brief discussion on page 342 above.
(3) That this was so was also implied above in the discussion of the 
degree of acceptance of Dean Tucker's recommendations for over­
coming the administrative problems the British government faced in 
the thirteen colonies; see this discussion at the end of chapter 
IV above.
(4) The best policy solution, and the policy option of just granting 
the colonies their independence, could be qualified even further 
to allow for the constitutional possibility of the thirteen 
colonies being politically independent of Great Britain but still 
being regarded as being within the British Empire. This 
possibility apparently did not occur to the British government, a 
point which will be discussed below.
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question to be answered, if possible, is why the majority of the 
British members of parliament in 1775, and later, thought that the use 
of force would be a superior solution to the policy problem it faced in 
the thirteen colonies, than granting the colonists their political 
independence of Great Britain, and thereby for Great Britain to cease 
to provide the collectively consumed goods from which the colonists 
benefited. In order to assist in the attempt to answer this question 
it is useful to go back to the game theoretic framework, outlined in 
chapter II, in order to develop some idea of the structural form of the 
conflict of interests between the American colonists and the British 
government in 1775. Before attempting such a reconstruction, however, 
the likely relative net returns to the more important strategic options 
available to the contesting parties first have to be estimated.
The major strategic option, and its likely relative net 
return, facing the colonists essentially has been discussed above. An 
important coalition of colonists in the thirteen colonies had 
established before 1775 that it was to their advantage not to 
contribute directly to the finances used by the British government to 
provide collectively consumed goods from which the colonists benefited. 
This uncooperative strategy probably provided greater net benefits to 
the colonists, and bore a riskless return, compared to the cooperative 
strategy, while the British government was willing to behave 
cooperatively by providing these goods without resorting to any 
measures to attempt to obtain revenue from the colonists to partly 
finance the production of these goods.
The strategic policy options available to the British 
government in 1775, on the other hand, if it wished to induce the
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colonists to cooperate, were strategies which basically lowered the net 
returns to the colonists if they behaved uncooperatively, and/or made 
these returns less certain, currently, or in the future, while the 
British government provided the relevant collectively consumed goods.
One such strategy was for the British government to bring military force 
to bear against the colonists, in order to coerce them into agreeing to 
contribute towards the cost of providing these goods. Some colonial 
leaders probably regarded such coercive action as lowering the certain 
net benefits to be obtained from remaining in the British Empire to the 
point where greater certain net returns could be received by the 
colonies if they left the British Empire altogether, by the colonies 
declaring and forcefully seeking their independence of Great Britain, 
and providing their own collectively consumed goods, previously provided 
by the British government. Other colonial leaders were not so sanguine 
about the likely beneficial outcomes of becoming independent, and 
pointed out the risks involved for the colonies by adopting such a 
strategy, in response to the threat of the use of military force by the 
British - the material harm that would result from an armed conflict 
between Great Britain and the colonists; in addition there was the 
potential loss of export markets to Great Britain, and the loss of the 
benefits produced by various collectively consumed goods then produced 
by Great Britain, if the thirteen colonies became independent.^ ^
These risks, nevertheless, were taken by the majority of the colonists 
in seeking their independence from Great Britain, in response to the
(1) John Dickinson, "Arguments Against the Independence of the 
Colonies ..." (July 1, 1776), as reproduced in J.P. Greene, 
Colonies to Nations, op. c i t pp. 292-296, particularly p. 295.
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military force employed by the British government against them. (1)
But the game need not have gone to the stage, where the 
colonists were prepared to take the risk of a relatively violent clash 
with the British, in order to become independent of the threat of the 
British Parliament imposing some form of economic burden on the 
colonies, for the British political leaders to have realised that the 
use of military force had a very small chance of succeeding in 
achieving the objective of inducing the colonists to contribute, 
directly or indirectly, towards the task of lowering the costs to Great 
Britain of meeting the colonists', and British, collective wants (as 
the British government saw them). Even if the colonists could have 
been subdued, at least for the time being, into making some form of 
contribution, the overall benefits to the British economy were not 
certain for the colonists always could have imposed an economic cost on 
Great Britain by refusing to purchase British imports. It does seem 
unlikely that the British political leaders were incapable of 
forecasting this possibility; in fact they did not have to forecast it
(1) Why the British American colonists were prepared to take these 
risks may be explained at least in part by a number of factors.
The first of these was that the colonists, who attempted to warn 
their fellow citizens of the risks involved if the colonies 
became independent, were not adequately organized to convey enough 
of this information to the general colonial community to counter 
the arguments of the opposing side. (That there was a lack of 
this organisation amongst the Loyalists is a view expressed, or 
implied, by W.H. Nelson in The American Tory, passim.) Once the 
Revolution was under way the valuation of these risks, of leaving 
the British Empire, was also reduced, relative to the risks of 
suffering a burden by remaining within the Empire, because of the 
military tactics employed by the British army against the colonial 
community; tactics which induced the previously indifferent 
colonists to take sides against the British government. See 
J. Shy, "The Military Conflict", in Essays on the American 
Revolution, op. cit.
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f o r  i n  1775 t h e  c o l o n i s t s  had p l a c e d  an embargo on B r i t i s h  i m p o r t s .
Ye t  a t t e m p t s  i n  1775 t o  make th e  B r i t i s h  government  f u l l y  aware of  
t h e s e  d a n g e r s  came to  no a v a i l .
To a t t e m p t  to  e x p l a i n  t h i s  l a c k  of  com prehens ion  o f  t h e s e  
d a n g e r s  f o r  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  amongst  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  
i t  i s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  government  s u f f e r e d
V
u n d e r  t h e  i l l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  r e b e l l i n g  c o l o n i s t s  c o u ld  have been
( 2 )
r e l a t i v e l y  e a s i l y  subdued i n t o  comply in g  w i t h  P a r l i a m e n t ’s w i s h e s .
Even i f  t h e  c o l o n i s t s  had been  subdued a t  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  c o s t ,  i n  
t h e  form o f  m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  e x p e r i e n c e  from a bou t  1763 on had 
shown t h a t  t h e  c o l o n i s t s  were q u i t e  c a p a b l e  o f  r e t a l i a t i n g  a g a i n s t  any 
a t t e m p t s  by P a r l i a m e n t  to  impose any ,  too  e x p l i c i t ,  d e v i c e  f o r  r a i s i n g  
r e v e n u e  i n  t h e  c o l o n i e s ,  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o l l e c t i v e l y  
consumed goods p r o v i d e d  by th e  B r i t i s h  gove rnm en t ,  by u t i l i s i n g  th e  
s t r a t e g y  o f  b o y c o t t i n g  B r i t i s h  i m p o r t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n d u c e  changes  i n  
t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  c o l o n i a l  p u b l i c  f i n a n c e  p o l i c i e s .  So from t h e  
B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p o i n t  of  view t h e r e  a p p e a r e d  to  be n o t h i n g  t o  be 
g a in e d  by em ploy ing  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o l o n i s t s ,  i f  t h i s  
government  i n  1775 w ishe d  to  i n d u c e  t h e  c o l o n i s t s  i n t o  c o o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  
t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l  p u b l i c  f i n a n c e  p o l i c y ,  and r e t a i n  
t h e  e x p o r t  m arke t  f o r  B r i t i s h  goods i n  t h e  American c o l o n i e s .
(1)  Edmund Burke ,  f o r  exam ple ,  i n  h i s  famous s p e e c h  o f  March 22 ,  1775,  
e m p h a s i se d  the  im p o r t a n c e  t o  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  m a r k e t s  
i n  t h e  American c o l o n i e s .  Parliamentary H istory3 Vol .  XV II I ,  
columns 478-540 ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  columns 485-487 .
(2)  T ha t  t h e  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  d i d  s u f f e r  from t h i s  
m i s c o n c e p t i o n  s e e ,  f o r  exam ple ,  Van A l s t y n e ,  Empire and 
Independencey op. c i t .  y p .  77,  and Bonamy Dobree ( e d . ) ,  The 
L etters o f  King George I I I  (London,  C a s s e l l ,  1968 ) ,  p .  99.
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An alternative method for attempting to induce this 
cooperation, which in effect meant lowering, and/or making less certain, 
the net benefits received by the colonists from adopting the 
uncooperative strategy, was for the British government to behave, or 
threaten to behave, uncooperatively as well, by not providing, or 
threatening not to provide, the collectively consumed goods to the 
thirteen colonies. Such a strategy obviously could have been 
implemented by the British government granting, or threatening to grant, 
the colonies their independence. The British government, however, was 
not willing to adopt such a strategy right up to the time of the 
outbreak of the American Revolution and beyond; the North ministry was 
not even prepared to threaten to grant the colonies their independence 
- that is before the colonists unilaterally demanded this independence 
in response to the British government's use of military force against 
them. But why should the British government have been so loath to 
grant this independence, or so eager to prevent the colonies from 
becoming independent when the colonies requested such a political- 
economic change in their relations with Great Britain? Why, in 1775, 
should the net benefits to the British government, resulting from 
adopting the strategy of granting the thirteen American colonies their 
independence, have not been greater than the net benefits to be 
received from the strategy, implied by North's resolution, of 
maintaining the state where the British government continued to provide 
collectively consumed goods, from which the colonists benefited, in 
return for which it received an indefinite, but probably small, amount 
of compensation in the form of financial contributions from the
colonists?
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The fear that the British political leaders had in 1775, and 
later, of the prospect of the colonies becoming independent of Great 
Britain appears to have been based upon some notions regarding the 
supposed economic benefits to be received from the mercantile system 
that the British had erected for itself within the framework of the 
British Empire. This is the clear implication in Josiah Tucker's 
discussion, in his Great Britain and the Colonies > of the fifth policy 
option which he suggested was available to the British government for 
overcoming the administration problems it faced in the American 
colonies {viz. of "declaring [the colonies] to be free and 
independent"). In answering the potential criticisms of this policy 
proposal, his reply concentrated mainly on questions of the probable 
alterations to Great Britain's international trading fortunes should 
the American colonies become independent: no, Great Britain would not
lose her export markets in the independent former American colonies, as 
long as Britain did not antagonise the colonists, for she had a natural 
comparative advantage over all other countries in the commodities she 
exported to the American colonies, and, anyway, the Navigation Acts dfd 
not provide any protection for British exports to the colonies for the 
relevant provisions of these Acts were easily evaded by the colonists 
yes, the British economy would still obtain commodities from the 
colonies as cheaply, and as freely, as before, for the British market 
provided one of the most profitable in which the colonists could sell
(1) Josiah Tucker, Great Britain and the Colonies, op. ait., pp. 361- 
362.
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their exports. But if the American colonies became independent
would they not come under the political and economic control of the
French, which (and this is inferred) would have the effect of inhibiting
British trade with this geographic area? No, for if the colonists
would not accept British rule, they certainly would not accept French
(2)political control.
These fears, apparently held by Great Britain's political 
leaders in 1775, and in the early years of the Revolution, about the 
economic losses that would result from Great Britain giving the thirteen 
colonies their independence, and which Tucker dismissed as groundless, 
perhaps are best reflected in a revealing letter written by George 111 
to North on 11 June, 1779. At the time peace proposals, that could be 
put to the American colonists, were being considered. The king could 
not accept these proposals; which meant the British government 
recognising the independence of the thirteen American colonies.
(1) Josiah Tucker, Great Britain and the Colonies, op. oit., pp. 359- 
361. While these arguments presented by Tucker may be taken to 
imply that he was generally in favour of free trade, he was not, 
as has been noted by Schuyler (Josiah Tucker, op. cit., p. 13), 
W.E. Clark (Josiah Tucker, Economist. A Study in the History of 
Economics, New York, 1903, p. 174 ff.) and Jacob Viner (Studies 
in the Theory of International Trade, New York, Harper, 1937, pp. 
99-100). Rather he was a protectionist who was critical of 
domestic monopolies. Yet, in addition, he rejected the view that 
the possession of colonies was required to contribute to the 
wealth of Great Britain; Tucker noted after the American 
Revolution that other factors, such as the protection of new 
industries, the removal of monopoles, changes to the taxation 
system, technical improvements, "would render any Country rich and 
flourishing, whether it had colonies or not". These observations, 
and more, were added by Tucker to his "Great Britain and the 
Colonies" of 1774. (See Josiah Tucker, op. cit., p. 364.)
(2) Josiah Tucker, Great Britain and the Colonies, op. cit., pp. 362- 
364.
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"... Should America succeed in that, the 
West Indies must follow them ... Ireland 
would soon follow ... then this Island 
would be reduced to itself, and soon would 
be a poor Island indeed, for reduced in Her 
Trade Merchants would return with their 
Wealth to Climates more to their Advantage, 
and Shoals of Manufacturers would leave this 
Country for the New Empire; ... consequently 
this Country has but one sensible, one great 
line to follow, the being ever ready to make 
Peace when to be obtained without submitting 
to terms that in their consequence must 
anihilate this Empire .
George III essentially maintained this view to the end of the
(2)war, and indeed at one point to some degree implicitly exploited the
terminology of game theory to express this opinion;
"... The giving up the Game would be total 
ruin, a small State may certainly Subsist 
but a great one mouldering cannot get into 
an inferior Situation but must be anihilated,
... by giving up the game we are destroying
(1) The King to Lord North, June 11, 1779, in J. Fortescue (ed.), 
Correspondence of King George III3 1760-1783, op. oit., Vol. IV, 
No. 2649, pp. 350-351. Also on the general point being made here 
see B. Donoughue, British Politics and the American Revolution, 
op. cit., pp. 42-44.
(2) R. Pares, King George III and the Politicians (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1953), pp. 68 and 119.
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ourselves to prevent being destroyed".
For the king, adopting the strategy in the game of giving the American
colonies their independence, and thereby Great Britain would be giving
up, or withdrawing from, the game, gave the lowest certain net return
to Great Britain in the long-run, of all the strategic options then
known to be available to the British government. Nor was the king
alone, amongst the British political leaders, near the end of the
Revolution, with the view that maintaining the British Empire intact
brought economic benefits to Great Britain which out-weighed the costs
of maintaining this status quo. Even after Great Britain had suffered
the costs of fighting the American colonists for some six years,
Germain stated after the battle of Yorktown (October, 1781), that
"We can never continue to exist as a great
and powerful nation after we have lost or
renounced the sovereignty of the American
(2)colonies".
After the war was over the Earl of Sheffield gave a succinct
statement of why the British government had used military force against
the colonists, instead of allowing them their independence;
"Our late wars have been for the exclusive trade
of American, and our enormous debt has been
(3)incurred for that object".
(1) The King to Lord North, 26th September, 1780, Correspondence of 
King George III3 op. cit.3 Vol. V, No. 3155, p. 136. Emphasis added.
(2) Cited by P. Mackesy, "British Strategy in the War of American 
Independence", The Yale Review, Vol. 55 (1963), pp. 539-557.
(3) Earl of Sheffield, "Observation on the Commerce of the American 
States" (1783), reproduced in G.S. Callender (ed.), Selections from
the Economic History of the United States, 1763-1860 (Boston, Gin 
and Co., 1909), pp/ 210-211.
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While this almost certainly was not the only reason why the British 
government initially began the war (another was to coerce the colonists 
into contributing to the revenue needed to administer and protect the 
British Empire) Sheffield's opinion was certainly consistent with those 
views cited above as to why British poltical leaders in the 1770s 
valued the American colonies so highly, and why they were so loach to 
give these colonies their independence.^^
The fears about the long-run economic prospects for Great 
Britain, if the American colonies left the Empire, were not
1
substantiated by events in the reasonable long-term after the American
Revolution. Nor in the short-run did Great Britain's trade with her
former American colonies shrivel away, just as Tucker had predicted it
would not. In the four years just prior to the Revolution (1771
through to 1774) Great Britain exported an annual average of £2.97
(3)million worth of goods, in money terms, to the thirteen colonies.
For the four years immediately after this military conflict (1784 
through to 1787) Great Britain exported commodities valued at £2.40 
million per annum to the new American states. This fall in the money 
value of exports after the Revolution no doubt can be explained, at 
least in part, in terms of the economic adjustment problems which must
(1) An obvious implication of the discussion of this point is that the 
British government did consider the strategy, at least after 1775, 
and well before 1783, of granting the colonies their independence.
(2) This was so despite the fact that the qualification by Tucker 
concerning this prediction (that the British should not antagonise 
the colonists) had been violated.
(3) The source for this information is B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of 
British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1962), Overseas Trade, Table 10, pp. 310-311.
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have faced the Americans after the revolution; a point which will be
discussed in a little more detail b e l o w . F r o m  this period onwards
(2)the money value of exports to the United States continued to grow. 
Employing the same time periods, the value of imports from the United 
States into Great Britain were £1.34 million per annum before the 
Revolution, and on average £0.85 million per annum after this event.
This fall in the money value of imports does not necessarily represent 
a loss of economic welfare to the British community, for no doubt part 
of this fall is accounted for by the termination of the British 
government's policy of subsidizing the production of certain exports 
from the American colonies. But some of this fall in the money value of 
imports from the United States does represent an economic welfare loss 
to Great Britain in that the imports from the United States now had to 
bear import duties, or were prohibited from entering Great Britain, 
whereas previously these restrictions were not imposed on imports from
(1) A problem with the trade information, being utilised here to make 
these comparisons, is that there are no export and import price 
indices available which could be used to adjust the money values 
of these international trade figures. A price index available for 
England for this period, which could act as a substitute (of 
indeterminate accuracy) for an export price index is the price 
index for consumer goods, other than cereals. This price index, 
for the time periods under discussion does not show any sharp 
changes; it moved from a low of 96 in 1771 to a peak of 103 in 
1772, and from a peak of 111 in 1784 to a low of 106 in 1786. See 
the Schumpeter-Gilboy Price Index, in B.R. Mitchell, British 
Historical Statistics, op. cit.3 p. 469.
(2) There is little point in comparing the short, medium, or long-term 
growth rates of British exports to the United States, before and 
after the Revolution, for these could have varied for a whole host 
of reasons, other than just the change in the political 
relationship between Great Britain and its former American colonies.
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the thirteen American c o l o n i e s . T h i s  loss, however, was not the
result of these colonies leaving the British Empire as such, but an
implication of the British government’s policy of imposing trade
restrictions on imports into Great Britain from countries outside the
(2)British Empire, a policy that could have been reversed.
That the probability was high that Great Britain would suffer 
few economic losses, if any, from the thirteen colonies becoming
(1) D.C. North, The Economic Growth of the United, States 1790-1860
(Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1961), pp. 19-22. This point 
was also implicitly discussed in a number of letters from John 
Adams to Jay in 1785. At a point in one of these letters, for 
example, Adams describes the problems the new American states were 
having developing their export (visible and invisible) trade with 
the British Empire:
"[The British government's] attachment to their navigation 
Act is grown so strong, and their determination to consider us as 
foreigners, and to undermine our navigation, and to draw away our 
seamen, is so fixed, in order to prevent us from privateering, in 
case of war, that I despair of any equal [trade] treaty".
Letters from John Adams to John Jay (1785), as reproduced in 
Callender, Selections, op. cit.3 p. 216.
(2) Actually aspects of the economic adminstration of the British
Empire at this time had the makings of a crude form of, what today 
is called, a customs union, where countries within the customs 
union give certain trade preferences to one another while they all 
impose trade restrictions against imports from countries outside 
the customs union. What the British politicians implicitly seem 
to have been fearful of, in about 1775, was that if the thirteen 
American colonies left the crude customs union formed by the 
British Empire the economic fortunes of Great Britain would 
sharply deteriorate. But, as some modern international trade 
theorists have pointed out, a country would do just as well, if 
not better, simply to follow a free trade policy rather than 
distort trade flows in any way by entering any form of customs 
union. [See, for example, M.B. Krauss, "Recent Developments in 
Customs Union Theory: An Interpretative Survey", Journal of
Economic Literature_, Vol. 9 (1972), particularly p. 430.] Adam 
Smith's criticism in 1776 of the mercantile system, that Great 
Britain had erected for itself within the British Empire, was 
implicitly based on this same proposition. See Adam Smith, An 
Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations3 Vol. 
II (London, J.M. Dent and Sons, 1910), pp. 155-156.
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independent, was an outcome that had come to be realised by at least 
one British politician by 1783. The Earl of Sheffield observed of the 
economic prospects for Great Britain, now that the American colonies 
had left the British Empire:
"Great Britain will lose few of the advantages 
she possessed before these States became 
independent, and with prudent management she 
will have as much trade as it will be her 
interest to wish for, without any expense for 
civil establishment and protection. The States 
will suffer - they have lost much by the 
separation. We shall regret the money that has 
been squandered, but it is not probable that 
our Commerce will be much hurt".
Sheffield's economic prediction for the British economy was soon to be 
proved correct. In fact Sheffield noted this point in a later edition 
of his "Observation":
"What was foretold in the first edition of 
this work has now actually happened. Every 
account says, that British manufactures are 
selling at a considerable profit, while 
other European goods cannot obtain the first 
profit".
He also went on to provide a reason why British exports to the former 
colonies were not quite as buoyant as they might be, and implicitly a 
reason why this export trade was not quite at the level of the
(1) Earl of Sheffield, "Observation on the Commerce of the American 
States", (1783) as reproduced in G.S. Callender, Selections3 op. 
clt.3 p. 210. 1
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immediate pre-Revolution period:
"The American consumers have been impoverished 
by an expensive war, which has bequeathed them 
many taxes to pay".^^
The fall in disposable income available to the former colonisLS, caused 
by the cost to these individuals of the Revolution, had meant that they 
had less to spend on British imports, than would have been the case if 
there had been no Revolution, and while other things remained the same.
Despite Josiah Tucker's accurate forecast of the future
international trading prospects for Great Britain, without the thirteen
North American colonies being within the British Empire, the majority
of the British political leaders in 1775 believed that the British
Empire had to be preserved, and preserved by the British Parliament
maintaining its authority over the colonies; there was no alternative,
and more flexible, political arrangement available which could prevent
the disintegration of the Empire. This was the conclusion arrived at
in the discussion by Donoughue of the political behaviour of the North
(2)ministry on the eve of the Revolution:
"Every Minister believed that the Empire 
could be preserved intact only if the Americans 
accepted the principle of total subordination.
... They could not conceive of any constitutional 
compromise which could be offered to the colonial 
radicals while still maintaining the imperial
(1) Earl of Sheffield, "Observation", op. cit., pp. 213-214.
(2) B. Donoughue, British Politics and the American Revolution, op. 
cit., pp. 281-282.
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relationship; in any case they were quite 
convinced that the American patriot leaders 
would not be prepared to accept one”.
As a result of this apparent lack of imagination amongst the 
North ministry in their thinking about constitutional devices (which 
would meet the colonists' demands, and yet keep the colonies within the 
Empire under some political arrangement or another) the choice for the 
British government, as it saw it in about 1775, was limited to that of 
maintaining the current political-economic arrangement of the Empire 
(while possibly attempting to improve the management of the colonies, 
from the British point of view, by coercing the colonists into 
contributing revenue for the purposes of partly financing the 
protection and administration of ehe colonies), or allowing the 
thirteen North American colonies to become independent of any political- 
economic control by the British Parliament. If the analysis presented 
above, of the attitudes of British political leaders towards the Empire 
in the mid-1770s to early 1780s, is correct, then it is possible that 
this lack of mental agility in the North ministry on constitutional 
matters could be explained (in part, at least) by the argument that 
these politicians believed that any diminution of Parliament's 
political-economic control over the Empire would have seriously eroded 
the economic benefits which Great Britain was supposed to have received 
from possessing an empire of its then current size, and institutional 
form.
Whether, or not, this explanation, of this inability in the 
North ministry to consider constitutional alternatives, is valid is 
unimportant for the present analysis. This political attitude may be
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taken as given, and attention concentrated instead on the options, 
constrained by the attitudes of British politicians, available to the 
British government in 1775. The point to be emphasised about these 
perceived options is that important individuals in the political 
establishment in Great Britain in 1775, and later, believed that the 
British Empire, which included the American colonies, was very much 
worth preserving; they could not accept the contrary view that this 
might not have been the case, and that there was no overwhelming 
benefit to be gained by not peacefully allowing the thirteen colonies 
their independence. Again, if the previous analysis is correct, then 
it was mainly economic considerations which prevented this lack of 
perception; important British political leaders believed that if the 
American colonies became independent this would lead to an 
indeterminate, but probably "large”, fall in Great Britain's economic 
fortunes. Another way of perceiving this point is that these British 
political leaders implicitly appear to have believed that if the 
British government adopted an uncooperative strategy, by withdrawing 
from the colonies the collectively consumed goods it provided, and 
from which the colonists benefited (which would have been the case if 
the thirteen colonies were offered their independence, and no defeuce 
alliance arrangements were made between the British and the new states) 
the American colonies would have continued to have behaved 
uncooperatively, which implied they would have left the Empire and that 
this would have imposed a relatively serious economic loss on the 
British community. Thus the valuations put on the net benefits 
received from this British strategy, of behaving uncooperatively, by 
the British politicians, were lower than those attached to other 
strategic policy options available to the British government in 1775,
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for assisting it to manage the underlying public finance policy problem 
it faced in the American colonies.
These propositions concerning the apparently more important 
strategies open to the two opposing parties, and the likely relative 
valuations put on the outcomes attached to these strategies, may now 
be drawn together, and brought into sharper focus, with the use of a 
relatively formal game theory framework. The purpose of doing this 
is to gain a clearer idea of the structure of the conflict of interests 
in 1775, and the few years that followed; in particular, the structure 
of this conflict of interests as seen by the British government because, 
given the social-political attitudes of the American colonists, it was 
for Great Britain to make the final decision in 1775, and later, as to 
whether, or not, military force was to be deployed against the 
colonists, to resolve the issue(s) at stake. It should be emphasised 
that this approach to this problem is not meant to provide a 
determinate solution to this conflict of interests; no such solution 
is possible from the gaming model utilized here simply because, in 
particular, subjective assessments are required to determine the 
valuations put on the net benefits to be obtained from adopting various
strategies, and on how the information passing between the two 
opponents is interpreted and reacted to.^^ The gaming model employed 
here is simply being exploited for the purposes of organising the
(1) These are not the only considerations which would tend to make the 
solution to the gaming model employed here indeterminate. Other 
factors which could influence the outcome are the type of 
information communicated, how it is communicated, the speed with 
which it is communicated, the ability of the threats available to 
the opposing players to seriously harm the opponent if used, the 
speed with which binding decisions have to be made, the number of 
times the game has been played by the same players, and so on.
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relevant historical material into some sort of coherent form.
The information that had been communicated by the colonists 
to the British government on many occasions, between at least 1763 and 
1775, was that they would not peacefully contribute resources to the 
level desired by the British government, to assist in the financing of 
the collectively consumed goods already being provided by the British, 
and from which the colonists benefited. In other words, the valuation 
put on the benefits derived from this uncooperative strategy by the 
colonists was greater than on the benefits likely to be obtained from 
the alternative cooperative strategy available to the colonists, while 
the British government played cooperatively.
Should the British government have adopted an uncooperative 
strategy as well, by giving the colonies their independence, the 
British government believed that the game was at an end, for now the 
colonists had been forced out of the game, and would have had to meet 
their collective wants unaided by the British. Actually it is not 
certain that the game would have come to an end at this point; the 
colonists may have responded by offering to behave more cooperatively, 
in order to receive the benefits of remaining within the British 
Empire, now that they were faced with the definite prospect of having 
to finance alone the collectively consumed goods previously provided 
by Great Britain. But speculation about what the colonists would have 
done, when faced with a British government behaving uncooperatively, is 
of little relevance here; what is relevant is what the British 
government believed, in regard to how the American colonists would have 
responded when faced with its own (the British government's)
uncooperative behaviour.
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Also the British government appears to have begun to realise 
only late in 1775,^^ that if it brought military force to bear against 
the colonists, in an attempt to coerce the colonists into behaving more 
cooperatively, they would indeed attempt to seek their independence of 
Great Britain, and thereby bring the game to an end.
It follows from these comments that the form of the payoff 
matrix for the colonists, as seen by the British government, is not 
easily depicted. The only payoff to the colonists apparently definitely 
within the game is that for the case where the British behaved 
cooperatively, and the colonists uncooperatively. In 1775 the British 
possibly thought that the use of force against the colonists to induce 
them to cooperate, while the British also behaved cooperatively, still 
gave the colonists a positive return over the value of the outcome to 
the colonists of their leaving the British Empire. The British 
government changed its view on this matter, and came to realise that 
rather force was required to keep the colonies in the political game.
For all the cases where the colonists were thought, by the British 
government, to have preferred to have left the game, and become 
independent, than adopt the strategy indicated by the game matrix, the 
relevant payoff for the colonists within the game is depicted by a 
blank.
Thus the payoff matrix for the colonists, as seen by the 
British government in at least early 1775, may have been of the 
following form (where C represents the cooperative strategy and D the
(1) See the earlier comments on the letter from North to Grafton of 








with the assumptions that B > A, and A becomes a blank sometime after 
late 1775. This limited conclusion, assuming it is correct, 
nevertheless provides the beginnings of the reconstruction of the 
structure of the decision problem facing the British government in
1775.
Turning to the payoffs for the various relevant strategies 
available to the British government, as it saw them in 1775 and later, 
while the colonists behaved uncooperatively, the net benefits to the 
British of behaving cooperatively apparently were considered, by Great 
Britain's political leaders, to have been greater than the net benefits 
to be obtained by the British behaving uncooperatively, and granting 
the colonists their independence. At least in 1775, if not later, the 
British government also appears to have believed that the value to 
Great Britain of the net benefits to be received from coercing the 
colonists into behaving more cooperatively, while the British behaved 
cooperatively, even after allowing for the costs of enforcing this 
cooperation on the colonists, would be greater than the value of the 
net benefits for the strategy where the British behaved cooperatively 
and the colonists did not. No doubt the strategy which would have 
brought the greatest net benefits to the British was that where Great
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Britain played uncooperatively, while the colonists behaved 
cooperatively. But it was unlikely that such a set of strategies 
could have been put into effect; the likely response of the colonists 
to such a situation would have been for them to behave uncooperatively, 
and for them to have left the British Empire.
This set of propositions may be summarised by the following 




where it is assumed that IV > I > II > III. In other words, this side 
of the pay-off matrix, namely that for the British, took the form of a 
Chicken game, although the payoff IV is not all that relevant to the 
game.
The British government began at II in 1774, and had the 
objective in early 1775 of wishing to move to I - this is what was 
implied by the North resolution. As time went by the net benefits to 
be achieved by reaching I apparently began to recede, as the colonists 
made their intentions known that they would prefer their independence of 
Great Britain, rather than be coerced by military force into 
contributing revenue to the funds drawn on by the British Parliament to 
finance the provision of collectively consumed goods. As a result the
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British government found itself trying to coerce the colonists back into 
the game by employing military force, and playing the public finance 
game according to the old rules. In other words, the British government 
appears to have been intent on achieving II; the net benefits of II, as 
valued by the British political leaders some time after 1775, were still 
regarded as being greater than those for III (the outcome for the 
British after unilaterally providing the colonists with their 
independence if they continued to behave uncooperatively).
The structure of this game played by the British government 
and the American colonists from 1774 through to about 1783 clearly was 
more complicated than the games depicted in chapter II above. This is 
what one would expect when faced with a dynamic set of actual 
circumstances, instead of a static theoretical game construct. The 
present game theory framework indicates that possibly part of the 
explanation of why the British government initially attempted to move 
away from receiving the net benefits of outcome II, in order to reach 
outcome I, hinges around the view that the British government was 
incapable of interpreting accurately the threatening information which 
the colonists had been communicating, verbally and as physical actions, 
to the British government for ten or more years before the outbreak of 
the Revolution; to the effect that they would not peacefully submit 
to providing resources to assist in the provision of goods which were 
collectively consumed, while the British government was providing these 
goods. This element of the analysis is probably required to explain 
how a case of civil unrest was inflamed into a military confrontation.
But a more important aspect of this game is that it serves to 
re—emphasise a conclusion arrived at earlier; namely, that the critical
489
element in the analysis of the relevant final events leading to the 
Revolution, and of the Revolution itself, was the apparent inability of 
the British government to accept that the value to Great Britain of the 
net benefits of granting the colonies their independence (the British 
government's valuation of the net benefits of outcome III) was greater 
than the benefits to be received from any of the other reasonably 
attainable strategies available to the British government in 1775, or 
later, to solve its public finance problem in the North American 
colonies. It could be argued that to conclude from this statement that 
the more important political leaders in Great Britain at this time were 
misguided in their relative valuations of this set of strategic 
payoffs facing Great Britain is made with the advantage of hindsight, 
and, therefore, this conclusion is invalid. In answer to this view it 
must be pointed out that in the earlier discussion of these relative 
valuations the analysis stressed, and substantiated, the view that just 
a little perception was required to predict accurately what optional 
strategies could, and would, be exploited by the colonists to frustrate 
the British government's attempts to impose its will on the American 
colonists; indeed, as was mentioned above, the North ministry did not 
need to predict what economic costs the colonists were likely to 
inflict on Great Britain if British military force was deployed in 
earnest against the colonial opposition - by early 1775 the merchants 
of Great Britain, hurt by the embargo imposed by the colonists on 
British imports,^  were petitioning the government to alter its
(1) This statement must be qualified by pointing out that the British 
government itself had also placed an embargo on British exports to 
the American colonies, although after the colonies had imposed 
their own embargoes. See Gipson, The British Empire, op. oit. > 
Vol. XII, pp. 288-294, on the reactions of the British to the 
embargo imposed by the colonists, and the imposition by the 
British government of its own blocks to trade with the colonies.
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policies towards the North American colonies.
Despite these political realities, and the common sense 
analysis embodied in Josiah Tucker’s public discussion of the policy 
options available to the British government in 1774, and after, to deal 
with the administrative problems it faced in colonial America, these 
considerations were apparently all lost from view for those leading 
figures in the British political establishment for whom the ideology of 
raercantalism apparently dominated their political thoughts and 
behaviour towards the colonies which made up the British Empire. It 
follows that ideological considerations were of some importance, but 
obviously to an indeterminate degree, in determining political 
behaviour at this time and during the set of historical events being 
discussed here. But it would appear that it was the ideology which was 
influencing the political behaviour of important political leaders in 
Great Britain which was the crucial element in causing the outbreak of 
the American Revolution, rather than the apparent revolutionary 
ideology of the colonists; as was emphasised above, the apparently 
believed anti-British rhetoric of the colonists does not seem to 
provide accurate predictions of the political behaviour of the former 
colonists, and of changes in immediate post—Revolution American society, 
and, therefore, by implication ideological considerations do not 
provide satisfactory explanations of the relevant political behaviour 
of the colonists in the late colonial era.
It might be thought that this conclusion may be in need of 
qualification by taking into account that British ministerial 
government in the 1760s was not a particularly stable institution, 
since ministries held office for only relatively short intervals of
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time during this period. As a result British governments were not in 
a particularly favourable position to think clearly about colonial 
policies, and learn from their mistakes in this field of policy-making. 
But if this independent variable had been changed to one of stable 
British ministerial government for this period, it does not necessarily 
follow that this alteration would have brought a different approach to 
the administrative problem the British faced in the colonies. If the 
majority of British politicians still were too inflexible in their 
ideas about the supposed economic importance to Great Britain of the 
British Empire, in the political form it took in the 1760s and 1770s, 
and still wished each of the colonies to bear some responsibility for 
the costs of maintaining the Empire, it seems reasonable to assert thaL 
the conflict of interests between the American colonists and the 
British government would have arisen, other things remaining the same, 
even though there was greater stability in the ministry. Indeed it 
could well be argued with some justification that if the political 
system in Great Britain had been more stable at this time, in the 
sense of lengthening the tenure in office of the ministries above what 
they actually were, the American Revolution may well have occurred ten 
years earlier; it was the replacement of the Grenville ministry with 
a more compromising administration which probably averted a military 
confrontation in the colonies in about 1765. It would appear from 
this line of analysis that, given the attitudes of the American 
colonists towards the financing of the collectively consumed goods 
provided by Great Britain, the independent variable that needed 
altering, in order to avoid military conflict in the American colonies, 
was the ideology of the particular British government confronting the 
colonists in delicate political situations, and not the length of
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tenure in office of the British ministries after 1763.
Finally, and to repeat a point made earlier, it is of some 
interest to contemplate how the game would have developed if the North 
ministry had taken the initiative of unilaterally granting the colonies 
their independence, unless the colonists were willing to contribute, to 
the level set by Parliament, to the costs of administering and 
protecting the colonists. The colonists might have reconsidered their 
strategy of behaving uncooperatively; and then they might not, but 
instead sought their independence. But no matter which option the 
colonists adopted at least Great Britain would have saved itself the 




As in many other discussions of the causes of the American 
Revolution, the present one has emphasised the importance of the issue 
of the financing of the external defences of the thirteen North 
American colonies in the period 1754 to 1763 and after, and the 
attempts to resolve this issue.^ What differentiates the analysis 
presented above, from these previous discussions, is that a more 
thorough economic analysis and explicit testing of this analysis, has 
been given of the economic aspects of colonial external defence and 
colonial administration, and of the political-economic behaviour which 
was elicited by the attempts to resolve the problem of the financing 
the provision of these collectively consumed goods.
The underlying proposition on which the previous analysis is 
based is that the market for the services of colonial external defence, 
and colonial administration, probably would have failed because the 
British government could not exclude the colonists, at reasonable cost, 
from the benefits produced by these collectively consumed goods which 
the British provided. To examine this proposition a number of tests 
were executed to determine whether the colonists did misrepresent their
(1) The classic examples of this analytical perspective of the causes 
of the American Revolution are to be found in G.L. Beer, British 
Colonial Policy, op. cit.} and L.H. Gipson, "The American 
Revolution As an Aftermath", op. cit.
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preferences for the British-provided external defence and colonial 
administration, and while each test taken by itself may not provide 
substantial evidence to support the hypothesis that the colonists took 
advantage of the non-excludability properties of these collectively 
consumed goods, the cumulative evidence is more convincing on this point. 
Thus apparently this market for these collectively consumed goods did 
fail, after 1753 and up to 1775, as the colonists proceeded to 
misrepresent their preferences for these services, and/or behaved 
uncooperatively (in the sense outlined on page 236 above) on the issue 
of contributing to the finances required to provide for certain of 
their collective wants.
The first level of explanation of this behaviour by the 
colonists, up to now, has been based upon the non-excludability 
property of collectively consumed goods. But it may be argued that 
this is not the only explanation possible. An alternative view is that, 
at least after 1763, the reason for this behaviour was that the 
colonists were objecting to the fact that the British government, being 
the sole supplier of certain collectively consumed goods, was 
attempting to exploit its market position in order to impose 
monopolistic tax-prices on the colonists; in other words, the colonists 
objected to finding themselves in a position of being price-takers in 
the market for colonial external defence and colonial administration. 
Certainly the British government after 1763 was the sole provider of 
certain types of colonial external defence^  ^ and portions of colonial
(1) After 1768, however, the colonists found themselves having to 
bear a larger share of the burden of defending the western 
frontier and administering Indian affairs. But in the case of 
naval defence the British government was still the sole supplier.
495
administration and, therefore, apparently was in the position to act as 
a monopolistic price-setter, especially since the colonists had no 
representatives in Parliament who could possibly influence the level of 
the tax-prices set by the British government.
This interpretation of the market relationship between the
colonists and the British government, where the colonists apparently had
no option available to them to choose between the British government,
and at least one other producer, as the supplier of colonial defence and
administration, was quite clearly implied by Jefferson and Charles
Hartley in their separate responses to the North resolution, although
they saw the lack of choice of suppliers as being more severe than in a
simple monopolistic market situation. As noted earlier, Jefferson
interpreted the North resolution to mean that the colonists would be
saddled "with a perpetual tax adequate to the expectations and subject
to the disposal of Parliament a l o n e " . S i m i l a r l y ,  Hartley noted in
Parliament, in the same year, that the resolution implied:
"... Give me as much money as I wish, till I
(2)say enough, or I will take it from you ...".
Had the colonists been able to purchase the required collectively 
consumed goods from an alternative supplier of these services the 
colonists would not have been in this extreme situation, as seen by
(3)Jefferson and Hartley, of being price-takers. But this was not the
(1) Virginia Resolutions on Lord North’s Conciliatory Proposal, 10th 
June, 1775, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, op. cit., p. 171.
(2) Parliamentary History, Vol. XVIII, op. cit., column 350.
(3) At least this would not have been the situation if the suppliers 
had not been able to collude.
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case, and the colonists objected accordingly to the market 
circumstances they found themselves in; a response which could have 
taken place even if the British government had been able to exclude the 
colonists from receiving the benefits from the external defence and 
colonial administration it provided {viz. had these goods been private 
goods) .
It must be emphasised, however, that if the colonists 
objected to this monopolistic situation they still had the incentive to 
misrepresent, in some way or other, the size of the tax burden imposed, 
or likely to be imposed, by the British government in order to finance 
colonial expenditures (even assuming that exclusion was effectively 
practised) so as to induce the British government to lower the tax- 
prices imposed, or proposed, down to some more "equitable" level. In 
addition, even in this hypothesised case, where a collectively consumed 
good is assumed to be a private good (because exclusion is assumed to 
be possible), the question still arises as to what was a "fair" tax- 
price to impose, for the sole supplier (the British government) of 
services to meet certain colonial collective wants. Naturally a value 
judgement is involved in answering this question.
This line of argument provides a supplementary explanation 
of the relevant political-economic behaviour of the American colonists; 
it is unlikely that it provides a total explanation for the relevant 
collectively consumed goods did possess the property of non­
excludability and, therefore, there was the economic incentive for the 
colonists to take advantage of this property. In addition, a weakness 
with this monopolistic market argument, to explain the colonists' 
political-economic behaviour, is that in the case of land defence, at
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least, the colonists apparently were not in such a position that they
could not, if they so wished, have altered the monopolistic market
structure for this collectively consumed service. By 1754 the
colonists were capable of supplying their own land defence, and had the
Albany Plan, or a similar plan, been adopted by the colonies they would
have become the major, if not the sole, supplier of the American
colonies' external land defence. In addition, in these circumstances
the British government probably would have felt more free to let the
colonies look after their own land defence and Indian affairs from 1763
on. Franklin was of a similar opinion. Reflecting on past events he
noted, in 1789, that if the colonists had been united by the Albany
Plan they "would have been, as they thought themselves, sufficient to
their own Defence, and being trusted with it as by the [Albany] Plan,
(1)an Army from Britain, for that purpose would have been unnecessary". 
Thus apparently, in the case of land defence, the colonists did have a 
choice between suppliers of this collectively consumed good if they had 
wished to take advantage of this choice by organising themselves 
appropriately; particularly if they had done so during the period from 
1754 through to 1763.
However, in the case of sea defence the colonists probably 
did not possess the resources required to provide an adequate level of 
this type of defence for themselves. In this case the argument is more 
credible, that the relevant political-economic behaviour of the 
colonists was an example of their responding to the attempts by the 
British government to exploit its monopolistic power, in its efforts to
(1) Franklin's Writings (ed. Smyth), III, pp. 226 and 227n; cited by 
Beer, British Colonial Policyy op. cit., p. 314.
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finance sea defence for the British Empire. But, as was pointed out in 
the previous paragraph, this is probably only a partial explanation of 
the political-economic behaviour of the colonists, as the property of 
non-excludability was still present in the case of sea defence.
Some may view this attempt at explaining the colonists' 
political-economic behaviour as being irrelevent, since they are not 
convinced by the analysis employed in the previous chapters to show 
that the American colonists did misrepresent their preferences for the 
benefits derived from the British government's public finance policies, 
and/or that they just behaved uncooperatively with respect to the 
partial financing of these policies. Hopefully others will bring more 
evidence to bear on this topic. But even if the colonists did not 
misrepresent their preferences, or behave uncooperatively, this fact 
is of little relevance as far as understanding the political-economic 
behaviour of the British government (the other side of the two-sided 
conflict of interests) in response to the colonists' reaction to being 
taxed, directly or indirectly, by this government. The British 
government's reaction in this regard was that of implicitly recognising 
(rightly or wrongly) that the colonists had misrepresented their 
preferences;^^ a reaction reflected, for example, in Grenville's 
views on the inadequacy of the requisition system, and the British
government's subsequent use of coercive methods to raise revenue in the 
colonies in place of the voluntary quota system. However, this attempt, 
by the British government, to overcome this market failure (at least,
(1) For this particular argument, the only relevance of the issue 
concerning whether, or not, colonial preferences were really 
misrepresented, is with reference to determining whether the 
responding behaviour of the British government was justified to 
any degree.
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as the British authorities saw the situation), in the case of the 
financing of collectively consumed goods, with a political mechanism, 
proved to be unacceptable to the colonists.
While this particular instance of the apparent failure of the 
market was of fundamental importance in determining the behaviour of 
the British government with respect to the colonists on public finance 
matters, it is, of course, not possible to say how relatively important 
this issue was in bringing about the American Revolution. But perhaps 
it is more important to note, in assessing the relative importance of 
this issue of the apparent failure of the market in bringing about the 
American Revolution, that it was not inevitable that this violence 
would have resulted from this apparent market breakdown. If, for 
example, the British government had adopted the policy proposal 
recommended by Josiah Tucker in 1766 (of exploiting the bargaining 
strategy of withholding the provision of colonial administration and 
external defence from the colonists, unless they contributed enough 
resources to the production of these collectively consumed goods) the 
American Revolution probably would not have taken place, other things 
remaining the same. Later the British government did consider a less 
refined version of this policy proposal of just giving the American 
colonists their independence. The reason why the British government 
did not adopt this policy option appears to have been because those in 
authority in the political establishment in Great Britain could not 
accept the view that Great Britain's best interests lay in the 
direction of freeing its international trade from, at least, some of 
the constraints imposed by its own imperial policies; in particular, 
they could not discard the view that Great Britain's economic interests
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lay in politically and economically controlling an empire of 
indeterminate size, but which included the thirteen North American 
colonies, which could supply it with some of its wants, and provide a 
market for its exports. That this was so in the case of the men of 
power and influence in the British political establishment between 1754 
and 1775, and after, also provides an explanation of why the British 
government was prepared to devote such a relatively large quantity of 
resources to attaining the objective of defeating the French in North 
American; an act with the repercussion of presenting the British 
government with its subsequent colonial administrative problem, the 
attempted solution of which led to the American Revolution.
The economic interpretation, given in the previous chapters, 
of the causes of the American Revolution is not based on any general 
theory of political violence.^ Nor does it seem that such a general 
theory is required to explain the causes of this particular violent 
confrontation, for the public finance theory utilised, and tested above, 
does appear to go a long way to providing a consistent explanation of 
some of the major causes of the American Revolution. Clearly this 
specific economic theory does not provide a total explanation of the 
relevant historical events; the previous analysis only penetrates to a 
certain level of explanation, and leaves unanswered important questions 
such as why did the American colonists apparently behave so 
uncooperatively, compared to the British tax-payer, on the issue of 
providing resources to assist in the production of collectively
(1) An attempt to provide such a general theory of mass political 
violence is to be found in D.A. Hibbs, Jnr, Mass Politioal 
Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis3 (New York, John
Wiley, 1973).
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consumed goods; why did the British political establishment perceive 
their imperial economic interests in the way they did, and, above all, 
why did the opposing groups ever need to resort to such violent 
behaviour in order to settle their conflict of interests. These indeed 
are hard questions to answer satisfactorily.^^ Yet to be able to 
answer these questions, without reference to tautologies, is to take 
the analysis of the causes of the American Revolution to a depth of 
understanding which has not yet been reached. Perhaps there are no 
really satisfactory answers to these questions, and the social 
behaviour implied by these questions are the social conventions (the 
given assumption about group behaviour within these two societies) 
which form the intellectual boundaries within which any analysis of 
the American Revolution must take place.
It might be noted, in conclusion, that the piece of history
analysed here also provides some insights into the evolution of the
history of economic thought. In Musgrave's fairly detailed discussion
of the historical development of the theory of the benefit approach to
(2)taxation, Josiah Tucker's name is not mentioned at all. Yet in
(1) Josiah Tucker asked just these sort of questions, with reference 
to the British government's behaviour, but could not provide 
answers for them.
"But how a commercial Nation, such as ours, whose continual 
Aim it should be to increase the Number of its Friends, and to 
attract Customers from every part of the Globe, by giving no just 
Alarms to their Fears and Jealousies: I say, how such a Nation
Should entertain that Fondness for War, and should espouse so many 
Quarrels as the English have eagerly done for almost half a 
Century last past, is, I own, beyond my Comprehension."
To be found in A Treatise Concerning Civil Government (1781), in 
Josiah Tucker, op. cit., p. 524. Emphasis in the original.
(2) R.A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York, McGraw-Hill, 
1959), pp. 61-69.
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Tucker's writings, cited above, on the colonial administration problems 
the British government was facing in the thirteen North American 
colonies, one finds a clear recognition of the notion that tax payments 
by an individual (or group) should be related to the benefits received 
from government expenditures.^ In addition, and more important from 
the point of view of the history of the evolution of economic policy, 
the British government, under the leadership of men such as Grenville 
and North, also had recognised (but, no doubt, independently of Tucker) 
the apparent political advantages of the benefit approach to taxation 
(in that the taxes imposed appeared to be equitable), and had 
incorporated this approach into legislation (the Stamp Act, for example)
(1) Tucker gave a more specific statement of this view of taxation in 
1781 in his "A Treatise Concerning Civil Government" in which he 
argued that the "primary use [of tax revenue] is to support 
Government, and to defray the several expenses military and civil 
incurred, or to be incurred thereby". In other words, the tax 
revenue raised was to be used to defray the costs of providing the 
benefits produced by government expenditures. To demonstrate the 
general point that the basic services provided by a government 
were required by those governed, and that individual freedoms 
needed to be constrained in order to raise the tax revenue 
required to pay for these government-provided benefits, Tucker 
turned to consult events in the American colonies which had 
declared their independence.
"... What did they do on this Occasion [of declaring their 
independence]? - Did they, for example, attempt to live in an 
absolutely independent State, without Order, or Control, or 
Subordination of any Sort? No: Did they even pretend to say, that 
they had a Right to live after that Manner, if they saw fit? No; 
they did not. On the contrary, their own Conduct plainly 
intimated, that they thought themselves bound to have some 
Government, or other." (Josiah Tucker, op. cit., pp. 443 and 445.)
This observation was made some six years before the constitution 
of the United States came into effect; a constitution which, as 
it was interpreted by the Federalists, was to constrain the 
individual freedoms of the American citizen in order to allow the 
provision of government services to meet collective needs. 
Nonetheless, the basic point being made by Tucker, about the 
political institutional developments on the North American 
continent, is similar to that Implied in sections of the analysis 
presented in the main text above.
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or policy proposals (the North resolution). However, this government 
also found out soon enough that the benefit approach to taxation did 
not facilitate the collection of tax revenue if exclusion, in one form 
or another, was not possible at reasonable cost. Tucker disLinguistics 
himself, however, in that he found a practical solution to the non­
exclusion problem which was entirely modern, if not particularly 
refined.
That Musgrave failed to mention Tucker (in his discussion 
mentioned above) is not surprising, for Tucker's analysis for solving 
the non-exclusion problem is extremely brief, and specific to solving 
the particular colonial economic policy problem facing the British 
government in the mid-1760s. Since Tucker was not interested in the 
intellectual niceties of the economic problem at hand, the result is 
that the generality of his analysis tends to be lost, for the economic 
theory which underlies his policy proposal remains implicit. 
Nevertheless, Josiah Tucker's contribution to the benefit approach to 
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